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Abstract 
 
Population biobanks hold promise for improving the health of future generations by 
providing researchers with a resource of both human samples and data to investigate 
the linkages between genes, lifestyle and environment in population health. 
Widespread concern has been expressed in academic and policy literature as to the 
ongoing ethical, legal and social challenges that are raised by population biobanks, 
by virtue of their longitudinal nature and broadly set research aims. 
To address these challenges, and to balance private interests of the individuals who 
donate to biobanks, with the public benefit that is believed to derive from the 
establishment of biobanks, some countries have specifically legislated to establish 
national biobanks. Alternatively, UK Biobank has been incorporated as a charitable 
corporation. Potentially, this private legal structure diminishes the public 
accountability of the project, as well as the protection of donors from personal harm. 
This thesis analyses the multi-layered nexus of laws within which UK Biobank is 
embedded and shows the tensions that are associated with using a private legal 
structure to secure public objectives. UK Biobank is in unchartered legal territory on 
a number of levels, and this thesis posits UK Biobank as a timely example of a large-
scale organisation whose model straddles the public/private divide in law and invites 
an eclectic mix of corporate, public, charity, contract and tort lawyers into a 
conversation with ethicists, scientists, policy experts and the public to consider how 
to effectively progress population health via biobanking. As such, the experience of 
UK Biobank raises questions as to how best to balance public and private interests in 
large-scale, public mission organisations in general.   
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Background: ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Biobanking 
‘UK Biobank embodies the worst form of governance, except all those other forms that 
have been tried from time to time.’1 
The way that biomedical research is carried out has undergone considerable change 
following the success of the Human Genome Project (HGP) in sequencing the first 
human genome in 2001.2 We are now in the midst of a ‘new era’ of medicine: 
genetic information is being collected and accessed with increasing ease and cost 
effectiveness via DNA sequencing, whole genome sequencing of NHS patients, and 
national and international initiatives for patient data sharing.3 Increasingly, large 
consortia that bring together researchers, experts and institutions from many 
different disciplines are carrying out genomic research in an attempt to translate 
public health benefits from research.4 Biobanks, repositories of biological samples 
with accompanying linked data, are examples of such consortia, and range from 
                                                          
1 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440. 
2 On 14th April 2003, the International Human Genome Consortium announced successful completion 
of the project: International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, ‘Finishing the Euchromatic 
Sequence of the Human Genome’ (2004) 431 Nature 931. 
3 For example, England’s Care.data: NHS England ‘The care.data programme – collecting 
information for the health of the nation’ <https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-data/> and 
Genomics England: ‘Genomics England is delivering the 100,000 Genomes Project’ 
<http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/> accessed 2 February 2016 
4 Chalmers D, Nicol D, Otlowski M, Critchley C: Personalised medicine in the genome era. Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics, 2013, 20: 577–594. 
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small-scale resources created for specific research purposes, to large-scale 
population biobanks built for broader, undefined research uses.5 
Over the past two decades, biobanks have proliferated in response to HGP findings. 
The HGP necessitated further research to understand the interaction between genes, 
lifestyle and environment.6 To facilitate such research, biobanks have been 
established to collect, store and release samples of human materials, which may be 
linked to individual health records. As such, biobanks are perceived as having the 
potential to accelerate research by providing efficient access to central repositories of 
samples and data, rather than requiring researchers to contact and obtain materials on 
an individual basis. Many countries7 have invested substantial sums of public and 
private money in biobanking in view of such potential. In fact, according to a BCC 
market research report published in 2011, the global biobanking market was worth 
$141 billion in 2010, and was projected to increase by 30% between 2010 and 2015, 
to an estimated $183 billion.8  
In particular, population biobanks have been established on the premise that they are 
essential tools for population-wide genomic research; deriving their scientific value 
from their large size and unique capacity to combine samples with health data for 
longitudinal research purposes.9 It has been argued that combining genetic and health 
information for whole populations is justifiable from both a science and industry 
perspective. Scientifically, biobanks are ‘the appropriate next step in translating 
recent advances… into knowledge of direct clinical and public health relevance.’10 
For industry, biobanks hold the potential to identify new forms of therapeutic 
                                                          
5 While it is accepted that there is no single definition of a biobank, there is widespread agreement on 
the broad aspects of what constitutes a biobank: Shaw DM, Elger BS and Colledge F, ‘What is a 
biobank? Differing definitions among biobank stakeholders.’ (2014) 85 Clin Genet 223. 
6 Professor Sir Rory Collins, ‘Big Data in the UK Biobank: Opportunities and Challenges’ (Gresham 
College Lecture, London, November 2014) <www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/big-data-in-the-
uk-biobank-opportunities-and-challenges> accessed 6 June 2015 
7 It is noted that investment has mainly been concentrated in scientifically advanced countries, 
compared to low- middle-income countries.  
8 BCC Research ‘Global Market for Biobanking To Surpass $183 Billion in 2015’ (BCC Research, 
August 24, 2011) <http://www.bccresearch.com/pressroom/bio/global-market-biobanking-surpass-
$183-billion-2015> accessed 22 January 2016 
9 Rothstein M, ‘Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks’ (2005) 33 JLME 89.  
10 Salter B and Jones M, ‘Biobanks and bioethics: the politics of legitimation.’ (2005) 12 Journal of 
European Public Policy 710.  
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interventions for common diseases,11 enabling rapid pharmaceutical advance and 
ultimately, the introduction of personalised medical care.12  
Typically, population biobanks collect samples and data from healthy volunteers, 
and are therefore more dependent on individual altruism than may be the case for 
disease-specific research projects.13 This is because they are designed on a 
longitudinal basis, which means donors will not themselves benefit from such 
altruism. Moreover, population biobanks are designed to be available for prospective 
and as yet unspecified research projects. Early concerns arose out of the challenges 
that were associated with establishing biobanks, which did not fit neatly within 
existing research paradigms and the genetic research that was to be undertaken 
therein. In sum, population biobanks have re-invigorated ethical and moral debates 
including those regarding property in the body,14 privacy, consent15 and benefit 
sharing.16  
Originally, while the promise of biobanking seemed readily justifiable from an 
industry and scientific perspective, the incentives from an individual donor’s 
perspective were less clear. In particular, the publics’ perception of genetic research 
was comparably embryonic, and debates regarding ‘genetic exceptionalism’ 
suggested that, ‘rightly or wrongly’, genetic information derived from human 
samples was ‘seen as more sensitive than other health information.’17 Early studies 
of public perceptions of biobanks18 revealed suspicion as to the storage and use of 
genetic data compared with other forms of data.19 Scholars who noted the potential 
                                                          
11 Beskow LM, Khoury MJ, Baker TG and Thrasher JF, ‘The integration of genomics into public 
health research, policy and practice in the United States’ (2001) 4 Common Genetics 2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Campbell AV, ‘The Ethical Challenges of Genetic Databases: Safeguarding Altruism and Trust’ 
(2007) 18 King’s Law Journal 227 
14 Beyleveld D and Brownsword R, ‘My body, my body parts, my property?’ (2000) 8 Health Care 
Anal 87. 
15 Greely H, ‘Human Genomics Research: new challenges for research ethics’ (2001) 44 Perspectives 
in Biology and Medicine 221.  
16 Dickenson D, ‘Consent, Commodification and Benefit Sharing in Genetic Research’ (2004) 4 
Developing World Bioethics 109.  
17 Holm S, ‘Me, Myself, I- against narcissism in the governance of genetic information’ in Widdows 
H and Mullen C, The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? (CUP 2009). 
18 Nelkin D and Lindee M, The DNA Mystique: The gene as a cultural icon (WH Freeman 1995). 
Cited in Levitt M and Weldon S, ‘A well placed trust?: Public perceptions of DNA databases.’ (2005) 
15 Critical Public Health 314. 
19 Ibid Pg 314. In interviews, reasoning was twofold: in some instances the ‘sacred’ character of 
genetic data was determinative: ‘I consider that absolutely sacrosanct, that’s ME, really the inner me 
they’re looking at.’ Second, lack of understanding of medical research caused unnecessary concern, 
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for misuse of genetic data signalled ethical dangers: ‘Family members, the State, 
researchers and employers could all claim an interest in knowing the genetic 
information relating to individuals.’20 Concerns were raised over the protection of 
individual privacy21 and the potential for genetic discrimination.22  
Furthermore, in some countries an environment of distrust in medical research and 
healthcare in general compounded such early scepticism.23 In the UK, the ‘Alder 
Hey’ public inquiry revealed that three children’s hospitals had been harvesting 
organs from deceased children without their parents’ informed consent. This scandal, 
which was first revealed in 1998, led to a legislative response. Parliament enacted 
‘reactive’ statutory legislation and established a corresponding statutory authority to 
regulate and supervise the collection, storage and use of human tissue.24 The events 
at Alder Hey brought issues of consent, organ and tissue use and storage under the 
spotlight; the Human Tissue Act 2004 was seen as necessary to reassure public 
confidence and maintain altruistic organ donation.25  
In response to the many ethical, legal and social challenges and to justify broad 
consent regimes, biobanks have developed comprehensive governance regimes. In 
the midst of a proliferation of different types of biobanks around the world,26 certain 
governance best practices have been identified which are believed to tackle such 
concerns.27 Importantly, the international biobanking community learnt lessons from 
the experience of the Icelandic national database, whose commercial basis and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
influenced by ‘media hype’ or ‘science fiction’: ‘I don’t want people meddling with part of me 
without telling me. I could have another me wandering around- ‘who are you?’ That’s the downside 
of giving a sample of DNA.’ 
20 Laurie G, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (CUP 2002), 20 
21 Ibid. See also Taylor MJ and Townend D, ‘Issues in protecting privacy in medical research using 
genetic information and biobanking: the PRIVILEGED project’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 253; Taylor 
MJ, Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy (Cambridge University Press 
2015).  
22 GeneWatch UK ‘Biobanks’ (GeneWatch UK) <http://www.genewatch.org/sub-507674> accessed 
26 January 2016 
23 Levitt M and Weldon S, ‘A well placed trust?: Public perceptions of DNA databases.’ (2005) 15 
Critical Public Health 314. A specific example includes the Alder Hey organ retention scandal: BBC 
News ‘Organ scandal background’ (BBC News Health, 29 January 2001) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1136723.stm> accessed 5 August 2010.  
24 Human Tissue Act 2004; Human Tissue Authority: <https://www.hta.gov.uk/> accessed 26 January 
2016. 
25 BBC News ‘Q&A: Human Tissue Act’ (BBC News, 30 August 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4944018.stm> accessed 24 January 2016.  
26  Chalmers D, ‘Genetic Research and Biobanks’ in Dilner J (ed), Methods in Biobanking (Springer 
2010).  
27 Knoppers BM and Zawati MH, ‘Biobanks’ in Chadwick R (ed) Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics 
(San Diego Academic Press 2012) 246. 
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statutory opt-out consent provision exemplified the difficulties in balancing the 
interests of the individuals who consent to donate to biobanks, and the public good 
that is believed to derive from such research.28 The database was never created.29  
Over time, the expansion of biobanking across public and private spheres30 has 
meant that these ethical and legal questions are arising on an ongoing basis. The 
benefits to be derived from cooperation and collaboration between ‘private’ and 
‘public’ research models for future public health have been emphasised.31 The 
biobank community has dedicated resources to identifying common principles for 
governance frameworks32 and building networks of a broad range of biobanks to 
increase efficacy and excellence in research of European interest.33 
Most recently, the issue of biobank sustainability has been brought to the fore.34 
Biobanks are not only expensive to establish, they are expensive to maintain, and 
this has been illustrated by the closure of the under-utilised35 Singapore Bio-Bank 
(originally known as Singapore Tissue Network).36 Arguably biobanks are subject to 
an ‘underlying belief that at some point, [they] should be capable of becoming ‘self-
sustaining…’37 but this goal is not often achieved.38 Commercialisation is one way 
                                                          
28  Winickoff DE, ‘Genome and Nation: Iceland’s Health Sector Database and its Legacy’ (2006) 1 
Innovations 80. 
29 As will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
30 In the commercial field, privately organised biobanks such as PXE International are also enjoying 
success: PXE International <https://www.pxe.org/> accessed 26 January 2016. 
31 It has been argued that biobanks are most effective when they can ‘link up and learn from one 
another’: Laurie G, ‘Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and 
the need to recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 130 Hum Genet 347, 348. 
32 For example, PG3: P3G ‘About us’ (P3G) <http://www.p3g.org/about-p3g> accessed 30 January 
2016.  
33 For example BBMRI-ERIC: Biobanking and BioMolecular resources Research Infrastructure. 
BBMRI-ERIC ‘The History’ <http://bbmri-eric.eu/history> accessed 1 September 2015.   
34 Watson P and others, ‘A Framework for Biobank Sustainability’ (2014) 12 Biopreservation and 
Biobanking 60. 
35 It is believed that the national database was under-utilised because of the availability of existing 
tissue banks which researchers were already accustomed to using: Ibid.  
36 Chan TW, ‘The Closure of the National Bio-bank in Singapore’ (2012) 16 Asia-Pacific Biotech 
News Journal 40. 
37 Watson P and others, ‘A Framework for Biobank Sustainability’ (2014) 12 Biopreservation and 
Biobanking 60. 
38 Vaught J, Rogers J, Carolin T and Compton C, ‘Biobankonomics: Developing a Sustainable 
Business Model Approach for the Formation of a Human Tissue Biobank’ (2011) 42 J Natl Cancer 
Inst Monogr 24. 
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of securing funding, but the literature has highlighted issues associated with such 
commercialisation in biobanking.39 
Thus, it is observable that to establish population biobanks, the task primarily for 
policy makers is to develop legal frameworks which are responsive to these ethical 
challenges, are built to last, and which successfully balance the interests of 
individual donors who provide their samples and access to their data, while fostering 
the public interest in carrying out lawful and ethical research40. Examples of 
governance frameworks can be observed around the world but these models have not 
been uniform in their approach.  
For example, as previously mentioned, in Iceland the Act on Health Sector Database 
was enacted to create a Health Sector Database. The Act granted an exclusive licence 
over the biobank resource to a private for-profit company: deCODE Genetics. 
Following political, judicial, professional and public opposition, the database was 
abandoned and deCODE have been forced to re-strategize. To an extent, operating 
on a commercial basis also threatened the downfall of Estonia’s population biobank. 
Just as Iceland had established a biobank specific statute, Estonia enacted the Human 
Genes Research Act (HGRA) for the Estonian Gene Bank, alongside a publically 
funded Estonian Genome Protect Foundation to co-ordinate and govern the biobank. 
The Foundation granted a 25-year exclusive licence to a private company to form a 
public-private partnership, which led to a period of bankruptcy. Today, still regulated 
by the HGRA, the biobank is entirely publically funded and operates within the 
University of Tartu, Estonia.41  
Thus, at the time of UK Biobank’s development (1999-200642), Iceland and Estonia 
were two comparative examples of governance models for population biobanking. 
Combined, these experiences highlighted two crucial questions: how should a 
population biobank in the UK be funded, and how should it be regulated?  
                                                          
39 Caulfield T and others, ‘A review of the key issues associated with the commercialisation of 
biobanks’ 2014 Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 94. 
40 Beyleveld D, ‘Data Protection and Genetics:  Medical Research and the Public Good’ (2007) 18 
King’s Law Journal 275; Campbell AV, ‘The Ethical Challenges of Genetic Databases: Safeguarding 
Altruism and Trust’ (2007) 18 King’s Law Journal 227; Brownsword R, ‘Genetic Databases:  One for 
All and All for One?’ (2007) 18 King’s Law Journal 247. 
41 University of Tartu Estonian Genome Centre: 
<http://www.geenivaramu.ee/en> accessed 24 January 2016. 
42 Recruitment between 2006-2010: UK Biobank ‘About UK Biobank’ (UK Biobank) 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/> accessed 30 January 2016. 
 
 
7 
While there was precedent in the UK for enacting specific statutory legislation in 
response to emerging new biotechnologies,43 UK Biobank was instead established 
with a £62 million investment from a mix of public and private funding,44 and 
supported by a private legal structure that is embedded into the existing regulatory 
framework for research in the UK. UK Biobank was ‘a natural progression’45 of the 
key involvement of the (publicly funded) Medical Research Council (MRC) and the 
Department of Health (DH) and charitable company the Wellcome Trust (WT) in the 
HGP, as a means of capitalising on HGP findings and translating benefits for the UK 
population. UK Biobank is a prospective cohort study, which has recruited over half 
a million donors aged 40-69.46 Volunteers have donated samples of blood, urine and 
saliva for long-term storage and analysis, and agreed to have their health monitored 
for their lifetime. The project aims to improve the prevention, diagnosis and 
treatment of a wide range of some of the most common and serious life-threatening 
illnesses; including cancer, heart disease, diabetes, arthritis, and dementia. 
In view of the scale of the resource and its longitudinal basis, the ethical and legal 
question for the funders was how to ensure that the structuring of UK Biobank on a 
private law basis could adequately reflect the interests of the donors and realise the 
public mission of the resource. In response, an ‘Ethics and Governance Council’ 
(EGC) was developed to oversee UK Biobank’s adherence with an ‘Ethics and 
Governance Framework’ (EGF) governing policy, with a specific remit to represent 
the interests of the public and donors in the running of the resource.47  
At the time of its creation, UK Biobank’s legal structure and governance framework 
were unique worldwide. As such, they hold promise as an exemplar for similar 
ventures. Yet, the governance model of UK Biobank has since been shown to give 
rise to a number of critical issues, including the extent to which the interests of 
donors and the public are engaged in the running of the resource. Concerns have 
                                                          
43 For example, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and corresponding Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/> accessed 26 January 2016   
44 UK Biobank ‘About UK Biobank’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-
uk/> accessed 26 January 2016 
45 Dr Mike Dexter, Director of the Wellcome Trust: <http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/News/Media-
office/Press-releases/2002/WTD002895.htm> accessed on 8 August 2010 
46 As of as of 7 July 2010: UK Biobank ‘About UK Biobank’ (UK Biobank) 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/> accessed 8 August 2010 
47 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council: <http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/> accessed 26 January 
2016 
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been expressed that a lack of adequate engagement may cause donors to ‘vote with 
their feet’ and withdraw from UK Biobank if they are unhappy with the way the 
project is run, potentially undermining the value of the resource. On this basis it has 
been argued that if donors (and members of the public) were more involved in the 
governance process, UK Biobank project goals will be better achieved.48 
Research questions and aims 
Given the ambitious nature and scale of UK Biobank and the novel research it will 
facilitate, the critical question is whether, and to what extent, the choice of legal 
structure for the resource will resolve the tension between public and private 
interests in biobanking. To answer this research question, this thesis will analyse the 
legal basis of UK Biobank and critically evaluate the legal avenues for donors and 
the public to hold UK Biobank to account. Further, this thesis will ask which 
additional mechanisms are available from the perspective of private and public 
common law. In so doing, this thesis will uncover the complex legal architecture of 
UK Biobank in charity and company law, and raise important further questions as to 
the adequacy of the governance framework for biobanking in the UK and other 
public mission organisations worldwide.  
These questions are inspired by the advice of esteemed scholar Brownsword, who 
has opined: 
If I were trying to direct legal researchers... I would suggest that they should focus 
on two fundamental questions- one question concerning effectiveness and the other 
concerning legitimacy- and that they should pursue these questions in the context of 
global governance.49 
With this in mind, this thesis aims to answer the following research questions: 
                                                          
48 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440, 449; Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009).   
49 Brownsword R, ‘An Introduction to Legal Research’ (2006) 
<http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/18856/1/TPA%20Smith%20-
%20'The%20Zealous%20Advocate%20in%20the%2021st%20Century'.pdf> accessed 27 January 
2012, 23. 
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i) To what extent does the dual legal structuring of UK Biobank as a private 
charity company facilitate the realisation of UK Biobank’s stated public 
good mission? 
ii) What avenues of accountability and redress are available (and to whom) 
by virtue of the nexus of laws in which UK Biobank is embedded?  
iii) How do these accountability mechanisms ensure that the private legal 
framework of UK Biobank meets the ethical challenges of large-scale 
population biobanking regulation in the 21st Century? 
Methodology 
i) Doctrinal approaches 
In pursuit of the above research questions, this thesis adopts a predominantly 
doctrinal approach to analyse the complex and multi-layered legal structure of UK 
Biobank. Standard library and internet based research techniques have been used to 
identify primary and secondary legal resources to inform analysis, including: 
Statutory legislation, common law jurisprudence, international guidelines, ‘soft-law’ 
guidelines and policies, governance documents, academic journal articles and 
textbooks.  
Doctrinal research is the most traditional approach to legal research. Cownie50 
defines this methodology as ‘based upon a conception of law as an internally 
coherent body of rules, analysed using the same techniques of precedent and 
statutory interpretation that are used by judges in courts.’51 Doctrinal researchers ask: 
‘what does the law say on the matter?’ They are concerned with the law as a body of 
value free rules52 and conceptualise the law as autonomous, with clear boundaries 
between law and other subjects; separating ‘legal’ issues from other moral, political 
and social issues.53 Doctrinal methodology assumes that the law is in the text, or 
rather, the law is the text.54 Doctrinal methodology uses interpretative methods to 
examine sources of law ‘in an attempt to seek out, discover, construct or reconstruct 
rules and principles. It then systematises and employs them to conduct descriptive 
                                                          
50 Cownie F, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (Hart 2004). 
51 Ibid. 49 
52 Ibid. 50 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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analysis and normative evaluation of the process of decision making...’55 Formalist 
assumptions of traditional doctrinal analysis maintain that law is a body of rules that 
exist within a framework independent of external issues; the law is the text of cases 
and statutes and analysis enables us to answer social problems through construction 
and systemisation of these existing rules and principles.  
According to this approach, the parameters of the law can be divided into ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ law, which will now be discussed in more detail because of the 
relevance to this thesis.  
Defining ‘public’ and ‘private’ law and ‘public’ and ‘private’ interests  
What is it that one intends to contrast with what, when one distinguishes private law 
from public law, and what is one’s purpose in doing so?56 
In this thesis, the regular reference to, and analysis of, the language of both ‘private’ 
and ‘public’ law necessitates a clear and upfront statement of the respective 
definitions and understandings upon which the thesis is founded.57 It has been 
recently acknowledged that the relationship between public and private law is an 
‘immense topic’ and that ‘statements of the relationship are also notoriously 
complicated by a lack of terminological clarity.’58 Traditional conceptions of the 
divide distinguish the body of positive law that governs relationships between 
private individuals (natural or otherwise) i.e. ‘private law,’ from ‘public’ law. In 
contrast, public law governs the relationship between individuals and the state acting 
in its capacity as the mediator of the public good.59 Within this definition, the 
substantive fields of private law include: charity law, property law, corporate and 
commercial (finance law), the law of torts and the law of private law remedies.60  
However, with the rise of new public management techniques the overlaps between 
the two fields have become multiple.61 As a result, traditional conceptions of public 
and private law have come to be challenged in a number of respects, including by 
                                                          
55 Banakar R and Travers M (eds) Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005). 
56 Barker K, ‘Private law: Key encounters with public law’ in Barker K and Jensen D, Private Law: 
Key Encounters with Public Law (CUP 2013), 3. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 4 
60 Ibid. 
61 Gamble A and Thomas R, ‘The Changing Context of Governance: Implications for Administration 
and Justice’ In Alder M, Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010). 
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those adhering to a ‘decentred’ understanding of law. Decentred understandings of 
law are more widely concerned with the regulation of governance arrangements that 
are not formally found in statute.62 Most pertinently, it is argued that: 
There is currently a mismatch between legal doctrine, which maintains a 
public/private dichotomy, and socio-political analysis of decentred regulation, in 
which that dichotomy has broken down. The result is that the classification of 
‘public’ in legal doctrine excludes those who are exercising the same regulatory 
function as government.63 
As such, a decentred understanding of regulation is not limited to a clear distinction 
between public and private, governance and government. For example, it has been 
argued that nothing of much substance may turn on this divide, as ‘public law’ 
values are also present in private law.64  
To answer the research questions outlined above, this thesis principally follows the 
traditional definitions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ law, as a means of ordering analysis 
of the complicated and layered nexus of laws within which the legal structure of UK 
Biobank is embedded. Analysis of charity and company law, together with the tort 
law of negligence is therefore conceived within the ‘private’ realm. In addition, 
‘public’ law avenues of redress are also considered, in view of the potentially 
‘public’ nature of UK Biobank (for reasons that will be shown herein). In so doing, 
however, the overlaps in the protection of public and private interests are noted. 
Questions are also raised for future research as to the appropriateness of a 
public/private law divide in the context of UK Biobank, as a result of the 
considerable discretion with which UK Biobank operates and the interests which it 
serves to protect. 
On the matter of defining ‘public’ and ‘private’ interests, it could be argued that 
where definitions of public and private law are conceptualised according to the 
relationship between either private individuals or private individuals and the State, it 
is consequential that the ‘interests’ which the laws serve to protect are respectively 
‘public’ and ‘private’. However, this separationist approach has been questioned in 
                                                          
62 Black J, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
“Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 CLP 103, 144.  
63 Ibid.   
64 Oliver D, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Butterworths 1999).  
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recent literature, particularly in relation to corporations, which may be ‘so powerful 
and so influential… that there may be good reasons for subjecting them to public 
levels of scrutiny and accountability.’65  
Indeed, such separation has been argued to be problematic in the context of 
biobanking and genetic research, for reasons that will be considered in this thesis. In 
brief, there is growing acceptance that there is both a private interest in respecting 
privacy in the process of sound scientific research, as well as a public interest in 
respecting the private privacy interests of individuals in this context to realise the 
ultimately public interest in scientific research taking place.66 Potentially, such 
overlap gives rise to difficulties in terms of which set of laws should operate to 
protect which set of interests.   
ii) Socio-legal and comparative approaches  
For lawyers, recourse to law is the natural reaction to new social challenges.67 
However, since the comprehensive Icelandic Act on Biobanks68 was declared 
unconstitutional, biobank policy makers have proceeded with caution and learnt 
from this experience,69 concluding that legislation may not guarantee the necessary 
and effective protection of the interests at stake. Longitudinal population biobanks 
raise ongoing challenges, and this makes ‘biobanking and the law uneasy 
bedfellows.’70  They are entrenched in a social, political and economic nexus that is 
far from static71 and in light of this constant development it is necessary to engage 
with such innovation on a continuous basis. Regulation and governance must 
therefore operate in real time, adapting and changing according to context. For this 
                                                          
65 Barker K, ‘Private law: Key encounters with public law’ in Barker K and Jensen D, Private Law: 
Key Encounters with Public Law (CUP 2013), 8. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 of 
this thesis. 
66 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The collection, linking and use of data in biomedical research and 
health care: ethical issues (Nuffield Council 2015) < http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-
health-data/> accessed 05th Feb 2016; Laurie G and others, ‘Managing Access to Biobanks: How Can 
We Reconcile Privacy and Public Interests in Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10 Medical Law 
International 315; Taylor MJ and Townend D, ‘Issues in protecting privacy in medical research using 
genetic information and biobanking: the PRIVILEGED project’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 253. 
67 Laurie G, ‘Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and the need 
to recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 130 Hum Genet 347, 350 
68Biobanks Act, No. 110/2000 (Iceland) as amended by Act No. 27/2008 and Act No 48/2009 
69 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440. 
70 Laurie G, ‘Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and the need 
to recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 130 Hum Genet 347 
71 Gottweis H and Petersen A, Biobanks: Governance in comparative perspective (Routledge 2008). 
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reason, a common response to biobanking has been policy led; involving an 
increased number of stakeholders in multi-level policy initiatives that aim for 
‘adaptability’72 or ‘reflexivity’73 in line with trends in genetic governance as a 
whole.74  
In direct response to the ethical, legal and social challenges raised by biobanks, the 
origins of UK Biobank are characterised by extensive public debate, consultations 
and engagement activities. On this basis, in addition to a doctrinal approach, this 
thesis also uses socio-legal and comparative analysis to examine the series of 
(political) events which led to the genesis of UK Biobank, and the key drivers for a 
population biobank in the UK, as well as UK Biobank’s own internal policy 
framework. 
Arguably, socio-legal methodology is more difficult to define than doctrinal 
methodology, primarily because of the diversity of research carried out under this 
heading; each approach challenging the idea that the law is composed of an 
autonomous, coherent body of rules free from values and context.75 In general, this 
methodology is concerned with analysing how the law operates in society, and has 
been defined as: 
An approach to the study of law and legal processes... [which] covers the theoretical 
and empirical analysis of the law as a social phenomenon.76  
A socio-legal approach to research recognises that the law may also be understood as 
a reflexive social institution and as such, requires looking beyond the rules of law to 
explain and understand legal frameworks. In this thesis, the use of socio-legal 
methodology facilitates an examination of the context of population biobanks, which 
are embedded in a social as well as legal context. For example, the role of UK 
Biobank’s core funding bodies is crucial to critical analysis of UK Biobank’s legal 
structuring. Socio-legal analysis will therefore contextualise the origins of UK 
Biobank and the reasons behind the chosen model. This approach enables a more 
thorough analysis of the legal structure of UK Biobank as a charity company, and an 
                                                          
72 O’Doherty and others, ‘From Consent to Institutions: Designing Adaptive Governance for Genomic 
Biobanks.’ (2011) 73 Social Science & Medicine 367. 
73 Laurie G, ‘Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and the need 
to recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 130 Hum Genet 347. 
74 Bunton R and Petersen A, Genetic Governance (Routledge 2004). 
75 Banakar R and Travers M (eds) Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005). 
76 Cownie F, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (Hart 2004), 51. 
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analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of this structure which may go some way to 
explaining how UK Biobank would be treated in UK public and private law.  
In addition to doctrinal and socio-legal approaches, this thesis uses comparative 
methodology to highlight the alternative legal frameworks that were available at the 
time of UK Biobank’s development, and particularly uses examples of comparable 
European population biobanks in Iceland and Estonia. Both biobanks were 
established on a statutory footing, with a mix of public-private funds. In the biobank 
community, crucial lessons were learnt from the experiences of these biobanks, and 
therefore, analysis of their regulatory and funding models is justified to inform 
contextual analysis of the origins of UK Biobank.  
Overall, it is observable that the context of UK Biobank’s development will 
contribute to doctrinal analysis in this thesis, and accordingly this methodological 
approach corresponds with Twining and Miers’ definition of socio-legal research: 
The approach adopted in this book is sometimes referred to as ‘contextual.’ We accept 
this label if it is taken to mean that law is our primary discipline: that legal rules, 
institutions, processes, personnel and techniques are the primary subject of study, but 
that, for reasons of understanding, rational criticism or developing basic skills, legal 
ideas and phenomena are nearly always best viewed in some broader context rather than 
studied in isolation as if they were things in themselves. Furthermore, we believe that 
legal concepts, rules and institutions often do not themselves provide the best starting 
point for study. ‘Context first’ is a good working rule of thumb, provided that it is not 
interpreted or applied too rigidly.77    
Contribution to existing scholarship 
Research questions should contribute to existing knowledge and have some 
importance for the ‘real world’.78 To date, literature in this field has extensively 
considered the evolving ethical, legal and social challenges that arise from 
population biobanking (as previously mentioned). Substantial comparative legal 
analysis has been undertaken to compare and contrast international regulatory 
frameworks for biobanks and identify best practices.79 Considerable socio-legal 
                                                          
77 Twining W and Miers D, How to Do Things With Rules (5th edn, CUP 2010).  
78 Epstein L and King G, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1. 
79 For example, Deschênes M and Sallée C, ‘Accountability in Population Biobanking: Comparative 
Approaches’ (2007) 33 JLME 40.  
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research has also been dedicated to the extent to which donors and members of the 
public ought to be engaged in the governance of biobanks, given their altruistic 
donations and to adequately ‘represent’ their interests in the operation of the resource 
over time. In particular, Winickoff80 and Hunter and Laurie81 have debated how 
parties with ‘interests’ in UK Biobank ought to be represented or involved in the 
governance framework of UK Biobank. This debate will be particularly considered 
in this thesis to inform an understanding of the theoretical corporate governance82 
framework of UK Biobank and the potential of ‘shareholder’ versus ‘stakeholder’ 
approaches for UK Biobank governance.   
However, hitherto, the existing biobanking scholarship has not engaged in a detailed 
analysis of the legal structure of UK Biobank as a charity corporation, and the extent 
to which this existing ‘private’ legal structure may operate in law to protect donor’s 
interests and accommodate the ‘public’ dimensions of the resource. Such a study is 
all the more pertinent and pressing because outside the biobanking context, it has 
been observed that where there has been a reduction in public law accountability 
following corporatisation, there is prima facie a case for redressing this loss, whether 
by administrative law or other means.83  In light of the range of legal structures open 
to UK Biobank, including the possibility of public statute, this thesis will analyse the 
avenues of accountability that exist within and outwith UK Biobank’s dual legal 
basis as a charitable company to show the extent to which this legal structure, which 
was novel of its time, is sufficiently robust to achieve its public good mission and 
protect the interests of donors. By exploring some of the legal avenues that may be 
available in public and private law, this thesis contributes an original addition to the 
existing scholarship on UK Biobank by identifying novel legal avenues that may be 
pursued to strengthen legitimacy and accountability.  
                                                          
80 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440, 449 
81Andriof J, Waddock S, Husted B and Rahman R, Unfolding Stakeholder Thinking: Theory, 
Responsibility and Engagement (Greenleaf 2002), cited in Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics 
in biobank governance: moving beyond existing approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C, The 
Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? (CUP 2009) 174.  
82 For an overview of the historical development of how corporations moved from laws of usury 
(broadly concerned with monetary loans) to laws of partnership see: Ireland P, ‘Company Law and 
the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 MLR 32. 
83 Vincent-Jones P, ‘Citizen Redress in Public Contracting for Human Services’ (2005) 68 Modern 
Law Review 887, 901.  
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This thesis also raises questions as to whether the charity company structure is still 
the most appropriate legal structure for UK Biobank as well as wider theoretical 
questions about the tensions and challenges of large-scale organisations established 
with public objectives and a private legal architecture. In so doing, this thesis 
informs the debate as to how best to link private legal structures, including biobanks 
such as UK Biobank Ltd,84 with the general public and society, and contributes to a 
growing debate as to the evolving role of corporations in society today.85 This debate 
considers the potentially ‘public’ aspects of ‘private’ corporations, which may invite 
into their private law responsibilities a range of stricter ‘public’ standards.86  
Thesis outline 
The thesis is comprised of three parts: Part 1 sets UK Biobank in context, shows its 
contemporary significance and considers the ethical and legal challenges of 
population biobanking. Chapter 1 summarises the evolution of population 
biobanking and identifies the key ethical issues that are raised by these research 
resources and which has been the subject of extensive academic and policy debate. 
Chapter 2 analyses some of the comparable regulatory approaches that had been 
adopted to respond to such challenges at the time of UK Biobank’s development. 
Chapter 3 considers the origins of UK Biobank and identifies the key motivations 
and drivers for a world-leading population biobank in the UK. The purpose of Part 1 
is to inform and contextualise Part 2’s analysis of the parameters of the legal 
structure of UK Biobank and the ways in which this structure operates to protect 
donors’ interests and achieve public objectives.  
In Part 2 of this thesis, Chapter 4 analyses UK Biobank’s governance structure and 
the wider regulatory environment in which UK Biobank is embedded. Chapter 4 also 
identifies the ‘private’ legal structure of UK Biobank and highlights some of the 
potential difficulties in protecting the public mission of UK Biobank and the private 
                                                          
84 But also noting the establishment of Genomics England a company wholly owned by the 
Department of Health: Genomics England ‘About’ (Genomics England) 
<http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/about-genomics-england/> accessed 24/01/2016 
85 Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise’ (2006) 33 International Journal of 
Social Economics 376. 
86 Barker K, ‘Private law: Key encounters with public law’ in Barker K and Jensen D, Private Law: 
Key Encounters with Public Law (CUP 2013), 3; Gamble A and Thomas R, ‘The Changing Context 
of Governance: Implications for Administration and Justice’ In Alder M, Administrative Justice in 
Context (Hart 2010). 
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interests of the donors in the private model. Considering the ethical challenges 
discussed in Part 1 and analysis of the governance structure of UK Biobank in 
Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presents proposals that have been made in the socio-legal 
literature for increased donor and public involvement, to improve the existing UK 
Biobank governance model. These proposals are framed by theories of corporate 
governance, but arguably presuppose examination of the legal structure of UK 
Biobank as a corporation and the implications of this private structure for the 
interests at stake. Therefore, Chapter 6 critically analyses the legal structure of UK 
Biobank as a charity company, and avenues of accountability that arise by virtue of 
the dual legal basis of UK Biobank in UK charity and company law. Chapter 6 
shows that although there are mechanisms to hold UK Biobank to its public good 
mission, these are complex and limited in scope, particularly in terms of protecting 
the private interests of UK Biobank donors and providing redress for any personal 
harm or loss suffered.    
Part 3 explores in detail how a range of legal avenues within both private and public 
law may be available to assert these interests and hold UK Biobank to account. 
Chapter 7 uses the specific example of donors’ private interests in the return of 
individual research findings to analyse the potential for redress in the private law of 
negligence. Chapter 8 analyses the applicability of public law to UK Biobank’s legal 
structure and considers whether the discretion with which UK Biobank operates is 
‘public’ for the purposes of judicial review. Together, Chapters 7 and 8 illustrate 
how UK Biobank’s legal structure straddles the public/private divide in law and will 
raise questions as to the appropriateness of the divide in this context.  
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Part 1 
Population biobanking: Ethical and legal 
challenges 
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1.1 Introduction 
This chapter will situate this thesis’ investigation into UK Biobank’s legal structure 
in the broader, socio-legal context of biobanking and global science.  
First, this chapter will describe the original scientific drivers behind the development 
of population biobanks, most significantly following the launch of the HGP in 1990. 
The HGP succeeded in mapping and sequencing the human genome (announced in 
200387) and as a result, it was widely accepted that further work was needed to 
capitalise on the new data generated by the project. There needed to be an improved 
understanding of how genetic material influences the workings of the body at a 
molecular level and the way that individuals are affected by the interaction between 
their genetics, their environment and lifestyle.88 For meaningful results, large 
                                                          
87 On 14 April 2003, the International Human Genome Consortium announced successful completion 
of the project: International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, ‘Finishing the Euchromatic 
Sequence of the Human Genome’ (2004) 431 Nature 931. 
88 Committee on Science and Technology, Human Genetic Databases: Challenges and Opportunities 
(HL 2000-2001, 57). 
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prospective association studies were needed;89 longitudinal collections of larger 
amounts of data which linked different types of data. As a result, biobanks 
(repositories of biological samples with accompanying linked data)90 have 
progressed from small-scale repositories of samples used for specific and limited 
research purposes, to large–scale population biobanks created for a number of 
research purposes.  
Next, this chapter will provide an overview of the ethical issues raised by population 
biobanks. In particular: how to protect the privacy of the individual’s information 
that is gathered, stored and disseminated; how to protect and further donor’s rights 
and interests in the collection, storage and use of their personal information and 
samples; and how to design a resource that is fit for purpose, and will sustainably 
benefit both public and private stakeholders.91 In biobanking literature, extensive 
attention has been paid over the years to the ethical, legal and social implications of 
population biobanking. Challenges such as the nature, scope and adequacy of 
consent;92 the importance of protecting privacy;93 the impossibility of guaranteeing 
anonymity;94 establishing and maintaining trust;95 participant and public 
engagement;96 and the inadequacy of existing legal mechanisms to accommodate 
some or any of these features,97 have founded academic and policy debate. More 
recently, the possibility of returning research results to biobank participants has 
                                                          
89 Professor Sir Rory Collins, ‘Big Data in the UK Biobank: Opportunities and Challenges’ (Gresham 
College Lecture, London, November 2014) <www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/big-data-in-the-
uk-biobank-opportunities-and-challenges> accessed 6 June 2015. 
90 Empirical research has demonstrated that there are differing definitions among biobank 
stakeholders: Shaw DM, Elger BS and Colledge F, ‘What is a biobank? Differing definitions among 
biobank stakeholders’ (2014) 85 Clin Genet 223.  
91 Including the general public:  Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: 
moving beyond existing approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic 
Information: Who Decides? (CUP 2009).   
92 Otlowski M, ‘Developing an appropriate consent model for biobanks: in defence of ‘broad’ 
consent’ in Kaye J and Stranger M (eds) Principles and practice in biobank governance (Ashgate 
2009).  
93Taylor MJ and Townend D, ‘Issues in protecting privacy in medical research using genetic 
information and biobanking: the PRIVILEGED project’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 253; Schroder C, 
Heidtke KR, Zacherl N, Zatloukal K and Taupitz J, ‘Safeguarding donors’ personal rights and 
biobank autonomy in biobank networks: the CRIP privacy regime’ (2010) 12 Cell Tissue Bank 233. 
94 Lowrance WW and Collins FS, ‘Identifiability in genomic research’ (2007) 317 Science 600. 
95 Sutrop M, ‘Trust’ in Hayry M, Chadwick R, Arnason V, Arnason G, (eds) The ethics and 
governance of human genetic databases (Cambridge University Press 2007) 190. 
96 Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C, The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009).   
97 Gibbons SMC, ‘Are UK genetic databases governed adequately?’ (2007) 27 Leg Stud 312. 
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challenged biobanking practices.98 And now, the challenges and opportunities raised 
by ‘big data’ i.e. data sets so large or complex that traditional data processing 
applications are inadequate, are dominating bioethical discussions.99   
The final purpose of this chapter is to situate biobank development in the wider 
context of the globalisation of genomics research. Following the success of the HGP, 
human genomics research is becoming global and we are moving from a one 
researcher, one project and one jurisdiction approach,100 to a complex, 
interdependent, collaborative research environment.101 Researchers are now striving 
to share data and samples internationally.102 Indeed, biobanks have been described as 
global goods.103 However, existing legal regimes governing human subject research 
overlap and interact at a local, regional and international level. This can give rise to 
problems associated with data overflowing national boundaries, causing tension 
between national ethical preferences and international harmonisation goals. 
Therefore, a number of international consortiums are being established to harmonise 
standards and approaches to enable sharing between biobanks worldwide.104 
Overall, population biobanks like UK Biobank are not fixed in any ‘cultural or 
temporal way’105 and this raises ongoing challenges to be understood, governed and 
in some cases, regulated. This chapter’s introduction to biobanking is intended to 
provide background to Chapter 2’s analysis of some of the models of biobank 
governance that were available at the time of UK Biobank’s inception and which 
shaped UK Biobank’s eventual model.  
                                                          
98 Wolf SM and others, ‘Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic research 
involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 361. 
99 Professor Sir Rory Collins, ‘Big Data in the UK Biobank: Opportunities and Challenges’ (Gresham 
College Lecture, London, November 2014) <www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/big-data-in-the-
uk-biobank-opportunities-and-challenges> accessed 6 June 2015; Davies G, Frow E and Leonelli S, 
‘Bigger, faster, better? Rhetorics and practices of large-scale research in contemporary bioscience’ 
(2013) 8 BioSocieties 386.  
100 Kaye J, ‘From single biobanks to international networks: developing e-governance’ (2011) 130 
Hum Gen 377. 
101 World Health Organisation, Governance for Health in the 21st Century: a study conducted for the 
WHO Regional Office for Europe (WHO 2011) EUR/RC61/Inf.Doc./6. 
102 Bedard K, Wallace S, Lazor S and Knoppers BM, ‘Potential Conflicts in Governance Mechanisms 
used in Population Biobanks’ in Kaye J and Stranger M (eds) Principles and practice in biobank 
governance (Ashgate 2009).  
103 Ibid. Describing ‘human genetic databases’; terminology which I will use interchangeably with 
‘biobank’.  
104 P3G (Public Population Project in Genomics). <http://www.p3g.org> accessed 15 October 2011   
105 O’Doherty KC, Burgess MM, Edwards K, Gallagher RP, Hawkins AK, Kaye J, McCaffrey V and 
Winickoff DE, ‘From Consent to Institutions: Designing Adaptive Governance for Genomic 
Biobanks’ (2011) 73 Social Science & Medicine 367. 
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1.2 Scientific Ambition: Human Genome Project success and a ‘New 
Generation’106 of Biobanking 
The completion of the mapping and sequencing of the human genome in 2001 was 
not the end of a project, but the beginning.107 
On 14 March 2000 (then) President, Bill Clinton (US) and Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair (UK) announced their agreement to open access to the first draft of the human 
genome.108 Widespread media coverage surrounded the race to sequence the first 
human genome between the public project led by John Sulston at the UK Wellcome 
Trust Sanger Institute, and the private project led by Craig Venter in the US. The 
success of the HGP means that the three billion chemical letters that make up an 
individual’s DNA have been sequenced. Ultimately, this success has moved 
scientific research a step closer to predicting and preventing disease, rather than our 
historically curative approach to medicine. 
Population biobanks like UK Biobank are heralded as a ‘post-genome challenge’ 
response to the success of the Human Genome Project (HGP). Biobanks have 
become increasingly popular as the primary means for translating genomic findings 
into practical health benefits. While the practice of researchers collecting 
information from subjects to understand their characteristics is certainly not new, the 
ability to analyse whole DNA sequences has opened important new possibilities for 
human genetics research and now technological advances have made it possible to 
create biobanks that contain more data, both genotypic and phenotypic, from more 
donors.109 The meaning of ‘biobank’ has therefore expanded to include both 
traditional small-scale genomic resources and a ‘new generation’ of large-scale 
population biobanks. First generation biobanks have been utilised for many years, 
                                                          
106 Greely HT, ‘The Uneasy Ethical Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic Biobanks’ (2007) 8 
Annu Rev Genomics Hum Genet 343. 
107 Einsiedel E, Whose Gene, Whose Safe, How Safe? Publics’ and Professionals’ Views of Biobanks 
(Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 2003); Widdows H and Mullen C, The Governance of 
Genetic Information: Who Decides? (CUP 2009) 178. 
108 Wallace H, Bioscience for Life?- Appendix A; The history of UK Biobank, electronic medical 
records in the NHS, and the proposal for data-sharing without consent (Genewatch UK 2009) < 
www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/UK_Biobank_fin_2.pdf> 
accessed 31 Jan 2016, 26. 
109 Greely HT, ‘The Uneasy Ethical Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic Biobanks’ (2007) 8 
Annu Rev Genomics Hum Genet 343. 
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but the ‘new generation’ biobanks have proliferated more recently.110 Combined, it 
has been argued that biobanks have the potential to become key tools in personalised 
medicine.111   
First generation genomic biobanks are comprised of research projects often looking 
at a particular health issue, for example breast cancer, aided by relevant biological 
samples including DNA collected from affected individuals and their family 
members.112 Researchers establish long-term relationships with these individuals, 
whose interest in the research is clearly identifiable; donating in the hope that this 
research could provide useful knowledge for interventions for themselves or their 
relatives.113 However, the first generation of biobank has limited uses because of the 
defined data collected within them, and its availability only to certain users.  
On the other hand, the findings derived from the HGP have made clear that while 
many common diseases have some genetic component, only in a few cases do single 
genes seem to contribute strongly to disease risk. Even there, any strong genetic 
component is limited to a small percentage of those with the disease.114 Furthermore, 
many life-threatening and disabling diseases are caused by many different exposures 
that might each have effects and interact with each other in complex ways.115 To 
investigate these exposures, extensive information needs to be collected from donors 
via questionnaires and physical measurements, as well as by storing biological 
samples that allows many different types of assay (e.g. genetic, proteomic, 
metabonomic, or biochemical).116  
Furthermore, recent technological progress in genotyping has meant that genome 
wide scans are no more expensive or time consuming than genotyping for a 
particular disease.117 In the past, relatively inefficient and expensive genetic 
sequencing technologies limited researchers to targeted genetic research, focussing 
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only on the most promising genes or genomic regions, hence the first generation of 
biobanking. More recently, however, new next-generation sequencing technologies 
have ‘broken through this data bottleneck.’118 With these technologies rapidly 
advancing119 and a $1000 genome recently announced,120 researchers have begun to 
sequence whole genomes instead of targeted genetic analysis.121 This has led to 
significant progress in identifying genes in common and genetically complex 
diseases (‘susceptibility genes’), as well as facilitating dramatic progress in the 
development of testing for such conditions.122  
Today, diverse conditions are being shown to have a genetic basis and genetic 
research has led to the identification of single gene diseases (for example 
Huntington’s disease) and genetically complex diseases (like coronary heart disease 
and diabetes). The former are rarer and can more accurately be predicted by heritage. 
The latter, which affect a far greater number, are influenced by DNA sequence 
variation in conjunction with environmental factors and lifestyle.123 Therefore, 
investigating the linkage between personal health information and genetic material 
has been the next step in genetic research. Population studies like UK Biobank are 
established to develop our understanding of this complex interplay, so that in the 
future it might be possible to prevent multifactorial disorders by tailoring one’s 
lifestyle or avoiding environmental toxins. To deliver statistically meaningful and 
reliable results data from a large population is required124 and accordingly, there is a 
need for larger biobanks with more donors, information and users.  
Thus, the biobanking field is developing. There exists a range of different types of 
biobank that vary according to size, research design, funding, types of biological 
samples collected, the method of sample collection, processing and storage, and the 
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research focus. Some biobanks are privately funded, others are established with 
government funding. Many biobanks will have a clear purpose and end point while 
others are open-ended. Indeed in some cases, governments and funding bodies have 
established and committed funding to population biobanks with the aim of using 
these as ‘biorepositories’ for unspecified research purposes.125 
In terms of sample size, large-scale biobanks are generally used for prospective and 
longitudinal molecular epidemiology research projects. The main research objective 
of a population-based biobank is to discover biomarkers for disease susceptibility 
within a specific population through prospective molecular epidemiology research 
strategies.126 These types of biobank recruit healthy participants who are 
representative of a region, country, or specific ethnic group.127 Large-scale 
population biobanks like UK Biobank,128 the Estonian Biobank129 and deCODE 
associated Biobank130 ‘derive their scientific value from their massive size, capacity 
to aggregate specimens by various biological criteria, and ability to link the 
specimens with individual medical records.’131 They present unique and challenging 
characteristics: they are diverse, both in terms of samples and structural approaches; 
inherently uncertain and designed to be open-ended, often giving rise to a tension 
between protection of participant interests and promotion of the resource; and 
temporal, in that benefits are only realised in the long term, requiring that the 
longevity of the biobank is ensured whilst at the same time remaining fit for purpose 
over time with respect to public and private interests at stake.132  
Alternatively, disease-orientated biobanks store a heterogeneous collection of 
biological materials, usually collected during clinical care.133 Biological materials 
found in such biobanks are usually collected from patients, and can lead to eventual 
re-sampling at follow up visits in the course of their disease treatment. An example 
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of a disease-orientated biobank is the PXE International biobank, which promotes 
research and supports individuals affected by pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE).134 
PXE is a non-profit foundation devoted to driving research on the rare tissue 
disorder. Case-control biobanks are collections of matched individuals with a given 
disease with compatible health controls and tissue banks which encompass diverse 
collections of tissue specimens, usually collected (with consent) by hospital 
pathology departments following medical procedures.135  
In light of (or perhaps due to) the existence of such a range of types of biobanks, a 
recent study revealed that there is still uncertainty among biobankers themselves as 
to what exactly a biobank is.136 In 2012, the European Commission described the 
characteristics of biobanks in their Report ‘Biobanks for Europe:’137 
Biobanks typically: (a) collect and store biological materials that are annotated not 
only with medical but often also epidemiological data (e.g. environmental 
exposures, lifestyle/occupational information) (b) are not static ‘projects’, since 
biological materials and data are usually collected on a continuous or long-term 
basis; (c) are associated with current (defined) and/or future (not yet specified) 
research projects at the time of biospecimen collection; (d) apply coding or 
anonymisation to assure donor privacy but have, under specific conditions, 
provisions that participants remain re-identifiable in order to provide clinically 
relevant information back to the donor, and (e) include established governance 
structure (e.g. ethics review committees) and procedures (e.g. consent) that serve to 
protect donors’ rights and stakeholder interests.  
For the purpose of this thesis, biobanks are generally defined as: 
An organized collection of human biological material and associated information 
stored for one or more research purposes.138 
More specifically, population biobanking is defined as: 
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Collections of biological material and the associated data and information stored in 
an organized system for a population or a large subset of a population.139 
1.3 Population biobanking: Ethical challenges 
There is a wealth of literature, spanning a number of disciplines, which accepts and 
describes the many ethical challenges that are raised by population biobanking and 
an entire thesis could be dedicated to any one of them. For the purpose of this thesis 
and for the sake of brevity, an overview of the most prevalent challenges will be 
provided, including: consent and secondary research uses; privacy and 
confidentiality; ownership, intellectual property and commercialisation; data access 
and data sharing; public confidence and trust; participant engagement; and feedback 
of research results.  
Large-scale population biobanks challenge ethical norms because they are more than 
individual research projects in which risk is evaluated in terms of a single research 
objective. They are research resources with the objective of multiple, population-
wide benefits which are often described as being for the ‘public good’ or the ‘health 
of future generations.’ The challenge for biobank managers, therefore, is to identify 
ways of protecting the fundamental rights of the participants who provide their 
samples and access to their data, while fostering the public interest in carrying out 
lawful and ethical medical research that maximises access to the resource. Indeed, in 
order to remain operational and sustainable, biobanks depend not only on donors to 
participate but also on continual public, political and commercial support. 
From the early stages of biobank development, the importance of trust has been 
recognised as having the power to considerably influence the progress and future 
success of biobanks.140 Medical research scandals such as Alder Hey and more 
recently Care.data141 (the centralisation of medical health records) are demonstrating 
that once trust is undermined it is incredibly difficult to regain. Therefore, public 
attitudes are of great importance and this is especially true in the constantly evolving 
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field of genomics and biobanking.142 Research involving human genetics has been 
seen as problematic by those claiming that human genetic material is exceptional, 
compared to other health related material. So-called ‘genetic exceptionalism’ is 
based on characteristics such as its predictability, identifiability and the implications 
genetic information may have for others, including family and social groups.143 Early 
studies of public perceptions of biobanks demonstrated such concern.144 However, it 
is notable that recent evidence shows that public attitudes recognise the value of 
genomic data, suggesting genetic exceptionalism is an increasingly out-dated 
view.145  
Biobanks also challenge legal norms because of the combined nature of the material 
that is stored, which has been distinguished as ‘corporeal’ (donated physical 
samples) and ‘informational’ (health data). All medical data in the UK is perceived 
as being sensitive compared to other personal data.146 Yet, a complex regulatory 
environment147 is created in the UK by separate legislation of human tissue 
specimens and health information.148 The implications of this for the regulation of 
population biobanks in the UK will be explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
1.3.1 Privacy  
Different conceptions of privacy have been articulated in the context of biobanking. 
It has come to be accepted that biobanks raise a number of privacy concerns, 
including fear of misuse of personal information, stigmatisation of groups and 
unjustified intrusion into private life.149 Four interrelated dimensions of privacy 
interests in biobanks have been articulated: (i) physical privacy (ii) informational 
                                                          
142 Gottweis H, Kaye J, Bignami F and others, Biobanks for Europe; A Challenge for Governance 
Luxembourg (European Commission, 2012) doi:10.2777/68942. 
143 Gibbons S and others, ‘Governing Genetic Databases: Challenges Facing Research Regulation and 
Practice’ (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 175. 
144 Nelkin D and Lindee M, The DNA Mystique: The gene as a cultural icon (WH Freeman 1995); 
cited in Levitt M and Weldon S, ‘A well placed trust?: Public perceptions of DNA databases.’ (2005) 
15 Critical Public Health 314.  
145‘When we asked patients and families how much they want to know about their genetic information 
their immediate reaction was that whatever information the researchers or clinicians found out, they 
wanted to know too,’ Alastair Kent OBE, Director of Genetic Alliance, in: Middleton A and others, 
‘Attitudes of nearly 7000 health professionals, genomic researchers and publics toward the return of 
incidental results from sequencing research’ (2016) 24 European Journal Human Genetics 21. 
146 Data Protection Act 1998, s 2. 
147 Brownsword R, Yeung K, (eds) Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and 
Technological Fixes (Hart 2008). 
148 Explained in Chapter 4 of this thesis  
149 Laurie G and others, ‘Managing Access to Biobanks: How Can We Reconcile Privacy and Public 
Interests in Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10 Medical Law International 315, 316 
 
 
29 
privacy (iii) decisional privacy and (iv) proprietary privacy.150 Respect for privacy 
has led to consensus that individuals have the freedom to consent to participate as a 
biobank donor and not to have their samples gathered and tested without their 
consent at the recruitment stage (physical privacy); the right to have their specimens 
sufficiently anonymised to prevent unauthorised identification and to protect 
confidentiality (informational privacy); the right to withdraw if and when they 
wish;151 an interest in controlling or influencing what is done with the resource made 
up of their samples and data (decisional privacy); and finally, an interest in the 
control of our genetic identity to protect against discrimination (proprietary 
privacy).152 
It has been argued that the concept of privacy has expanded as technological 
innovations have made public what was previously out of the public view.153 This 
has led different approaches as to where the balance should be struck between public 
and private interests in biobanking. As we have seen, biobanks vary according to 
type, size and research focus etc., and often research is conducted into diseases that 
affect particular groups of a population. Indeed, the assumption that privacy relates 
primarily to personal forms of identity is challenged in certain circumstances, and 
this has been argued to be the case in the context of genetics research where 
information about one’s DNA may have implications for family members and even 
communities.  
The concept of solidarity has been used as a moral basis to further the interests of an 
individual or a group that results from social cohesion. Writing in the context of 
bioethics, Prainsack and Buyx describe the act of solidarity as signifying: 
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Shared practices reflecting a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’ (financial, 
social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others.154  
Solidarity has been proposed as a moral basis for biobanking; whereby solidarity ‘is 
the default social norm from which individuals retain the entitlement to withdraw, 
rather than as a moral obligation from which they may be released only 
exceptionally’.155 As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, this approach has been adopted in 
the context of population biobanking, and underpinned the Icelandic model for 
population biobanking. 
One technical solution for biobanks to uphold individual privacy has been to enhance 
confidentiality by removing personal identifiers as a means of guaranteeing a high 
level of privacy at an individual level, while enabling sharing of data for research. 
Data can be de-identified on a number of levels. Anonymisation refers to the process 
of irreversibly de-identifying data, whereas pseudonymisation refers to the 
separation of identifiers from encrypted or key-coded data. Data can be made 
anonymous if all information capable of identifying the individual to whom the data 
relates is removed and destroyed, and therefore re-contact of the individual is 
impossible. Data can be encoded if a serial number or other code is attached to data 
and a key to this is held elsewhere. Encoded data might be effectively anonymous to 
the research team working on it because they do not hold the master list linking the 
serial numbers to the personal identifiers. However, the data would not be truly 
anonymous because someone would be able to link the two. Finally, encryption turns 
data into strings of numbers or letters. Only someone with the key can decipher the 
record itself. The latter processes pseudonymise the data.  
In some cases, such as in the field of biobanking research, it is not desirable or 
indeed possible to fully anonymise data if the biobank is to be useful to researchers. 
This is true in the case of population biobanks that are designed to contain and link a 
number of different types of information over a long period of time, which often 
involves re-contact and where cross-border research is desirable. Therefore, the more 
practicable and commonplace threshold in biobanking is pseudonymisation, rather 
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than full anonymisation.156 This technical solution is then combined with participant 
consent and rules relating to data access to uphold individual privacy. Indeed, an 
‘either/or’ approach to consent and technical data protection solutions has been 
argued to be insufficient to protect the privacy interests of donors’ in research.157 
1.3.2 Consent  
Consent operates to protect autonomous participant’s privacy interests in 
biobanking. However, consent alone would not ensure that all of the interests of the 
participants are protected and biobanks require additional policies for ethical data 
access to prevent misuse of an individual’s data. The importance of obtaining 
consent of research participants able to give it is stressed at both international and 
national level, and is one of the fundamental principles of ethical research.158 
Typically, to be legally valid, consent must be freely given and fully informed.159 
Strict adherence to bioethical protocols would require that research participants re-
consent to every individual use of their tissue sample or personal data. This is 
because the World Medical Association’s Helsinki Declaration states: 
In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately 
informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the 
study and the discomfort it may entail.160  
However, one of the most controversial aspects of population biobanking has been 
the use of broad consent, i.e. consenting to undefined future research uses of 
donations,161 rather than the more conventional informed consent. Crucially, 
biobanks depend on people volunteering to give up their genetic material, but 
members of the public will only do this if they have confidence that their material 
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will not be used in a manner contrary to their interests now or into the future. One 
way to solve this is for participants to give consent on very narrow grounds, which is 
common practice for small-scale, first generation biobanks. Generally, these smaller 
projects have a specific research purpose and participants are provided with detailed 
information about the uses of their donated material at the time of consent. Quite 
often research is conducted into conditions that the participants and/or their family 
are affected by, and so to an extent participants may personally benefit from their 
own donation. In these circumstances, consent can be classed as ‘informed’ because 
involvement is dependent upon voluntary, expressed consent based on information 
about the research proposal. Therefore, individual autonomy is respected.162   
On the other hand, narrow consent in large-scale biobanking would prevent many 
desirable uses of collected materials, not least because many beneficial uses of 
population biobanks are not anticipated at the point at which material and consent is 
taken. Secondary research uses would be prohibited without re-consent to every use 
of their sample/data, which would be very time consuming, expensive, and an 
inefficient use of resources.163 So the alternative is to give broad consent, in 
confidence that arrangements will be made to ensure that material will not be put to 
uses that participants would regard as improper. Such broad consent has been 
accepted as being ethically valid, but only if additional oversight is in place to decide 
on the acceptability of new propositions for study resources;164 and to ensure the 
safety of personal information and uphold an individual’s right to withdraw.  
Re-consent has been identified as a means to enable participants to make decisions 
about their participation in biobanking, but generally is only required if there is a 
change in protocol or to confirm participant expectations in case of change. 165 There 
have also been proposals for more ‘dynamic’ consent procedures; to provide 
mechanisms for informing participants about the uses of their data and to allow 
participants to set preferences of research uses, thereby facilitating ongoing 
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engagement should they so choose.166 These procedures could also facilitate 
feedback of research results that are pertinent to a donor’s health but which are not 
envisaged at the time of donation and are therefore not part of the consent process. 
Purported ‘incidental’ or ‘individual’ ‘findings’ or ‘results’ raise difficult ethical and 
legal questions and will be the topic of Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Therefore, building biobank governance mechanisms that outline data access policies 
and procedure, communicate the purpose of the project, and describe the procedure 
of the day-to-day running of the resource, has been a means of further protecting 
individual interests.167 This is especially the case in the UK, where there exists no 
specific legal framework for the regulation of biobanking, as will be described.  
1.3.3 Data access  
Because population biobanks are longitudinal resources often designed for 
unspecified research purposes, this gives rise to a number of issues associated with 
who gets access to the contents of the resource: 
The central question is whether access necessarily and unjustifiably compromises 
privacy interests or whether it can be compatible with robust privacy protection.168 
This is especially true in the case of biobanks that contain both samples (which may 
be depleted) and associated data, because the risk of individual identification and 
possible privacy breaches are heightened when data and samples are combined.169 
Where biobanks are committed to the public interest, it is crucial that procedures are 
put in place that facilitate ethical and lawful access to the resource to ensure that this 
purpose is furthered. While consent and confidentiality processes like anonymisation 
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operate to protect privacy interests and mitigate an individual’s loss of control over 
their information and samples, data access procedures are necessary to maximise 
‘bona fide’ research that is in the interests of the public, the participant and the 
scientific community using the resource.170 Once access is accepted to be in the 
public interest, the priority for biobanking is how to share data rather than whether 
data should be shared at all.171  
Data access committees and data access policies have been used as mechanisms for 
the promotion of ethical and lawful research access to biobanks.172 Expert data 
access committees may be established to review access applications in an 
accountable and transparent way. Data access policies can be drafted to outline the 
access requirements of the biobank, including criteria for researcher’s proposals, 
affiliations and purposes. Such policies will vary between biobanks, for example 
depending on whether the biobank will be accessible by private commercial 
companies, or only non-profit researchers. If successfully granted access, researchers 
must then typically agree to conditions of use, which are often contained in 
contractual or Material Transfer Agreements (MTA). Guiding principles such as 
necessity and proportionality have also been put forward as a means of tempering 
access decisions, so for example, access should not be granted to identifiable data if 
appropriately anonymised access can serve just as well.173  
Increasingly, ‘open access’ policies are becoming commonplace in publicly funded 
genomics research projects; with many funders requiring open access as a condition 
for funding.174 Open access to data is believed to accelerate advances in science by 
making data freely available to all for the most efficient use of resources that are 
publicly funded. Several data generating projects now provide free access to data 
online, a movement arguably led by the Human Genome Project when the first 
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human genome sequence was uploaded for open access in 2003.175 However, it is 
rarer for projects that contain identifiable personal information to be open access, 
with aggregate level data more readily available to all.176  
There is also a growing acceptance that the merits of biobanking will only be fully 
realised if resources can ‘link up and learn from each other, ideally on a global 
scale.’177 In the biobanking literature there has been a shift in focus from 
identification of the ethical challenges raised by biobanks towards recognition of 
common principles for the development of best practice guidelines, to expedite 
effective global data-sharing.178 This development represents a response to problems 
associated with cross-border sharing of data, principally the restrictions that are 
caused by national, uncoordinated policies.179 As a result, a number of international 
networks are being established to harmonise standards and approaches to enable 
sharing between biobanks worldwide.180 
The Publics Population Project (P3G) is a not-for-profit international consortium that 
provides the international population genomics community with easy access to the 
expertise, resources, innovative tools and most up-to-date information from all areas 
of public population genomics.181 It aims to promote collaboration between members 
of the international research community to advance knowledge transfer for health of 
                                                          
175 On the other hand, ‘Restricted access policies’ don’t provide access to individual level data unless 
certain criteria is met, for example the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium have developed data 
release policies to control access such that researchers must establish their credentials before they are 
allowed access to information that could potentially identify research donors: Wellcome Trust Case 
Control Consortium <http://www.wtccc.org.uk/> accessed 10 May 2015 
176 Kaye J and others, ‘Data Sharing in Genomics – Reshaping Scientific Practice’ (2009) 10 Nat Rev 
Genet 331. 
177 Laurie G, ‘Reflexive Governance in Biobanking: On the Value of Policy Led Approaches and the 
Need to Recognise the Limits of Law' (2011) 130 Human Genetics 347, 349; Walport M and Brest P, 
‘Sharing research data to improve public health’ (2011) 377 The Lancet 537; Cambon-Thomsen A, 
Rial Sebbag E, Knoppers BM, ‘Trends in ethical and legal frameworks for the use of human 
biobanks’ (2007) 30 ERJ 373. 
178 O’Doherty and others, ‘From Consent to Institutions: Designing Adaptive Governance for 
Genomic Biobanks.’ (2011) 73 Social Science & Medicine 367; Laurie G, ‘Reflexive governance in 
biobanking: on the value of policy led approaches and the need to recognise the limits of law’ (2011) 
130 Hum Genet 347; Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic 
property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 440; Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: 
moving beyond existing approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic 
Information: Who Decides? (CUP 2009).   
179 Briceño Moraia L, Kaye J, Tasse AM and others, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Requirements 
for the Use of Data in Biobanks Based in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom’ (2014) 14 Med Law Int 187. 
180 P3G <http://www.p3g.org> accessed 15 October 2011   
181 Ibid.  
 
 
36 
populations.182 P3G works with biobankers and other experts from around the world 
to ‘Encourage collaboration between researchers and biobankers; Promote 
harmonization of information; Optimize the design, set-up and research activities of 
population-based biobanks; Facilitate the transfer of knowledge and provide training 
to those working in the field.’183 The consortium advocates a ‘Charter of 
Fundamental Principles’ to be integrated by member biobanks, which underpin P3G 
activities.  These include promotion of the common good, responsibility to protect 
the interests of affected stakeholders, mutual respect for cultural diversity and 
scientific specificity, accountability and proportionality.184 There is also an 
international collaborative effort to establish a data sharing code of conduct for 
international genomic research185 and the European Biobanking and Biomolecular 
Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI) is a collaboration of key European 
biobanks who are developing governance structures for biobank networks.186  
1.3.4 Property, ownership and commercialisation 
Inherent to the challenges of privacy and data access raised by biobanks are 
questions of ownership and commercialisation. When a sample is given for purely 
research purposes, the question arises as to whether the donor of the sample has any 
continuing interest in that sample. This process is embroiled in ethical and legal 
debate as to whether there is ‘property’ in the human body and if so, who has the 
‘right’ to this ‘property’.187 The status and meaning of human tissue, and the 
relationship between the providers and users of tissues, has been the focus of ethical, 
legal and sociological debate and the emergence of population genetic databases has 
problematized this further because of its increased scientific and commercial value in 
this context.188  
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One view is to treat samples as an unconditional gift. Theoretically, this entitles the 
recipient to do what they wish with the sample, in the same way as the recipient of 
an ordinary gift may use the gift as they wish. In this view, DNA gifted to a 
researcher could be subjected to whatever processes the researcher chooses to 
employ. It has been argued that the discourse of ‘gift-giving’ has been a powerful 
means of inspiring altruism in participants to provide their samples and enrol in 
biobank projects.189 In so doing, institutions seek ‘to bring participants into social 
relationships by emphasising their common purpose in seeing improvements to 
human health.’190 This language of gift giving has been used by those who resist the 
alternative; commodification of the human body, which is argued to be the case if 
property rights are recognised in the body, to represent a non-exploitative 
relationship between the providers and users of the tissue: 
[O]ur sense of dignity of humanity is fundamentally disturbed by the suggestion that 
which bears the marks of personhood can somehow be equated with property.191  
Parts of the body that bear ‘marks of personhood’ are those seen to be ‘central to 
what characterises living persons, members of the community’ and these include 
blood or organs that ‘our social traditions suggest… may be given, but not sold’. 
‘Gift-giving’ is therefore viewed as the only acceptable way for such parts of the 
body to be transferred because it accords respect for the dignity of the person 
involved.192 Gift-giving is also seen as altruistic in nature; expressing a sense of 
community or solidarity and performed to benefit the greater social good.193 In 
biobanking, gift-giving is important to promote participation in the face of public 
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spending on the infrastructure which relies entirely on participants being willing to 
volunteer.  
Therefore, biobanks are ‘reanimating old ethical dilemmas about the marketization 
of persons’ and Winickoff articulates the crucial ethical challenge: 
How can societies negotiate the desire to incentivise private capital to construct mega-
experimental apparatus of genomic biobanks to help drive knowledge and economy 
forward, even as they remain deeply concerned about the penetration of markets into the 
personal domains of genome and body, health, and personhood?194 
In response, there has been a focus in legal and ethical literature on the practical 
solutions for biobanks; focussing on how to remedy this potential inequity of 
interests and ensure that biobanks are sustainable in the long term. For some, this 
requires recognition that participants may have limited property rights in their tissue, 
such that they are entitled to control how their tissue is used. Some of these solutions 
will be reflected upon at the end of this thesis as potential models for biobank 
governance. They include Winickoff’s own ‘Charitable Trust Model’, as well as 
other models of benefit sharing with research donors (for example by contract, 
regulation, taxation and ethical standards to remedy problems of distributive 
justice)195 and models for participant involvement and engagement in biobanking 
such as the ‘Stakeholder Model’ proposed by Hunter and Laurie.  
Researchers are also under pressure to commercialise and translate their work and 
funding agencies create and reinforce this commercialisation pressure by earmarking 
grants of projects that aim to bring products and therapies to the market within a 
short amount of time. This commercialisation process creates a range of policy 
challenges for scientists, research participants and funders.196 It has been argued, ‘It 
is not unreasonable to view the overall purpose of biobanks as being to enable the 
development of translational outcomes which are intended to benefit patients. 
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Indeed, many biobanks have such an explicit aim.’197 Since biobanks are used for 
research, ‘it is therefore intended, and likely, that a biobank will be used by others to 
develop useful innovations.’198 When research gives rise to an innovation, then that 
invention could potentially be patentable. A patent is a limited monopoly that is 
granted in return for the disclosure of technical information. For innovation to be 
patentable, it must satisfy a number of criteria. Patents are available for inventions in 
the form of products, processes or methods. The invention must be novel,199 non-
obvious or inventive200 and susceptible to industrial application.201  
It has been argued that the patent system reflects an implicit social contract, which 
balances private and public interests. Private interests are served through the grant of 
a limited monopoly right, which provides the incentive for further invention, 
investment in research and development. The public interest is served through the 
development of innovative products and through disclosure of technical 
knowledge.202  
However, academics such as Winickoff argue a double standard currently governs 
the commercialisation of biological materials. This is because although intellectual 
property law allows researchers to capitalise on their contributions to a research 
enterprise, it denies donors of biological materials the right to compensation for their 
contributions. This is especially so given that it is arguable that value is added to the 
participants’ human tissue as soon as it is combined, gathered, stored and used.203 
Challenges of ownership and commercialisation are therefore embroiled with how a 
biobank resource is set up and funded and the purpose for which the biobank was 
created. If a biobank is ‘public’ (in its funding and its purpose) then it is arguable 
that the benefit sharing model ought to reflect this. Alternatively, if a biobank is 
privately funded, private use may not necessarily be against the interests of the 
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participants or indeed, the public. In this sense, obvious support from public funding 
entities for population biobanks does not prevent ‘concerns [which] remain about the 
long term financial sustainability of biobanks.’ Population biobanks are expensive 
ventures and ‘hence, ‘biobankers’ are looking increasingly to private funding sources 
and links with industry. This strategy has the potential to add further ethical and 
legal complexities to the many policy challenges that are associated with 
biobanks.204  
1.3.5 Public and private interests in biobanking research 
Population biobanks are often set up expressly to promote the public interest, which 
in this context has been submitted to be ‘to create resources of genetic material and 
information and to promote access by a range of as-yet unknown parties.’205 
There exists no single definition of ‘the public interest’, as recently articulated by the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics.206 Philosophers have debated how to identify the 
proper objects of the public interest, such as Bentham’s utilitarian aggregation of 
individual private preferences.207 Social contract theory advocated by Hobbes and 
Rawls recognises certain ‘public goods’ for which the State is responsible for 
securing, in exchange for limits to the free pursuit of individual interests.208  
On the other hand, lawyers often focus on the procedural elements of the public 
interest209 including transparency in how public interest decisions are made and clear 
lines of accountability for responsible decision-making.210 
In the context of medical research the public interest has been articulated as 
‘securing objectives that are valued by society.’211 As well as protecting the private 
interests of individuals who donate to biobanks, it has also been argued that there is a 
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public interest in both protecting the privacy of individuals and promoting 
scientifically sound and ethically robust health research.212 Arguably this means that 
in the context of medical research, research conducted by commercial, private actors 
need not necessarily be excluded to uphold the public interest in privacy protection. 
Therefore, the fundamental challenge for biobanks is how to uphold participant 
privacy while at the same time furthering the public’s interest in maximising 
research use of the biobank resource.  
While the public interest is not necessarily the opposite of a private right to privacy, 
the two may come into conflict with each other and the challenge will often be to 
reconcile the relationship between the two.213 In the context of human rights, the 
public interest refers to the need for a balance of considerations rather than a 
substantive definition. This interaction is exemplified in Article 8 of the HRA, 
whereby the right to a private and family life is recognised as a fundamental human 
right, but this right is subject to ‘proportionate and lawful restrictions’. As such, 
individual rights and freedoms ought to be considered first and if these are found to 
be engaged then the onus is on State authorities to justify any interfering actions ‘as 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’214 Substantively, it is necessary to balance the potential for public good 
relative to the risks and costs for individuals and society.215  
1.4 Global science and biobanks   
Population biobanks have emerged in the context of the globalisation of scientific 
and genomic research. In 2002 the International Ethics Committee of the Human 
Genome Organisation (HUGO) stated that human genomic databases should be 
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considered as global public goods,216 the latter defined as: goods ‘whose scope 
extends worldwide, are enjoyable by all with no groups excluded, and when 
consumed by one individual, are not depleted for others.’217  
In 2011, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Regional Office for Europe 
commissioned a study on governance for health in the 21st Century that suggests that 
the main changes which are taking place in governance are also manifesting in 
relation to health and are crucial for achieving health gains in the decade to come.218 
The study focuses on how governance for health and wellbeing is evolving to meet 
these new challenges and circumstances of the 21st Century, what is driving the 
change in how states and society govern for health, and how governments can take 
steps to enact smarter governance for health through collaboration.219 In this context, 
governance for health is the ‘attempts of governments and others to steer 
communities, whole countries or groups of countries in the pursuit of health and 
well-being as a collective goal.’220 The summary states that many of the challenges 
‘reflect the seminal shift from industrial to knowledge based societies.’221  
Emerging academic analysis highlights that this global goal cannot be realised if 
diversity of practice methods and governance is too great.222 As information 
overflows national boundaries, problems may arise where national positions vary. 
Tensions may surface between necessary diversity in ethical positions and common 
principles and procedures to manage these challenges to foster research223 to the 
detriment of the population. The issue of governing ‘new’ genetic technologies such 
as large-scale population biobanks is inevitably approached differently at the 
national or societal level, according to the values and jurisprudence of the societies 
in question.  
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However, the regulatory regimes that govern this type of research overlap and 
interact at a local, regional and international level. This can give rise to problems 
associated with data overflowing national boundaries, causing tension between 
national ethical preferences and international harmonisation goals. A global 
understanding of science means that it may not always be appropriate to ‘control’ 
research with national or international regulation. Indeed, existing regulatory 
instruments are often perceived as complex hurdles obstructing progress.224 
Accordingly, ‘governance’225 regimes are challenged to move away from a strictly 
governmental approach to one in which a variety of regulatory activities are 
undertaken by numerous and differently placed actors.226 Instead of hierarchical, 
detailed and compartmentalised control, governance regimes must evolve and adapt 
according to challenges of time, space and culture. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Population biobanks raise a range of ethical challenges that need to be managed if a 
biobank is to achieve its objectives and succeed. This chapter has provided an 
overview of the challenges pertinent to those involved in the biobanking process 
including researchers, participants and biobank managers. The crucial challenge is to 
manage these diverse interests in a way that is consistent with their expectations and 
the purpose of the biobank to inspire and maintain trust. As will be shown in the next 
chapter, there is no singular method and a range of models have emerged according 
to the type of biobank concerned. 
To capitalise on the scientific promise of population biobanks and overcome the 
range of ethical issues that have been outlined in this chapter, the UK faced the 
challenge of structuring and governing a biobank resource in a lawful manner that 
was financially viable and inspired public trust to secure participation and ensure 
sustainability. Historically, the Icelandic national database was a catalyst for national 
and international debate of these challenges and the national biobank of Estonia has 
encountered and managed many of the same issues. Together, these comparative 
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experiences show the technical, political and cultural environment in which biobanks 
are embedded and illustrate how ultimately, the sustainability and success of these 
particular biobanks depended on more than their legal frameworks; even more 
crucial were their business models. 
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Chapter 2: Governance of population biobanks: Comparative 
perspectives and lessons learned from public-private 
partnerships in Iceland and Estonia 
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2.1 Introduction  
Population biobanks in both Iceland and Estonia were established with public and 
private funds between 1996 and 2000, sustained with public-private partnerships and 
regulated by purpose-designed national legislation.  
The Act on Health Sector Database created for the Icelandic Health Sector Database 
granted an exclusive licence over the resource to a private, for-profit company; 
deCODE Genetics (deCODE). This company originally proposed the idea of a 
biobank and actively negotiated with the Icelandic government to set up a database 
to collect medical records from the entire Icelandic population. Following strong 
opposition from The Iceland Medical Association and later hurdles posed by the 
Icelandic Supreme Court and Icelandic Data Protection Commission, deCODE 
abandoned the national database and instead refocused on a bank of genotypic and 
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detailed medical data that could be obtained from a significant number of volunteers. 
This project is now funded (following a number of periods of bankruptcy) by US 
biotechnology for-profit giant Amgen.  
In Estonia, while the Human Genes Research Act was passed for Gene Bank, the 
Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs established the Estonian Genome Project 
Foundation to co-ordinate and govern ‘Gene Bank’. This Foundation created a 
private company EGeen Ltd and granted the company a 25-year exclusive 
commercial licence to form a public-private partnership between the Foundation and 
the company to finance and commercialise the results of the Estonian Genome 
Project. Later, the Human Genes Research Act was amended to transform the 
Estonian Genome Project into the Estonian Genome Centre of the University of 
Tartu (EGCUT) in 2007. Now, following a period of bankruptcy, the Estonian 
Government provides the core funding for the Estonian Biobank at the EGCUT.227  
This chapter will discuss the evolution of these biobanks, paying attention to the 
differences between their institutional designs and the challenges they have 
encountered. The history and development of these biobanks will be outlined and 
discussion will focus on their mission and organisational structure. Attention will 
also be paid to the roles of stakeholders including funders, government, 
committees/review boards, participants and researchers, and how their positions are 
reflected in the structure and operation of the resource. Crucially, both biobanks have 
encountered challenges and controversies relating to their financing models. This is 
because population biobanks require stable and significant financial investment to 
establish and maintain such large-scale infrastructures.228 Indeed, it has come to be 
accepted that to be sustainable, biobank governance needs to develop a strategy for 
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how to link the research of a biobank to worldwide funding and access.229 These 
measures are necessary to prevent the fate of biobanks such as Singapore which 
closed in 2011 after failing to be used enough to be financially viable.230   
Overall, this chapter will raise the fundamental questions faced by the UK when 
creating UK Biobank, in particular:  
1. How to structure the resource to overcome the ethical challenges of 
population biobanking; 
2. How to fund these expensive, national resources.  
Consequently, this chapter will highlight themes of public/private interests in 
biobanking and public/private biobank models. These themes underpin the narrative 
of this thesis’ investigation into the legal implications of UK Biobank’s public-
private model of governance. In addition, this chapter will illustrate the importance 
of the judiciary in the development of norms in genomics. In many ways, the 
Icelandic Supreme Court ruling in Guðmundsdóttir v Iceland231 prompts 
investigation in Part 3 of this thesis into the potential jurisprudential consequences of 
UK Biobank legal structure.  
2.2 Iceland: A global lesson for biobanks and genomics  
Iceland is a small island in the North Atlantic which was inhabited between the 
years 870 and 930 A.D., mostly by Norwegian entrepreneurs and Irish slaves. The 
year 1000 A.D. [sic], the population was around 70,000 but around the year 1410 
A.D. the Plague had reduced it down to approximately 30,000. The population had 
again grown to about 70,000 when at 1700 A.D. Hekla, the most powerful volcano 
in the history of Europe, spew lava and ash all over Iceland, which led to a famine 
that reduced the population again down to approximately 30,000.232 
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2.2.1 Privatising the Icelandic Health Sector Database  
With a small population (270, 000) that is almost entirely derived from the original 
settlers, Icelanders are argued to be a genetically homogeneous people.233 They 
display a strong founder effect, so by following genetic markers, it is believed to be 
possible to trace a common origin of a large proportion of them.234 Partly due to this 
belief, which was used as an incentive by organisers, and the corresponding potential 
for identifying genetic factors in disease, Iceland was the first country in the world to 
plan a national database for population genetics research. While the Icelandic Health 
Sector Database is widely known in the field, this is despite the fact that the planned 
national database was never actually created. Instead, what operates today is a 
genomic biobank owned exclusively by US incorporated for-profit company 
deCODE Genetics. In short, what was originally intended to be a State-built database 
of health information on the entire population of Iceland for wide-reaching research 
purposes is now a smaller-scale privately run biobank established for genomic 
research.  
The development and ‘legacy’ of Iceland’s biobank has been well narrated by David 
Winickoff235 and the story of deCODE is still evolving. deCODE has now conducted 
whole genome sequencing of 2,636 individuals; a little less than 1% of the Icelandic 
population. Indeed, on March 25 2015, deCODE Genetics published four papers in 
Nature Genetics which presented the largest set of human genomes from one 
population, together with findings to date.236 In this sense, Iceland is at the forefront 
of genomics research, despite a history filled with ethical, legal and political 
controversy that has shaped consensus and informed biobank governance on an 
international scale.    
The idea of an Icelandic Health Sector Database (HSD) was posed and led by 
deCODE Genetics; a US incorporated for-profit company. deCODE was founded in 
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1996 by Karl Stefansson.237 deCODE’s headquarters are in Reykjavik, although 5 
out of 7 Board members are from the US.238 From 1996-1998 deCODE, led by 
Stefansson, actively negotiated with the Icelandic government to set up the HSD. 
But this was one of two of deCODE Genetics’ main objectives. 
Their first objective was to establish a commercial laboratory to carry out biomedical 
research in Iceland, with headquarters in Reykjavík, which would seek to collaborate 
with clinicians and pharmaceutical companies to develop new DNA diagnostic tests 
and drugs. At the time of the HSD lobbying, deCODE was already collaborating 
with local doctors to collect DNA samples from consenting individuals suffering 
from particular diseases. Before the HSD, medical records in Iceland were not 
accessible in the public domain and so access relied on hospitals and clinics to 
transfer their data to deCODE with independent ethics committee review. By 
September 1999 the company had collected samples from over 10,000 people with 
full written consent, and through this work the company created a large database of 
DNA and genealogical information. 239  
deCODE’s second, more ambitious aim, was to construct the Genetics, Genealogy, 
Phenotype Resource database which would comprise of encrypted medical records 
of the entire Icelandic population and later became the Health Sector Database.240 
There was no specific legislation in operation at the time that governed such an 
endeavour and consequently the Icelandic government passed the Act on Health 
Sector Database, which gave deCODE the sole right to exploit the database 
commercially for a period of 12 years,241 in return for a fee paid to the public health 
service sector.242 
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Throughout negotiations for the creation of the database, Stefansson painted his 
‘genomic vision’ by emphasising Iceland’s heritage, which he argued gave Iceland 
an advantage for discovering new genetic factors for disease: 
First and foremost was the idea that Icelanders were a genetically homogenous 
people because of their historic isolation… Second was the existence in Iceland of 
intricate and detailed genealogical records. In its early business plans, Stefansson 
touted the existence of a lineage database for 100 per cent of Icelanders back to 
1910 and 85 per cent of Icelanders back to 1800. He explained that this record of 
lineage would make it ‘relatively easy to determine relationships between 
participants or subjects in genetics studies done in Iceland.’ A third foundational 
claim was the existence of high-quality medical records dating back to the 1920s, 
many of which were ‘centralized and accessible.’ Hence, the business plan 
explained, ‘it is relatively easy to find a match between genotypes of Icelanders and 
whatever genetic traits are reflected in their diseases or health.’243  
Stefansson argued that if all three resources: Icelanders’ DNA; genealogies; and the 
phenotypic data could be linked together, it would create a uniquely powerful tool 
for conducting genetic linkage studies as well as allelic association studies.244 This 
idea enticed investors and Stefansson initially raised $12 million in U.S. venture 
capital and $25 million from Icelandic Institutional investors. In February 1998, 
deCODE reached agreement with Hoffman-La Roche for rights and discoveries 
derived from deCODE’s existing work for approximately $200 million.245 
With financial interest secured, Stefansson could finance the creation of the 
database, providing the Iceland’s Parliament passed legislation to realise his vision. 
Stefansson emphasised the economic value of the resource that had been 
demonstrated by US investment, in addition to arguments based on Iceland’s 
homogenous culture and rich history: 
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…deCODE’s rhetoric addressed the central political problem of survival itself: how 
could such a remote island society best leverage its natural and social resources to 
remain a viable sovereign nation in the global order?246 
Arguably, this was an early example of a common motivation for establishing 
national biobanks. For many countries including Estonia and the UK, but also non-
western countries such as Singapore, population biobanks have been seen as 
opportunities to boost a country’s economy by making them more internationally 
competitive.247 To some extent, this investment has been based on the belief that 
population biobanks will help translate biomedical research into practice (Chapter 1). 
In reality, due to the expense of sustaining these large-scale projects the long-term 
viability of population biobanks is increasingly being questioned in light of examples 
of under-utilisation.248  
2.2.2 Establishing and dismantling a legal framework: The Health 
Sector Database Act 
In December 1998, Iceland’s national Parliament (the ‘Althing’) passed the Health 
Sector Database Act (HSDA).249 This Act provided the necessary legal framework 
for the operation of a centralised database containing non-personally identifiable 
health data from the medical records of virtually all Icelanders.250 The Act authorised 
the transfer of citizen health information that was to be controlled by the state and 
governed by the requirements of Iceland’s Data Protection Commission251 by licence 
to private industry, for the creation and operation a for-profit national database.252 
Article 10 of the Act grants the licensee the right to use the data for ‘purposes of 
financial profit.’ According to Article 5(9) of the Act, the licence was to be 
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temporary and would not be extended for more than 12 years.253 deCODE Genetics 
were granted the licence, ‘but this was fait accompli’254 since deCODE had initiated 
the drafting of the Bill, which went through two drafts before passing.255  
The scope of the HSDA was defined in Article 2;256 it only applied to the collection 
of medical data for the HSD. The HSDA regulates data, primarily ‘non personally 
identifiable data,’257 in contrast to the Biobanks Act No. 110/2000,258 which governs 
the collection, storage, handling and use of human biological samples259 in all 
Icelandic biobanks.260 The HSDA also stated that the health service database was not 
to be transported out of Iceland and that the processing of the database was also to be 
strictly only carried out in Iceland.261 
Most controversially, the HSDA authorised the transfer of all medical record data to 
deCODE Genetics for commercial development without the express consent of 
individuals and relying on a rule of ‘presumed consent’. Individuals had six months 
from the construction of the database to ‘opt-out’ but information on deceased 
individuals was to be automatically included. However, the Act did attempt to 
protect privacy in a number of ways compared to the first draft of the Bill, which had 
not included this six-month opt-out period. The Act did not allow direct access to the 
database or information it contained to third parties, required information to be 
processed in ways that could not be linked to identifiable individuals, and contained 
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penalties for negligent disclosure of information and violations of the act, the 
licence, or government regulations under the HSDA.262   
Winickoff has analysed the legal and ethical implications of the licence, particularly 
the property and ownership implications of the Act which ‘imposed a new regime of 
control of Icelandic medical records.’263 He suggests that procedurally the licence 
‘sever[ed] the ability of doctors to prevent their health institutions from handing over 
patient medical data without their authorisation.’ Instead, the directors of health 
institutions would be empowered to negotiate all transfer of information without 
review by independent ethics committees264 (which was previously protocol).  
Although Notes to the Bill stated that Icelandic health records could not be subject to 
ownership ‘in the usual sense,’265 the government claimed power to provide access 
to the medical information and licence it for commercial use and ‘access, use, and 
control are nothing but the traditional components of property.’266 For Winickoff, the 
public-private model for the biobank created ‘biocapital’ in the collection of data and 
samples that was capable of being ‘owned’ by the state. Consequently, granting 
rights of ownership to deCODE, a for-profit company, gave rise to an ethical tension 
that ultimately undermined the database entirely.  
The HSDA sparked national and international debate as to the appropriate ethical 
and legal framework for the collection of citizen health information and the 
commercial undertone of the Act, coupled with inadequate technological security 
measures and the ‘opt-out’ consent model, caused outcry amongst patient 
organisations. The Icelandic Medical Association publicly opposed the Act, and 
activist groups such as ‘Mannverd’ – ‘Association of Icelanders for Ethics in Science 
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and Medicine’267 argued that the Act threatened the confidentiality and human rights 
of Icelanders based on the Helsinki Declaration and the Nuremberg Code. Despite 
opposition the Act passed; ‘largely because of its demonstrated ability to raise 
investment capital, and the power of its economic promises.’268 However, the 
database was never created. 
In 2003 the Supreme Court of Iceland ruled in Guðmundsdóttir v Iceland 269 that the 
HSD Act was unconstitutional. Guðmundsdóttir brought a claim to exclude her 
deceased father’s clinical record from the database. Previously, the Medical Director 
of Health denied her request on the basis of the Notes on the Bill, which had stated 
that it was not the legislative intent to allow children to opt-out their deceased 
parents.270 Guðmundsdóttir was then denied legal standing by the Icelandic District 
Court in 2001 on the grounds that the information in the database was not personally 
identifying, dismissing her assertion that she had a personal interest in preventing the 
transfer because it was possible to infer information from the data which could also 
apply to herself. The Icelandic Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower 
court on the issue of standing and personal privacy interests on the grounds that the 
technology for the database (one way encryption) did not ensure data anonymity.271 
The Court held that: 
It is unequivocal that the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 71 of the Constitution 
– the provision that ‘everyone shall enjoy freedom from  interference with privacy, 
home, and family life’272 – apply to information of this kind and… guarantee 
protection of privacy in this respect.273  
The ruling occurred against a backdrop of emerging consensus on a national and 
international level that consent of patients was necessary in this context. The HSDA 
‘trigger[ed] a small explosion of international scrutiny and criticism’ which 
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culminated in the World Medical Association declaring that it stood ‘fully behind the 
position taken by the Icelandic Medical Association in opposing the Icelandic 
Healthcare Database legislation recently passed by the Icelandic Parliament,’ 
stressing the need to safeguard the ‘integrity of patient data and to have open access 
to all scientific data.’274 Ultimately this debate undermined and caused the downfall 
of the database.275 
2.2.3 Regulating and financing deCODE today   
After the Guðmundsdóttir ruling, deCODE refocused their strategy on their original 
aim: collecting and building a research database of clinical and genetic information 
collected with informed consent from volunteers of the Icelandic population.276 In 
addition, a number of spin-out companies have consequently been established 
alongside deCODE, including most recently WuXI NextCODE (discussed further in 
due course). 
To date, deCODE Genetics has gathered genotypic and medical data from over 
160,000 volunteers.277 deCODE operates from their headquarters in Reykjavík, 
meaning deCODE’s activities are governed by Icelandic law. Because deCODE 
processes personal information about participants, their activities are regulated by 
Law No. 77/2000 (as amended) on the Protection of Privacy, which applies to any 
electronic processing of personal data.278 Under this Act, information about the 
health of individuals including genotype information is considered sensitive personal 
data279 and the Data Protection Authority is responsible for monitoring the 
application of the Act. 
Although deCODE Genetics continues to operate there have been significant 
obstacles in their path with implications for the biobank resource. In particular, 
deCODE has persisted through financial difficulties; in November 2009 the company 
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filed for bankruptcy in the US with debts of $313.9 million. deCODE had promoted 
and sold its shares to the public in Iceland before offering them worldwide and their 
bankruptcy led to large investment losses for members of the Icelandic public. In 
fact, deCODE’s bankruptcy occurred after Iceland’s own financial crisis and 
bankruptcy in October 2008 which resulted in a $2.1 billion loan by the International 
Monetary Fund in November of the same year. 280  In December 2012 US 
biotechnology private company Amgen purchased the company for $415 million281 
and deCODE is now an entirely private Amgen subsidiary.282 In so doing, 
deCODE’s biobank has ‘clearly… become a ‘private asset’’ 283 and the sale has 
enabled the company to pursue various spin-off opportunities.  
Prior to this sale, deCODE had been offering direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic 
testing kits through their business ‘deCODEme’ to generate more immediate profit 
returns. The deCODEme Complete Scan covered 47 conditions and traits and cost 
around $1000. However, other DTC companies such as 23andMe seemingly out 
priced deCODEme and the tests are no longer available. 284 Now, deCODE’s strategy 
will focus on using whole genome sequencing to understand common diseases and 
human variation:285  
‘One of the ways to truly realize the full value of human genetics, is to make our 
research synergistic with drug development efforts where target discovery, 
validation and prioritization efforts can be accelerated,’ said Kari Stefansson, M.D., 
Dr. Med., founder and CEO at deCODE Genetics. ‘We believe Amgen's focus and 
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ability to incorporate our genetic research into their research and development 
efforts will translate our discoveries into meaningful therapies for patients.’286 
In October 2013 former deCODE executives launched NextCODE Health; a spin-out 
subsidiary private company with a five year licence with Amgen to deCODE’s 
platform. NextCODE focusses on using deCODE’s bioinformatics platform and 
genetic database for clinical genome analysis to develop diagnostics services in the 
clinical setting.287 According to their own website, deCODE claim to have used the 
genotypic and medical data they have collected to put together a genealogy database 
covering the ‘entire present day population and stretching back to the founding of the 
country more than 1000 years ago.’288 NextCODE offer genome interpretation, data 
analysis and next-generation clinical sequencing services to enable researchers and 
clinicians to more quickly, accurately and cheaply decipher whole genome sequence 
data and diagnose conditions.289 NextCODE have also developed the ‘NextCODE 
Exchange’; an internet-based system that allows genomic data to be shared instantly 
across the globe. This year, NextCODE was sold to Chinese pharma company, 
WuXi PharmaTech, for 8.5 billion ISK ($65 million).290 
In addition to financial uncertainty, deCODE has faced sustained challenges from the 
legal and ethical community. In May 2013, the Icelandic Data Protection Authority 
rejected a request from deCODE to allow it to apply computational methods to the 
country’s genealogical records to estimate the genotypes of 280,000 Icelanders who 
had not previously agreed to take part in the company’s research. This is an approach 
whereby the odds of an individual carrying a particular genetic variant are estimated 
without directly sequencing their DNA. deCODE had conducted whole genome 
sequencing of approximately 2,500 participants at the time of the challenge but 
wanted to use this approach to extend the data to many more, including the close 
relatives of the volunteers. deCODE argued that according to Article 9 of the Act, 
processing of sensitive personal data can be carried out in the interests of scientific 
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research without consent when the public interest of such research outweigh the 
privacy interests of the data subject. The Data Protection Authority refused and ruled 
that first deCODE had to obtain informed consent, according to Act No. 77/2000, 
Directive 95/46/EC (which Act No.77/2000 implements) and Article 6 European 
Convention on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data.291  
Even more recently, deCODE has attempted to recruit volunteers to give DNA 
samples by sending swab packs in the post together with information that couriers 
would collect the samples from willing participants. For every sample collected by 
the couriers (volunteers from Icelandic Search and Rescue (ICE-SAR)), deCODE 
offer a $20 donation to the charity. This has not been well received by those 
advocating group privacy rights, especially because of the shared nature of genetic 
information:  
They can fill in the missing gaps… deCODE has collected so much information that 
we might become the first nation to be genome sequenced. Now it becomes much 
more than asking questions about an individual’s privacy – we are talking about 
group privacy… and whether we can be discriminated against as a member of that 
group.292  
Despite ethical, legal and financial difficulties, it is evident that deCODE is 
producing significant scientific research findings and in this regard is a success.293 
On March 25 2015, deCODE announced that it had sequenced the genomes of 2,636 
people from Iceland. They then culled data from genealogical records and other 
genetic sources to project the genetics of 101,584 more. A total of four studies were 
published online in Nature Genetics reporting many markers for common diseases 
such as Alzheimer’s: ‘Large-scale whole-genome sequencing of the Icelandic 
population;’ ‘Identification of a large set of rare complete human knockouts;’ ‘The 
Y-chromosome point mutation rate in humans;’ and ‘Loss-of-function variants in 
ABCA7 confer risk of Alzheimer’s disease.’ Stefansson has hailed deCODE as 
‘probably the most productive entity in human genetics in the entire world’ and 
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maintains ‘most Icelanders support our work’. 294 Stefansson even advocates this as a 
model for the future, including for the US Precision Medicine Initiative.295  
Overall, the deCODE legacy demonstrates just how entrenched population biobanks 
are in science, technology, ethics, politics, culture and law. The downfall of the 
Icelandic National Database was an early and important regulatory lesson for 
population biobanks. Even though specific biobank legislation was enacted to govern 
Iceland’s national database, the fact that the regulation provided an exclusive licence 
to a for-profit company to access individual’s data using an opt-out model meant it 
was ultimately deemed unethical and unlawful by the national and international 
community. Despite starting as a ‘unique blending of public and private: through an 
enabling statute and commercial license,’ ultimately, ‘this bold public-private 
experiment was a failure.’296 Crucially, ethical challenges of consent, privacy and 
commercialisation in biobanking were illuminated, which no doubt informed the 
creation of Estonia’s national biobank, as will now be analysed.  
In particular, the themes that have emerged so far from the discussion of the 
Icelandic ‘biobank’ model, which include the choice of a regulatory mix of public 
and private ownership and control of the database by the Icelandic government and 
deCODE, as well as the public-private mixed financial model, will be explored in 
relation to the Estonian model. This analysis aims to identify commonalities and 
differences in the historical development of these international biobank examples, 
which may be informative for investigation into UK Biobank in the remaining 
chapters of this thesis. 
2.3 Estonia  
Much like the experience of Iceland, the historical development of the Estonian 
population biobank demonstrates how crucial financial models are for biobank 
sustainability and success. Despite a unique and forward thinking piece of biobank 
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specific regulation, the Estonian government established the (then) Estonian Genome 
Project (EGP) with a public-private partnership model and predominately private 
funding. In December 2000, the Estonian Parliament passed the Human Genes 
Research Act (HGRA); a purpose built statute the primary purpose of which is to 
establish and govern the (then) EGP for a national population biobank. In 2007, the 
Estonian State funded 1.15 million euros, and 7.7 million euros were guaranteed for 
the years 2007-2009 to sustain the biobank, following the termination of private 
funding.297 As of November 2009, the Estonian Genome Project became the 
Estonian Genome Centre, University of Tartu (EGCUT).298  
Ultimately, this partnership highlighted the difference in priorities between public 
and private investors in genomics research and between short-term drug 
developments compared with research for long-term benefits for the general public. 
The Estonian experience also illustrates deeper ethical tensions about ‘ownership’ in 
research involving human material. Combined, these challenges led to the temporary 
collapse of the Project, which subsequently undermined the public trust in the 
Project and significantly hindered its progress. To date, the wholly public biobank 
has recruited only half of the 100,000 participants that it originally set out to 
recruit.299 Thus, much like the Icelandic example, the evolution and organisation of 
the Estonian biobank is particularly interesting in terms of its choice of regulatory 
and financial model. 
2.3.1 Organisational development of the Estonian Genome Project  
The historical development of the EGP between 1999-2006 has been well narrated 
by Kattel and Suurna300 and this chapter draws on the authors’ analysis for this 
period.  
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The initiative for the EGP ‘came very clearly from the scientists themselves.’301 In 
January 1999, scientists from the University of Tartu and other scientists from 
Estonia formed the Estonian Genome Project Foundation (EGPF), which ‘effectively 
became the organisation that started to work very actively in establishing a 
nationwide genetic database.’302 The aim of the EGP was to create a database of 
health, genealogy and genome data from a large part of Estonia’s population, to 
enable research into links between genes, environmental factors and common 
diseases and help new discoveries in genomics and epidemiology for increasing 
efficacy of health care in the future.303  
Politically, though, the Project was ‘positioned as a policy agenda that could play a 
key role in considerably strengthening the Estonian economy, creating an Estonian 
biotechnology industry and helping Estonia’s ‘return back’ to Europe.’304 According 
to initial plans in 2000, the EGP was intended to support existing entrepreneurship in 
the field of medical biotechnology, which is seen ‘as one of the ‘core technologies’ 
in transforming Estonia into a knowledge-based economy’. For the public sector, the 
biobank combined aspirations of improving the general economic position of Estonia 
internationally and actively contributing to the ‘reshaping of new, democratic, post-
Soviet Estonia.’305 
During the preparation phases of the Estonian Genome Project, ‘two important ideas 
took shape: first, as the Human Genes Research Act would later state, the genetic 
database would, by the act of the government, be started as a foundation (a private 
legal entity); second, the financing of the database would come from both public and 
private sources.’ The details of the financing of the database will be discussed in due 
course in this chapter, following an overview of the Act, which codified in an 
overriding single document the law for the governance of the (then) EGP to address 
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the ethical challenges of biobanking that have been discussed in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis.306 
2.3.2 The Human Genes Research Act  
The idea of an EGP was first publicised in 1999 following a series of interviews with 
scientists from the EGPF. Around a year later, Parliament ‘without any significant 
discussions internally or within the media’307 passed the Human Genes Research Act 
in December 2000.308 The HGRA established the necessary institutional and 
organizational framework of the EGP to regulate the establishment and maintenance 
of an Estonian ‘Gene Bank’ and to organise genetic research thereof. At the same 
time, the Act aimed to ensure the voluntary nature of gene donation and 
confidentiality of their donation and ensure protection from misuse of genetic data 
and genetic discrimination.309 Today, an updated version of this same Act regulates 
the EGCUT, although the procedures of the EGCUT must also be in conjunction 
with Estonia’s Data Protection Act and the Public Information Act.310  
According to s 1(2) of the Act, the following are provided for in the HGRA: 
1) The conditions for processing tissue samples, descriptions of DNA, descriptions 
of state of health and genealogies in the Gene Bank; 
2) The rights and obligations of gene donors, the chief processor and authorised 
processors of the Gene Bank and genetic researchers relating to tissue samples, 
descriptions of DNA, descriptions of state of health and genealogies; 
3) The conditions for the establishment and maintenance of the Gene Bank; 
4) The restrictions on the use of tissue samples, descriptions of DNA, descriptions of 
state of health and genealogies collected in the Gene Bank; 
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5) The conditions for genetic research relating to the Gene Bank and the 
organisation of supervision thereof.311 
Organisationally, the HGRA establishes a ‘chief processor’ to manage the Gene 
Bank;312 who accordingly has the right to ‘organise the taking of tissue samples… to 
perform research and to collect, store, destroy and issue genetic data.’313 According 
to the Act, the objectives of the chief processor are to: 
1) promote the development of genetic research; 
2) collect information on the health of the Estonian population and genetic 
information concerning the Estonian population; 
3) use the results of genetic research to improve public health.314 
Originally, the chief processor that was established by the Government of the 
Republic of Estonia in 2001 was the EGPF, a non-profit organisation under the 
Ministry of Social Affairs.315 The terms of the Act316 allowed the EGPF to contract 
with authorised processors, physical or legal persons, or researchers to whom it can 
delegate its processing privileges.317 This enabled them to ‘retain control over the 
type of research undertaken as well as the macro and micro management of the 
authorised processor’s research’ such as conditions for storage, security processes 
and accountability mechanisms.318  
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2.3.3 Public-Private Partnership: The Estonian Genome Project 
Foundation and EGeen Ltd 
During the preparatory phase of the EGP, representatives of the EGPF spoke about 
the share of public funding ‘as amounting to 1/3 of the 100 million euros’. However, 
the public funding of the project remained ‘symbolic’ until 2007.319 So, in 2001, the 
EGPF as chief processor founded and granted an exclusive 25 year commercial 
licence to use anonymous data from the biobank to a private company: EGeen Ltd, 
which was registered in Estonia. EGeen Ltd held exclusive and commercialisation 
rights of the EGP. This licence aimed to facilitate further private funding from 
international investors, and financed the preparation and establishment of the 
biobank during 2001-2002.320 Until this point, the Estonian government had 
provided only initial funding of 64,000 euros for the initial costs to create the 
EGPF.321 EGeen Ltd was obligated to make the annual payment of about 300 
thousand euros to the EGPF; there were also additional payments depending on the 
financial success: unlimited annual profit payment of 0.5 % and 3% of the 
turnover.’322 
Kattel and Suurna speculate as to the origin of this decision:  
[i]n 2000, the initiators foresaw that the EPG would need funding at least in the 
range of 100 million euros over the next 4-5 years, and it must have been clear for 
everybody involved that such levels of public funding would not be available. At the 
same time, there seemed to be quite strong enthusiasm about finding private 
financing, particularly from abroad. In fact, in 2001, Raim Tamm, representing LHV 
investment bank, which was advising the group of scientists from the Estonian 
Genome Foundation, spoke openly about the project as something that should be 
attractive to venture capitalists (Eesti Päevaleht 2001). Indeed, it is in this phase of 
establishing the EGP that the focus of the project seems to shift decidedly form a 
scientific long term endeavour to a commercial project, where innovation and 
venture capital become dominant. 
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Thus, setting up the database as a foundation seemed to enable the involvement of 
private funding without many regulatory problems.323 
In turn, the EGPF and EGeen Ltd founded a US-based private company, EGeen Inc 
(EGI), which pooled funding from different venture capital firms (mostly 
international) and private individuals (mostly Estonians).324 However, this public-
private funding model lasted for only three years from 2001-2004, when the contract 
between the EGeen Ltd and the EGPF was terminated. During those three years the 
EGI had financed the Project, totalling 4.3 million euros. Hence, during this period, 
the governance structure of the EGP has been described as ‘an independent 
foundation established by the Estonian government and almost fully financed by 
foreign and local private venture capital. In essence, it was a public-private 
partnership in science, research and development.’325 
It has been argued that this partnership ended because of disagreement over the 
scientific strategy of the Foundation and the purpose of the Gene Bank. Gottweis 
describes that the first conflicts in the Project began in 2003 when the EGI argued 
that the Project should change the way the samples were gathered to have a narrower 
focus that concentrated on specific disease groups, rather than continuing as a broad 
population biobank.326 Tension emerged between the public and private investors and 
it appeared that the EGI were more focussed on the short-term financial returns of 
the Gene Bank than the long-term research results and their impact on public 
health327 to be derived from a population biobank, which the EGPF prioritised.328  
Whereas the scientific motivation behind the Icelandic Health Sector Database 
focussed on the homogeneity of the Icelandic population, scientists in Estonia 
stressed the heterogeneity of Estonians (the result of various occupations over the 
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last few hundred years) as representative of the European gene pool as a whole.329 In 
terms of commercialisation, this was perceived to be an advantage of a population-
based model rather than a narrower disease based database.330 The returns did not 
match the expectations of the US parent company, which was ‘obviously interested 
in the short-term commercial success’331 and eventually this disagreement led to the 
termination of the exclusive licence and financing contract with EGI in November 
2004.  
The termination of the contract meant that EGeen Ltd was no longer obligated to 
finance the genome project and the activity of the project, including data collection, 
was frozen between 2004 and 2007. During this time negotiations took place 
between scientists (led by Professor Metspalu) and politicians332 as to how to finance 
the Project and achieve the goals set out of the HGRA. In 2007, the Estonian 
Parliament passed the Amendment of the Human Genes Research Act that provided 
a legal basis for the EGP to continue as a structural unit of the University of Tartu. 
The current Estonian Gene Bank is an entirely public venture funded directly by the 
Estonian State and accountable to the State via the HGRA. ‘Essentially, the EGP was 
turned (back) into a basic science venture, where results will be available only in the 
long term.’333 
2.3.4 Protecting participants and securing public trust 
The failure of the public-private business model undermined the trust of the public 
despite the strength of the regulatory framework for the biobank. For the recruitment 
of participants and for the collection of samples and health data, a unique network of 
data collectors was set up consisting of General Practitioners (GPs) and other 
medical personnel in private practices and hospitals. Recruitment via GPs had 
provided several advantages, especially because of Estonian information technology 
infrastructure and electronic health records available for all GPs.334 Keis has 
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described how ‘starting data collection again after a three year break was extremely 
difficult. The EGC had lost the trust not only of society but also of the general 
practitioners as well. A large number of general practitioners ceased to collect data 
for the biobank. The EGCUT had to establish another data collection network 
through participant recruitment offices.’335 It took until 2009 for the EGCUT to 
collect the necessary data to move into the research phase of the biobank.336 To date, 
the Gene Bank has 51,515 participants.337 
The HGRA should now be recognised as a notably rights-based piece of biobank 
legislation that adopts a favourable position towards biobank participants. The 
HGRA was founded on UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights338 and the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention), which Estonia has signed and ratified.339 This 
has significant implications for the content of the HGRA, including the ‘Rights of 
Gene Donors’ which are uniquely extensive:   
(1) Gene donors have the right not to know their genetic data. 
(2) Gene donors have the right to access personally their data stored in the Gene 
Bank. Gene donors do not have the right to access their genealogies. 
(3) Gene donors shall not be charged for accessing their data stored in the Gene 
Bank. 
(4) Gene donors have the right to genetic counselling upon accessing their data 
stored in the Gene Bank.340 
By granting gene donors the right to know and not to know their genetic data, the 
HGRA significantly prioritises the autonomous interests of donors in the Gene Bank. 
The HGRA is also unique in its provision of genetic counselling. Combined these 
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provisions recognise and legislate for the ethical challenge of managing results that 
may arise as a consequence of taking part in biobanking. This position is likely 
influenced by the Oviedo Convention, which upholds an individual’s right to know 
information collected about his or her health and maintains that ‘the wishes of 
individuals not to be so informed shall be observed.’341 As will be seen in Chapter 4, 
this is distinguishable from the UK regulatory position, which does not expressly 
recognise a right to know or not to know one’s genetic information (indeed, the UK 
is not a signatory to the Oviedo Convention).  
According to the Act, participants are required to sign a consent form informing 
them of these rights. Participants provide broad consent that allows participation in a 
wide range of research projects without having to re-contact participants for re-
consent.342 The governance model of the biobank requires applicant research projects 
to be approved by the Ethics Committee on Human Research of the University of 
Tartu, which is an independent, multidisciplinary body with its own governing 
‘Statute’.343 Once the Ethics Committee approves an application it must then be 
approved by the Scientific Advisory Board of the EGCUT, who evaluate the 
scientific validity of a project against the main objectives of the HGRA. A Material 
Transfer Agreement reflecting the conduct of the researcher, the EGCUT and third 
parties, including the return of results to the EGCUT, is also required.344 A website 
based at the University of Tartu provides transparent public access to all of this 
information.345  
2.4 Conclusion 
To summarise, at the time of UK Biobank’s development, between 1999-2004, 
Estonia and Iceland were two suitably comparative examples of models for the 
regulation and governance of a population biobank in the UK. Both countries had 
enacted specific legislation to regulate the collection, storage and use of samples and 
data and to manage the ethical challenges that are raised by such activities. As 
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previously stated, such recourse to law is arguably the natural reaction to new social 
challenges.346 However, when the Icelandic Act on Biobanks347 was declared 
unconstitutional this was an important lesson for biobank institutions, challenging 
the assumption that specific legislation would guarantee the necessary and effective 
protection of the range of interests at stake in biobanking.348 Indeed, as highlighted 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis, population biobanks raise ongoing challenges and this 
makes ‘biobanking and the law uneasy bedfellows.’349  
Important lessons can also be drawn from the Estonian experience of biobanking in 
terms of biobank sustainability and organisational management. Crucially, the 
original EGP was a Foundation established and legally owned by the government of 
Estonia but funded almost entirely by private companies. Considerable private sector 
involvement resulted in a serious conflict of interests and highlighted fundamental 
tensions between the expectation of private investors, who prioritised short-term 
innovation and commercialisation, and the reality of population biobanking, which is 
now understood to deliver more long-term and undefined benefits for public health 
(Chapter 1). Private sector involvement threatened the objective of the initiative and 
ultimately a misalignment of expectations caused the management structure to fall 
apart.  A complete re-organisation of the governance structure was required for the 
EGP to continue, and today the EGP is the EGCUT and is directly funded by the 
government and wholly owned by the University of Tartu.  
When it came to building a population biobank in the UK, the experiences in Iceland 
and Estonia raised two fundamental questions: how the biobank should be 
established, of which funding is a key issue; and how the biobank should be 
regulated. Chapter 4 of this thesis will describe the UK’s regulatory framework for 
biobanking, which notably does not include biobank specific legislation. Instead, a 
‘patchwork’ of laws spanning a number of areas meant that there were two choices 
for UK Biobank’s regulatory model: modify or create a new piece of legislation to 
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statutorily create UK Biobank in the same way as Estonia and Iceland, or establish 
the biobank without a specific statutory basis.  
The next chapter will describe the origins of UK Biobank to understand the 
motivations and pressures that were behind the choice of legal structure for the 
establishment of UK Biobank.  UK Biobank was built with a public good mission 
and is often described as a ‘public’350 biobank because it is funded by a partnership 
between public bodies: the DH and the MRC and the WT; a private, non-for-profit 
research charity dedicated to promoting research that is for the public benefit.351 As 
the next chapter will illustrate, such significant public investment led to an 
organisational model for UK Biobank that would guarantee financial security and 
sustainability and inspire public trust.  
UK Biobank was established with a legal basis as a charitable company limited by 
guarantee, UK Biobank Ltd, and to a limited extent this is a similar approach to that 
of the Estonian Genome Foundation previously discussed. However, in contrast to 
the Estonian model, UK Biobank’s charitable incorporation has implications for the 
expectations of the outputs of UK Biobank, which must be run for the public benefit 
(to be analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6). It is possible that this incorporation 
minimizes the potential for the conflicts of interest that were experienced in the early 
stages of the Estonian biobank and still persist in Iceland today. One of the aims of 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis is to investigate how far this is the case.  
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3.1 Introduction  
It is in view of the comparative experiences of biobanks in Iceland and Estonia that 
the origins and development of UK Biobank will now be considered. Analysis of 
these biobank models has illustrated the social, political and economic nexus352 in 
which biobanks are entrenched; which has the power to undermine comprehensive 
regulatory regimes. Both Iceland and Estonia required substantial private investment 
to establish their biobanks and get them up and running. However, this commercial 
investment significantly challenged the future success of these biobanks.  
This chapter will describe the origins of UK Biobank and socio-legal discussion of 
the development of UK Biobank will situate this thesis in the economic, social and 
political context of the UK at the time of the UK Biobank’s creation. The first 
section of the chapter will show that UK Biobank was initially a governmental 
response to the scientific imperative for a population-based biobank following the 
success of the Human Genome Project in sequencing the human genome.353 The next 
section will signal the key decision makers in the process, drawing on a broad range 
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of primary sources and empirical evidence.354 Consequently, significant funding had 
to be secured to establish the biobank, whether from public or private funds. 
Crucially, organisers needed an institutional design to facilitate the establishment of 
a population biobank in the UK that was suitably regulated. While extensive 
Parliamentary and public debate preceded the establishment of UK Biobank, there is 
evidence that not all recommendations were followed, giving rise to questions as to 
the robustness of the eventual model.  
3.2 Background  
3.2.1 The UK and a ‘genetic revolution’  
The United Kingdom is in a unique position to capitalise on, and derive benefit 
from, advances in human genetics.355 
As discussion in the previous chapters has demonstrated, ‘new generation’ large-
scale biobanks are ambitious and expensive ventures. One of the reasons for the 
development of UK Biobank was the presence of strong, expert organisations 
financially capable and motivated enough to drive the project forward, backed by 
governmental ambition to become world leaders in biomedical research. 
Contextually, UK Biobank was originally intended to be one of the first steps 
towards building a national DNA database of everyone in the NHS; an idea first 
proposed amidst the success of the HGP in sequencing of the human genome.356  
The Human Genome Project (HGP) 
From the beginning, the HGP and the race between the publicly funded sequence 
project led by John Sulston at the UK Sanger Centre and the private project led by 
Craig Venter in the US, illustrated a tension between innovation and 
commercialisation in biomedical research that has been demonstrated by the 
Estonian and Icelandic biobanks, and continues today.  
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In the UK, the WT and MRC were key players in the UK’s mission to sequence the 
human genome. During the course of the late 1980’s to the early 1990’s, John 
Sulston and his colleagues had been working on mapping the genome of the 
nematode worm at the MRC’s Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge. The 
MRC is funded by the British taxpayer (through Parliament) and works closely with 
the Department of Health. The MRC receives annual ‘grant-in-aid’ funding from 
Parliament through the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, with which 
the MRC bids in the Comprehensive Spending Review.357   
In the early 1990’s, the MRC approached the WT proposing a partnership to fund 
Sulston’s worm sequencing as a pilot for the HGP.358 The WT is a global charitable 
foundation established in 1936 as an independent charity359 and with donations 
totalling approximately £13.9 billion it is the UK’s largest non-governmental source 
of funds for biomedical research. The WT proposed a much larger sequencing effort 
in competition with the Human Genome Project in the US. This led Sulston to 
submit a grant application in 1992 for £40-50 million to fund the WT Sanger Centre, 
where the British arm of the HGP sequencing efforts would take place in pursuit of a 
publicly available sequence.360 The Wellcome Trust Sanger Centre opened in 1993 
after receiving an initial £46.5 million from the WT, and in March 2000 the 
announcement was made that the project had been a success.  
Due to this heavy involvement in the HGP, the WT, MRC and UK Government were 
aware that in isolation the HGP findings would not create practical benefits for the 
UK population. The scientific imperative for a large-scale resource in the UK was 
voiced; to realise the potential of human genetics research, scientists wanted to 
access both genetic and informative data from large numbers of individuals over 
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long periods of time, to note their disease and other outcomes and look for 
correlations between those health outcomes, genetic make-up and other life 
circumstances.361  
The UK Government conducted a comprehensive review of the regulatory and 
advisory framework for human genetics and biotechnology in May 1999.362 The 
review concluded that in response to rapid developments in human genetics, the 
advisory framework for biotechnology needed to be more transparent, to gain public 
and professional confidence; be more streamlined, to avoid gaps, overlaps and 
fragmentation; ensure capacity to deal with rapid developments; and take broad 
social and ethical issues fully into account. To maximise the benefits from potential 
advances in human genetics, the Government needed advice from a variety of 
sources and as a result the (then) Human Genetics Commission (HGC) was 
established.363 
3.2.2 NHS reform and public- private partnerships in the UK 
At the same time the newly elected Labour government was leading the biggest ever 
Government led public-private science partnership for science in the UK, as well as 
reform of the NHS and importantly, medical records. This added impetus to the 
scientific pushes for access to informational patient data, with the aspiration to 
maximise the use of NHS resources that were considered by some an ‘under-utilised’ 
resource.364 
In December 1997 the Department of Health White Paper: The New NHS; Modern, 
Dependable set out policy for the internal market to be replaced by a system called 
integrated care ‘based on partnership and driven by performance.’365 This marked the 
start of a ten year programme for the NHS and in July 1998 the then UK Chancellor, 
Gordon Brown announced £1.1 billion would be provided for the science base 
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through a public-private partnership to support innovative research programmes, 
with the help of £400 million from the WT.366 This announcement signified an 
increasing role for charities like WT and the private sector as a whole. As will be 
discussed this reform goes some way to explaining subsequent funding decisions for 
UK Biobank.  
In 1998, the Department of Health released Information for Health; An Information 
Strategy for the Modern NHS 1998-2005. Two years later, The NHS Plan; A plan for 
investment, A plan for reform followed. These strategies signalled Labour reform of 
the NHS: ‘a 1940’s system operating in a 21st century world.’367 ‘Modernising 
Britain’ was a central theme of the Government’s programme since it came to office 
in May 1997. Crucial to this objective was the drive to modernise the NHS; ‘giving 
people of this country the best healthcare in the world.’368 The aim was to update the 
health service by increasing funding, both public and private; enforcing far-reaching 
changes across the NHS to ultimately ensure patients received the best possible care. 
To this end, Information for Health envisaged the Electronic Health Record 
(EHR).369 During the period of this strategy, the first versions of EHRs were 
developed and implemented with the aim of ensuring seamless information transfer, 
where authorised, across all sectors of the NHS.370 Introducing individual patient 
NHS numbers to be used as an identifier throughout the health service was also seen 
as a means to facilitate this linkage.371 
The NHS Plan published on 1st July 2000 made a strong commitment to ‘a long-term 
study’, emphasising that it was vital for the NHS to play an ‘active and collaborative 
role’ in realising the benefits of genetics: 
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We will contribute with other government departments and medical charities to a 
long-term study of the interaction between genetics and the environment in common 
diseases of adults such as cancer, heart disease and diabetes.372 
New genetics research partnerships between the NHS and industry were proposed in 
The NHS Plan and an extra £250 million was promised for information technology 
in 2003/2004.373 The existence of the NHS meant that the UK was uniquely well 
positioned to generate valuable epidemiological data; ‘providing the doorway to one 
of the largest sources of medical data and well-characterised human biological 
samples within Europe, consisting of 50 years of family records, ethnic diversity, 
access to disease (tissue) libraries and excellent clinical research frameworks.’374 
However, to do so, the NHS needed considerable investment in systems to collect 
standardised and comparable data on clinical history, consultations and 
investigations, and to allow linkage across different data sets.375  
To date, the EHR has facilitated continued progress in NHS England. Most 
significantly, the Health and Social Care Act was enacted in 2012 and in late 2012 
the UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced plans to sequence 100,000 
genomes.376 The project aims to establish a genomic medicine service within the 
NHS and support the Government Strategy for UK Life Sciences.377 UK Biobank 
was envisaged during a period of widespread reform of the NHS and UK Biobank 
has successfully tested the methodology of data linkage to NHS medical records. 
Overall, the future vision is to establish England as one of the world’s leading 
centres for innovation in digital health and care services;378 a vision in which UK 
Biobank has played an early, vital role.  
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3.2.3 Policy debate and consultation   
During the early stages of the development of what was to become UK Biobank 
there was considerable debate both in and out of Parliament as to the general issues 
raised by biobanking, as well particular issues associated with the creation of a 
population biobank in the UK.  
Human Genetics Commission 
The original proposal for a research facility linking clinical and genetic data was 
planned in parallel with two reports from the HGC and progress was contingent on 
report findings:379 Whose hands on your genes?380 and Inside Information.381  
The HGC consultation paper on the storage, protection and use of personal genetic 
information382 and subsequent report Inside Information identified the main principle 
of respect for persons383 as the basis for biobanking, and highlighted the importance 
of balancing the demands of autonomy with the interests of others in line with 
principles of genetic solidarity and altruism.384 Four secondary principles relevant to 
personal genetic information were identified: privacy- a person should not be obliged 
to disclose information about his or her genetic characteristics; consent- genetic 
information about a person should generally not be obtained, held, or communicated 
without that person’s free and informed consent; confidentiality- genetic information 
should generally be treated as being of a confidential nature; and non-discrimination- 
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no person shall be unfairly discriminated against on the basis of his or her genetic 
characteristics.385  
Parliamentary discussion of imperative for a national database and 
appropriate legal framework 
Human genetic databases also formed the topic of Parliamentary debate in 2000. The 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology launched an enquiry 
into the challenges and opportunities that they raised.386 In the main, the Committee 
Report was geared towards the potential development of a national DNA database 
consisting of electronic NHS medical records linked with DNA samples, which had 
been proposed by George Poste in his written evidence to the report.387 To this end, 
Poste had voiced the need for public/private investment in the UK (as discussed 
above):  
A strategy must be articulated to identify and mobilise the appropriate scientific and 
clinical skills, to build a large-scale computational infrastructure and to debate, and 
address, the ethical, legal, political and social dimensions relating to the use of 
clinical information... To express this strategy and share value, we require a pre-
competitive, public/private consortium, fusing technologies and encompassing NHS 
R&D capacity, private companies, universities and medical research funders and 
government. Creation of the health resource database transcends both what the NHS 
is currently doing in information technology and what researchers are building with 
genomic databases. A consortial approach would generate a new lead for the UK in 
the biosciences and their application in the delivery of rational medicine. 388 
[Emphasis added] 
The report also expressed strong support for a large national database created to 
study the interactions of genetic and lifestyle factors in the occurrence of disease:389 
the ‘UK Population Biomedical Collection.’ In consideration of both proposals, the 
Report concluded that linkage of a participant’s medical records with genetic 
lifestyle data necessitated development of both the UK’s infrastructure and the 
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methodology to obtain access to NHS records.390 The Report stressed that the NHS 
needed considerable investment in systems to collect standardised and comparable 
data on clinical history, consultations and investigations, and to allow linkage across 
different data sets.391  
The House of Lords acknowledged the primary importance of the DPA in governing 
genetic information in light of the definition of personal data under the DPA.392 The 
Committee recommended; ‘The…Government should conclude that the primary 
means of regulating human genetic databases should be the DPA and that, except as 
recommended… no additional protection is required for personal genetic data.’393 
The Report maintained that after examining the issues arising from human genetic 
databases and the principles that might inform regulatory arrangements, ‘The more 
we considered the evidence received, the clearer it became that regulation of human 
genetic databases per se was neither necessary nor feasible…’394 It was concluded 
that the provisions in the DPA are ‘adequate for the purpose’ and ‘any regulatory 
framework would be impossibly cumbersome.’395  
3.3 Building UK Biobank 
Once the scientific imperative was voiced and the potential of the NHS to facilitate 
linkage noted, the subsequent challenge was to choose an institutional framework to 
enable the type of research requested by scientists effectively and securely, while at 
the same time inspiring and protecting the general public. The challenge for experts 
and stakeholders was to determine the scope and design the shape of UK Biobank.  
3.3.1 Proposal  
In 1998, the MRC bid to the Comprehensive Spending Review stressing the need for 
‘large collections of well-characterised human DNA samples for research on gene 
function and the interaction between genetic and environmental risk factors in multi-
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factorial diseases.’396 Following this bid, a MRC Working Group on DNA sample 
collections and facilities for large-scale genetic typing met in May 1998 and defined 
three types of study needed: very large case control studies to identify disease genes 
or disease modifier genes; large longitudinal cohorts to study gene-environment 
interaction using prospectively gathered information on exposure and lifestyle; and 
large, well-documented case series with non-responders and responders identified 
from within the series to identify genes affecting treatment response.397 
The first discussion of the proposed UK Population Biomedical Collection emerged 
as a result of a meeting between the MRC and WT on 14th May 1999.398 This 
workshop brought together other funders and scientists involved in existing 
epidemiological surveys. The focus of the workshop was on multi-factorial diseases 
of significant public health importance. The attendees were asked to consider, in the 
light of collections already available in the UK, whether it would be valuable to set 
up one or more large new collections in the UK, and, if so, what form it/they should 
take.399 There was general agreement that existing cohorts established for other 
purposes would not be suitable for a number of reasons, including the 
appropriateness of existing consent and the technical limitations of existing 
resources, whose size were considered insufficient to provide the necessary number 
of incidents of disease to be statistically valid and capable of being linked to 
environmental factors:400 
In the UK and world-wide, most existing collections are too small to allow 
statistically meaningful research, do not have enough high quality health 
information, have too little DNA left, or are not based on full consent for this sort of 
research.401 
The workshop established an Expert Working Committee to develop the outline for 
the resource and the Group produced a report and recommendations in March 2000. 
The report proposed the establishment of a cohort; 500,000 adults aged 45-64 for the 
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study of interaction between genetic and environmental risk factors for common 
multi-factorial diseases. It also recommended the creation of a birth cohort of 
approximately 20,000-50,000 to construct a population profile of exposure and 
immunological responses to the prevailing infections in the UK.402 However, the 
Group stressed the higher priority of the former, which was predicted to have more 
of an impact on public health in the medium term since disease would develop faster 
in this age range and because it was at a more developed stage of planning.403 The 
report was approved by the MRC Council and WT Governors and circulated to the 
MRC Research Boards, WT Panels and individual experts for comment on the 
ethical, legal and management issues involved prior to further protocol development.  
3.3.2 Public-private funding for UK Biobank 
The project envisaged by the Expert Working Committee required substantial 
funding, both in the short term to build the resource, and in the long term when 
industry would be invited to join the research later on for specific projects that they 
would fund.404 UK Biobank was to be an exceptionally large-scale resource. A 
suitably large amount of funding was needed for its creation; potentially outside the 
scope of the private sector capabilities. In other words, for UK Biobank to succeed it 
needed to be backed and financed by the Government. The MRC and the WT 
committed funds to Biobank as early as June 2000, when the proposal for the UK 
Population Biomedical Collection was agreed in principle.405 Despite representation 
on the Expert Working Committee, the Department of Health had not at this stage 
dedicated funding. The MRC expressed their desire for Governmental involvement 
and funding for the project: 
It is currently assumed that the MRC and WT will be partners in funding the setting 
up of the resource, and will provide the majority of the necessary funding, although 
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it is hoped that the Department of Health, the Scottish Executive and other charities 
may also contribute.406  
The need for Government involvement was also raised in the House of Lords 4th 
Select Committee on Science and Technology 4th Report on Human Genetic 
Databases.407 Written evidence noted the ‘obligation’ of the NHS to act as a research 
resource for the development of initiatives that would improve the quality of care, 
for which new public-private partnerships were vital. Indeed, the challenge of high 
cost new technologies had led other industry sectors to explore the value of 
precompetitive public-private consortia to generate innovation.408 In the same way, 
‘the time has come when the escalating cost of life sciences research requires 
analogous activities in healthcare.’ 
We envisage a precompetitive public-private consortium requiring a fusion of 
technologies (particularly biomedical, informatics, and communications disciplines), 
involving multiple companies, universities, medical research charities and 
government… The challenge now lies in forging the relationships for this 
partnership, for improved training, and for consideration of the ethical and social 
issues, in order to ensure that the potential value of epidemiology is realised to 
produce better health and quality of life.409  
Thus, UK Biobank was an opportunity for the UK Government to put the UK at the 
forefront of genomics research. Funders were keen to facilitate the type of research 
required and initial funding for the project of £45 million was announced by the 
MRC, WT (£20 million each) and Department of Health (DH £5 million) in April 
2002.410 Active involvement from the DH was confirmed in 2002 in a House of 
Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology Report.411 Here, it was 
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explained412 that the WT, MRC and DH would be continually committed to UK 
Biobank and it was expected that the biobank would in time generate income; from 
industrial organisations that would use the information.413 Questioning the 
enthusiasm of industry about Biobank, the Select Committee asked; ‘Are the 
industry jumping up and down with this idea and saying ‘we would love to put 
millions into this?’ Are you hearing from them at all?’414   
What we are hearing from industry is it is important that something like this is set 
up, in the first instance, without industrial funds so that it clearly belongs to the 
public domain. Once you have it set up, yes, we would very much want to be part of 
it and we would come in.415  
It has also been argued that the decision to fund the UK Biobank from a variety of 
public and private resources was informed by the Icelandic database, which was 
suffering huge criticism for its approach at the same time as UK Biobank was 
developing in the UK (Chapter 2).416 High costs, coupled with a Governmental push 
for public-private partnership and lessons from Iceland and public outcry over their 
privately owned population biobank, ultimately resulted in £62 million initial 
funding from the UK Government and the WT to create UK Biobank. In turn, there 
was a pressing need to justify the use of public funds for a project like UK Biobank. 
3.3.3 Consulting with stakeholders417  
It was important that the ethical issues of biobanking were given proper 
consideration by UK Biobank developers and were shown to be given such 
consideration, to be deemed legitimate and ensure overall success (Chapters 1 and 
2). In a bid for openness and transparency, a number of consultations were 
conducted and commissioned by the funding bodies with a variety of groups 
including: industry, interest groups, scientists, health workers, general practitioners 
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and the public to inspire confidence in the endeavour.418 Initiatives such as the WT 
Biomedical Ethics Programme,419 and numerous workshops organised by UK 
Biobank funders, considered the ethical challenges of human biological sample 
collections. Cragg Ross Dawson undertook public consultation in 2000, funded by 
the MRC and WT to investigate public perceptions of the collection of human 
biological samples.420  
In opposition, GeneWatch UK, a not-for-profit policy research and public interest 
group that ‘aims to ensure that genetic technologies are developed and used in the 
public interest’421 critiqued the scientific rationale of UK Biobank; namely the 
inadequacy of medical records and quality of data; the scope and age of the cohort 
used; and the likelihood of UK Biobank delivering meaningful results.422  
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Indeed, the consultations have been criticised as being ‘too politically tailored by 
biobank planners’;423 for avoiding contentious issues (such as the establishment of a 
UK-wide biobank in the first place);424 for ‘the validity of the science for which the 
database is being created’;425 and for ‘ignoring public concerns.’426 Hunter and 
Laurie have argued that ‘the consultations may be criticised for having adopted an 
expectation of a ‘passive public’ rather than one which would be more involved in 
UK Biobank’s governance and decision making.’427 This has led to academic debate 
as to ‘how to include people well in biobank governance’, including calls for greater 
participant involvement on decision making bodies such as the Ethics and 
Governance Council and the Board of Directors. This is an issue that goes to the 
heart of this thesis and will be explored in the chapters that follow.  
3.3.4 Protocol development  
A Protocol Development Committee was established in May 2001 to ‘steer and 
oversee’ the production of a detailed draft protocol for a proposed cohort study (size, 
age-range etc.) and to endorse it in time for international peer review and for passing 
on to the funding bodies. It was asked to consider the financial constraints involved 
in UK Biobank and the consultations undertaken with the scientific community, the 
public, health professionals, industry, and charities that would ‘inform’ the protocol. 
The Committee was comprised of experts and representatives of the funders, 
including a representative of the DH following the first meeting. The first draft of the 
Protocol was produced on 12 October 2001 and was sent out for international peer 
review in November 2001.  The protocols were sent to a MRC board (the document 
                                                          
423 Wallace H,‘The development of U.K. Biobank: excluding scientific controversy from ethical 
debate’ (2005) 15 Critical Public Health 323.  
424 Wakeford T and Hale F, Generation Scotland: Towards Participatory Models of Consultation 
(University of Newcastle, Policy Ethics and Life Sciences Research Institute (PEALS) 2004) 
<www.generationscotland.org/images/stories/GS_-
_towards_participatory_models_of_Consultation.pdf> accessed 06 Feb 2016. 
425 Godard B, Marshall J, Laberge C and Knoppers BM, ‘Stategies for consulting with the 
community: the case of four large-scale genetic databases’ (2004) 10 Science and Engineering Ethics 
468. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C, The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009),155. 
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does not specify which board) on 22 Feb 2002 in preparation for the aforementioned 
funding decision meeting in March 2002. 428    
Between 2000 and 2003, representatives from the DH, WT and the MRC formed a 
‘Joint Funders Action Team’ (JFAT). The group addressed key issues including the 
funding decision, the development of the organisational model (‘hub and spoke 
model’) and the role of various committees that would continue the development of 
UK Biobank.429 The eventual model will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has contextualised the formation of UK Biobank, which was influenced 
by a number of historical developments in the UK and worldwide. The establishment 
of a population biobank in the UK was driven by the MRC and WT following heavy 
involvement in the success of the HGP in the late 1990’s, and in response to pressure 
from the scientific community for a large-scale epidemiological resource to combine 
patient medical information with human tissue samples to investigate the linkages 
between lifestyle, genes and environment. Around the same time (late 1990’s) the 
NHS was undergoing considerable reform including the development of the 
electronic health record, as well as governmental investment in new genetics 
research partnerships between the NHS and industry. This infrastructure and 
investment meant that the UK was in a unique position to be able to fund and 
facilitate a world-leading resource comprised of 500,000 participants’ human tissue 
and medical records.  
Early consultations and Parliamentary and public debate identified the corresponding 
question of how to structure the biobank in a way that lawfully facilitated scientific 
research while at the same time protecting the interests of the individuals who would 
eventually donate to the biobank (Chapter 1). The question was whether the UK 
ought to specifically regulate the biobank via legislation, as had been the case in 
Iceland (Chapter 2) or whether the existing regulatory framework for medical 
research in the UK would be sufficient. The next chapter will analyse this 
framework, as well as the discussions that led to the eventual decision to embed UK 
Biobank within the existing regulatory environment. Significantly, there is no single, 
                                                          
428 Langan MA, ‘A contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank 1998-2005 
(PhD thesis, University of Glasgow 2007).  
429 Ibid.   
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biobank specific piece of legislation in the UK and instead, the law that governs 
biobanking spans a number of fields of law including data protection law, the 
regulation of human tissue and human rights. Therefore, the way in which the wider 
legal framework of UK Biobank and its own policy the ‘Ethics and Governance 
Framework’ protects the private interests of the UK Biobank donors will be outlined.  
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4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter has highlighted how international experiences of the ethical 
challenges of biobanking, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, were 
clearly influential in the debate and design of UK Biobank. Lessons learned from 
comparable population biobanks such as the Icelandic biobank (Chapter 2), 
demonstrated the importance of managing the ethical challenges raised by population 
biobanking (Chapter 1) and crucially, the need to strike an appropriate balance 
between the protection of the private interests of the individuals who would 
ultimately donate their human tissue (and data therein) to the biobank, with the 
perceived potential benefits for the population as a whole.  
In both Iceland and Estonia, specific legislation was enacted in an attempt to realise 
this equilibrium. However, the Icelandic experience was an early warning of the 
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difficulties associated with building a biobank on a statutory footing that is reliant on 
a private funding model. Ultimately, an exclusive licence granted to the private 
company deCODE, coupled with an ethically controversial and unpopular ‘opt-out’ 
statutory provision for participation, undermined the success of the national 
database. On this basis, both the regulatory and funding model for the Icelandic 
biobank seem to be equally culpable for the demise of the resource.  
On the other hand, while the sustainability of private funding used to establish the 
Estonian population biobank threatened the survival of the biobank, once subsequent 
public funding was secured, the statutory framework of the biobank provided a 
stable environment for the continuance of the biobank. This experience suggests that 
the legal framework in Estonia successfully balanced, and continues to balance, the 
private interests of the individual participants (including most notably a right to 
feedback of research results) with the public interest in the research taking place. 
Therefore, comparative analysis suggests that while there is a crucial relationship 
between funding and regulatory models, a critical challenge for a successful and 
sustainable biobank model is to design a legally accountable governance framework 
that adequately manages the ethical challenges associated with population 
biobanking and strikes an appropriate balance between public and private interests.   
With Chapters 1-3 in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to contextualise UK 
Biobank in the ‘regulatory environment’ for biobanking in the UK and consider the 
ways in which this environment has evolved to protect public and private interests in 
biobanking. Unlike the Estonian and Icelandic model, UK Biobank was not created 
by Parliament and a specific statute. If UK Biobank had been established on 
statutory basis, the result would be that it would be clearly subject to public law 
duties and Parliamentary oversight of its legal basis. Instead, UK Biobank was built 
with private law model that sits in the existing nexus of regulatory instruments and 
legislation relating to biobanking, including: data protection law, the regulation of 
human tissue and human rights, UK common law jurisprudence, EU directives, 
regulations and international directives, and ‘soft-law’ policy guidance, as well as a 
number of oversight bodies and research ethics committees (RECs).  
Chapter 3’s discussion of the origins of UK Biobank has highlighted the integral role 
of the WT and the MRC in driving the decision to build a population biobank in the 
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UK, which was partly motivated by the anticipated scientific benefits voiced 
following the success of the HGP. In addition, the WT, the MRC and DH recognised 
the perceived opportunity for the UK to lead the innovation agenda by capitalising 
on the potential of the NHS to facilitate linkage to the UK population’s medical 
records. The dominant role of the WT and MRC in the development of UK Biobank 
is ultimately reflected in the legal structure of UK Biobank as a charity company 
with representatives of the WT and the MRC as the signatory Members of UK 
Biobank Ltd.  
The choice of legal structure for UK Biobank has implications for the accountability 
of the resource. Briefly, the most significant consequence of establishing UK 
Biobank as an independent charity company is that it falls to management within the 
corporation to run the resource and manage the inherent ethical challenges that have 
been described in Chapter 1. As will be illustrated in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, 
the use of a private law structure to facilitate the public mission of UK Biobank 
raises tensions between the interests promoted and protected by a combination of 
(potentially conflicting) legal frameworks.  This chapter sets out the reasons for the 
choice of this dual legal structure, including the creation of Ethics Governance 
Council as a collateral advisory body, and identifies the inherent legal complexities 
of the structure before the implications of these complexities are critically analysed 
in Chapter 6.430 
Overall, this chapter aims to highlight the difficulties raised by the choice of a 
private law model and associated multiple layers of law to address the public 
dimensions of UK Biobank as well as the interests of the individual donors.   
4.2 The ‘Regulatory environment’431 for biobanking in the UK 
4.2.1 Statutory framework 
In the UK there is no specific statute for the regulation of population biobanks. In 
fact, there is no single piece of legislation for medical research on human beings.432 
                                                          
430 And the way in which the common law may interact with this legal structure in the future will be 
investigated in Chapters 7 and 8, in order to consider the extent to which public and private interests 
in the running of UK Biobank are balanced in this model.  
431 Brownsword R, Yeung K, (eds) Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and 
Technological Fixes (Hart 2008). 
432 Kaye J, ‘The Regulation of Human Genomics Research’ in Kumar D and Eng C (eds) Genomic 
Medicine: Principles and Practice (2nd Edn, OUP 2014).  
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This has led to widespread criticism of what has been described as ‘a fragmented 
patchwork of law’433 for biobanking:  
…[T]here exists a bewildering array of statutes, legislative provisions, regulations 
and common law doctrines, together with well over 30 codes of practice… 
statements of ethical principles, plus numerous binding or non-binding but 
influential international conventions, directives, declarations, recommendations, 
statements, resolutions , decisions and guidelines, all have some obvious or potential 
bearing on genetic databases or the professionals involved with them.434 
Fundamentally, a distinction is maintained across UK legislation between human 
material (samples) and information relating to individuals (data) and this distinction 
determines the appropriate regulatory framework for each.435 The Human Tissue Act 
2004 (HTA) regulates and requires a licence for the storage and use of human 
tissue,436 whereas the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) requires the fair and lawful 
processing of personal data including the sensitive personal information that may be 
derived from genetic information.437 Since human tissue samples contain genetic 
material standardly assumed to contain genetic information including sensitive 
personal information438 about the source of the tissue and their current and future 
health,439 the DPA and the HTA are the primary sources of legislation for the 
                                                          
433 Kaye J, Bell J, Briceno LM and Mitchell C, ‘Biobank Report: United Kingdom’ (forthcoming) 
JLME  
434 Gibbons SMC, ‘Are UK genetic databases governed adequately?’ (2007) 27 Leg Stud 312, 319. 
435 Briceño Moraia L, Kaye J, Tasse AM and others, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Requirements 
for the Use of Data in Biobanks Based in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom’ (2014) 14 Med Law Int 187, 191 
436 The Human Tissue Act 2004 is the implementation into UK law of European Parliament and 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2004/23/EC of 31 March 2004 on setting 
standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, 
storage and distribution of human tissues and cells [2004] OJ L102/48. 
437 As a Member State of the European Union, the Data Protection Act implements the Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
[1995] OJ L281/31 (‘EU Data Protection Directive’) due to be replaced by a General EU Data 
Protection Regulation by 2018. It is noted that genetic information is explicitly recognised as 
‘personal data’ in the final draft of General Data Protection Regulation: draft available: 
<http://www.haerting.de/sites/default/files/pdfs/proposal-eudatap-regulation-final-compromise-
151216.pdf> accessed 20 January 2016 
438 The European Commission Data Protection Working Party considers that genetic information is 
sensitive personal data under Article 2(a) of the EU Data Protection Directive: Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on Genetic Data’ (European Commission 
12178/03/EN, WP 91, 2004). 
439 Manson N, ‘The medium and the message: tissue samples, genetic information and data protection 
legislation’ in Widdows H and Mullen C The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009), 15. 
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regulation of UK Biobank. As such, the establishment of UK Biobank in 
Manchester, where the physical samples are stored, was licensed in accordance with 
the HTA 2004.  
Beyond the DPA and the HTA, legal principles relevant to biobanks built for the 
collection, storage and use of tissue samples440 and data, are enshrined in several 
statutes including: the Human Rights Act 1998,441 specifically the Right to respect 
for private and family life;442 the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which dictates who will 
be legally able to consent to participation in biobanking;443 the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000;444 and the National Health Service Act 2006, the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012 and the Care Act 2014, which combined, and for certain 
purposes that include research, allow the supply of identifiable NHS patient 
information without consent.445 European and International Human Rights law such 
as the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) and 
the Council of Europe Oviedo Convention446 may also shape how biobanking is 
regulated in UK law. Unlike Estonia and Iceland, the latter is not binding in the UK 
because it has not been signed and ratified.447  
                                                          
440 Excluding gametes and embryos, which are regulated separately by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 as amended, implementing the Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 2004/23/EC of 31 March 2004 on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells 
[2004] OJ L102/48. 
441 Implementing into UK law the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (‘European Convention on Human Rights’, as amended, opened for signature 11 November 
1950, entered into force 03rd September 1953) CETS No. 005. 
442 European Convention on Human Rights Art 8 
443 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 3(1) (a)-(d) 
444 Which covers any recorded information that is held by a public authority in England, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland, and by UK-wide public authorities based in Scotland.   
445 National Health Service Act 2006, s. 251-252; which requires the approval of the Confidentiality 
Advisory Committee under s.158 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. The Health and Social Care 
Act was amended by the Care Act 2014 to allow the discretionary dissemination of data by the Health 
and Social Care Information Centre only for: (a) the provision of health care or adult social care, or 
(b) the promotion of health (s. 261(1A) Health and Social Care Act 2008)  
446 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘European 
Convention on Human Rights’, as amended, opened for signature 11 November 1950, entered into 
force 03rd September 1953) CETS No. 005. 
447 Within the legal framework for biobanking in the UK, there are a number of organisations that 
have a role in the governance of biobanks in order to ensure their compliance with ethical and legal 
requirements. Some bodies are statutorily created to administer legislation, such as the Human Tissue 
Authority (under the Human Tissue Act 2004). The Authority is the regulator for human tissue and 
organs and is responsible for licensing collections of samples (excluding gametes and embryos, which 
is the remit of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/> 
accessed 8 July 2015) and administering Codes of Practice as guidance for professionals and 
researchers, as well as guidance for the public: <https://www.hta.gov.uk/> accessed 8 July 2015.  
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4.2.2 Case law 
In addition, and because the English legal system is founded on common law, a 
number of judicial decisions have been made relating to the ethical challenges that 
are associated with biobanking including consent, privacy and property rights, and 
ownership of human tissue. These decisions are precedents that may be applied in 
the future, although to date there have been no reported cases in UK or EU courts 
that have applied these decisions specifically to biobanking.  
Privacy and consent  
It has been argued that the doctrine of consent operates to protect privacy interests in 
a number of ways within UK law.448 Broadly speaking, appropriate consent is 
required to legitimize any interference with one’s physical integrity and autonomy. 
Unlawful touching i.e. intentional interference without such consent may amount to 
a tort of battery449 or assault450 under English tort law.451 Other remedies are also 
available where the individual has suffered physical harm or psychological harm as a 
result of the negligence of the defendant.452 The Mental Capacity Act codified the 
common law position that to be legally valid, consent must be freely given and fully 
informed.453 But what counts as ‘informed’ consent will vary according to context. 
In the context of medical treatment, consent may be express (in the form of a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Under the Data Protection Act, the Information Commissioner has powers to enforce the Data 
Protection Act via audits, fines and investigations: <https://ico.org.uk/> accessed 8 July 2015.  
In the specific context of research, in 2011 the Human Research Authority (HRA) became the first 
single government body in the UK responsible for the oversight of the research process in the UK, to 
protect and promote the interests of patients and the public in health research (NHS Health Research 
Authority, HRA Approval: <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/> accessed 20 January 2016). The National 
Research Ethics Service now comes under the ambit of the HRA and is responsible for providing 
guidance and the system of accreditation for research ethics committees (RECs).  
At the time of creation, UK Biobank was granted research ethics approval from the North West Multi-
centre Research Ethics Committee (MREC). Instead of requiring each applicant to obtain separate 
ethics approval to use the resource, UK Biobank has generic Research Tissue Bank (RTB) approval: 
UK Biobank, Access Procedures: Application and review procedures for Access to the UK Biobank 
Resource Version 1.0 (UK Biobank, 2011 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Access-Procedures-2011.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2014. B.7: ‘Legal and ethics 
approval’ 
448 Kaye J, Bell J, Briceno LM and Mitchell C, ‘Biobank Report: United Kingdom’ (forthcoming) 
JLME. 
449 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 
450 Ibid.  Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 
451 Despite Scotland’s separate legal regime, the applicable principles are Scottish tort law:  Mason JK 
and Mason K and Laurie GT, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (9th edn OUP 
2013) Ch 5. 
452 See for instance, Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1. 
453 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 3(1)(a-d).  
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signature in a consent form)454 or implied (i.e. via one’s actions of allowing a blood 
sample to be taken). The deference accorded to medical opinion in the leading House 
of Lords cases over the past three decades in setting standards of disclosure to secure 
‘informed consent’ has been recently eroded in the 2015 Supreme Court decision in 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board.455 Montgomery took a significantly 
patient orientated approach in its robust analysis of informed consent by setting a 
high standard of care owed to patients in respect of disclosure of small yet material 
risks prior to medical intervention.456  
The importance of obtaining the consent of research participants is stressed at both 
international and national level and is one of the fundamental principles of ethical 
research.457 It is thus accepted that consent is required for the taking of samples from 
biobank participants, as a means of protecting their right to make autonomous 
decisions about their body. However, whether and to what extent biobank donors fall 
within the category of research participants is far from clear and has certainly been 
doubted by leading scholars.458 This could potentially raise difficulties in the 
application of established principles in the medical and research context and will be 
returned to in Chapter 7.  
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 1, another significant challenge in securing 
‘informed’ consent for the use of samples is that it is often not possible to predict all 
                                                          
454 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 
455 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] 2 WLR 768 
456 Ibid. 
The new test is a test of ‘material risk’, which may involve asking whether a risk is one that the 
particular patient would regard as significant. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances 
of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that 
the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it. ‘….patients are now widely regarded 
persons holding rights, rather than as the passive recipients of the care of the medical profession.’ [75] 
457 Plomer A, Law and Ethics of Medical Research: International Bioethics & Human Rights 
(Routledge 2005). 
At the international level, relevant documents include the Oviedo Convention, Art 16 states the need 
for express and specific consent to participation in research. At the national level, ethics committees 
enforce the ethical requirement of consent, and all statements of professional bodies and funding 
bodies such as the MRC stipulate the need for informed consent of the research subject, of the subject 
is capable of giving such consent. Issues have been covered in depth by the MRC in their operational 
and ethical guidelines: Medical Research Council, Guidelines on Human Tissue and Biological 
Samples for Use in Research (Medical Research Council 2001).   
458 For this reason, this thesis will refer to UK Biobank ‘donors’ rather than participants, except when 
citing references to ‘participants’. Luther L and Lemmens T, ‘Human Genetic Data Banks: From 
Consent to Commercialization – An Overview of Current Concerns and Conundrums’ in Doelle WH 
and DaSilva EJ (ed) Biotechnology, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS 2007). 
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future applications for which a biobank might be used at the time consent is 
obtained. This is problematic because interpreted strictly, the doctrine of informed 
consent would appear to require that consent be re-obtained for any use other than 
that explicitly anticipated when consent was originally obtained.  
Finally, the use of individual’s ‘health data’ is also regulated separately under the 
Data Protection Act. When research is based on identifiable personal health data, it 
may take the form of a ‘broad consent’ to multiple uses of a person’s health data. As 
long as the consent is ‘explicit,’459 this may be to a range of potential future uses.  
In practice, but only to a limited extent, the (de) identification of an individual’s data 
may be secured by technical measures to protect the individual’s confidentiality460 in 
biobanking.461 It is recalled from Chapter 1 that generally, technical fixes can be 
employed to enhance confidentiality of information collected and stored. Because 
one scientific benefit of population biobanks is their longevity, biobank organisers 
will typically reversibly anonymise data samples for their storage and use, so that 
individuals may be re-identified for research purposes, and to honour participant’s 
right to withdrawal (Chapter 1). In reliance on these practical measures, UK Biobank 
has been set up on a broad consent basis.  Individual samples and data are being 
donated and released on the understanding that systems will be in place for secure 
data flow, including (reversibly) anonymising data and samples, and enforcing 
confidentiality.462  
However, it has recently been proven that it is impossible to absolutely anonymise 
genetic data.463 Arguably, this calls into question the appropriateness of the ‘consent 
or anonymise’ approach that has prevailed in biobanking to date and in UK 
                                                          
459 Data Protection Act 1998, Sch. 3, Para 1 
460 Although this has been argued to lead to a ‘consent or anonymise’ dichotomy, which Dove and 
Laurie have argued inappropriately conflates the protection of ethical interests with technical 
standards: Dove T, Laurie G, ‘Consent and anonymisation: beware binary constructions’ (2015) 350 
BMJ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.h1139.  
461 Taylor MJ and Townend D, ‘Issues in protecting privacy in medical research using genetic 
information and biobanking: the PRIVILEGED project’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 253; Townend D, 
Taylor MJ, Wright J and Wickins-Drazilova D, ‘Privacy and Access: Privacy Interests in Biobanking: 
A Preliminary View on a European Perspective,’ in J Kaye and M Stranger (eds), Principles and 
Practice in Biobank Governance (Ashgate, 2009).  
462 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016. 
463 Hayden EC, ‘Privacy protections: The genome hacker’ Nature: Vol 497: Issue 7448: 2013 
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Biobank,464 and potentially gives rise to heightened risks of personal harm as a 
consequence of participating in biobanking, which may or may not have been 
appreciated at the time of consent.  
In fact, in 2015 a tort of misuse of private information was expressly recognized in 
the Court of Appeal’s ruling of Google v Vidal Hall, which held that damages will 
be awarded for misuse of private information which causes ‘mere distress’ under the 
Data Protection Act.465 This is in contrast to the previous position, which required 
proof of financial damage for distress to be compensated.  The threshold test is 
whether the person publishing information knows or ought to know that the 
information in question should be kept confidential.466 Awarding such damages for 
mere distress provides significant ‘teeth’ to privacy and data protection regulation. 
Property and ownership  
A key ethical challenge inherent in biobanking is the question of whether there exist 
ownership rights to samples once they have been donated for the purpose of research 
(Chapter 1).  
The HTA 2004 avoids the complex question of ownership of tissue samples and 
instead upholds consent as the main tool for regulating the competing interests of 
individuals, researchers and potentially corporations.467 Jurisprudence in the UK and 
internationally has maintained that there are no property rights in the human body. In 
the US, this was the principle established in the landmark case of Moore v Regents of 
the University of California468 and subsequently in Greenberg v Miami Children's 
Research Hospital Institute.469 This ruling has subsequently been cited with approval 
by English courts in cases such as R v Kelly,470 which qualified that ownership rights 
may arise in respect of body parts where sufficient ‘work or skill’ has been exercised 
over them. Since these decisions, it is notable that Yearworth v North Bristol NHS 
                                                          
464  UK Biobank, Ethics and Governance Framework (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) < 
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/resources/> accessed 26 January 2016. 
465 Google Inc v Vidal-Hall & Others [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2015] 3 WLR 409 
466 In the Google case, ‘personal’ and ‘private’ information are considered separate ‘types’ of 
information. 
467 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 1: Consent (Version 14.0, HTA July 2014) < 
www.hta.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Code_of_practice_1_-_Consent.pdf> accessed 31 Jan 2016. 
468 Moore v Regents of the University of California 51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 
(1990) 
469 Greenberg v Miami Children's Research Hospital Institute 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
470 R v Kelly [1999] Q.B. 621 (CA), [630] held that amending the rule would require legislative 
intervention.  
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Trust471 broke new ground by holding that sperm was the property of the six men 
from which it was derived and that this would have been the case even if it had not 
been subjected to any kind of work or skill in the light of the background statutory 
framework of the HFE Act. This landmark ruling potentially signals a move towards 
increased recognition of property rights in human samples.472 
However, in the absence of a legislative framework clearly asserting the continuing 
rights of veto over use of the tissue samples it is not clear how far rights of 
ownership may be extended in biobanking and specifically in the case of UK 
Biobank. The powers of Directors of the biobank in respect of such uses and 
ownership are discussed below in connection with the governance structure of UK 
Biobank.  
4.3 The legal structure for UK Biobank: Private corporation with a 
public mission 
Biobank… will help us to increase knowledge and we, as politicians, must make 
sure that the framework is right for the use of this knowledge… We have to make 
sure that ‘evil people’… cannot use it for ‘evil ends’… The debate should be about a 
framework to safeguard the proper and secure use of all the new knowledge that 
Biobank generates… The insights that scientists have, and even more so their 
application, depend on the institutional framework and the regulatory regime under 
which science takes place. We need to get the framework right to achieve the 
benefits from Biobank that we all hope for and to prevent abuses and negative 
consequences.473 
4.3.1 Rationale for the legal structure 
The rationale behind the choice of legal structure as a charity company for UK 
Biobank was informed by the regulatory experiences in Iceland and Estonia 
                                                          
471 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1 
472 In Yearworth, the Court of Appeal rested its decision that the sperm supplied by the men amounted 
to property that belonged to those men, on the facts that ‘By their bodies, they alone generated and 
ejaculated the sperm... The sole object of their ejaculation of the sperm was that, in certain events, it 
might later be used for their benefit...[the] sperm [could not] be stored or continue to be stored 
without their subsisting consent [under the terms of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990]...no person, whether human or corporate, other than each man [who supplied the sperm had] 
any rights in relation to the sperm which he...produced’: Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] 
EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1 [45](f). 
473 House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology ‘The Work of the Medical 
Research Council’ Session 2002-2003: Adjournment debate  
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(Chapters 2 and 3) as well as consultations and policy debate which highlighted the 
need to inspire public confidence and trust in the biobank to secure participation 
(Chapter 3). Most likely though, the legal structure was chosen by the MRC, the WT 
and latterly the DH because it appropriately safeguarded the significant financial 
investment that they dedicated to the establishment and maintenance of UK Biobank. 
Crucially, the private model as a charity company empowers the funders who are the 
Members of the Company.  
Evidence of the decision to incorporate UK Biobank as a company can be traced 
back to the Medical Research Council’s Memorandum to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology in 2002.474 Speaking on behalf of the DH, 
the Minister of State revealed that the current thinking of the funders of UK Biobank 
(WT and MRC) was that funding would be provided through the creation of an 
independent limited company, owned by its Members (the WT and the MRC as the 
main funders of UK Biobank) and consisting of a Board of Directors (with 
representatives of the Funders), a Steering Committee (led by a Chief Executive 
Officer) and an International Scientific Advisory Board. Upon advice from the 
specifically created Interim Advisory Group (IAG) for UK Biobank (Chapter 3), the 
funders established UK Biobank without specific statutory footing, despite the 
absence of formal specifically tailored biobanking regulation in the UK:475 
Consideration was given to whether it would make sense to seek a statutory basis, 
guaranteeing the independence of the Council, for instance… But the view came to 
be that in the current parliamentary climate such legislation was unlikely to be 
obtainable, certainly within the time frame of UK Biobank’s development.476 
                                                          
474 MRC memorandum to House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology ‘The 
Work of the Medical Research Council’ Session 2002-2003 Examination of Witnesses Q 133.   
475 Although, around the same time the Human Genetics Commission advised the UK Government 
that while there was not a need for additional, tailored legislation to ensure the ethical oversight of 
genetic research, ‘genetic research databases established for health research should not be used for 
any purpose other than such research and that this be put beyond any doubt, by legislation if 
necessary’: Human Genetics Commission, Inside Information: Balancing interests in the use of 
personal genetic data (Department of Health 2002) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061023110946/http:/www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/Do
cPub/Document/insideinformation_summary.pdf> accessed 31 Jan 2016, para 5.50 
476 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance 
Framework Background Document’ (Wellcome Trust, 10th October 2003) 
<www.wellcome.ac.uk/about-us/publications/reports/biomedical-ethics/wtd003284.htm> accessed 06 
Jan 2016. 
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Interestingly, empirical and archival research undertaken by Langan into the origins 
of UK Biobank between 1998 and 2005477 suggests that historically, it was not 
always anticipated that UK Biobank would take this form and at least one of the 
motivations behind the model was security of significant investment of public and 
charity funding. Indeed, this model was perceived to depart from ‘standard academic 
practice’ in science research, which can ordinarily be typified into two funding 
models:  
‘It is a strange set up as usually funding takes two forms: the idea is approved and 
people are given the money to do it or (mostly in the private sector) funders give 
people the money to manage the project but it is still their project. UK Biobank is 
trying to do both. It invited investigators to take part but the funders have not 
allowed them the authority to take care of the science.’ [030, p.42; p. 3].478 
Langan’s thesis was based on evidence from MRC archived documentation, within 
which there was no record of any debate regarding the selection of the model. In 
fact, to date there is still very little concrete, accessible evidence as to whom selected 
the model, why it was chosen, and what alternatives were considered.479 However, 
based on Langan’s empirical findings, it is possible to deduce that establishing UK 
Biobank as a separate legal identity was seen as a means of providing protection for 
people taking part in the study; gaining the public’s trust in the project, as well as 
securing the considerable investment of public and charitable funds.  
Langan conducted interviews with the academic scientific community involved 
(directly and indirectly) in UK Biobank, representatives of the funding bodies and 
representatives of UK Biobank Ltd between 2004- 2005 (i.e. after UK Biobank’s 
establishment).480 Answers from those interviewed suggest that representatives of the 
funding bodies (DH/MRC/WT) established the ‘hub’ as a company to ensure that it 
was free from any particular individual or groups’ control. Representatives of the 
funding bodies argued that the hub should be established as an entity separate from 
the funding bodies, the Government and any single organisation, including 
                                                          
477 Langan MA, ‘A contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank 1998-2005 
(PhD thesis, University of Glasgow 2007). Langan’s research was conducted until 2005 when 
significant organisational changes meant that the ‘hub and spoke’ model was significantly altered and 
Professor Sir Rory Collins was appointed CEO and PI of UK Biobank.  
478 Ibid.  
479 Ibid.  
480 Ibid. 85: Langan refers to interviewing ‘four funders’ though these are not specified and interview 
responses are of course confidential. 
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universities, to ensure its independence. Establishing the ‘hub’ of UK Biobank as a 
charitable company was a means to prevent any organisation from exerting undue 
influence and to grant it a strong separate identity ‘that would gain a life of its 
own.’481 A ‘spoke’482 representative commented: 
They chose it [the establishment of the hub as a charitable company] to sort of 
remove it from them [the funding bodies] the power of control of it [UK Biobank], 
so its separate, it’s not the MRC’s project, it’s not Wellcome’s project, it’s not the 
Department of Health’s - it’s Biobank’s project.483  
A representative of the funding bodies stated: 
We believe it [the establishment of the hub as a company] gives, especially with this 
type of database, patients who consent to be part of the study reassurance that this is 
not a company that’s going to make profit out of it, it’s not a Government sponsored 
organisation that they might begin to feel a little bit, in the future anyway, not happy 
with, some kind of Government sponsored thing for patients is a fear that they are 
not giving it to a truly independent body and use it in the best interests, not simply to 
them but of the other people in the UK.484 
Another funding body representative remarked: 
It wasn’t easy to see how you could create the kind of resource that you wanted 
while simply giving a grant to one of the organisations in the field. You’d have 
ended up with something that belonged more to a university than it did to the 
national research enterprise but then we also needed a model through which a set of 
funders could operate and feel comfortable with.485  
Thus, independence emerged as the key reason for establishing UK Biobank as a 
charitable company. However, the interviews also highlighted a fundamental tension 
between the views of academic scientists and the funding bodies (MRC and WT) 
regarding such independence and the reality of those actually in control. In 
particular, academic scientists criticised the project as being politically rather than 
scientifically driven and expressed dissatisfaction at the control exerted by the 
                                                          
481 Ibid. 212 
482 ‘Spokes’ are the regional collaborating universities: described in Ibid.  
483 Langan MA, ‘A contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank 1998-2005 
(PhD thesis, University of Glasgow 2007), 211 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid. 212  
 
 
102 
funding bodies over the resource, which was allegedly ‘driven from the top.’486 
Academic scientists from the collaborating Universities (‘spokes’) argued that it was 
in fact the funding bodies, and not the Company (UK Biobank Ltd - or the ‘hub’) 
who were in control of UK Biobank. One spoke member reflected: 
Whenever we’ve raised something that we think should be questioned and we are 
given back the message that the funders won’t countenance it, it gives us the 
impression that the funders are keeping a very tight rein on the project.487 
The interviews highlighted dissatisfaction of scientists and collaborating Universities 
with the chosen organisational structure. In particular, criticism focussed on the role 
of the funding bodies (the MRC, WT and the DH) in the organisation and running of 
the resource. One spoke member commented: 
The funders are particularly concerned with the scale and in discussions of having 
fewer participants and more detailed information the funders have always stuck to 
the scale of the project… the project is not scientifically driven, it is driven from a 
marketing point of view, political with a small p. They do not want a better study 
with smaller, they want to be the ‘largest’, they are just not interested in anything 
smaller.488 
Academic scientists also accused the funding bodies of taking organisational 
decisions, such as those regarding the chosen model and the Board of Directors. 
They argued that the funding bodies, rather than the scientists, were responsible for 
the model. A member of the Expert Working Group remarked:  
In terms of the way the project was set up, I can’t really comment except that it went 
into the offices of the Wellcome Trust and the MRC and to my knowledge, the 
model for how it was to be set-up did not arrive out of a consensus view offered by 
the study proponents but by the organisers and the funders, so it was driven by the 
funders, not by the scientists.489 
Criticism focussed on the role of the funding bodies within the organisational 
structure, specifically in the Board of Directors. Given the involvement of 
representatives of the funding bodies, academic scientists questioned the 
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independence of the Board. For example, a clinical academic involved in UK 
Biobank commented: 
It’s not a truly independent company because there are three directors who come 
from the funding agencies, of course, very properly, their interest in coming from 
the funding agencies is declared but it means that the Board is looking over its 
should all the time, what the funding agencies would want.490 
One spoke member stated: ‘the Board is largely, not necessarily governed, but 
largely influenced by the views of the funders.’491 Acknowledging the role of the 
funding bodies on the Board, one member of the Board commented ‘the Board has to 
be aware of the need to meet the requirements of the funders at all times.’ Justifying 
this involvement, academic scientists acknowledged the funding bodies’ financial 
obligations and their importance in getting the project up and running. A clinical 
academic involved in UK Biobank stated: 
It’s an awful lot of money and it is their money, they’re responsible publicly for it... 
they’ve got to retain a delicate, light touch but very clear understanding of what’s 
going on so that they’re guarding their money but not slowing things down.492  
Representatives of the funding bodies also justified their role based on their 
obligations to ensure the security of financial investment. For example, one 
representative commented: 
It’s not something that the Medical Research Council or even the Wellcome Trust 
would probably feel comfortable simply delegating to a group of scientific 
champions... in the after analysis the Wellcome Trust has its trustees, and the MRC 
has its council and government to whom they are accountable.493 
They also referred to their legal obligations as members UK Biobank Ltd (the 
company itself) as justification for their continued involvement following the set-up 
of UK Biobank Ltd; 
There is still some need I think to be involved in stakeholder engagement, ensuring 
that we get the best value for money from Biobank and that Biobank’s providing 
                                                          
490 Ibid  
491 Ibid.  
492 Ibid. 200 
493 Ibid. 202  
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what the scientific community wants and that can’t solely be down to Biobank and 
its objectives.494 
Overall, it seems that Langan’s empirical research is evidence that the decision to 
structure UK Biobank as a charity company was made by the funders, who saw the 
model as a means of securing the independence of the biobank while guaranteeing 
their significant financial investment and retaining long-term control of the 
organisation and maintenance of the resource. As will be briefly explained, the 
funders went on to be key stakeholders in the legal structure of UK Biobank.  
Constituting UK Biobank in this way raises a number of risks for the accountability 
of UK Biobank to both the individual donors and the public good mission of the 
resource. Some of these risks are hinted at in Langan’s empirical findings, such as 
the seemingly dominant control of the funders, potentially at the expense of advice 
of scientific experts who questioned the merit and justifications for a population 
biobank in the UK. Moreover, despite justifying the choice of a private legal 
structure on the grounds of its separation from any one funder, the remains of this 
chapter will highlight that in fact the companies’ Board of Directors who are 
responsible for running the resource are accountable to the WT and the MRC as the 
signatory Members of the company. Furthermore, the Ethics and Governance 
Council, which alternatively could have been set up on a statutory footing to secure 
public accountability to Parliament, is also in fact accountable to those behind the 
creation of the EGC and the EGF: the WT and the MRC. 
Therefore, to investigate the potential risks raised by this framework, the next section 
of this chapter will introduce the dual legal structure of UK Biobank Ltd as a charity 
company, before Chapters 5 and 6 critically analyse the constitution of this private 
model, the interests that are protected and promoted in the running of UK Biobank, 
and the extent to which it is publically accountable.     
4.3.2 Legal structure    
UK Biobank was incorporated as a charity company, ‘UK Biobank Ltd’, on 28 
November 2003495 and consequently is registered with Companies House496 and the 
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Charity Commission.497 Acknowledging the need to command the public’s full 
confidence and trust, it was planned that the Chairman (CEO) and all other Board 
members of the company would be appointed in a transparent way using the ‘Nolan 
Principles for Public Life’.498  
It is important to deconstruct exactly what this legal structure entails, because in 
conjunction with the public-private mix of funding from the WT, MRC and DH, the 
private model that was chosen has significant implications for mechanisms of 
oversight for UK Biobank activities. Fundamentally, by virtue of this legal structure 
and the timing of its incorporation, UK Biobank is subject to a dual regulatory 
regime of both UK charity law via the Charities Act 2011 and UK company law and 
the Companies Act 2006.499 This legal basis will be briefly explained before more 
critical analysis of the implications of this regime in Chapters 5 and 6. Overall, 
incorporation as a charity company adds a further layer of complexity and 
accountability to the multi-faceted legal framework of UK Biobank, in addition to 
the wider legal framework for biobanking outlined in the first section of this chapter.   
4.3.3 Incorporation as a charity 
A critical aspect of the legal position of UK Biobank is its charitable status; a choice 
that allowed the founders to advocate the new body as an organisation that was not 
driven by a profit motive and would act in the public interest. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
495 Company number 04978912: <https://betACompanieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912> accessed 
19 January 2016  
496 Ibid.   
497 Charity Commission ‘UK Biobank’ <http://betACharitycommission.gov.uk/charity-
details/?regid=1101332&subid=0> accessed 19 January 2016 
498 House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology ‘The Work of the Medical 
Research Council’ Session 2002-2003 adjournment debate: Column 370;  
Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘The 7 principles of public life’ (the ‘Nolan principles’, 
Cabinet Office 1995) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life/the-7-
principles-of-public-life—2> accessed 17 September 2014.   
499 The Charities Act 2006 introduced the Charitable Incorporated Organisation as new legal structure 
for charity companies, now incorporated in the Charities Act 2011 Part II ‘Charitable Incorporated 
Organisations’. Amongst other benefits simplifies the regulatory regime such that only the Charity 
Commission regulates charity companies with this structure. This will be discussed further in this 
Chapter. For now, it is important to note that this legal structure was not available to UK Biobank Ltd 
at the time of its establishment, although it is possible for them convert to this legal structure in the 
future: Charity Commission ‘Change your charity structure’ (Gov.uk) 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/change-your-charity-structure> 2 January 2016 
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For the purpose of the Charities Act 2011, ‘charity’ means an institution that is 
established for charitable purposes only,500 and falls to be subject to the control of 
the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to charities.501 The 
main advantages of charitable status include: significant tax exemptions and 
reliefs;502 enhanced public standing;503 advice and support from the Charity 
Commission;504 and consent requirements for charity proceedings.505 All of these 
benefits match the proclaimed purposes of the model chosen for UK Biobank. 
On the other hand, there are a number of perceived disadvantages of charitable 
status, from the perspective of company law. Primarily, charities are subject to a 
certain degree of public control by the Attorney-General (A-G) and the Charity 
Commission. The Charities Act also imposes specific duties on persons having 
general control and management of the administration of the charity.506 This 
oversight means charity companies are subject to a dual administrative burden and 
must register and report to both Companies House and the Charity Commission. 
Registration as a charity also places considerable limitations on the scope of a 
company’s objects and powers. The default provision in respect of private companies 
is that such a company’s objects are unlimited.507 On the other hand, the objects of a 
charitable company must be wholly and exclusively charitable508 and its benefits 
must be made available to a sufficient section of the community for the company to 
fulfil its charitable purpose.509 Satisfying the requirements for charitable 
                                                          
500 Charities Act 2011 s.1(1)(a) 
501 Ibid s.1(1)(b)  
502 Specific tax exemptions can be claimed by a charity by virtue of s.505(1) of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1988.  
503 There is argument that possession by an institution of a charity registration number continues to 
inspire confidence in the public mind, and may elicit a better response in appeals for funds: Luxton P, 
The Law of Charities (OUP 2001), 62 
504 One of the Charity Commissions’ general functions is to promote the effective use of charitable 
resources by giving information or advice to charity trustees on any matter affecting the charity: 
Charities Act 2011 s 15.  
505 Legal proceedings brought under the court’s jurisdiction with respect to charities including 
charitable companies are ‘charitable proceedings’ for the purpose of Charities Act 2011 s.115. As a 
general rule, charity proceedings may only be brought by a specified class of persons and only with 
the consent of the Charity Commission. These restrictions can be seen as a form of protection for 
charities: R v National Trust, ex p Scott [1988] JPL 465, 467. This matter will be described in detail 
later in the chapter.  
506 Charities Act 2011 s.177 Charity Trustees (The meaning of which will be discussed later in this 
chapter) 
507 Companies Act 2006 s.31(1) 
508 Charities Act 2011 s.1(1)(a) 
509 Ibid. s.4 
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incorporation, UK Biobank’s mission is to advance the health and welfare of human 
beings, and promote knowledge and education,510 and was designed to fall within the 
list of charitable purposes found in the Charities Act, under ‘the advancement of 
health or the saving of lives.’511 As will be argued later in this thesis (Chapter 6), 
incorporation as a charity adds an additional layer of accountability that ensures UK 
Biobank is run in accordance with its public good mission. This accountability arises 
because charities must be run for a recognised charitable ‘purpose’ to enjoy the 
benefits of charitable status and a (broadened) non-exclusive list of these purposes is 
found in s.3(1) of the Charities Act 2011.  
The choice of charity company status for UK Biobank needs to be viewed in the 
context of more general ongoing debates about this model of organisation, which 
will be discussed in detail in the next Chapter of this thesis. In brief, only institutions 
with a recognised legal structure can enjoy charitable status. Prior to the Companies 
Act 2006, these were the trust, unincorporated association or corporation.512 The 
drawbacks of these legal structures for charitable institutions have been noted:513 the 
trust is seen to lack legal personality distinct from its trustees and the unincorporated 
association falls at the same hurdle.514 Consequently, this leaves trustees vulnerable 
to potentially unlimited liability; 515 for example, when an unincorporated association 
is sued or incurs liabilities the trustees are jointly and severally liable. On the other 
hand, the most commonly used corporate form, the company limited by guarantee, 
enjoys separate legal personality so that it may enter into contracts, hold title to land, 
sue and be sued in its own name. Trustees and Directors of an incorporated charity 
are therefore better insulated from individual financial liability;516 and any liability 
                                                          
510 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk> accessed 20 October 2012  
511 Charities Act 2011 s.3(d)  
512 Charities Act 2011 
513 Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, ‘Private Action, Public Benefit: Charitable Incorporated 
Organisation’ (Background Paper, Cabinet Office, September 2002) Pg 4 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/st
rategy/assets/inc.pdf> accessed on 22nd October 2012  
514 Cross SR, ‘New legal forms for charities in the United Kingdom’ [2008] Journal of Business Law 
662. 
515 Warburton comments that ‘[I]t is probably no longer realistic to expect charity officers to accept 
potential open-ended liability.’ Warburton J, ‘Charity corporations: the framework for the future’ 
[1990] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer (March-April) 95. Cited in Cross SR, ‘New legal forms for 
charities in the United Kingdom’ [2008] Journal of Business Law 662. 
516 Although, trustees remain liable for breaches of trust and in the case of a charitable company for 
fraudulent or wrongful trading. Fraudulent trading is when a person acts dishonestly with the intent to 
defraud creditors. Wrongful trading is where the director knew or ought to have known that there was 
no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvency: Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, ‘Private 
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will be on the part of the Company as a separate entity.517 Incorporation can also 
facilitate a membership structure without shareholders, where there is no share 
capital.518 
However, the charitable company structure is not without drawbacks. Charity 
companies are subject to dual registration at Companies House and the Charity 
Commission, thereby doubling the administrative burden of preparing and 
submitting accounts and annual returns.519 The result is that some charitable 
institutions may be subject to two sets of laws: those that relate to status (charity 
law) and those that relate to structure (company law).520 As we will see all of these 
issues are relevant to, and evident in, the UK Biobank model. 
4.3.4 Ownership of UK Biobank Ltd 
As will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis, another fundamental 
implication of the creation of UK Biobank Ltd as a charitable company limited by 
guarantee is that UK Biobank Ltd is a separate entity with its own legal personality 
that is ‘independent’ of the resource itself. This means that any liability will be on 
the part of the Company as a separate entity, rather than the individual members or 
directors. This independence also facilitates ownership rights over the biobank to the 
charitable company, who in turn have powers to pursue its charitable objects. In brief 
these objects are:  
 The power to undertake the project;521  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Action, Public Benefit: Charitable Incorporated Organisation’ (Background Paper, Cabinet Office, 
September 2002) Pg 4 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/st
rategy/assets/inc.pdf> accessed on 22nd October 2012  
517 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, HL. This case established the following fundamental 
principle of company law: on incorporation, a company becomes a separate legal entity distinct and 
separate from its shareholders and is not the agent of those shareholders. As a separate legal entity, 
the company must be treated like any other independent person with rights and liabilities appropriate 
to itself. Hannigan B, Company Law (2nd ed, OUP 2009) 53. Unless, in exceptional circumstances 
the ‘veil of incorporation’ is lifted so as to hold individual actors liable for their actions. For example, 
to prevent a fraud from being perpetrated: Guildford Motors v Horne [1933] Ch 935. 
518 A company limited by guarantee is a company having the liability of its Members limited by the 
Memorandum to such an amount as the Members may respectively thereby undertake to contribute to 
the assets of the company in the event of it being wound up: Companies Act 2006 s.3(3) 
519 For example most charitable companies must make annual filings with both Companies House and 
the Charity Commission.  
520 Charities Act 2011; Companies Act 2006 respectively.  
521 Memorandum of Association Para. 4(A): UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Memorandum and Articles of 
Association of UK Biobank Limited’ (Incorporated 28 November 2003) available at Companies 
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 To collect, gather in, label, store and anonymise information and blood and 
samples;522  
 To develop and operate policies governing and encouraging access and use of 
the resource and data samples and to grant licenses inside and outside the 
UK;523  
 To receive, investigate and resolve complaints;524  
 To hold, grant licenses, sell, lease and deal with or dispose of rights or 
interest in, the undertaking, property, rights and assets held by the Company, 
including the Resource;525  
 To invest capital held by the Company not immediately required for the 
objects of the Company in any part of the world in investments;526 and 
 To acquire any copyright, patent, publication or other intellectual property 
right in or arising out of the resource, data samples and any other research or 
research results.527  
Significantly, the Board of Directors, who are charity trustees for the purpose of UK 
charity law528 and Company Directors for the purpose of UK company law,529 ‘may 
exercise all the powers of the Company.’530 The purpose of the next chapters 
(Chapters 5 and 6) will be to critically analyse the implications of this dual legal 
framework for the range of stakeholders involved in UK Biobank. For now, it is 
clear that this apparent ‘ownership’ gives rise to an ethical tension between the no 
property rule and rights of access, use, and control that are all traditionally accepted 
to be property interests.531  
                                                                                                                                                                    
House, company no. 04978912 <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912/filing-
history> accessed 8 Feb 2016.  
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523 Ibid. Para 4(E)  
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Significantly, this chapter has identified a number of key risks that may arise from 
the choice of this structure, informed by both Langan’s empirical analysis and 
Chapters 1 and 4’s discussion of the ethical and legal challenges of biobanking in the 
UK. For example, the public good mission of UK Biobank may compete with the 
aims and objectives of the funders of the corporation and its managers. Furthermore, 
the rights of individual donors (Chapters 1 and 4), such as protection from breach of 
privacy or personal harm, may not be as effectively protected as would be the case 
under English public law or via Parliamentary scrutiny, which may have been the 
case if UK Biobank had been established on a statutory footing.  However, the dual 
legal basis of UK Biobank does go some way to addressing certain risks, as will be 
shown in the remaining chapters. To investigate the potential risks that arise by 
virtue of this dual legal structure in terms of the interests that are protected and 
promoted within this model, Chapter 6 will critically analyse the constitution of this 
private model to highlight the extent to which it is publically accountable. The 
remains of this thesis will be dedicated to investigating the extent to which these 
risks are mitigated by the potential for legal remedies outwith the model, in 
negligence or judicial review.  
First, though, the question arises as to how the UK Biobank design addresses the 
risks that derive from its legal structure. In direct response to these risks the core 
funders (the WT and the MRC) built core institutional safeguards in the form of a 
self-regulatory governance policy; the UK Biobank ‘Ethics and Governance 
Framework’. This Framework details the ways in which UK Biobank Ltd manages 
the ethical challenges associated with population biobanking and their relationship 
with ‘participants’, ‘research users’, and ‘society’. Furthermore, an accompanying 
independent ‘Ethics and Governance Council’ has been established, accountable to 
the WT and the MRC, to monitor UK Biobank’s conformance with this Framework, 
and mandated with a purely advisory role to advise on the interests of participants 
and the general public in relation to UK Biobank. The final part of this chapter will 
outline some of the ways in which this governance framework addresses the ethical 
challenges described in Chapter 1 and will begin to consider the remit of the EGC, 
before the wider legal standing of the EGC in the running of UK Biobank Ltd as a 
charity company is evaluated in Chapter 6.  
 
 
111 
4.4 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council and Ethics and 
Governance Framework 
4.4.1 Interim Advisory Group on UK Biobank Ethics and Governance  
The first draft Ethics and Governance Framework (EGF) was prepared by the UK 
Biobank funders the DH, MRC and the WT, with the advice of an Interim Advisory 
Group on Ethics and Governance (IAG).532 In view of the regulatory framework for 
biobanking in the UK and bearing in mind the choice of legal structure for UK 
Biobank as a charity company, the IAG ultimately recommended that the UK 
Biobank should adopt and be subject to an ‘Ethics and Governance Framework’ 
(EGF), which was to be overseen by an independent, ‘Ethics and Governance 
Council’ (EGC).533  
The IAG included experts in research ethics, philosophy, law, science and social 
science, and lay representation and was chaired by a consultant in health policy and 
ethics. The Group met during early 2003 and their deliberations were informed by 
the aforementioned consultations, an ethics consultation workshop held in April 
2002 and two consultation exercises; undertaken in May 2003 on an early draft of 
the EGF, in which members of the public, health-care professionals, and a wide-
ranging group of experts and stakeholders participated. The IAG also recruited 
People Science & Policy Ltd (PSP) to establish a panel of 64 lay people aged 
between 45 and 69 (the age group of UK Biobank participants) to consult on the 
draft EGF before finalising their report to the funders. Version 1.0 of the EGF was 
published in September 2003 and copies of the Framework were made publically 
available for comment and sent to over 100 stakeholders between 24 September 
2003 and 24 October 2003.  
Evidently, UK Biobank’s funders perceived the need to establish internal governance 
arrangements and independent oversight as an extra layer of scrutiny of the 
management and day-to-day running of UK Biobank, in the hope that this inspired 
trust in participants and the general public. It is arguable that their decision was 
                                                          
532 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance 
Framework Background Document’ (Wellcome Trust, 10th October 2003) 
<www.wellcome.ac.uk/about-us/publications/reports/biomedical-ethics/wtd003284.htm> accessed 06 
Jan 2016.  
533 Ibid.  
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informed by the concerns expressed in reports of the House of Lords Select 
Committee and Human Genetics Commission, previously mentioned, as well as the 
controversy that had led to the demise of the Icelandic national database (Chapter 2). 
The EGF was an opportunity to communicate in a transparent way exactly how the 
project intended to handle these ethical challenges. The contents of the Framework 
and the remit of the Council will now be outlined.  
4.4.2 The Ethics and Governance Council 
During the IAG discussions the need for the establishment of an oversight body 
widely perceived to be critically important534 and this oversight body became the 
Ethics and Governance Council. The EGC was established in 2004 as an 
independent advisor to the Board and the Funders and according to the EGC modus 
operandi,535 the remit of the EGC includes the publishing of public reports on the 
conformance of UK Biobank with the EGF and with the interests of the participants 
and the public.536  
The EGC does not have the power of veto over the use of data or samples. This 
power, as we have seen, belongs to the Board of Directors. However, no member of 
the EGC is present on the Board of Directors. In fact, if the EGC feels that a 
particular application is not in the public interest or is unethical, they have three 
forms of redress: lodge a complaint, report publically on their views and ultimately, 
if dissatisfied with the Board’s response, they could resign. Influential media 
coverage could mean, ‘if the EGC did ‘go public’ no doubt there would be extensive 
                                                          
534 People Science and Policy Ltd, UK Biobank Consultation on the Ethical and Governance 
Framework—Report prepared for the Wellcome Trust and The Medical Research Council (People 
Science & Policy Ltd 2003) <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/EGF-
Consultation.pdf?> accessed 5 February 2016 
535 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council ‘Terms of Reference and Modus Operandi’ 
<http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/default/files/terms%20of%20reference%20and%20modus%20oper
andi.pdf> accessed 5 February 2016 
536 It is noted that the remit of the EGC was modified as of 1 January 2015 and consequently, the 
EGC will no longer review every application made to the UK Biobank. Instead, the UK Biobank 
Board of Directors will ‘Alert’ the EGC to applications that raise ethics or governance issues that 
merit the Council’s attention: ‘Under this arrangement, the EGC will rely on UK Biobank to advise it 
that a significant application is in the system. An application will be significant where it involves: a 
request for re-contact; or; a novel and/or important ethical issue; or; a novel and/or important 
governance issue; or making a decision that will set a major precedent; or; some other matter that, in 
the judgment of UK Biobank, merits the attention of the EGC.’  
UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council ‘The Ethics and Governance Council’s Oversight in 
Relation to UK Biobank’s Administration of the Access Process’ (2014): 
<http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/default/files/Final%20EGC%20Oversight%20131114.pdf > 
accessed 5 February 2015 
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media coverage and a subsequent effect on recruitment/retention of donors.’537 
Significantly, this falls short of the promise made in the Government White Paper 
Our Inheritance, Our Future (previously mentioned) that stated there would be an 
‘independent monitoring body with the power of veto.’538  
In fact, the remit and powers of the EGC were ‘the most difficult issue for the IAG – 
suggestions ranged from monitoring and advising, to regulatory oversight, even to 
veto power over UK Biobank’s actions.’539 Some members, ‘sceptical of what they 
saw as being merely rhetorical power’ thought that the EGC should have the veto 
powers envisaged in the aforementioned White Paper, as well as independence, to 
give it authority to exert over UK Biobank’s actions if necessary and foster public 
perception of its protective status. The Group also noted that veto powers could 
conflict with the legal authority and responsibility of the Board of Directors and 
probably would not be acceptable to the Funders or the Board. The IAG examined a 
number of possibilities and obtained legal advice on the matter, and concluded that 
the most appropriate status for the Council was a committee established by the MRC 
and the WT: ‘On practical legal grounds the Council’s being established as a 
company limited by guarantee was judged not to be appropriate’.540  
As a committee established by the MRC and the WT the EGC is accountable to the 
Funders for acting within its remit, carrying out its functions and acting in 
accordance with their modus operandi. The EGC may be required by the Funders to 
provide information to demonstrate this.541 Importantly, to fulfil this remit, the EGC 
have the right to require from parties involved in UK Biobank ‘whatever information 
and discussion are necessary.’542 Chapter 5 will investigate how far this is a 
satisfactory position from the perspective of corporate governance theory, or whether 
the EGC should be more adequately represented on the Board of Directors, to better 
                                                          
537 Ibid.  
538Department of Health, Our Inheritance, Our Future: Realising the Potential of Genetics in the NHS 
(White Paper, CM 5791-II, 2003).  
539 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance 
Framework Background Document’ (Wellcome Trust, 10th October 2003) 
<www.wellcome.ac.uk/about-us/publications/reports/biomedical-ethics/wtd003284.htm> accessed 06 
Jan 2016.  
540 Ibid.  
541 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council ‘Terms of Reference and Modus Operandi’ 
<http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/default/files/terms%20of%20reference%20and%20modus%20oper
andi.pdf> accessed 5 January 2016 
542 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016. 
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protect donors and facilitate accountability. Subsequently, Chapter 6 of this thesis 
will demonstrate that despite a lack of legal ‘teeth’, there may nonetheless be 
avenues available within the legal structure of UK Biobank as a charity company for 
the Ethics and Governance Council to hold UK Biobank to account.543  
Before this detailed legal analysis, the final part of the current chapter will examine 
UK Biobank’s EGF and the extent to which this policy instrument strives to balance 
the public and private interests involved in UK Biobank.  
4.4.3 The Ethics and Governance Framework  
The Ethics and Governance Framework was drafted by the WT and the MRC for UK 
Biobank in view of the regulatory framework for biobanking in the UK. While the 
EGF is not legally binding, it is a statement of principle that communicates how the 
ethical challenges of biobanking will be managed as per the UK’s regulatory 
position. As a living document it will be revised as necessary to adapt to changing 
social attitudes or unanticipated challenges. A series of vital statements as to UK 
Biobank’s constitution are enshrined in the EGF. The Framework communicates the 
UK Biobank’s relationship with, and commitment to, participants,544 researchers,545 
and society at large546 and in so doing, ‘it identifies a very full range of stakeholders 
and the interests considered to be at stake…’547 (to be explored in Chapter 5 and 6.) 
Purpose 
The Biobank’s purpose is articulated in the Framework as: 
UK Biobank aims to build a major resource that can support a diverse range of 
research intended to improve the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of illness and 
the promotion of health throughout society.548 
                                                          
543 In charity law, as a ‘person interested’, the EGC is potentially able to challenge the BoD decision 
making via UK Biobank’s legal structure as a charity company limited; analysed in depth in the next 
two Chapters of this thesis.  
544 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016 
545 Ibid. II. ‘Relationship with Research Users’ 
546 Ibid. III. ‘Relationship with Society’ 
547 Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009).   
548 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016; ‘Purpose 
and Overview’ 
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Their website expands;  
UK Biobank will ensure that only those who are bona fide researchers working on 
health related research in the public interest get access to the valuable information 
and data.549 (Emphasis added) 
Consent 
As Chapter 1 has illustrated traditional, informed consent is problematic in the 
biobanking context, where it is not possible (or desirable) to predict all future 
applications for which the biobank will be used. Therefore, two options were 
available to UK Biobank: specific or broad consent. With specific consent, any use 
of data other than that explicitly outlined in the consent process would require 
contacting donors to re-consent each time a new research proposal came up for 
consideration. UK Biobank aims to encourage as many legitimate uses of the 
material stored as possible, consistent with its stated purpose of the public interest. 
To enable this, and informed by guidance from the (then) Human Genetics 
Commission that consent in this context cannot be fully specific,550 UK Biobank 
adopted a broad consent model.551 This general consent was deemed to be acceptable 
by the HGC where confidentiality is protected, data is anonymised and there is 
provision for the right to withdrawal.552 
UK Biobank’s EGF reflects this and states: 
Consent will be sought to participate in UK Biobank. Participation will be presented 
as an opportunity to contribute to a resource that may, in the long term, enhance 
other people’s health. Because it will be impossible to anticipate all future research 
                                                          
549 UK Biobank ‘UK Biobank in the news’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2012/04/uk-
biobank-in-the-news-2/> accessed 9 April 2012 
550 Human Genetics Commission, Inside Information: Balancing interests in the use of personal 
genetic data (Department of Health 2002) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061023110946/http:/www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/Do
cPub/Document/insideinformation_summary.pdf> accessed 31 January 2016. 
551 At the time, interest groups such as GeneWatch UK argued that participants should be given more 
specific information so they had the option to be informed of when and where their genetic 
information was being used, and whether to consent to use of their data in research funded by certain 
organisations: GeneWatch UK, Memorandum submitted by Gene Watch UK (Appendix 2 to The 
Minutes of Evidence) in Select Committee on Science and Technology, The Work of the Medical 
Research Council (HC 2002-3, 132).  
552 Ibid. 
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uses, consent will be sought for research in general that is consistent with UK 
Biobank’s stated purpose (rather than for specific research.)553  
This consent is based on an explanation of the following: the purpose of the biobank 
and its longitudinal nature; the participation process; the fact that there will be a link 
to the full record of medical and health relevant information; the fact that UK 
Biobank is the legal owner of the database and the samples therein; the safeguards 
that will be in place including reversible anonymisation; the research access 
requirements, including that commercial entities will apply; re-contact; the right to 
withdrawal at any time; and UK Biobank’s commitment to engage with participants 
and society.554 Participants have a three-tiered right to withdrawal: ‘No further 
contact’ maintains permission to use information and samples and allows UK 
Biobank to obtain further information from participant’s health records, but prohibits 
further direct contact with the participant. ‘No further access’ prohibits UK Biobank 
obtaining further information from participant’s health records in the future, but is 
otherwise the same as ‘no further contact.’ ‘No further use’ is the most 
comprehensive withdrawal option and prohibits further contact or obtaining further 
information and requires any information or samples collected previously to be no 
longer available to researchers and destroyed.555  
Safeguarding confidentiality  
UK Biobank organisers concluded that general consent was acceptable since there 
was to be anonymity of data samples;556 Biobank data will be stored and routinely 
used in this format: 
UK Biobank is committed to protecting the confidentiality of data and samples. 
Systems will be in place for secure data flow and for protecting confidentiality, 
(reversibly) anonymising data and samples, and enforcing confidentiality.557  
                                                          
553 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 4 April 2012; I.B.1: 
‘Consent’  
554 Ibid.  
555 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 4 April 2012; I.B.6: 
‘Right to withdraw’ 
556 Human Genetics Commission, Inside Information: Balancing interests in the use of personal 
genetic data (Department of Health 2002) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061023110946/http:/www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/Do
cPub/Document/insideinformation_summary.pdf> accessed 31 Jan 2016. 
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No information will be released in any form that allows individuals to be identified. 
That said the anonymisation process has to be reversible to allow individuals to be 
re-identified for research purposes and to honour participants right to withdrawal.558 
Participants are made aware at the time of consent that UK Biobank has the facilities 
in place for re-contact and consent accordingly. The consent form states:  
I understand that I may be re-contacted by UK Biobank (e.g. to answer some more 
questions and/or attend another assessment visit), but this is optional.559 
Since UK Biobank reached its target for recruitment in 2010, 20,000 participants 
from Manchester, Sheffield, Liverpool and Leeds have returned for a second 
assessment.560  
Access and Ownership 
Access will be granted to UK Biobank if research purposes are deemed to be in the 
public interest. But data held in UK Biobank is potentially of interest to a number of 
parties other than researchers. For instance: the police;561 insurers;562 employers; 
commercial companies outside of medical research; and the participants themselves. 
In response to the controversy surrounding the Icelandic population database, which 
granted an exclusive licence to private company deCODE Genetics, UK Biobank is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
557 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 4 April 2012; I.B: 
‘Understandings and Consent’ 
558 Therefore there is some potential for misuse of data: ‘ultimately there will remain a remote 
possibility that the identifiable information will be released from the UK Biobank and that this must 
be clearly explained when seeking consent’: Human Genetics Commission written evidence to House 
of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology Third Report: ‘The Work of the Medical 
Research Council’ Session 2002-2003 Ev. 55 
559 UK Biobank, Consent Form: UK Biobank (UK Biobank 2006) <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Consent_form.pdf?phpMyAdmin=trmKQlYdjjnQIgJ%2CfAzikMhEnx6> 
accessed 31 Jan 2013 
560 Re-contact will become available to more UK Biobank donors in other parts of the country in due 
course: UK Biobank ‘Have you been invited to a repeat assessment?’ 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2012/06/repeat-assessments-adding-value-to-this-exciting-resource/> 
accessed 1 August 2013 
561 Currently the DPA contains exemptions allowing police access to personal data to prevent or 
detect crime or to apprehend or prosecute offenders: Data Protection Act 1998 s.29(1) 
562 Prohibited use of genetic information by insurers is currently subject to a voluntary moratorium 
agreed with the Association of British Insurers (ABI): HM Government and Association of British 
Insurers, The Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance (ABI 2014) 
<www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Topics-and-issues/Genetics/Genetic-testing> accessed 19 
March 2015. 
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the ‘legal owner’ of the samples for benefits to be directed towards the ‘public good’ 
and held in the public domain.563  
According to its specifically drafted ‘Access Procedures’564 UK Biobank will seek 
payment for granting access to the resource with a fixed charge for managing the 
application review process and a variable charge depending on how many samples, 
tests and/or data are required for the approved research project.565  
Feedback of results 
UK Biobank will generally not provide health information to participants and a clear 
explanation of this policy (and the few exceptions) will be provided in the participant 
information material: 
UK Biobank will aim to ensure that participants understand that enrolment does not 
provide them with a health check. In principle, it would be possible to provide 
participants with the results of some measurements or observations at any of the 
three stages; at the initial assessment visit (e.g. blood pressure or incidental 
findings), in the initial stage before the samples are stored (e.g. white cell count) and 
much later as results arise from research studies (e.g. genetic or biochemical 
studies).566  
Under existing arrangements, the only information that individual UK Biobank 
participants receive are ‘baseline measures’ at the assessment visit.567 These are 
                                                          
563 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 1 August 2013 II. A: 
‘Stewardship Of Data And Samples’ 
564  UK Biobank, Access Procedures: Application and review procedures for Access to the UK 
Biobank Resource Version 1.0 (UK Biobank, 2011 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Access-Procedures-2011.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2014.  
565 UK Biobank ‘Principles of Access’ <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/principles-of-access/> accessed 
on 7 April 2012 
566 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 1 August 2013, B. 3: 
‘Provision of health information to participants’  
567 Ibid. B.3 states: 
‘At the initial assessment visit: It would be impractical and inappropriate to conceal from participants 
some of the measurements taken in their enrolment visit (i.e. blood pressure, height, weight, estimated 
amount of fat). Consequently, a printed report will be provided at the end of their visit as a means of 
feeding back such measurements. By reporting standard ranges, the participant should be provided 
with sufficient information to give meaning to the measurements taken, so that they may act on the 
results if necessary and arrange to see their general practitioner or other relevant health professional.  
The legal duty of care for staff conducting enrolment will be determined by the research context, and 
will apply mainly to safe and competent collection of questionnaire data, baseline measurements, and 
blood or other samples. They will not have the same duty of care that they would have in a clinical 
setting. However, even in this research context, there may be occasions when staff consider there to 
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communicated in the form of a printed report which participants may act upon as 
necessary.568 Measurements include blood pressure, lung function, bone density, 
weight, and estimated amount of fat.569 They are compared to population standard 
ranges so participants have some indication of whether their results fall outside the 
‘normal’ range. Results are considered ‘abnormal’ where they deviate significantly 
from reference values. They are considered critical when they will cause a patient to 
suffer a life-threatening event if not communicated immediately, in which instance 
participants are advised by UK Biobank (via the data collector) to visit their GP.570  
This is also the approach adopted in UK Biobank’s enhanced imaging study; for 
which participants were contacted to re-consent. Imaging scans conducted by trained 
radiographers present an important opportunity for feedback at the collection site, 
before researchers for subsequent studies use data. Incidental findings in the course 
of imaging research are reported to be common, around 3-12% in neuroimaging and 
up to 30% in body imaging depending on the population being studied.571 Therefore, 
UK Biobank’s provisional approach will be to provide limited feedback as part of 
their ‘baseline assessment’572 for incidental findings considered to be potentially 
‘serious’ (defined in this context as ‘likely to threaten life span, quality of life or 
major body functions’573) that are observed during the data acquisition or quality 
control stage. The feedback loop provides for review by the radiologist performing 
the assessment, and then, if appropriate, feedback will be provided to the participant 
                                                                                                                                                                    
be a professional or ethical obligation to draw attention to abnormal measurements (such as elevated 
blood pressure) or incidental findings (such as possible melanoma). In such circumstances, 
participants will be encouraged to contact a relevant health professional.’  
568 Though donors are reminded that this is not to be considered a ‘health check’: UK Biobank ‘Invite 
to repeat assessment visit’ <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/repeat-assessment/> accessed 18 December 
2013 
569 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> 18 December 2013 
570 Knoppers BM and Kharaboyan L, ‘“Deconstructing” Biobank Communication of Results’ (2009) 
6 SCRIPTed 677, 680 
571 The Royal College of Radiologists (RCR) and the Scottish Imaging Network: A Platform for 
Scientific Excellence (SINAPSE), Management of Incidental Findings Detected During Research 
Imaging (The Royal College of Radiologists 2011) 
<www.rcr.ac.uk/docs/radiology/pdf/BFCR(11)8_Ethics.pdf> accessed 19 Dec 2015. 
572 UK Biobank’s Principle Investigator Rory Collins argues that this approach is ‘consistent with- but 
more detailed than- the standard operating procedure on incidental findings in the baseline UK 
Biobank assessment visit.’ Peterson SE and others, ‘Imaging in population science: cardiovascular 
magnetic resonance in 100, 000 participants of UK Biobank- rationale, challenges and approaches’ 
(2013) 15 Journal of Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance 46, 54 
573 Ibid.   
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and his/her GP.574 This feedback mechanism raises the question of whether UK 
Biobank should feedback other incidental findings and the extent to which this 
would be in the interests of the participants and the public. This will be the topic of 
Chapter 7 and part of Chapter 8 of this thesis.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to contextualise the choice of a private legal structure for 
UK Biobank within the wider context of the regulatory framework for biobanking in 
the UK, to begin to illustrate the multiple layers of laws that are applicable to the 
running of the resource to secure public objectives and protect the interests of 
individual donors. This legal structure raises risks relating to the protection of the 
‘public’ and ‘private’ interests in UK Biobank.575 For example, it is debatable how 
far donors are protected from personal harm by this legal structure (Chapters 1 and 
7). Furthermore, the private legal structure (as defined in the introduction of this 
thesis) as a charity company arguably diminishes the ‘public’ accountability of UK 
Biobank. However, the remaining chapters of this thesis will analyse the legal 
framework in more detail to show the extent to which such risks are avoided or 
mitigated.  
In summary, UK Biobank was incorporated as a charity company with a mix of 
public and private funding from the WT, the MRC, and latterly the DH. This choice 
of legal structure potentially reduces the public accountability of the resource 
because UK Biobank Ltd is a separate legal entity independent of the public funds 
used to create it rather than a public body established on a statutory footing. 
Although comparative experiences of Iceland and Estonia suggest that the specific 
statutory frameworks for population biobanks do not necessarily guarantee a 
successfully operating biobank, it is arguable that public accountability goes some 
way to ensuring that a biobank is held to their stated aims. Thus, while the legal 
structure of UK Biobank as a charity company undoubtedly brings with it a number 
of benefits for the funders (for example, investment security, tax advantages and 
liability implications) whether accountability has been lost or maintained is 
questionable. Additionally, it is necessary to consider the extent to which this 
                                                          
574 Ibid.  
575 It is recalled from the Introduction that these are not easily separated, as will be shown in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis.  
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structure benefits the interests of the individual donors of UK Biobank. While 
incorporation as a charity at least means that UK Biobank Ltd is held to its charitable 
purpose to benefit the health of future generations, had the biobank or the EGC been 
established on a statutory footing this would have facilitated more straightforward 
public accountability via Parliament. Instead, this choice of private model has 
created risks for the public accountability of UK Biobank Ltd. 
Considering an ‘extensive consultation process’ to gauge public interest, inspire 
confidence and ultimately engender participation in the ambitious project576 (Chapter 
3) UK Biobank might be considered a ‘model for public involvement’.577 However, 
UK Biobank has since been criticised for failing to invite the public and other 
consultees to consider more fundamental questions prior to the project’s creation, 
such as ‘the priorities of commercial users versus the public interest, the likelihood 
of benefits set against other possible uses of those resources, the content of 
regulations and who would be enforcing them.’578 Instead, such concerns are 
supposedly addressed by the general reassurance made in the EGF (and on the UK 
Biobank website) that as a charitable company, UK Biobank will serve the public 
interest and will only act in the public good, monitored by the EGC. While it is 
arguable that the EGC and EGF have been created with donors and wider 
stakeholders in mind and to cover the ethical challenges associated with biobanking, 
there are a number of potential shortcomings if this Framework is relied upon for the 
protection of public and private interests in the running of the resource in and of 
itself.  
For example, there are currently no members of the EGC on the Board of Directors 
(although the Chair of the EGC is able to sit in on Board meetings579) and the EGC 
does not have the legal standing to veto applications made to UK Biobank should 
they deem this necessary. Furthermore, there are no donor or public representatives 
on the Ethics and Governance Council. As identified in this chapter, other risks flow 
                                                          
576 Jones M and Salter B, ‘The governance of human genetics: policy discourse and constructions of 
public trust’ (2003) 22 New Genetics and Society 21. 
577 Levitt M, ‘UK Biobank: a model for public engagement?’ (2005) 1 Genomics Society and Policy 
78. 
578 Ibid.  
579 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council ‘The Ethics and Governance Council’s Oversight in 
Relation to UK Biobank’s Administration of the Access Process’ (2014): 
<http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/default/files/Final%20EGC%20Oversight%20131114.pdf > 
accessed 19 January 2016 
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from this choice of legal structure. These include the potentially dominant role of the 
funders as Members of the Company and the potential for the public good mission of 
UK Biobank to come into conflict with the aims and objectives of these Members (as 
the principal funders of UK Biobank); the lack of statutory independence for the 
EGC; and the potentially diminished protection of individual donors within this 
private legal structure, which may not have been the case if UK Biobank was more 
clearly accountable under English public law (via Parliamentary scrutiny) and 
established on a statutory footing. This has led to criticism that the UK Biobank 
model fails to adequately represent the full range of interests that are associated with 
the project580 and proposals for improved donor representation in the future,581 to 
which the next chapter will now turn.  
                                                          
580 Papaioannou T, ‘Democratic governance of genomics: the case of UK Biobank’ (2012) 31 New 
Genetics and Society 111. 
581 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440, 449; Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009).   
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5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) have shown that there existed a range of 
organisational and legal models for a population biobank in the UK, including 
establishing the biobank on a public, statutory footing. Instead, UK Biobank was 
established with a private legal structure and a complicated dual legal basis as a 
charity and a company.582  Chapter 4 has identified that both UK charity and 
company law583 regulate the legal status and structure of UK Biobank Ltd as a 
charitable company limited and highlighted some of the potential difficulties in 
protecting the public mission of UK Biobank and the private interests of the 
individual donors in a private model. This would not necessarily have been the case 
if UK Biobank had been set up on a statutory basis as a public body and directly 
accountable to Parliament (to be considered in Chapter 8 of this thesis). 
The previous chapter has begun to identify some of the key stakeholders584 of UK 
Biobank Ltd, including the MRC and WT as Members of the Company, the Board of 
Directors, the EGC and the general public. Correspondingly, Chapters 3 and 4 have 
                                                          
582 As identified in Chapter 4.  
583 Charities Act 2011; Companies Act 2006. 
584 It is remembered from Chapter 3 that the general use of the term ‘stakeholder’ refers to anyone 
with an interest or concern in a matter. This is distinguished from the more specific definition within 
corporate governance, the leading of which is Freeman’s popular definition: ‘any group or individual 
who can affect or be affected by the achievement of the organization’s ‘objective’: Freeman RE, 
Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (CUP 1984). 
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highlighted the criticism that UK Biobank faced during its development stages, on 
the grounds that donors and other interested stakeholders were not given adequate 
opportunity to be involved in early decisions or consultations about the eventual UK 
Biobank governance model.585 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
theoretical underpinnings of corporations in the UK to better understand the ways in 
which interests are prioritised and promoted in the governance of profit and not-for-
profit organisations. As will be seen, different conceptions of corporate governance 
have implications for the ways in which companies are run, the range of interests 
that are taken into account, and the mechanisms in place for accountability to these 
interests in the running of the organisation. Responding to criticism that UK Biobank 
fails to adequately involve donors in it’s governance model (Chapter 3), theories of 
corporate governance have been applied in the context of biobanking, in an attempt 
to better understand what it means to govern biobanks well and the extent to which 
donors and the public ought to be involved in the running of UK Biobank.586 These 
proposals will be discussed after the relevant perspectives of corporate governance 
have been outlined, namely; ‘shareholder’, ‘stakeholder’ and ‘social institutions’.   
5.2 Corporate governance in profit and not-for-profit organisations 
Other than to facilitate their establishment as separate legal entities and distinct legal 
forms, the law in the UK has historically played an arms-length role in the regulation 
of corporations.587 The courts are reluctant to enter into the merits of commercial 
decisions and will usually not interfere with the internal management of companies 
acting within their powers.588 Rather, it is left to the shareholders and the directors of 
                                                          
585 Levitt M, ‘UK Biobank: a model for public engagement?’ (2005) 1 Genomics Society and Policy 
78. 
586 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440; Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009).   
587 Statutorily regulated by the Companies Act 2006. 
588 This principle is often referred to as the ‘business judgement rule’, which emphasises that a 
director is ‘employed to take risks’ and that sometimes those risks result in losses to the company. 
There is a danger that courts might apply hindsight and conclude that directors acted without due care 
and skill, and so ‘the assessment of commercial matters and the making of business decisions is a 
matter for managers… That other managers might have taken a different course and made different 
decisions is beside the point.’ IBM United Kingdom Holdings Ltd v Dalgleish [2014] EWHC 980 
(Ch). 
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the company to manage company affairs,589 and it is for the shareholder majority to 
enforce issues relating to the running of the company; for example the performance 
of director’s duties.590 In the event of wrongdoing to the corporation (itself a legally 
recognised ‘person’) it will be for the company to bring an action in court to redress 
matters that cannot be decided by the majority of a company’s shareholders.591 It is 
said that without these principles, which have been upheld for over one hundred 
years, futile actions,592 oppressive litigation,593 and multiplicity of suits594 would 
ensue and companies would be ‘torn to pieces’ by litigation.595  
Given the relative freedom of companies in their operation,596 it is best practice for 
companies to develop ‘corporate governance’ strategies to facilitate effective 
management for a successful company;597 detailing the composition and scope of the 
company, and to guide assessment of what the purpose of the company should be, in 
whose interests the company should be run, and the particular forms of 
accountability that are in place for the protection of the company and its objectives. 
                                                          
589 ‘It is not the business of the court to manage the affairs of the company. That is for the 
shareholders and the directors:’ Scrutton LJ, in Shuttleworth v Cox Bros. & Co. [1927] 2 KB 9  [23]. 
Cited in Wedderburn KW, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 
Cambridge Law Journal 194. 
590 Which must be exercised their subjective good faith judgment: Smith and Fawcett Ltd, Re [1942] 
Ch 304; Upheld in Companies Act 2006 s.172, as will later be discussed in more detail. 
591 Foss v Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189 (1843) 2 Ha 461 and Mozley v Alston (1847) 1 Ph. 790. 
Together, these principles – majority shareholder control and the role of the court in the running of a 
company are widely referred to as ‘the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’: Burland v Earle [1902] AC. 83, 93 
(P.C.) per Lord Davey. Cited in Wedderburn KW, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194. 
592 Foss v Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189 (1843) 2 Ha 461 [494]; Bagshaw v E. Union Ry. Co. (1849) 7 
Hare 130. 
593 Gray v Lewie (1873) 8 Ch App 1035, [1050-1051] 
594 Mozley v Alston (1847) 1 Ph 790, [799]; Lord v Copper Miners Co. (1848) 2 Ph. 740, [752]; 
MacDougall v Gardiner (No. 2) (1875) 1 Ch.D. 13, [25]. 
595 La Cie. de Mayville v Whitley [1896] 1 Ch 788 [807], Kay LJ cited in Wedderburn KW, 
‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 Cambridge Law Journal 194. 
596 Sjafjell B, Johnston A, Anker-Sorensen L, and Millon D ‘Shareholder primacy: the main barrier to 
sustainable companies’ in Sjafjell B and Richardson BJ (eds), Company Law and Sustainability: 
Legal Barriers and Opportunities (CUP 2015). The authors argue: 
‘Organising the firm through a corporate legal structure has – or is meant to have – implications for 
the decision making process of the firm. Those implications include constituting the shareholders as 
the general meeting within which certain important decision are made; vesting in the board a strategy-
setting, supervisory, and in some jurisdictions executive role; protecting creditors; and, in some 
jurisdictions, also regulating employee participation through codetermination rules.’  
This is notable in terms of the motivations behind choosing the corporate legal structure for UK 
Biobank over alternatives such as the trust, as will be explored later in this chapter and in Chapter 6. 
597 The UK Corporate Governance Code describes the purpose of corporate governance is to 
‘facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long-term success of 
the company’: Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2014) 
<www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-
2014.pdf> accessed 6 Jan 2016 
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Generally then, ‘corporate governance’ is the way in which companies are directed 
and controlled.598 In the narrow sense, corporate governance relates to the 
composition of the Board of Directors who are responsible for the running of the 
company.599 More broadly corporate governance encompasses both the set of 
relationships of those who depend on, or contribute to, the organisation, as well as 
the structure of a corporation, its purpose, and the role of those exercising control.600  
To safeguard the running of charities for the public benefit, the Charity Commission 
was statutorily created by the Charities Act 2011 to regulate the running of charities 
in the UK. Therefore, the operation of corporations that are incorporated as 
charitable will be subject to external oversight, which, as will be demonstrated in this 
Chapter, gives rise to an inherent legal tension between the primacy of shareholders 
under company law601 versus the priority of the general public as the beneficiaries of 
charitable organisations under charity law.602 Consequently, this gives rise to 
uncertainty as to who director’s duties are owed, how they are enforced, and by 
whom.  
                                                          
598 Ibid: ‘Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in 
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate 
governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s 
strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the 
business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, 
regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.’ Citing the Cadbury Committee definition 
produced for the first UK Corporate Governance Code in 1992: Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance (the Cadbury Committee), Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992).   
599 Taylor PN, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Companies Act 2006’ (PhD thesis, Birkbeck 
College, University of London 2010), 13 
600 Most recently, the OECD have reviewed their Principles of Corporate Governance and adopt a 
broad definition encompassing both the relationships and the structure of a corporation and its 
governance:  
‘Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined.’  
OECD Corporate Governance Committee, Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD 2015) 
<www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf> accessed 30 Jan 2016.  
601 It is noted that whether such primacy is still appropriate today is the subject of comprehensive 
academic debate. See: Ireland P, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 
MLR 32; Sjafjell B, Johnston A, Anker-Sorensen L, and Millon D ‘Shareholder primacy: the main 
barrier to sustainable companies’ in Sjafjell B and Richardson BJ (eds), Company Law and 
Sustainability: Legal Barriers and Opportunities (CUP 2015).  
602 Charities Act 2011  
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Furthermore, the lack of share capital603 raises deeper theoretical questions as to the 
appropriate conceptual basis of a charitable company.604 In short, because charities 
are created for the benefit of the public, it is more appropriate to refer to 
‘membership’ rather than ‘shareholding’ in companies that are incorporated as 
charitable. On this matter, corporate governance research has produced a number of 
theories that seek to explain how interests within an organisation ought to be 
safeguarded and prioritised.605 Fundamentally, perspectives of corporate governance 
vary according to the particular organisation under consideration and this is usually 
dictated by the particular ‘asset’ that is owned and managed by the company. 
Traditionally, profit making organisations have been conceptualised as based on 
either property or as a nexus of contracts.606 According to these perspectives, 
shareholders are prioritised in the corporation. Shareholder models of governance are 
based on the principle that the role of the Board of Directors is to act as ‘agents’ of 
the shareholders in the day-to-day management of the company.607 Therefore, 
directors are typically elected to the Board by virtue of their expertise and ability to 
inspire trust and to maximise profit for shareholders.608  
More recently a third way of viewing organisations has emerged; as a social 
institution.609 This view is argued to be more appropriate for non-profit 
                                                          
603 Though, it is noted that there has been a reluctance to define what constitutes a ‘share’:  Ireland P, 
‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 MLR 32 
604 Which will be explored in Chapter 8 and the Conclusion of this thesis.  
605 Mason C, Kirkbride J and Bryde DJ, ‘From stakeholders to institutions: the changing face of social 
enterprise governance theory’ (2007) 45 Management Decision 284. 
606 Historically this was because shareholders were treated as the legal ‘owners’ of the corporate 
assets, or the firm was the base for contracting with the aim of to maximising benefits for 
shareholders via optimal contracting and increased residual income. According to the property view 
the shareholders have a property interest in the company, akin to ownership. On the other hand, the 
nexus of contracts model conceptualises the firm as the base for contracting. The ultimate aim is to 
maximise benefits for shareholders via optimal contracting and increased residual income. This is not 
necessarily still the case, because of the widespread recognition of companies as separate legal 
personalities and as such, it is the company that ‘owns’ the company’s assets.  
For an in depth overview of the historical development of (the ‘myth’ of) shareholder primacy, see: 
Ireland P, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 MLR 32. 
For views on social enterprise theory, see: Mason C, Kirkbride J and Bryde DJ, ‘From stakeholders to 
institutions: the changing face of social enterprise governance theory’ (2007) 45 Management 
Decision 284. 
607 Taylor PN, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Companies Act 2006’ (PhD thesis, Birkbeck 
College, University of London 2010).  
608 Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise’ (2006) 33 International Journal of 
Social Economics 376; citing: Iecovich E, ‘The profile of board membership in Israeli voluntary 
organisations’ (2005) 16 Voluntas 161. 
609 Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise’ (2006) 33 International Journal of 
Social Economics 376 
 
 
128 
organisations, whose assets are held in trust and locked-in for public benefit610 and 
so are theoretically owned by the public rather than by shareholders.611 In contrast to 
profit making organisations, it is arguable that stakeholder models of governance are 
appropriate for not-for-profit organisations or social institutions. This is because 
stakeholder approaches to governance prioritise the importance of wider interests 
beyond those of company shareholders.612  
Stakeholder theory has been motivated by a ‘changing business scene’, which is 
characterised by ‘the emergence of numerous stakeholder groups and new strategic 
issues [that] requires rethinking of our traditional picture of the firm.’613 Stakeholder 
approaches seek to emphasise corporate social responsibility of businesses and 
business managers’ moral obligations to all the interests at stake.614 This is founded 
on the assumption that giving prominence to shareholders is problematic and that 
corporate governance should in fact be the arena for attending to the legitimate 
interests of all stakeholders, through mechanisms such as giving board positions to 
stakeholder representatives.615 ‘Stakeholders need to communicate with the board of 
directors, and managers need to be given the scope to pursue stakeholders’ interests 
most effectively.’616 Therefore, members of the board of directors are typically 
democratically elected to represent the full range of stakeholders associated with the 
corporation, as opposed to election based on their expertise.617 According to 
Freeman’s most widely cited definition, a stakeholder is ‘any group or individual 
who can affect or be affected by the achievement of the organisation’s ‘objective’.618 
Commonly identified stakeholders in the corporate context include: shareholders and 
                                                          
610 Dunn A, Riley CA, ‘Supporting the not-for-profit sector: the government’s review of charitable 
and social enterprise’ (2004) 67 MLR 632. 
611 Ibid.  
612 Mason C, Kirkbride J and Bryde DJ, ‘From stakeholders to institutions: the changing face of social 
enterprise governance theory’ (2007) 45 Management Decision 284, 288 
613 Freeman RE, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (CUP 1984). 
614 Ibid.   
615 Goodpaster K, ‘Business ethics and stakeholder analysis’ in Winkler E and Coombs J (eds), 
Applied Ethics: A Reader (Blackwell 1993) 229; Donaldson L and Preston M, ‘The stakeholder 
theory of the corporation: concepts, evidence, and implications’ (1995) 20 Academy of Management 
Review 85 cited in Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise’ (2006) 33 
International Journal of Social Economics 376 
616 Mason C, Kirkbride J and Bryde DJ, ‘From stakeholders to institutions: the changing face of social 
enterprise governance theory’ (2007) 45 Management Decision 284, 289 
617 Taylor PN, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Companies Act 2006’ (PhD thesis, Birkbeck 
College, University of London 2010).  
618 Ibid. 
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investors, employees, customers and suppliers, special interest groups, competitors, 
the natural environment, the state, local communities and society at large.619  
Before the reform of the Companies Act in 2006, company law in the UK was 
arguably founded on the traditional shareholder approach to corporate governance.620 
To a limited extent, this approach has been ‘reformed’ by the introduction of s.172 
into the Companies Act 2006.621 This provision represents a move towards 
‘enlightened shareholder value.’ which means directors owe a statutory duty to have 
regard for non-shareholder interests.622 Enlightened shareholder value is intended to 
promote inclusiveness among stakeholders and encourage directors to consider long-
term sustainability in terms of what is good for society at large, in recognition of the 
increasing role that companies play in wider society.623 For some, this provision is 
akin to stakeholder approaches to governance because it explicitly recognises the 
importance of taking into consideration wider interests for the success of the 
company.  
5.2.1 UK Biobank: shareholder or stakeholder approach? 
As a charity company it might be assumed that UK Biobank Ltd is most 
appropriately conceptualised by a stakeholder model of governance, because of its 
public mission and the lack of share capital. In fact, it is not immediately appropriate 
to talk of UK Biobank Ltd in terms of ‘shareholding’ but rather ‘membership’. As 
will be discussed in this chapter, part of the Board’s functional responsibility is to 
negotiate access to the resource; to maximise use of the resource and optimise public 
benefit outputs. In pursuit of this objective it is arguable that expertise, rather than 
                                                          
619 Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009), 169; citing Hillman AJ and Keim GD ‘Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and 
social issues: what’s the bottom line?’ (2001) 22 Strategic Management Journal 126.  
620 Although, for commentary on the extent to which this is true, see Ireland P, ‘Company Law and 
the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 MLR 32. 
621 Which will be analysed in the context of UK Biobank Ltd in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
622 This followed an overwhelmingly positive response to consultation and consequential 
recommendation by the Company Law Review Steering Group, alongside the Charity Commission’s 
Advisory Group, who saw the advantage in having a separate vehicle for charitable companies: Cross 
SR, ‘New legal forms for charities in the United Kingdom’ [2008] Journal of Business Law 662, 665. 
623 Historically, public-private partnerships became more popular under New Labour Government 
(Chapter 3) and in the last decade UK company law (via the Companies Act 2006) has recognised 
new legal structures for companies including the Charitable Incorporated Organisation, and the 
Community Interest Company; recognising the increasing public service delivery role of private 
corporations. This transition from private to public will be explored in more detail in Chapter 8 of this 
thesis (which analyses the role of public law in UK Biobank).  
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democratic representation, fuelled the election of the UK Biobank Board of 
Directors, and this approach corresponds with a traditional shareholder approach to 
corporate governance.624 
On the other hand, analysis will also reveal that the Board is under a statutory duty to 
consider wider stakeholders by virtue of the previously mentioned ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’ provision of the Companies Act 2006 and in this regard it may be 
more fitting to view UK Biobank governance as being underpinned by a stakeholder 
perspective of governance. However, analysis will demonstrate that this is not 
necessarily fully realised because the Board of Director’s are not democratically 
elected to represent this full range of stakeholders. Donors are ‘conspicuously 
absent’625 from the governance model and members of the EGC, who are supposedly 
responsible for safeguarding the interests of the public in the running of UK 
Biobank,626 are also absent from the Board.   
In view of these perceived shortcomings, and evaluating the UK Biobank 
governance model, Winickoff and Hunter and Laurie have put forward solutions 
founded on a wider debate between stakeholder and shareholder perspectives of 
corporate governance.627 Winickoff has expressed dissatisfaction regarding the 
‘critical distance remaining between the rhetoric of partnership and the actual 
structure of entitlements within UK Biobank… donors possess little control share, 
                                                          
624 Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise’ (2006) 33 International Journal of 
Social Economics 376. 
625 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440, 449. 
626 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016  
627 Because of this thesis’ investigation into the legal structure of UK Biobank Ltd as a charitable 
company limited by guarantee, this discussion will focus on two particular proposals from David 
Winickoff in Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 
35 JLME 440; and Hunter and Laurie in Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank 
governance: moving beyond existing approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of 
Genetic Information: Who Decides? (CUP 2009).  Although it is acknowledged that there are many 
other proposals for good biobank governance such as: Haddow G and others, ‘Tackling community 
concerns about commercialisation and genetic research: A modest interdisciplinary proposal’ (2007) 
67 Social Science & Medicine 272; Fortun M, ‘Towards Genomic Solidarity: Lessons from Iceland 
and Estonia.’ (OpenDemocracy, 9 June 2003) <www.opendemocracy.net/theme_9-
genes/article_1344.jsp> accessed 30 Jan 2016; Laurie G and others, ‘Managing Access to Biobanks: 
How Can We Reconcile Privacy and Public Interests in Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10 Medical Law 
International 315; O’Doherty and others, ‘From Consent to Institutions: Designing Adaptive 
Governance for Genomic Biobanks.’ (2011) 73 Social Science & Medicine 367. 
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and no equity share, in the common pool resource.’628 Winickoff therefore proposes 
solutions inspired by a traditional shareholder model, whereby donors are recognised 
as shareholders for their contribution of ‘biocapital’ to the company without which 
UK Biobank would not exist. Hunter and Laurie have argued against Winickoff’s 
call for direct donor representation on the Board of Directors to bridge this gap, and 
instead favour mechanisms for ongoing dialogue and communication between the 
wide range of UK Biobank stakeholders, including donors and those responsible for 
the administration and management of the resource.629  
The next section of this chapter will briefly consider this debate, because it casts 
important light on the range of interests within the governance framework of UK 
Biobank and the extent to which the approach of UK Biobank is considered 
appropriate. The debate also further explains some of the key risks which may arise 
if interests are not adequately protected and it is important to bear these risks in mind 
for the analysis of the legal structure in the next chapter. In brief, the authors put 
forward solutions for more direct engagement between donors, the EGC, and the 
Board of Directors as managers of UK Biobank. However, the limits of the proposals 
made by Winickoff and Hunter & Laurie are notable because they presuppose 
critical legal analysis of the legal structure of UK Biobank Ltd. Such investigation is 
crucial to an appreciation of the range of interests protected by the private legal 
structure and the range of accountability mechanisms that are available to these 
stakeholders within the dual model as both a charity and company. In fact, there are 
a number of means within the structure that arise by virtue of both charity and 
company law, although these are limited in both their scope and application. The 
next chapter of this thesis will investigate these avenues and propose options for 
reform informed by the theoretical underpinnings of UK Biobank, which will now be 
discussed.   
                                                          
628 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440. 
629 Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009).   
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5.2.2 Shareholding in UK Biobank Ltd: Reconciling the ‘agency gap’ 
between biobank managers and the expectations of donors and the 
public  
Winickoff argues that the core problem underlying UK Biobank Ltd governance is 
‘agency’,630 and more specifically how to represent the interests of the donor 
collective to ensure alignment with management aims.631 Winickoff contends that 
membership of the Board of Directors evinces a clear logic of representing important 
UK Biobank constituencies, including the WT, MRC, DH, academic research 
community and experienced members of the field, who are all ‘well represented’ (as 
Chapter 4 and 5 have illustrated).632 Yet, on the matter of representing important UK 
Biobank constituencies, ‘one thing is clear about Board membership: donor 
representation is conspicuously absent...’ and for Winickoff, this is a missed 
opportunity.  
Winickoff argues that this lack of representation gives rise to the risk that ‘if certain 
commercial deals are struck or if public access is somehow limited, there may be a 
real or perceived sense in which managers have reneged on an implied promise to 
advance ‘public good.’’ The adoption of a ‘controversial policy might operate as a 
triggering event, eliciting withdrawals of donations and a decrease in the value of the 
resource’. For Winickoff: ‘… [If] donors had some form of real representative power 
then project goals would be better achieved.’633 Moreover, mechanisms of 
meaningful representation of the donor collective ‘could greatly enhance both 
participation rate, participation trust, and by extension, project sustainability.’634 
To address this risk, Winickoff argues: 
                                                          
630 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440, 450. 
631 Agency theory is based on the traditional separation of ownership and control and the principle 
that managers in corporate governance are in a relationship as ‘agents’ of the companies’ 
shareholders. An agency gap is the risk that the expectations of the shareholders are not in line with 
the managers and corporate governance is therefore designed to minimize this risk: Ireland P, 
‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 MLR 32. 
632 As you would expect according to shareholder perspectives of corporate governance where 
management is elected on the grounds of expertise: Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of 
social enterprise’ (2006) 33 International Journal of Social Economics 376; Iecovich E, ‘The profile 
of board membership in Israeli voluntary organisations’ (2005) 16 Voluntas 161. 
633 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440, 449. 
634 Ibid.  
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Project planners and potential research participants ought to consider new forms of 
‘partnership governance’ that draw upon the logic of corporate governance to solve 
the agency problems involved in the management of collective genomic assets.635 
Applying a shareholder partnership636 approach to accountability in corporate 
governance, he suggests, may be ‘less strange’ than it may seem, given UK 
Biobank’s legal structure as a corporation (Chapter 4): 
The idea that shareholders will be represented in corporate decision making is one 
of the pillars of the corporate concept. Why should the same not apply in the realm 
of biobanks?637 
How then, does Winickoff propose to move from rhetoric to practice?638 By enacting 
a committee of direct representatives of the research participant group who would 
play a formal role within the governance structure.639 Accordingly, use of the 
resource would be contingent on review of two bodies; the typical ethics review 
board and a ‘Donor Approval Committee.’ This latter committee would function as a 
‘conduit between the donor group, the board of trustees, and the researchers to 
address controversial projects or issues as they arise.’640 During the consent process 
potential donors could voluntarily sign on to a donor association. Association 
members would elect leadership to sit on UK Biobank’s Board of Directors ‘akin to 
how a major institutional investor would sit on such a corporate board.’641 
Furthermore, the donor association would be responsible for filling a number of seats 
on the EGC.642 Public meetings would be held annually to address attitudes and 
preferences and deliberate policy choices regarding resource distribution,643 and 
leadership would be bound to represent any collective decisions reached on the 
                                                          
635 Ibid.  
636 For an overview of the historical development of how corporations moved from laws of usury 
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Board and EGC.644 Donors would thereby possess a ‘share’ in determining how a 
collective public resource is charitably allocated. Winickoff submits that this form of 
empowerment could address the ‘agency gap’ between public expectations and 
values and those of biobank managers,645 and could enhance the spirit of public 
giving to ensure that the project moves forward ‘fairly and sustainably.’646  
From the outset, Winickoff acknowledges a number of potential criticisms of this 
proposal. First, putting donors into an interest group modality might mean the group 
merely advances their self-interests. In turn this might undermine the altruism that 
motivates people to participate.647 However, Winickoff reiterates that the 
organisation is obliged to act in accordance with its charitable mission and as such, 
neither donor representatives nor the Board as a whole could act in a way that would 
benefit themselves or their groups in a direct financial way without jeopardising the 
project’s mission and legal status,648 as Chapter 4 of this thesis has illustrated. There 
is also potential for the donor association and its process of electing representatives 
on the BOD and EGC to reproduce the same issues of agency and representation 
because the large donor collective is unlikely to agree on their preferences, and 
representation itself entails problems of bias and self-interest. Therefore, the 
consequential challenge is to come to an acceptable form of representation that 
minimises this risk.649  
Practical and conceptual issues with the shareholder model  
Responding to this shareholder reform proposal, Hunter and Laurie criticise the 
theoretical underpinnings of the shareholder model on the basis of UK Biobank’s 
legal structure as a charity company.650 As this chapter has previously mentioned, 
this structure means there is no share capital and therefore no shareholders. 
Moreover, a crucial consequence of UK Biobank’s charity status is that the powers 
of the company can only be exercised in pursuance of the charity’s objectives and 
‘public good’ mission (as identified in Chapter 4). Here lies the basis of Hunter and 
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Laurie’s first practical issue: the shareholder model only accommodates the donor 
collective; ‘the wider public is conspicuously absent.’651 For these reasons, Hunter 
and Laurie criticise the shareholder model for its failure to ‘take adequate account of 
the central question any system of governance must answer: ‘What is the objective 
of the corporation and for whose benefit is it to be run?’’652 On this basis, 
Winickoff’s proposal is unsatisfactorily narrow; UK Biobank has an extremely wide 
constituency of concern, which includes not only its participants and their interests, 
but extends to the wider public and health of future generations.653  
Next, Hunter and Laurie comment on the dangers of ‘democratic representation.’ 
Winickoff also acknowledges this issue and questions ‘whether a body could 
adequately represent the donor collective of UK Biobank... a collection of 500,000 
heterogeneous donors without a clearly shared goal.’654 The representative body 
would need to reflect the diverse interests and views of the collective, and it would 
be very difficult to ensure that this included a broad range of voices that avoided the 
domination of vocal minorities.’655 This leads the authors to question whether 
Winickoff’s proposal successfully addresses the aforementioned agency gap and 
trust problem, and argue that in fact it may even ‘widen that gap by placing 
additional actors within governance mechanisms and do little more than provide a 
pastiche of participation.’656  
Conceptually, Hunter and Laurie raise the distinction between notions of 
‘partnership’ and ‘shareholders.’ Winickoff’s articulation of ‘partnership’, which 
‘connotes a form of cooperative human relations with respect to shared conditions 
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and aims’657 is distinguished from the analogy of ‘shareholding’ which ‘suggests an 
interest-based form of relations, moving the discourse-and any resultant model- 
away from charity towards economics and private (property) rights.’658 Drawing 
upon traditional Anglo-American corporate governance659 they evaluate: ‘The 
‘shareholder’ analogy envisions not ‘partnership’ or ‘co-operation’ but, rather, self-
interest and control. There is something inherently antagonistic about the 
relationship between shareholders and managers, which neither embodies nor 
reflects an ‘ethos of trust’ of ‘goodwill.’’660 Ultimately, whereas the objective of a 
shareholder model is to ‘maximise profits for its shareholders,’ UK Biobank aims to 
‘maximise benefits’ for public health. ‘[T]his language and conceptualisation 
therefore clearly sit awkwardly with… UK Biobank’661 in view of its charitable 
objectives. 
Nevertheless, Hunter and Laurie do not entirely dismiss Winickoff’s proposal and 
note that it may be adequately robust for a private biobank662 with one overriding 
research goal (Chapter 1). In this case it is more feasible to conceptualise donors as 
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shareholders, since they are likely to have a direct and tangible interest in the 
research and its benefits. However, ‘the analogy breaks down in the context of large-
public orientated resources such as UK Biobank’ since ‘the participants… will have 
varied and potentially conflicting goals, will be unlikely to benefit directly from the 
any research conducted using the resource and have contributed to the resource 
explicitly for the benefit of others.’663 For these reasons, Hunter and Laurie conclude 
that the shareholder model is neither ‘necessary nor sufficient’ to address concerns of 
an agency gap and maintenance of trust.   
Overall, Hunter and Laurie critique that the very idea of shareholders implies a 
privileged position for participants, when the purpose of UK Biobank is known to be 
benefit for all.664 For this reason, the authors take issue with Winickoff’s contention 
that the main problem with biobank governance is agency and donor representation. 
It is their belief that giving donors a ‘voice’ would be contrary to UK Biobank’s 
charitable purpose to benefit the public and would be unlikely to address the ‘trust 
problem,’ where past experiences have shown dominating vocal minorities 
undermining democratic participation.665 Furthermore, the authors submit that 
Winickoff’s model of representation does not ensure that ‘the right sort of 
deliberations take place’ within either the Board or the EGC, with the donor 
collective as a whole, or wider constituencies.666  
Instead, Hunter and Laurie believe the fundamental challenge is to engage with and 
take into account the views of all UK Biobank ‘stakeholders’ via transparent 
processes throughout the life of the project. To this end, aside from the notion of 
shareholding but still in the corporate sphere, the alternative ‘stakeholder’ 
framework is proposed. 
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5.2.3 Stakeholders of UK Biobank Ltd: Where to draw the line? 
Stakeholder theory is based on communitarian philosophy which strives for a society 
based on ‘fairness and a move towards social responsibility and respect for 
others.’667 The theory maintains that a firm should be ‘run for the benefit of, and be 
accountable to, all their stakeholders’668 rather than just the shareholders. Compared 
with shareholder approaches to corporate governance, stakeholder approaches are 
more democratic.669 As such, managers are more likely to be appointed to be 
representative of the full range of interests that are inherent in the corporation, rather 
than on the basis of their expertise. Stakeholder approaches to governance are 
therefore argued to be more appropriate for non-profit corporations that are 
established to benefit the public. 
The most widely cited definition of a stakeholder is Freeman’s definition: ‘any group 
or individual who can affect or be affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
‘objective.’670 Employing this definition, Hunter and Laurie acknowledge the vast 
number of stakeholders who might have a legitimate ‘stake’ in UK Biobank: 
participants; Board of Directors; EGC; funders and Members of the company; 
researchers; communities; the wider public or society; and, arguably, future 
generations whose health the resource is intended to improve.671 While inclusion of 
potential beneficiaries and future generations as potential stakeholders is unusual, 
Hunter and Laurie justify that in the context of UK Biobank its longitudinal nature 
means that wider groups such as this are crucial to success of the project and are 
therefore easily identified as stakeholders. It has also been argued that the British 
taxpaying public enjoys a form of indirect representation on the Board of Directors 
via the DH and the MRC.672 Hunter and Laurie concede that it is ‘undeniable’ that 
the British public has a stake in UK Biobank, on the grounds that it is publicly 
funded and the public is explicitly identified as a beneficiary in the EGF. 
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Furthermore, the public enjoys an element of control over the success of the project, 
by choosing to participate or not and later whether to withdraw from it. This 
reinforces the need for UK Biobank policies to reflect social and ethical values and 
take into account public concern (Chapter 1).  
The authors acknowledge that while there is a good argument for identifying donors, 
the general public and future generations as stakeholders, it is more difficult to 
imagine how such a wide group can be involved in practice. It appears that 
‘everyone’ could theoretically be a stakeholder; ‘accountability becomes valueless 
because it is too broadly set and useless from a managerial point of view.’673 Hunter 
and Laurie argue that while direct participation in decision-making is unrealistic, it is 
the role of management to ensure that the expectations of organisational constituents 
and wider society are aligned. They therefore favour ‘the stakeholder involvement 
strategy’ over a ‘stakeholder participation strategy’ for the governance of UK 
Biobank.  
i) The stakeholder participation strategy  
This strategy is most commonly achieved through representation on Boards or other 
management bodies. The fundamental issue is determining which stakeholder groups 
should be included, and to overcome this, proposals have been made for large 
numbers of stakeholders to form ‘stakeholder council[s].’674 Such councils would not 
strictly be part of the management Board, but may have an elected representative 
who is.675 Arguably proposals such as this are similar to Winickoff’s shareholder 
model, however there are key differences. For example, representatives would be 
drawn from a larger constituency (not just the donor collective), participation would 
not be conditional on representatives donating ‘biocapital’ to the resource, and 
representatives would be ‘recruited’ rather than self-selected.676 However Hunter and 
Laurie argue that the key problems with Winickoff’s shareholder model could also 
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undermine this model, including difficulties ensuring truly representative 
individuals, openness and accountability. Because the authors are not persuaded by 
the merits of representation, the alternative ‘stakeholder involvement strategy’ is 
chosen for application to UK Biobank. 
ii) The stakeholder involvement strategy  
This governance strategy envisages ‘long term interactive, mutually engaged and 
responsive relationships’ between companies and stakeholders to ‘create the 
groundwork for transparency and accountability.’677 This form of interaction678 
requires organisational commitment both to put in place mechanisms for ongoing 
dialogue with multiple stakeholders and to respond and adapt to their concerns. As a 
result,‘in contrast to the shareholder model, a stakeholder model genuinely resonates 
with democratic notions of participation, involvement and inclusion.’679  
For Hunter and Laurie, this strategy already resonates with UK Biobank governance, 
especially given the EGC’s commitment to actively engage with a variety of 
stakeholders, including ‘participants, research users and society in general over the 
lifetime of the resource.’680 Moreover, UK Biobank’s EGF demonstrates a 
commitment to ethics that reflects the stakeholder involvement model that is 
underpinned by a ‘strong normative core, which recognises that ethics cannot be 
separated from an organisation’s activities.’681 The authors argue that the EGF is 
ideally placed to facilitate such ethical responsibilities, since it is a living document 
it can evolve in response to changes in stakeholder expectations. To fully realise this 
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strategy, the authors recommend that it is reasonable and appropriate for 
stakeholders to expect that their views and perspectives will be taken into account in 
decision-making and governance, and that these processes are transparent with clear 
explanations and justifications for decisions reached or advice given.682 The extent to 
which this has happened to date is debatable.  
As the authors note, UK Biobank and the EGC have demonstrated openness and 
transparency via their respective websites by publishing information as to successful 
research grants, minutes of EGC meetings, and releasing annual reports on biobank 
activities. On the other hand, significant developments have taken place in UK 
Biobank since the time of participation, which have not been consulted upon and 
have instead progressed under the broad consent of the donor’s. For example, UK 
Biobank is currently genotyping all 500,000 participants and the genotype data on 
150,000 participants has recently been released.683 While participants have the option 
to withdraw from UK Biobank if they are unhappy with such genotyping (Chapter 
3), they have been given no option to opt out of this particular development alone. It 
is questionable how far UK Biobank Ltd (because it can be assumed that it was the 
company managers and Principal Investigator who made the decision to genotype 
data) considered the views of participants when making this decision. Admittedly, 
there has not been a surge in participant withdrawal since, which in itself may 
demonstrate agreement. It remains to be seen whether risks associated with 
genotyping (Chapter 1) will manifest in the future, and if they do UK Biobank may 
well be criticised for failing to engage their participants in upstream decision 
making. 
5.3 Conclusion 
A number of important lessons may be drawn from Winickoff and Hunter & 
Laurie’s theoretical debate, which aid understanding of the kinds of risks that may 
ensue should UK Biobank Ltd’s legal structure fail to adequately protect and be 
accountable to the full range of interests that are at stake in its activity (in addition to 
those identified in Chapter 1 - 4).  
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For example, Winickoff argues that the adoption of a controversial policy by the 
Board could lead to the mass withdrawal of participants, which would in turn affect 
the value of the resource, and therefore contends that direct donor representation in 
the legal structure would help prevent this eventuality and go some way to ensuring 
the sustainability of UK Biobank. However, both Winickoff and Hunter and Laurie 
acknowledge the difficulties associated with securing truly ‘representative’ 
individuals, both in terms of the range of interests that individuals would be 
representing, and the legitimacy of ‘representing’ other donors who may or may not 
share the same view. Even though Hunter & Laurie’s adaptation of stakeholder 
governance aims to overcome this shortcoming by involving a wider range of 
constituencies via a number of engagement strategies, the authors acknowledge that 
it falls to management to ensure that a genuine commitment is made to involve 
stakeholders. Thus, such reliance gives rise to the additional problem of how to hold 
UK Biobank managers to such promises.  
Therefore, the debate between Winickoff and Hunter & Laurie raises a series of 
important corollary legal questions as to which interests are prioritised and protected 
in the legal structure of UK Biobank, and to what extent those with an interest in the 
running of UK Biobank may utilise the legal structure to hold UK Biobank 
accountable to its stated aims.  To answer these questions, Chapter 6 will now 
analyse the range of interests empowered by the legal structure, who might be 
framed as those with a ‘share’ in the company i.e. the funders as Members of the 
Company and the Board of Directors. On the other hand, and contrary to what might 
be expected of a charitable organisation, the donors, members of the public or 
members of the EGC are not directly represented in the legal structure. Chapter 6 
will identify the range of interests that might be indirectly represented in the model 
beyond those with a ‘share’ in the company and including more widely the EGC, 
researchers, the general public, and potentially future generations intended to benefit 
from the resource.684 In this sense, UK Biobank is arguably more representative of 
the stakeholder model, as articulated by Hunter and Laurie.  
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In fact, irrespective of the murky theoretical underpinnings of UK Biobank there are 
a number of irreducible legal conflicts that arise by virtue of the dual regulation of 
charitable organisations in UK charity and company law, which are arguably not 
fully captured by the stakeholder/shareholder conception and have motivated the 
introduction of new legal forms for corporations in the UK.685 Because the corporate 
regime is tailored to meet the practicalities of the for-profit commercial sector, the 
model sits uncomfortably with the conception of charities, as the next chapter will 
now show. 
Given these conflicts, the next chapter is a critical legal analysis of UK Biobank’s 
legal structure as a charity company, to more fully understand and establish the 
avenues of accountability that are available within the charity company structure to 
further the public and private interests at stake and hold UK Biobank to its stated 
aims. Investigation will focus on the legal implications of a charity company 
structure for the operation of UK Biobank to identify the range of interests that arise 
by virtue of the model and evaluate the extent to which donors are, if at all, 
represented in the legal structure of UK Biobank Ltd. The investigation goes to the 
heart of how companies are run, and the procedural and governance requirements 
imposed by both charity and company law in light of dual regulatory status as a 
charitable company. The analysis focuses on those actors responsible for the 
management and administration of the company, the Board of Directors and the 
Members of the Company, and the stakeholders who are affected by their 
discretionary power and decision-making. In particular, how truly independent is UK 
Biobank Ltd? What influences do the main funders, the MRC and the WT as 
Members have over the running of the project? What are the rights and duties that 
arise from this role? What duties do the Board of Directors owe, and to whom? As a 
charity company limited by guarantee what mechanisms of oversight are in place? 
Who has standing to enforce such oversight? The next chapter will investigate the 
legal reasons for, and implications for stakeholders of, the chosen structure for UK 
Biobank, which is: ‘not a body that’s completely at arm’s-length; legally it’s a 
company limited by guarantee with members and the members are the Wellcome 
                                                          
685 Which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
144 
Trust and the MRC, and the structure of it, the corporate structure of it means that 
there are required to agree all sorts of major decisions.’686  
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6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter has shown the criticism that UK Biobank has faced from 
leading scholars who have opted for stakeholder and shareholder models of 
governance to reform the lack of direct representation or involvement of donors or 
members of the public in the governance model of UK Biobank, as well as the lack 
of representation of the EGC on the company’s Board of Directors.687 However, to 
date there has been no sustained legal analysis of how UK Biobank Ltd operates as a 
charity and a company when, arguably, the inherent legal tensions between charity 
and company status cut across the criticisms in the socio-legal literature regarding 
the engagement of donors within the governance model.688  
To contribute to this debate, the aim of this chapter is to consider the mechanisms 
which are in place within this private legal structure to hold UK Biobank to account 
to its public objectives and critically analyse the dual legal basis of UK Biobank Ltd 
in company and charity law; highlighting the legal tension between UK Biobank’s 
company objects and charitable purpose. This chapter will undertake a detailed 
analysis of the legal avenues open to donors and the EGC within the dual legal 
structure of UK Biobank to secure public accountability and protect donor’s 
interests.689 This dual legal basis has implications for the role played by the 
Members and Directors, based on the underlying assumption that they have a 
financial interest in the company, which is not always the case.690 As has previously 
been raised, there is legal tension as to exactly how the duties imposed on directors 
by company law overlap with the duties imposed by charity law on trustees and, 
                                                          
687 Levitt M, ‘UK Biobank: a model for public engagement?’ (2005) 1 Genomics Society and Policy 
78. 
688 Winickoff DE, ‘Partnership in U.K. Biobank: a third way for genomic property?’ (2007) 35 JLME 
440, 449; Hunter K and Laurie G, ‘Involving publics in biobank governance: moving beyond existing 
approaches’ in Widdows H and Mullen C., The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? 
(CUP 2009).   
689 Under the Companies Act 2006, as will be discussed later in this Chapter.  
690 This means that there is no explicit duty on Members to act in the best interests of the company, as 
it is assumed that their financial interests will be one and the same: Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 
‘Private Action, Public Benefit: Charitable Incorporated Organisation’ (Background Paper, Cabinet 
Office, September 2002), 4 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/st
rategy/assets/inc.pdf> accessed on 22nd October 2012 
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where there is a conflict, which is paramount.691 This chapter will explore these 
questions and will examine UK Biobank Ltd’s constitutional documents and UK 
charity and company law, to reveal the implications of such pressures for UK 
Biobank Ltd. This analysis aims to inform evaluation of the extent to which the legal 
structuring of UK Biobank Ltd as a charity company assists in the furtherance of its 
public good mission.  
6.2 Constitution of UK Biobank Ltd 
It is recalled from the previous chapters that UK Biobank’s incorporation as a charity 
company means it is subject to a dual legal regime that relates both to its charity 
status (UK charity law) and its structure as a company (UK company law). This legal 
structure requires UK Biobank to be registered with both Companies House and the 
Charity Commission, with implications for the administration of UK Biobank as 
well as its accountability. As will now be demonstrated, such duality also has 
implications for the Constitution of the Company, which empowers the Members 
and the Board of Directors to run the Company, as well as the duties owed by the 
managers, and to whom.  These implications will now be examined in turn.  
6.2.1 UK Biobank Ltd’s Company Objects and Powers: Memorandum 
and Articles of Association 
By virtue of its incorporation as a charity company with Companies House, UK 
Biobank Ltd's Memorandum and Articles of Association form the Constitution of the 
Company; detailing the ‘objects’ of the company and the duties, powers and rights of 
those involved in the corporate form. This Constitution serves as the benchmark to 
measure UK Biobank’s performance. It provides many of the rules governing the 
internal operation of the company, and states UK Biobank’s charitable objects:  
The objects for which the Company is established are to protect, preserve and 
advance all or any aspects of the health and welfare of human beings and to advance 
and promote knowledge and education...692  
                                                          
691 The implications of this for UK Biobank Ltd will be discussed in more detail in the next section of 
this chapter.  
692 Para 3 Memorandum of Association: UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association 
of UK Biobank Limited’ (Incorporated 28 November 2003) available at Companies House, company 
no. 04978912 <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912/filing-history> accessed 8 
Feb 2016.  
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When making decisions, granting access and conducting the day-to-day management 
of UK Biobank, UK Biobank Ltd is granted powers to pursue this overarching object 
and directors are under a general duty to observe the Constitution.693 It is 
commonplace to separately list the powers of the company to attain these objects. 
This is because in the absence of express powers to carry out its objects, a company 
will only have those powers that are implied by law. A company incorporated under 
the Companies Act is considered to have such implied powers as are necessarily 
incidental to, or consequential upon, the pursuance of the objects stated in its objects 
clause.694 Since these implied powers are unlikely to be as extensive or uniquely 
suited for the running of each particular company, it is important that the powers in 
the Memorandum are set out expressly and in detail.  
The powers of UK Biobank Ltd to pursue its object are listed in paragraph 4 of the 
Memorandum. These include its power to undertake the project;695 to collect, gather 
in, label, store and anonymise information and blood and samples;696 to develop and 
operate policies governing and encouraging access and use of the resource and data 
samples and to grant licenses inside and outside the UK;697 to receive, investigate 
and resolve complaints;698 to hold, grant licenses, sell, lease and deal with or dispose 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 ‘…By engaging in, encouraging and supporting: 
(i) Investigations into the separate and combined effects of genetic, environmental (including 
lifestyle, physiological and environmental exposures) and other factors on human health and 
welfare and on the risk and causation of diseases in the human population; 
(ii) The establishment, holding, operation, management, promotion, support, expansion, 
improvement and safeguarding of a collection of biomedical, biochemical, epidemiological, 
genetic and other data and blood and other biological and biochemical samples obtained and 
developed through, for the purpose of an/or in connection with some or all of the 
investigations referred to in paragraph (i) and pertaining to a cohort of human Participants 
(‘Data and Samples’, for use in a research, knowledge and information resource 
provisionally known as the UK Biobank (‘the Resource’); 
(iii) Research into the biological and medical sciences and other disciplines which may contribute 
to the improvement of human health and welfare (‘the Biosciences’); 
(iv) The discovery, invention, improvement, development and application of treatments, cures, 
diagnostics and other medicinal agents, methods and processed that may in any way relieve 
illness, disease, disability or disorders of whatever nature in human beings; and  
(v) The study and understanding of any of the Biosciences.’ 
693 Companies Act 2006 s. 171 
694 A-G v Great Eastern Railway [1880] 5 App Cases 473; A-G v Mersey Railway Co [1907] AC 415 
(HL) 
695 Para. 4(A) Memorandum of Association: UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Memorandum and Articles of 
Association of UK Biobank Limited’ (Incorporated 28 November 2003) available at Companies 
House, company no. 04978912 <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912/filing-
history> accessed 8 Feb 2016.  
696 Ibid Para. 4(B)  
697 Ibid Para 4(E)  
698 Ibid Para 4(G)   
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of rights or interest in, the undertaking, property, rights and assets held by the 
Company, including the Resource;699 to invest capital held by the Company not 
immediately required for the objects of the Company in any part of the world in 
investments;700 and to acquire any copyright, patent, publication or other intellectual 
property right in or arising out of the resource, data samples and any other research 
or research results. 701  
In corporate governance, it is common practice to give the Board of Directors, as 
centralised management, the broad power to run the company. According to UK 
Biobank Ltd’s Articles of Association this is also the case.702 To whom, then, do the 
Board of a charitable company like UK Biobank Ltd owe their duties?703 Crucially, 
UK Biobank’s incorporation as a charitable organisation means that the Board of 
Directors owe duties both to UK Biobank Ltd and wider stakeholders including the 
general public. Additionally, the Board are ‘charity trustees’ for the purposes of UK 
charity law704 and this means that the Board owe fiduciary duties and is accountable 
to the general public, as well as the Members of UK Biobank Ltd (signatory 
Members at the time of registration were Colin Blakmore (on behalf of the Medical 
Research Council) and Mark Walport (on behalf of the Wellcome Trust)).  
As will be seen, the dual legal structure creates a series of obligations, which go 
some way to addressing the series of questions and ethical concerns raised when UK 
Biobank was created and in the course of its development (Chapter 1, 3 and 4). 
However, the duality also gives rise to considerable uncertainty as to how exactly the 
duties imposed on directors by company law overlap with the duties imposed by 
charity law on trustees. This tension will now be explained in more detail by 
reference to the Companies Act 2006, and the Charities Act 2011, which both the 
                                                          
699 Ibid Para 4(J)  
700 Ibid Para 4(K) 
701 Ibid Para 4(Q) 
702 Para 12.1 Articles of Association: UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association of 
UK Biobank Limited’ (Incorporated 28 November 2003) available at Companies House, company no. 
04978912 <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912/filing-history> accessed 8 Feb 
2016.   
‘Power of Directors’ states: Subject to the provisions of the Statutes, the Memorandum and these 
Articles and to any directions given by resolution of the Members, the business of the Company shall 
be manage by the Board, which may exercise all the powers of the Company.  
703 This disconnect is at the heart of the problem with charity companies, and indeed was a persuading 
factor for the introduction of the new charity form, as will be discussed in this chapter.   
704 Which will be explained in detail later in this chapter.  
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UK Biobank Ltd Members and Board of Directors (analysed respectively) are 
subject to. 
6.2.2 Members of UK Biobank Ltd: The Wellcome Trust and the Medical 
Research Council 
As Members of a charity run exclusively for charitable purposes and for the benefit 
of the public, the WT and MRC as signatory Members of UK Biobank Ltd have no 
financial interest in the outcome of its activities.705 Since UK Biobank Ltd is a 
charitable company UK company and charity law regulates the position of Members 
respectively.706 Within this dual regime and in contrast to directors, there are limited 
legal obligations on members. Alternatively, members have a number of rights that 
stem from both company and charity law, and the extent to which members are 
under obligations to exercise these rights in a particular way, will now be analysed.  
Administrative rights of members fall into two categories: rights which are 
connected with determining the organisational structure of the charity (e.g. rights 
relating to the appointment or removal of charity trustees, or to the amendment of the 
Charity’s Constitution); and rights which relate to the operation of the charity, for 
example a right reserved to a charity founder by the governing document of a charity 
to direct how the resources of the charity should be applied. Such rights are legally 
enforceable ‘in their capacity as members’ in accordance with the provision of s.33 
of the Companies Act 2006.  
While members of a non-charitable company do not have a general obligation in 
company law to exercise their rights in the interests of the company,707 this is not the 
case for all rights, for example altering the Company’s Constitution. A member is 
more likely to be subject to legal restraint if he has majority voting powers and if the 
vote involves an alteration of the articles with potential adverse effects on other 
members.708 In this instance the majority may be subject to equitable rules, 
                                                          
705 See Gaudiya Mission v Brahmachary [1997] 4 All ER 957 
706 This is also the case for the Board of Directors, which will be the topic of the next section of this 
Chapter. 
707 A members’ motive for voting is normally irrelevant and he can vote for his own interest even if 
that is against the interest of the company. The position was summarised by Megarry VC in Estmanco 
(Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2 [1982] 1 All ER 437 when he said: 
‘When voting a shareholder may consult his own interest’ 
708 Warburton J, ‘Charity members: duties and responsibilities’ (2006) 70 CPL 330. 
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enforceable in court, requiring the power to be exercised in good faith for the benefit 
of the company.709  
There is also some uncertainty regarding the extent to which members of charitable 
companies are legally obliged to exercise their voting rights in the best interests of 
the charity of which they are members. Members’ voting rights710 include the ability 
to vote, to waive a breach of fiduciary duty,711 or duty of care by a director,712 in a 
general meeting. It has been argued that the members of charitable companies are in 
the same position legally as the members of non-charitable companies. If this were 
the case, it may be that there is no such duty to vote in the best interests of the 
company and members are free from restraint.713 The courts have only intervened in 
this scenario in extreme cases regarding fraud on a minority and insolvency.714  
On this matter, the Charity Commission has urged that in exercising their right to 
vote and influence the governance of a charity, members of a charity should ensure 
that their behaviour is not damaging to the running of the charity or to its good name. 
The Commission takes the view that members have an obligation to use their rights 
and exercise their vote in the best interest of the charity of which they are members, 
and asserts that the rights that exist in relation to the administration of a charitable 
institution are fiduciary regardless of the identity of the person or persons on whom 
the rights are conferred.715 In this sense, while it would be hypothetically possible for 
                                                          
709 Sjafjell B, Johnston A, Anker-Sorensen L, and Millon D ‘Shareholder primacy: the main barrier to 
sustainable companies’ in Sjafjell B and Richardson BJ (eds), Company Law and Sustainability: 
Legal Barriers and Opportunities (CUP 2015).  
710 The Charity Commission, (RS7) Membership of Charities (Charity Commission 2004), 4 < 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284722/rs7text.pdf> accessed 
10 November 2012: Lansley J, ‘Membership Participation and Ideology in Large Voluntary 
Organisations: The case of the National Trust’ (1996) 7 Voluntas 221 
711 Lansley J, ‘Membership Participation and Ideology in Large Voluntary Organisations: The case of 
the National Trust’ (1996) 7 Voluntas 221 
712 By extension, this right applies to directors of a charitable trust who are ‘charity trustees’ for the 
purpose of Charities Act 2011 s.177 as those responsible for the management and administration of 
the charity.  
713 Phillips v Manufacturers’ Securities Ltd [1917] 116 LT 290 [296] per Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R; 
Northern Countries Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1133 [1144] per Walton J; 
Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2 [1982] 1 All ER 437 [1982] 
1 All ER 437 [444] per Megarry V.C 
714 The Charity Commission, (RS7) Membership of Charities (Charity Commission 2004), 4 < 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284722/rs7text.pdf> 10 
November 2012; Muman v Nagasena [2000] 1 WLR 299, [1999] 4 All ER 178 
715 The Charity Commission advise: ‘If, under the terms of the governing document of an institution, 
administrative rights can be exercised otherwise than in the interests of the institution, without a 
breach of trust or duty, then the question arises whether the institution is in fact established for 
exclusively charitable purposes’ The Charity Commission, (RS7) Membership of Charities (Charity 
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a company member to use its voting rights without external intervention, it seems 
that incorporation as a charity opens a company to additional accountability such that 
voting rights ought to be exercised in the interests of the public as beneficiaries of 
the company.  
In addition to administrative and voting rights, and because the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association represent a binding contract between the company and its 
members, members also have the right to enforce these articles in court. However, 
this right is not without constraint. As has previously been mentioned, the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle716 historically has meant that the minority of members by votes 
cannot complain of wrongs done to the company (whether by the directors, the 
majority of the members, outsiders, or other wrong-doers) or of irregularities in the 
conduct of the company’s internal affairs. Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006 has 
modified this position;717 according to which a minority may litigate if they pass 
strict tests. These hurdles are to avoid pointless or oppressive litigation against 
companies:718  
The courts are essentially seeking a balance between their natural reluctance to 
become involved in the internal affairs of a company and a desire to see that there is 
some control over fraud and abuse of power.719  
For this reason, members also need to obtain consent of the Charity Commissioners 
to bring an action against the company in the form of charity proceedings under the 
Charities Act,720 which will be analysed later in this chapter.   
Applied to UK Biobank Ltd, the extent to which the WT and MRC as Members owe 
a fiduciary duty to exercise their administrative and voting rights in the best interests 
of the charity is seemingly unclear. For the purpose of this thesis, this is significant 
in terms of: a) the composition of the Board of Directors of UK Biobank; and b) the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission 2004), 4 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284722/rs7text.pdf> 10 
November 2012 
716 Drury R, ‘The Relative Nature of a Shareholder’s Right to Enforce the Company Contract’ (1986) 
45 CLJ 219, 237 cited in Warburton J, ‘Charity members: duties and responsibilities’ (2006) 70 CPL 
330. 
717 ‘Derivative claims and proceedings by Members’ s 260.  
718 Gray v Lewis [1873] 8 Ch App 1035, [1050-1]; Mozley v Alston [1847] 1 Ph 790 [799]  
719 Ibid.  
720 Charities Act 2011 s.115 
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Company Constitution (the Memorandum and Articles of Association). The 
composition of the Board of Directors has come under scrutiny for the lack of donor 
or Ethics and Governance Council representation. Currently (2016), the Board is 
comprised of esteemed experts in public health, epidemiology, bioscience and law, 
and is chaired by Sir Mike Rawlins, President-Elect of the Royal Society of 
Medicine and Chairman of the National Institute of Health & Clinical Excellence.721 
Whether or not the absence of donors and EGC representatives in the composition of 
the Board is appropriate given the range of interests associated with UK Biobank and 
the running of the company has been reflected upon in the theoretical discussion at 
the beginning of this chapter, and will be considered in terms of legal accountability 
in the final section.  
Furthermore, the administrative rights of Members to amend the Constitution of UK 
Biobank Ltd might also be significant in the future, for example, in response to 
changing societal attitudes to ethical issues associated with biobanking (Chapter 1) 
or in response to financial difficulty (Chapter 2).  On the basis of this analysis, it 
seems to be the case that when Members of UK Biobank are appointing and/or 
removing charity trustees, they are not under a legal obligation to exercise their 
rights in a particular way. On the other hand, this does not appear to be so when it 
comes to amending the company’s Constitution. This finding is interesting if we 
think back to observations that have been made in Chapter 4 regarding the role of the 
funding bodies in driving the development of UK Biobank, both historically and in 
the future. In particular, this conclusion gives rise to the potential risk of conflicts of 
interest in the hiring of Board members, or preferential treatment (to be raised again 
in the discussion of the Board of Director’s duties below). 
However, analysis has also revealed that UK Biobank’s incorporation as a charity 
means that there is a duty to act in accordance with the company’s charitable purpose 
and the Charity Commission urge members of a charity to act in a fiduciary manner. 
In this regard, Members of UK Biobank will be subject to constraints in exercising 
their rights for the advancement of health of future generations.  
                                                          
721UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Board’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/uk-biobank-
board/> accessed 5 February 2014. 
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Analysis will now turn to the role of UK Biobank Ltd’s Board of Directors and in 
particular, the implications of UK Biobank’s charitable incorporation on the 
discretionary powers of the Board in running the organisation including the extent to 
which the Board is publically accountable. As will be demonstrated, while it appears 
to be the case that Members of UK Biobank Ltd primarily owe duties under 
company law to the company itself, and charity law limits these duties only to an 
extent, the UK Biobank Board of Directors act as both charity trustees and company 
directors, and thus the dual legal basis of UK Biobank gives rise to a number of 
difficulties regarding the interplay between such obligations.  
6.2.3 UK Biobank Board of Directors and ‘charity trustees’: Duty to the 
company or the public? 
Over time, the definition of ‘charity trustee’ has necessarily evolved from a narrow 
understanding that encompasses only trustees of a charitable trust structure, to a 
broader interpretation that applies to all those responsible for the management and 
administration of a charity.722 According to the latter, ‘charity’ includes any 
institution, corporate or not, and therefore includes both trustees of a charitable trust 
and directors of a charitable corporation.723 This is the definition most recently 
endorsed by s.177 of the Charities Act 2011, which states:  
In this Act, except in so far as the context otherwise requires, ‘charity trustees’ 
means the persons having general control and management of the administration of 
the charity.  
This is explained in UK Biobank’s Ethics and Governance Framework:  
The Board of Directors of UK Biobanks are company directors under UK company 
law and charity trustees under UK charity law. They are accountable to the 
Members of the Company (Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust), and to 
the Charity Commission for England and Wales, for the performance of their duties 
as directors and charity trustees, including the duty to act in the interests of UK 
Biobank. 724 (Emphasis added) 
                                                          
722 Luxton P, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001), 336 
723 Ibid. 337 
724 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016: III.A 
‘Management and Accountability Board of Directors’. Furthermore, UK Biobank Ltd’s 2011 Report 
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As ‘charity trustees’,725 UK Biobank Directors exercise ‘management oversight of 
UK Biobank.’726 As ‘company directors’,727 the Board is responsible for managing 
the Business of the Company and ‘may exercise all the powers of the Company.’728 
But this power is not unlimited, and when exercising such discretion the Board are 
accountable under both charity and company law. The Board owe statutory and 
fiduciary duties, which Directors assume when they take up office according to ss. 
170-177 of the Companies Act 2006, and the Charities Act 2011. 
Briefly, while the duties of a director of a non-charitable company are owed to the 
company itself,729 and are enforceable by its members, trustees of a charitable trust 
owe their duties to the public. This is because unlike private trusts, there are no 
individual beneficiaries; charitable trusts must be run for the ‘public benefit.’730 
These duties are enforceable by the Charity Commission, amongst others, and 
subject to Charity Commission oversight. While the company director’s duty of care 
is to act in the best interests of the company and for the benefit of its members,731 the 
duty of care imposed on a charity trustee is to act in the best interests of the charity, 
with an emphasis on both the current and future beneficiaries, who may well not be 
the same as the members.732 
In more detail, the Companies Act 2006 relates specifically to the structure of UK 
Biobank Ltd as a charity corporation.733 Directors of the company owe statutory 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and Financial Statements recognised that ‘...the Directors of the Charity are its Trustees for the 
purpose of charity law and throughout this report are collectively referred to as the Directors...’ UK 
Biobank Ltd, ‘Report and consolidated financial statements’ (UK Biobank, 30th Sept 2011), 4 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/UK-Biobank-Limited-Signed-2011-Report-and-
Financial-Statements.pdf> accessed 06th Jan 2016. 
725 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016 
726 Ibid. ‘Organisation and Funding’ 
727 Ibid.  
728 Para 13.1 Articles of Association: UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association of 
UK Biobank Limited’ (Incorporated 28 November 2003) available at Companies House, company no. 
04978912 <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912/filing-history> accessed 8 Feb 
2016.  
729 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421; codified in Companies Act 2006 s.170 (1): ‘a director of a 
company owes the general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 to the company.’   
730 Charities Act 2011 s.4 
731 Companies Act 2006 s.170 (1) 
732 Charities Act 2011 s.4 
733 Companies Act 2006 ss. 170-177 codifies the common law position: The Law Commission and 
Company Law Review recommended a ‘high level’ statutory restatement of the common law 
principles of the nature and scope of general fiduciary duties and duties of skill and care which had 
previously remained largely in the common law: Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, 
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duties found in ss.170-177 of the Act, to the company.734 There has been 
jurisprudential debate as to how far fiduciary (rather than statutory) duties of 
directors may be interpreted as being owed directly to shareholders, but in relation to 
charitable companies, it is difficult to see how this would be an issue given the 
membership structure and lack of share capital.735 Therefore, a distinction can be 
drawn between duties owed directly to shareholders,736 from the question of how far 
director’s duties owed to the company require directors to take into account the 
interests of wider stakeholder groups.  
The latter is embodied in s.172 of the reformed Companies Act 2006, which requires 
company directors to have regard for a range of groups, interests and activities in 
promoting the success of the company. Under common law jurisprudence, this 
provision has meant a duty to act in the best interests of the company,737 but the 
more complicated question has been: whose interests are to be considered the 
interests of the company?738  
Before the reform of the Companies Act, the prevailing approach regarding non-
charitable companies had been that the collective interests of the members of the 
company could be equated with the interests of the company.739 Clearly, this position 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law 
Com No 261, 1999), Ch. 3 and Annex C 
734 Companies Act 2006 s.170(1) 
735 Traditionally common law has been reluctant to recognise directors’ general duties as being owed 
to individual shareholders. Recognition of duties owed individually would undermine the collective 
nature of the shareholders’ association in a company. It would also undermine the rule that duties are 
owed to and are enforceable by the company. If the directors owed to individual shareholders a set of 
duties parallel to those owed by them to the company, the restrictions on the derivative action could 
easily be side-stepped by means of the individual shareholder suing to enforce, not the company’s 
rights, but his or her own rights: Towcester Racecourse Co Ltd v The Racecourse Association Ltd 
[2003] 1 BCLC 260. 
However, in the decision of the CA in Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC. 372 Mummery LJ 
distinguished clearly between the fiduciary duties owed by directors of the company which arise out 
of the relationship between the director and the company, and fiduciary duties owed to shareholders 
which are dependent upon establishing ‘a special factual relationship between the directors and the 
shareholders in the particular case.’ The crucial question is what sort of dealing needs to take place 
between director and shareholder in order to trigger a fiduciary or other duty owed to an individual 
shareholder by the directors. Such a duty will certainly arise where, on the facts, the directors’ place 
themselves, as against shareholders individually, in one of the established legal relationships to which 
fiduciary duties are attached, such as agency: Cited in Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008). 480.  
736 Which only arise very rarely, where there is an assumption of responsibility to an individual on the 
facts: Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372 
737 Smith and Fawcett Ltd, Re [1942] Ch 304 
738 Yap JL, ‘Considering the enlightened shareholder value principle’, (2010) 31 Company Lawyer 35 
739 Ibid.  
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sits uncomfortably with charitable companies, which must be run for the benefit of 
the public to attain charitable status. Thus, s.172 (2) was specifically inserted to deal 
with charities that are companies or similar. This section puts the purposes of the 
company above those of its members and states: 
Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include 
purposes other than the benefits of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the 
reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
were to achieving these purposes.  
Consequently, s.172 is of crucial importance in terms of the public mission of UK 
Biobank and the range of stakeholders represented by the UK Biobank model. The 
scope and implications of this duty, and others, for the Board of Directors of UK 
Biobank will now be discussed in more detail. In particular, the extent to which there 
is a duty to take into account the public in the running of UK Biobank as well as the 
potential for participants to be included within this bracket.   
In short, as a result of UK Biobank Ltd’s dual legal basis, the Board of Directors 
owe a number of duties under company law, which are enshrined in both the 
Companies Act 2006 and in equitable principles, as well as a number of fiduciary 
and statutory duties owed in charity law. The duties that are more likely to be 
relevant to the UK Biobank Board of Directors and are most interesting in terms of 
this thesis will now be dealt with respectively.   
6.3 Board of Director’s duties under company law 
As a reminder, the main source of the UK Biobank Board of Directors’ powers and 
constraints on those powers is the Memorandum and Articles of Association; the 
Company’s Constitution. These duties therefore symbolise the principle that the 
powers held by Directors are not unlimited, and represent one mechanism of control 
over such power.740 Under company law, these duties are owed to the Company UK 
Biobank Ltd rather than the individual members but it is for the majority members of 
the Company to enforce these duties, and the previous discussion has highlighted the 
potential limitations on this right. The statutory and fiduciary duties most relevant to 
UK Biobank Ltd will now be outlined.  
                                                          
740 Nolan RC, ‘Controlling fiduciary power’ (2009) 68 CLJ 293. 
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6.3.1 Duty to act within powers: s.171  
According to s.171, directors must ‘act in accordance with the company’s 
constitution’741 and must ‘only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are 
conferred.’742 A company will break its duty to act within its powers if it acts in 
breach of this constitution.743 It is not necessary that those responsible for the breach 
are shown to be subjectively aware of the unconstitutional nature of their actions,744 
so directors are under a duty to acquaint themselves with the terms of the company’s 
articles and abide by them.745 An act or decision of the directors that is outside the 
company’s constitution, i.e. where a director professes to have a power that it does 
not have is void; it is of no effect. Where the directors simply exceed an authority 
that has been conferred on them the decision is only voidable.746 If the contravention 
of the constitution has involved the improper distribution of the company’s assets, 
the directors are regarded as in breach of trust and are liable to replace the assets.747 
The vice, therefore, lies in utilising a power for a purpose, or with an intention, 
beyond its scope:748  
The proper purpose doctrine looks to the particular ends intended to be achieved 
through certain particular acts and determine whether such ends are contemplated 
(and therefore authorised) by the power in question.749 
If directors have exercised their powers for a purpose outside those for which the 
powers were conferred, this may be a breach of duty according to s.171 (b). Again, 
                                                          
741 Companies Act 2006 s.171(a) 
742 Ibid. s.171(b)  
743 This duty was recognised in the early years of modern company law, and is reflected in a number 
of nineteenth century decisions, usually involving the purported exercise by directors of powers which 
were ultra vires the company; Lands Allotment Company, Re [1894] 1 Ch 616 CA. Or payments of 
dividends or director’s remuneration contrary to the provisions in the company’s articles: Oxford 
Benefit Building and Investment Society, Re [1886] 35 Ch D 502. An early example of a company’s 
accounts recognising profits, which had not been earned. Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008), 498 
744 Leeds Estate Building and Investment Company v Shepherd [1887] 36 Ch D 787  
745 Ibid   
746 Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254, [1966] 3 WLR 995: a decision to attach multiple voting rights 
to shares issue to the company’s pension fund, in breach of the company’s articles was ineffective. 
Guinness v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663, [1990] 2 WLR 324: fixing of directors’ remuneration by a 
board committee, rather than a full board, in breach of the articles meant that the recipient director 
had to repay the money. Cf. Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549: where the correct 
body acted by the director was in breach of his obligation under the articles to comply with the 
disclosure provisions. Cited in Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008), 499. 
747 Ibid. 
748 Nolan RC, ‘Controlling fiduciary power’ (2009) 68 CLJ 293. 
749 Ibid.  
 
 
159 
this is an objective test.750 When deciding whether a particular purpose is proper the 
courts have taken a broad reading of the constitution, rather than a narrow analysis of 
a particular clause.751 Thus, in Mills v Mills752 it was held that the courts must try to 
ascertain ‘the substantial object the accomplishment of which formed the real ground 
of the board’s action’ and then judge that to be proper or improper according to the 
purposes of the power in question. Where the directors act for an improper purpose, 
their act is voidable by the company, not void, as it is in the case where the directors 
purport to exercise a power they do not have.753  
Applying this proper purpose doctrine, it has been demonstrated that UK Biobank’s 
charitable purpose is the advancement of health and the saving of lives, for the 
benefit of the public. Difficulties arise however, since the Companies Act is 
primarily concerned with shareholding rather than membership, and this doctrine has 
mainly been applied to instances where the proper purpose concerns the Directors’ 
powers to allot shares etc. Nevertheless, the Memorandum of Association of UK 
Biobank states the powers of its Board, including the power: 
                                                          
750 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltd [1974] AC 821, [1974] 2 WLR 689: which concerned the power of 
directors to issue new shares.   
751 Smith and Fawcett Ltd, Re [1942] Ch 304 [306]: where the clause in question (regarding the 
admission of new Members to a small company) was widely construed so as to produce the effect 
equivalent to the partnership rule of strict control by the board over the admission of new Members. 
The case of Gaudiya Mission v Brahmachary [1998] Ch 341, [1997] 4 All ER 957 concerned a 
company limited by guarantee and formed for the purpose of campaigning for the adoption of a 
particular policy in a certain area of social life. It was held that the director’s powers to expel 
Members with contrary views should not be cut down on the grounds that the directors were seeking 
to control the composition of the general meeting. Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008), 503. 
752 Mills v Mills [1938] 60 CLR 150 [185-186] per Dixon J 
753 ‘The distinction between ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ turns on the reasons why a transaction or purported 
transaction can be questioned. If the flaw in what happened was that the fiduciary had no authority to 
act as he did, the prima facie his decision to act will be void in equity, and his action pursuant to that 
decision will also be treated as void in equity. If that result is not possible, then the fiduciary’s 
decision to act will still be void in equity, but the result of his actions (for example, the creation of 
new legal property) will necessarily fall to be treated as only voidable in equity. Context matters 
vitally to remedies… One good example of this situation is the improper allotment and issue of shares 
in a company. By contrast, if the fiduciary did have the authority to do what he did, but acted on the 
basis of a flawed decision, then his action should in principle be voidable: in private law at least, 
flawed exercise of authority is still an exercised of authority until set aside.’ Nolan RC, ‘Controlling 
fiduciary power’ (2009) 68 CLJ 293. 
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To receive and apply money and other property from persons desiring to promote the 
objects of the company on such terms as shall be thought desirable by the Board; and to 
hold funds in trust for the same.754  
Thus, if the Board were to apply money in a manner other than in pursuit of its 
Company object and wider charitable purpose this could constitute a breach of s.171, 
and it is for the Members of UK Biobank Ltd to enforce this duty.  
Interestingly, the Board has the power:  
To invest all or part of the capital or income held by the Company not immediately 
required for the objects of the Company in Investments and to administer, manage, sell, 
realise and deal in such Investments, in each case as may be permitted by law and to the 
extent permitted by law hereunder and under the Articles, having regard to the need for 
diversification of investments in so far as it is appropriate to the circumstances of the 
Company, and to the suitability of any proposed investments for the Company, and to 
such other matters as the Company thinks fit and where appropriate after obtaining 
advice from a financial expert. 
While this power seems to give the Board a wide discretionary power to make 
investments, this will be constrained by UK Biobank’s overriding charitable purpose 
for the benefit of the public. One example of such an investment is the UK 
Biocentre; a wholly-owned UK Biobank subsidiary created to help other health 
studies enhance the quality and cost-effectiveness of their projects.755 Any profits 
from UK Biocentre will be put back into UK Biobank to strengthen the resource.  
6.3.2 Duty to promote the success of the company: s.172 
Perhaps the most controversial duty756 codified by the Companies Act 2006 is the 
s.172 duty to promote the success of the company.757 This duty is also most 
                                                          
754 UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association of UK Biobank 
Limited’ (Incorporated 28 November 2003) available at Companies House, company no. 04978912 
<https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912/filing-history> accessed 8 Feb 2016. 
Memorandum of Association Para 4(O) 
755 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biocentre’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/uk-biocentre-2/> 
accessed 21 January 2016  
756 See, for example, the debates in the House of Commons in Standing Committee D, 11 July 2006 
(Col 543)   
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmstand/d/st060711/am/60711s01.htm> 
accessed on 10 November 2012  
757 This duty was particularly controversial because it was proposed by the Company Law Review 
that it should not simply repeat the common law, which had previously formulated the principle that 
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significant for this analysis since it makes express reference to companies which are 
not-for-profit, like UK Biobank Ltd. Section 172(1) requires directors to act ‘in the 
way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole’ and then sets out a non-
exhaustive list of matters which are means to the end of the benefit of members as a 
whole. In so doing, this ‘enlightenment’ principle requires members to have regard 
for interests other than those of shareholders, over the long term (Chapter 5).  
In relation to a non-profit company, however, it needs to be remembered that 
s.172(2) puts the purposes of the company above those of its members and the 
Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act state: 
Where the purpose of the company is something other than the benefit of its 
members, the directors must act in the way they consider, in good faith, would be 
most likely to achieve that purpose. It is a matter for the good faith judgment of the 
director as to what those purposes are, and, where the company is partially for the 
benefit of its members and partly for other purposes, the extent to which those other 
purposes apply in place of the benefit of the members.758 
Applied to UK Biobank, this therefore places a duty on the Board to act in ways that 
they consider most likely to promote the success of UK Biobank Ltd for the benefit 
of the public in light of its charitable status. So, for example, when granting access 
decisions, the Board is obliged under company law to take into account the likely 
contribution of the research to UK Biobank’s object of research in the public interest. 
Under company law it will be for the Members to enforce this duty, but the decision 
as to what constitutes ‘success’ is one for the good faith judgment of the Board of 
Directors;759 thereby granting them broad discretion. On this matter, according to 
UK Biobank Ltd’s own financial report the charity’s mission is to maximise the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
directors were required to act in good faith in the way they believed to be ‘in the best interests of the 
company.’ Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2008), 506 
758 Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006, para 330. 
759 The common law position has been modified slightly by s.174 Companies Act 2006, which will be 
described in turn.  
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value of the biomedical research resource, and the success of this strategy is 
measured according to the amount of research usage and the results generated.760 
6.3.3 Duty to exercise independent judgment: s.173 
This duty is fairly uncontroversial. The duty does not prevent directors seeking and 
acting on advice, but directors must regard themselves as taking responsibility for 
the decision reached.761 Neither does this duty prevent delegation of the directors’ 
functions, so long as this power is conferred upon the directors in the company’s 
constitution. Section 173 does not, in itself, give directors the power of such 
delegation.762 In the case of UK Biobank, paragraph 15.1 of the Articles of 
Association ‘Delegation of the powers of the Board’ states: 
The Board may from time to time provide for the management and transaction of the 
affairs of the Company in such manner as it thinks fit. In particular, the Board may 
delegate any of its powers and discretions to: 
a) Committees; or  
b) To any person, whether or not a Director, chief officer, Secretary, employee or 
officer of the Company or any other person. 
Accordingly, the Board has appointed an ‘Access sub-committee’, which is 
responsible for making key access decisions, particularly regarding the use of 
depleting samples or potentially contentious research, in accordance with the access 
requirements laid down in UK Biobank’s own ‘Access Procedures’ policy 
document.763 Furthermore, according to UK Biobank Ltd’s Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, in the event that UK Biobank is shut down or goes into 
liquidation the EGC will be responsible for what happens to the samples contained in 
the biobank. Given the EGC’s commitment to the public interest, this goes some way 
to ensuring that the samples will not be exploited in the future, thereby honouring 
participant’s consent to research that is in the public interest.  
                                                          
760 UK Biobank Ltd., ‘UK Biobank—Summary Information Return 2013’ (Charity Commission 
Online, submitted 10 April 2014) 
<http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/SIR/ENDS32/0001101332_SIR_20130930_E.PDF> accessed 
08 February 2016.   
761 Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2008), 525 
762 Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006, para 333-335 
763 UK Biobank ‘Access sub committee’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/access-to-the-
resource/> accessed 10 November 2012 
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6.3.4 Duty of skill, care and diligence: s.174  
This section codifies the director’s duty to exercise reasonable skill, care and 
diligence in the performance of their position. Traditionally, the courts employed a 
subjective test which did not require the directors to exhibit a greater degree of skill 
than may reasonably be expected from a person with their knowledge and 
experience.764 Under the 2006 Act, however, the director’s subjective level of skill 
only sets the standard if it improves upon the objective standard of the reasonable 
director.765 Section (a) sets a standard, which all directors must meet, and it is not 
dependent upon the particular director’s capabilities; (b) adds a subjective standard, 
which operates only to increase the level of care required of the director: 
a) The general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a 
person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the 
company; and 
b) The general knowledge, skill and experience that the director actually has766 
Accordingly, UK Biobank’s Board of Directors ought to consider the scientific 
advantages, weighed against any disadvantages for the public when exercising their 
functions. If the Board is found to be acting below this minimum objective standard, 
and the individual ought to have subjectively known better due to a special skill or 
experience, then they will be found to be in breach of their duties under company 
law. In very rare circumstances, if breach is so proven, directors may be held 
personally liable to compensate for the loss.767 Lack of due care and skill does not in 
itself vitiate a transaction, but instead will require compensation to reimburse the 
Company for the harm caused to it by the Directors’ breach.768 Directors’ breach 
may take the form of acting in bad faith or for improper purposes. It is evident that 
the spirit of s.174 runs through all the directors’ duties.  
                                                          
764 City Equitable Fire Insurance Co, Re [1925] Ch 407 [1924], 3 All ER 485: a director need not 
exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected 
from a person of his knowledge and experience.’ per Romer J [427] 
765 Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2008), 490 
766 S.174 Companies Act 2006 is said to mirror the tests laid down in the Insolvency Act 1986 s.214, 
which includes an objective assessment of a director’s conduct. 
767 But not if it can be proven that the director acted in good faith: IBM United Kingdom Holdings Ltd 
v Dalgleish [2014] EWHC 980 (Ch) 
768 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, [1997] 2 WLR 436 Millet LJ stated: ‘it is 
inappropriate to apply the expression [breach of fiduciary duty] to the obligation of a trustee or other 
fiduciary to use proper skill and care in the discharge of his duties.’  
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6.3.5 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest: s.175 
The duty to avoid conflicts of interest requires a director of a company to ‘avoid a 
situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflict, or 
possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company.’769 Good faith must not 
only be done, but must manifestly be seen to be done; the duty focuses not on the 
scope of power but instead on the process of decision making by the director, which 
lies behind an exercise of power.770 This core ‘no conflict’ principle underlies the 
subsequent duties to be discussed; the duty not to receive benefits from third parties; 
and the duty to declare an interest.  
S.175(2) states that this applies particularly to the ‘exploitation of any property, 
information or opportunity.’ This may be controversial given that paragraph 5(v) of 
UK Biobank’s Memorandum states: 
Members and Directors (and any firm, body, company or academic institution 
(including a Member) of which a Director is a member, officer or employee) may 
have access to and use the Resource as a beneficiary of the Company in accordance 
with the terms of access and use adopted by the Company from time to time.  
In light of stringent access requirements, this has the potential to put Directors and 
Members in a favourable position. Those involved in the set-up and running of UK 
Biobank are invariably more knowledgeable regarding the terms of access and can 
manipulate their access applications for the greatest chance of success. There is 
however, a binding duty on Directors to disclose any interest they may have in the 
meeting of the Board, and if this interest is deemed to be material they will not 
vote.771 If this procedure is followed, the Director shall not be accountable to the 
Company for any benefit or gain that they derive from any such interest.772  
Importantly, s.180(4) of the Companies Act 2006 authorises members of a company 
to approve conflicts that would otherwise constitute a breach of this duty. On this 
issue, Chapter 4 and the theoretical discussion in Chapter 5 have in combination 
                                                          
769 Companies Act 2006, s.175(a) 
770 Nolan RC, ‘Controlling fiduciary power’ (2009) 68 CLJ 293. 
771 UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association of UK Biobank 
Limited’ (Incorporated 28 November 2003) available at Companies House, company no. 04978912 
<https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04978912/filing-history> accessed 8 Feb 
2016. Articles of Association Para 18.1 
772 Ibid. Para 18.3  
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highlighted the risk of conflicts of interest in the running of UK Biobank Ltd. This 
risk is magnified because a number of the Board members are involved with the 
main funding bodies.773 Therefore, it is possible that Members’ powers to vitiate 
breaches and elect Board members could result in the prioritisation of researchers 
who are involved with the WT and the MRC. As such, the power of Members to 
vitiate conflicts could potentially threaten the public accountability of the resource, 
and this threat is a direct consequence of the incorporation of UK Biobank as a 
private corporation. 
6.3.6 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties: s.176 
S.176 provides that a director ‘must not accept a benefit from a third party conferred 
by reason of a) his being a director or b) his doing (or not doing) anything as a 
director.’ This duty is linked to the previous duty, and the two are not mutually 
exclusive but instead cumulative.774 This duty is self-explanatory. 
6.3.7 Duty to declare an interest in proposed transaction or 
arrangement: s.177  
This duty requires that if a director of a company is in any way, directly or indirectly, 
interested in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, he must 
declare the nature and extent of that interest, either at a meeting of the directors or by 
notice. Again, this is linked to the s.175 duty to avoid conflicts of interest.  
6.4 Fiduciary and Statutory duties of the Board of Directors as 
‘charity trustees’ under charity law 
If directors’ duties under the Companies Act are owed to the company, at the other 
end of the spectrum are the directors’ duties as charity trustees owed to the public 
under the Charities Act.775  This section will outline the most relevant fiduciary and 
statutory duties that UK Biobank charity trustees owe under Charity law, before 
reflecting on the interplay between the dual legal structure of a charity company, and 
                                                          
773  UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Board’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/uk-biobank-
board/> accessed 5 February 2016  
774 Davies PL, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2008), 575 
775 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL), [1895-99] All ER Rep 1009: these common law principles are 
precedent for charitable companies, since the Trustee Act 2000 strictly applies to charitable 
institutions with a trust structure. 
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the implications of this duality for the enforcement of such duties and the 
accountability of the legal structure.    
In the landmark case of Re French Protestant Hospital776 it was held that the 
directors concerned, although not technically trustees of a trust, were in the same 
fiduciary position as trustees in respect of the affairs of the corporation. Therefore, 
there was a duty owed to the public not to make profit for or benefit from a position 
of conflict of interest. This was a clear statement that the courts were more 
concerned with the role of directors as trustees,777 rather than the structure of a 
corporation: 
It seems to me that in a case of this kind the court is bound to look at the real 
situation which exists in fact. It is obvious that the corporation is completely 
controlled under the provisions of the charter by the governor, deputy governor and 
directors, and that those are the persons who in fact control the corporation and 
decide what shall be done. It is plain that those persons are in a fiduciary position as 
trustees in regard to any acts which are done respecting the corporation and its 
property.778 
Thus, the courts have shown a tendency to give priority to charity rather than 
company law when dealing with a charity company limited by guarantee. However, 
the multi-faceted approach is both complex and burdensome for charitable 
organisations of a company structure. The dual character of the duties creates a 
defect of legal uncertainty as to the scope of the duties and standing. This may be 
problematic in terms of management and enforcement, since duties owed to the 
company under company law may be reviewed by the company itself, and certain 
breaches can be ratified by special resolution without intervention. But if these duties 
relate to the application of company property to its charitable purpose, ratification of 
a breach will require consent from the Charity Commission.779 Even if consent is 
                                                          
776 [1951] Ch 567 
777 In Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Att. General [1998] Ch 1 [209] 
Slade J. held that a charitable company is in a position analogous to that of a trustee in relation to its 
corporate assets. Warburton J, ‘Charity members: duties and responsibilities’ (2006) 70 CPL 330. 
778 per Danckwerts J at [940]. 
779 Charities Act s.115 
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granted, such breaches may ultimately be used as evidence justifying investigation 
from the Charity Commission.780 
The general standard of care and skill required of any trustee (including company 
directors for the purpose of the Charities Act) is that of the prudent man of business 
acting in the management of his own affairs.781 A trustee who is honest and 
reasonably competent is not to be held responsible for a mere error of judgment, and 
a trustee is not therefore liable merely because his decision is wrong and results in a 
loss to the trust.782 A trustee is to be judged ‘not so much by success as by absence of 
proven default.’783 It is therefore clear from the analysis above that the position 
under charity law is in line with s.174 of the Companies Act. Fiduciary duties 
include: the duty to participate in the management of the charity; the duty not to 
deviate from the terms of the trust or exceed their powers; and duties relating to the 
exercise of their powers. A charity trustee owes a duty of undivided loyalty to the 
trust and must therefore avoid conflicts of interest.784  
The Charities Act also imposes statutory duties upon directors as ‘charity 
trustees.’785 These are mainly matters of internal management and administration, 
such as the duty to apply for registration of the charity786 and obligations on directors 
to file accounts, reports and returns.787 If these charitable fiduciary or statutory duties 
are breached it may give rise to civil and criminal obligations788 and if such breach 
constitutes ‘misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity,’ this 
will enable the Charity Commission,789 following inquiry790 to exercise their 
remedial powers to protect charities, including the removal or suspension of 
trustees.791  
                                                          
780 Ibid. 
781 Speight v Gaunt [1883] 9 App Cas 1 [19]  
782 Barnett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (No.1) [1980] Ch 515 [531] 
783 Nestle v National Westminster Bank Plc [1993] 1 WLR 1260 [1270] 
784 Luxton P, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001), 385  
785 Charities Act 2011 s.177 
786 Ibid. s. 30  
787 Ibid. Part 8 ss. 135 - 136 
788 Ibid. ss. 195 - 196 
789 Ibid. ss. 15 (1-2) 
790 Ibid. ss. 114-115 
791 Ibid. ss. 79-80 
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Such oversight will now be the topic of the remainder of this chapter. As we have 
seen, the Act makes clear that an organisation will not attain charitable status if it is 
not of public character, that is, for the benefit of the public.792 The result is that the 
duties of directors under charity law are subject to ‘state intervention’793 and 
oversight, and are therefore enforceable via the Charity Commission, the Attorney-
General (A-G), or a ‘person interested’ in charity proceedings.794 This intervention is 
justified to ensure that a company’s ‘property’ is applied to its exclusively charitable 
object. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, anyone taking charity 
proceedings involving a charitable company must satisfy the requirements of s.115 
of the Charities Act 2011, and obtain the authorisation of either the Charity 
Commission or the court. However, the courts have not shown themselves eager to 
intervene in the decision making of those responsible for the running of charities, 
since ‘to impose too stringent a test may impose intolerable burdens on trustees who 
often undertake heavy responsibilities for no financial reward.’795 
6.4.1 Conclusions on the accountability of UK Biobank via the Board of 
Directors 
The important conclusion to be drawn from the analysis so far is that the Board of 
Directors of UK Biobank Ltd owes both statutory and fiduciary duties, to the 
company and the public under charity and company law. This raises questions as to 
the effectiveness of the legal duties of the Directors in terms of accountability to the 
public interest. Arguably, the dual nature of Director’s duties leaves the model 
vulnerable to criticism that the private model has lessened the public accountability 
of the company and has complicated the extent to which the private interests of the 
donors are protected or furthered in the running of the company. Clearly, the 
difficulties that arise from the dual legal structure go beyond those articulated by 
shareholder and stakeholder models of corporate governance (Chapter 5) and are 
reflective of the challenges that led to company law reform. These shortcomings are 
especially pertinent given the availability of alternative legal forms with simplified 
legal regimes such as the Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO).  
                                                          
792 Ibid. s.2(1)(b); s.4 
793 Luxton P, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001), 312 
794 Charities Act 2011 s.115 
795 Scott v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [2000] 1 WLR 594 [718]  
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In light of such tensions, the remains of this chapter will further investigate the 
potential oversight mechanisms that are available to hold UK Biobank Ltd to its 
public good mission and to promote the range of interests that the model seeks to 
protect.  
6.5 UK Biobank Ltd: Accountability and oversight in charity and 
company law 
Now that the various obligations (and rights) of UK Biobank’s Board of Directors 
and Members have been analysed, which arise by virtue of its structure and status as 
a charity company, analysis next focuses on the corresponding avenues of oversight 
applicable to this institution and the implications of UK Biobank’s private legal 
structure in terms of its accountability and discharging its public good mission. This 
analysis will show that the Members of UK Biobank Ltd (the WT and MRC), the 
Charity Commission, the A-G, High Court, EGC and any ‘person interested in the 
charity’ are all in a position to be able to supervise, report, or call to account the 
considerable discretionary power of the Board of Directors. However, as will be 
discussed, this avenue of redress is limited in terms of the scope of the challenges 
that may be made, as well as the constituencies who are likely to be able to bring 
such challenge.  
Ultimately, this section is one of the key and novel contributions of this thesis to 
existing scholarly debate (including Winickoff and Hunter & Laurie discussed in the 
previous chapter) because it highlights one of the legal lines of accountability that 
exists within the dual legal structure of UK Biobank, which may be utilised to hold 
UK Biobank to account and to its stated aims.  
6.5.1 Members as a means of accountability and control  
It is remembered from previous discussion that it is the members of the company 
who can enforce director’s duties. In this sense, Members of UK Biobank Ltd are an 
important means of accountability and control over the UK Biobank Ltd Board of 
Directors. In particular, analysis has revealed the crucial function of Members for the 
appointment (or removal) of Directors at the annual general meeting, although this is 
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a constrained right.796 In addition, matters referred to Members at the general 
meeting, for example breach of the duties previously outlined in this chapter, may be 
submitted to higher review via the Charity Commission as evidence of ‘misconduct 
or mismanagement in the administration of the charity.’797 However, the extent to 
which this is a reliable means of accountability has been called into question by the 
identification of a risk of conflicts of interests between Members, the Board of 
Directors and the running of UK Biobank Ltd. This risk is a significant consequence 
of UK Biobank Ltd’s incorporation as a private company, which would not 
necessarily exist had UK Biobank been established on a statutory footing for direct 
public accountability.  
Nevertheless, incorporation as a charity does reduce this risk, because it opens 
accountability avenues in charity law, which will now be investigated. In fact, there 
are two mechanisms by which the running of UK Biobank Ltd could be overseen. 
First, the Charity Commission has the power to investigate issues brought to their 
attention by anyone who alerts them to a problem and second, but only once this 
avenue has been exhausted, charity proceedings may be brought against UK Biobank 
by someone with legal standing to do so. These avenues for redress will now be 
investigated in turn.  
6.5.2 Charity Commission oversight 
By virtue of its charitable status, the duties and responsibilities of the UK Biobank 
Ltd Board of Directors and Members are subject to a higher level of oversight via 
charity law. The Charity Commission is a statutory regulator with legal powers to 
achieve this role. Accordingly, s.46 of the Charities Act 2011 gives the Charity 
Commission the general power to institute inquiries into charities like UK Biobank 
Ltd. For the purpose of such an inquiry the Commission may direct any person to 
provide accounts, statements798 and copies of other documents799 of evidence 
relevant to the matter in question. A search warrant may be granted,800 and results of 
an inquiry may be published as the Commission sees fit.801 If the Commission is 
                                                          
796 Foss v Harbottle restricts the ability of Members to control the affairs of the company.  
797 Charities Act 2011 ss. 114-115 
798 Charities Act 2011 s.47(2)(i)(ii) 
799 Charities Act 2011 s.47(2)(b) 
800 Ibid. s.48 
801 Ibid. s.50 
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satisfied that there has been misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of 
the charity,802 or that it is necessary or desirable to act to protect the property of the 
charity or for securing proper application for the purposes of the charity or of 
property coming to that charity,803 then they may exercise their remedial powers and 
appoint, suspend or remove a charity trustee of their own motion.804  
It is arguable that the company law and charity law duties of the Directors and the 
Members could all be subject to investigation via the Charity Commission. Matters 
of internal management, or breach of director’s duties under Company Law, could 
constitute evidence of ‘misconduct or mismanagement’ for the purpose of s.115 
Charities Act 2011. Breach of Directors and Members’ duties under charity law will 
trigger direct investigation via the Charity Commission. In fact, there are no limits to 
who has standing to report issues to the Charity Commission, which in turn may 
initiate an inquiry. One issue with the commencement of charity proceedings is the 
likelihood of anyone triggering them. In the context of UK Biobank, however, we 
might assume that given the public profile of the endeavour there are a number of 
potential sources that could generate a trigger. So, for example, the Chair of the EGC 
may initiate an enquiry. The Chair sits in on Board meetings and has access to all 
materials it deems necessarily for the performance of its mandate (as identified in 
Chapter 4 and evidenced in the EGC modus operandi). Or an inquiry might be 
initiated by a journalist who is given a lead by someone within UK Biobank or 
associated with UK Biobank in some way, and reports such information to the 
Charity Commission for their investigation.  
Procedurally,805 all concerns raised with the Charity Commission are referred to the 
Commission’s ‘First Contact’ area, which evaluates the risks806 to decide whether it 
is a matter for the Commission. While some problems can be resolved by the charity 
                                                          
802 Ibid. s.76(1)(a)  
803 Ibid. s.76(1)(b)  
804 Ibid. s.76(3)  
805 Charity Commission Where the Charity Commission Investigates Charities (Policy paper, Charity 
Commission, 23rd May 2013) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/where-the-charity-
commission-investigates-charities> accessed 22 January 2016 
806 By applying a ‘risk framework’:  which involves examining all allegations and causes for concern 
to: determine the level of risk; decide whether a statutory inquiry should be opened; and indicate the 
type of intervention required if a statutory inquiry is not appropriate.   
Charity Commission, ‘Our regulatory approach to protecting the public’s interest in charity—how we 
assess and manage risks’ (Risk Framework, Charity Commission, June 2012) 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/313453/risk-framework-our-
regulatory-approach-to-protecting-the-public_s-interest-in-charity.pdf> accessed 22 January 2016. 
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trustees themselves, others will be examined and resolved by the Commission. 
However, in the most serious cases the Commission may deem it necessary to 
formally investigate matters further. In this instance, the Charity Commission may 
conduct an inquiry the outcome of which may lead to charity proceedings by the 
Charity Commission themselves. 
Alternatively, once the Charity Commission is convinced that it cannot resolve the 
matter appropriately itself,807 according to s.114 of the Charities Act 2011 charity 
proceedings808 may be brought directly against the Charity by the Attorney 
General,809 the charity trustees810 and a ‘person interested’.811 However, legal 
standing will first need to be proven within the Charities Act. The final section of 
this chapter will now discuss charity proceedings as an avenue of accountability of 
UK Biobank Ltd.  
6.6 Charity Proceedings: The Attorney General, the Charity 
Commission and a ‘Person interested in the Charity’812 
Crucially, legal standing must be proven under the Charities Act before charity 
proceedings may be brought directly against a charity.813 The Attorney General, 
representing the Crown parens patrea (i.e. on behalf of the ‘beneficiaries’ of a trust) 
has the power under charity law to intervene and protect a charity’s property if it has 
been, or there is threat of it being, applied in breach of trust for non-charitable 
purposes.814 Since the ‘beneficiaries’ of a charitable trust are the general public, the 
Attorney General may be considered to protect the public interest.815 The Charities 
Act 1993 also granted the Charity Commission a new power to institute legal 
                                                          
807 The Charity Commission have warned that the majority of causes for concern brought to the 
attention of the Charity Commission are unfounded. 
808 Charities Act 2011 s.115 
809 Ibid. s. 113(2)  
810 Ibid.115(1) (b)  
811 Ibid.115(1) (c)  
812 Charities Act 2011 s.115(1)(c) 
813 Proceedings concerning a charity’s administration 
814 Luxton P, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001), 511 
815 Ibid.  
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proceedings themselves.816 In terms of who constitutes a person ‘interested in the 
charity’ for the purpose of ‘charity proceedings’817 it has been stated that:818 
If a person has an interest in securing the due administration of a trust materially 
greater than, or different from, that possessed by an ordinary member of the 
public… that interest may, depending on the circumstances, qualify him as ‘a person 
interested.’819  
Jurisprudence has declined the opportunity to provide a clear definition. Generally, a 
distinction has been made between a person interested in the charity and a person 
interested in charity property.820 Those falling under the latter category, for example 
those with a contract with the charity, are deemed to be outside the scope of the Act: 
Those who have some good reason for seeking to enforce the trust of a charity or 
secure its due administration may readily be accepted as having an interest in the 
charity, whereas those who merely have some claim adverse to the charity, and seek 
to improve their position at the expense of the charity, will not. The phrase, I think, 
is contemplating those who are on the charity side of the fence, as it were, however 
much they may disagree with what is being done or not being done by or on behalf 
of the charity. The phrase does not refer to those who are one the other side of the 
fence, even if they were in some way affected by the internal affairs of the charity.821 
Charity proceedings may be taken with reference to a charity either by the charity,822 
any of the charity trustees,823 or by any person interested in the charity.824 Except 
where legal proceedings are taken by the Attorney General, charity proceedings 
cannot be pursued unless the taking of proceedings is first authorised by the Charity 
Commission.825 Furthermore, the Commission must not, without special reasons, 
authorise the taking of charity proceedings where in its opinion the case can be dealt 
with by the Commission under its s.114 powers, discussed above.826 These filter 
                                                          
816 Charities Act 1993 s. 32 
817 Charities Act 2011 s.115(1)(c) 
818 Re Hampton Fuel Allotment Charity [1989] Ch 484, [493] per Nicholls LJ 
819 Luxton, P. The Law of Charities OUP 2001, 521 
820 Halesmere Estates v Baker [1982] 1 WLR 1109, [1982] 3 All ER 525  
821 Ibid. per Sir Megarry V-C [1122] 
822 Charities Act 2011 s.115(1)(a) 
823 Ibid. s.115(1)(b)  
824 Ibid. s.115(1) (c)  
825 Ibid. s.115(2)  
826 Ibid. s.115(3)  
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mechanisms aim to minimise the number of claims against charities, avoiding 
frivolous and ill-founded claims.827  
Following on from the previous discussion in this chapter, state intervention via the 
A-G, the Charity Commission or a ‘person interested’ (dealt with next) is more 
likely where there has been an application of property to non-charitable purposes, i.e. 
for substantive breaches rather than performance of director’s duties under the 
Companies Act.828  
The court’s desire not to become involved in a charity’s internal administration 
mirrors a similar desire of the courts not to become involved in internal management 
of a company, where it has given rise to an analogous principle, the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle. One of the principles enshrined in this rule…is that matters of internal 
regulation are under the control of the majority, thereby precluding applications to 
the court to regulate many matters of internal management.829 
Charity proceedings are proceedings in any court in England or Wales brought under 
the court’s jurisdiction with respect to charities, or proceedings brought under the 
court’s jurisdiction with respect to trusts in relation to the administration of a trust 
for charitable purposes.830 Subsequently, jurisprudence has concluded that litigants 
may not rely on charity proceedings to enforce a personal right,831 such as an action 
in tort832 or for breach of contract or another right at common law or equity.833 On 
the other hand, an action brought against a trustee for breach of a fiduciary duty is 
likely to fall within the definition of charity proceedings.834 Expensive litigation is 
discouraged in the charitable sphere; sitting uncomfortably with the nature of 
                                                          
827 Re Hampton Fuel Allotment Charity [1989] Ch 484  
828 Which are likely to be resolved by the company itself-general meeting etc. 
829 Luxton P, The Law of Charities (OUP 2001).   
830 Charities Act 2011 s.115(8) 
831 In Rooke v Dawson [1895] 1 CH 480: Here the trust deed provided for the award of a scholarship 
to the pupil achieving the best performance in an examination. The trustees declined to award the 
scholarship to the plaintiff, who had obtained the highest mark and who sought a declaration that he 
was entitled and an order directing the trustees to make him the award. Chitty J decided that, there 
being no contract between the plaintiff and the trustees, the formers action was not to enforce a 
personal right, but rather to enforce the administration of the trusts of the charitable deed. As the 
Charity Commissioners certificate had not been obtained under the Charitable Trusts Act 1853, s.17, 
his Lordship held that the action could not proceed. 
832 British Diabetic Association v Diabetic Society of Great Britain [1995] 4 All ER 812 [1996] FSR 1 
833 In Rendall v Blair [1890] 45 ChD 139. At [160] Fry LJ expressed the view that an action to 
enforce ‘an individual equitable right, not relating to the administration of the trusts of the charity’ 
would be outside the Charitable Trusts Act 1853, s.17 
834 Construction Industry Training Board v A-G [1973] Ch 173, [1972] 3 WLR 187 
 
 
175 
donation. With these limitations in mind, and in response to concerns that donors and 
the EGC are underrepresented in the running of UK Biobank (Chapter 4 and 5), the 
potential for UK Biobank donors or the EGC to bring direct charity proceedings 
against UK Biobank Ltd will now be investigated.  
6.6.1 UK Biobank donors: ‘Person interested’ 
In the aforementioned case of Rooke, the distinction was drawn between a person 
interested in the charity and a person interested in charity property,835 with the latter 
unqualified to bring charity proceedings. This precedent significantly limits the 
scope of proceedings that may be brought against charities and seems to indicate that 
only issues relating to mismanagement or maladministration of the charity for its 
charitable purposes (e.g. fraud) may be the subject of a claim. Applying the Rooke 
rationale, it is arguable that UK Biobank could be challenged, for example, for 
fraudulent spending of profit that ought to be reinvesting in the resource according to 
its charitable purposes (a risk identified in Chapters 1, 4 and 5).   
Thus, based on an interpretation of the principles of charity law and the spirit of the 
Charities Act, even if a donor could prove legal standing as a ‘person interested’ in 
the charity, this line of accountability would only enable them to challenge the 
running of the company for its charitable purpose rather than, for example, breaches 
such as misuse of their samples or personal harm. Nevertheless, with legal standing 
as a ‘person interested’ in charity proceedings, a participant could theoretically 
challenge decisions made by the Board of Directors that present a conflict of interest, 
or a decision not made in the public interest, for example. However, bearing in mind 
that there are no donor representatives on the Board, it is difficult to imagine how 
they would gain the knowledge of such activity.  
On the other hand, it has been identified in this chapter (and Chapters 4 and 5) that 
the Chair of the EGC may sit in on Board meetings, and has the right to request 
whatever documentation or information it deems necessary for the performance of its 
remit to ensure UK Biobank is run in accordance with its public mission and to 
advise on the interests of its donors and the wider public. As such, the potential for 
                                                          
835 Halesmere Estates v Baker [1982] 1 WLR 1109, [1982] 3 All ER 525  
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the EGC to bring direct charity proceedings against UK Biobank will now be 
explored.  
6.6.2 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council: ‘Person Interested’ 
Charity law precedent does not clarify whether the EGC would have legal standing 
to bring proceedings against UK Biobank Ltd as a Council, if individual members 
such as the EGC Chair could bring proceedings, and in what capacity. This gives rise 
to an interesting (and uncertain) legal question as to whether members of the EGC 
would be restricted to bringing charity proceedings in their capacity as members of 
the EGC (a capacity in which the EGC are accountable to the WT and the MRC) or 
as individuals. By extension, there are uncertainties as to who would fund such 
litigation given the not-for-profit nature of UK Biobank and inclusion of public 
funds. Moreover, according to the EGC modus operandi, members of the EGC are 
actually appointed by the UK Biobank Ltd Members themselves (WT and MRC),836 
which compounds the question of its independence. Therefore, the EGC is on 
unprecedented legal territory which warrants further future investigation.  
For now, analysis will proceed on the assumption that the Chair of the EGC 
attempted to bring proceedings within their capacity as a member of the EGC and 
given their representative role in Board meetings in which issues of concern may 
arise.837 It is recalled that the remit of the EGC includes acting as an independent 
guardian of the UK Biobank EGF; monitoring and reporting publicly on the 
conformity of the UK Biobank project with the EGF.838 In pursuing this remit: 
The Council will engage with, and render accounts to, a number of internal and 
external audiences. Internal dialogues will be with the Board of Directors, the 
CEO/PI and the funders. External dialogues could be with participants, regulatory or 
government bodies, other interested parties, and the general public. The Council will 
                                                          
836 UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council ‘Terms of Reference and Modus Operandi’ 
<http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/default/files/terms%20of%20reference%20and%20modus%20oper
andi.pdf> accessed 22 January 2016 
837 Ibid.  
838 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> Section III.A.2 Ethics and 
Governance Council; Annex: ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council Terms of Reference’ 
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not speak ‘on behalf of’ UK Biobank, as this will be the responsibility of the Board; 
instead it will speak ‘about’ UK Biobank.839  
To fulfil this remit, the EGC will be able to require from parties involved in UK 
Biobank ‘whatever information and discussion are necessary.’840 Importantly: 
Normally the Council will communicate its reflections and criticisms informally. If 
the Council is not satisfied with UK Biobank’s response, it could make a formal 
statement of concern (e.g. to the Board or the funders) or, if necessary, make a 
public statement that certain actions should or should not be taken. In the extreme, 
members of the Council could resign in protest and announce this publicly.841  
Herein lies a potentially crucial implication of UK Biobank’s legal structure as a 
charity company. As a ‘person interested’ in the running of the charity, the EGC 
Chair may have the remit to report UK Biobank performance to the Charity 
Commission in the event that the Council is dissatisfied or concerned. As the EGF 
and modus operandi demonstrates, the Council has access to all documentation and 
accounts that are important to the running of UK Biobank, which could theoretically 
be passed onto the Charity Commission as the basis of their inquiry.  
The fact that the EGC’s primary function is to monitor UK Biobank’s conformance 
with the Ethics and Governance Framework, coupled with its role representing the 
public, could be used as evidence to support the conclusion that the EGC has a legal 
interest in the running of UK Biobank Ltd in accordance with the Biobank’s 
charitable purpose. This is an important potential strength of the EGC, which as we 
have seen in Chapter 3 and 5, is often criticised for lack of legal standing to hold UK 
Biobank to its obligations and goes beyond the avenues of accountability described 
in the EGF.842 However, it is noted that this avenue of accountability within the 
charity law framework is by no means straightforward and is limited in its scope in 
much the same way as was the case for donor accountability previously discussed.  
                                                          
839 Ibid.  
840 Ibid.  
841 Ibid.  
842 As highlighted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5: UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance 
Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 5 February 2016 
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6.7 Conclusions 
There are a number of important conclusions to be drawn from this chapter’s 
detailed analysis of UK Biobank’s legal structure as a charitable company, which has 
identified some of the implications and limitations of the private model according to 
its dual legal basis. These conclusions go some way to answering the research 
questions of this thesis regarding the extent to which this chosen model assists in the 
furtherance of UK Biobank’s public good mission.  
Building on the background debate about the best design for UK Biobank discussed 
in Chapter 4, the theoretical debate between Winickoff and Hunter & Laurie in 
Chapter 5 has shown some of the interests that are (or are not) represented in UK 
Biobank’s governance model and has raised some of the risks that consequently 
emerge for these interests. However, the authors ground their observations in the 
theoretical underpinnings of corporate governance, specifically stakeholder and 
shareholder perspectives, and do not investigate the ways in which UK Biobank’s 
legal structure as a charity company may be utilised to address such risks. As such, 
this chapter has attempted to deconstruct the complicated duality of UK Biobank’s 
legal basis in both company and charity law, to analyse the implications of this 
structure in terms of the lines of accountability to hold UK Biobank to its stated 
aims, and to protect the range of interests identified by Winickoff and Hunter & 
Laurie in the running of the resource. Investigation has revealed a number of 
findings, which will now be briefly recapped.  
On the basis of in depth analysis of the duties of the Board of Directors and the 
Members of UK Biobank Ltd, it seems that the duties owed by the Board of 
Directors are enforceable by the Members under company law. Yet there are only 
limited ways to intervene to ensure that these duties are exercised in pursuit of the 
interests of the public. In fact, analysis of the constitutional documents of UK 
Biobank Ltd and UK company and charity law suggests that there are few legal 
qualifications on the exercise of Member’s administrative and voting rights to ensure 
these rights are exercised in the interests of the public. As a result, there appears to 
be no legal requirement for the Members to appoint directors for the Board in pursuit 
of the public good mission of UK Biobank. This finding may go some way to 
explaining why the composition of the Board does not include any direct 
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representation of donors or the EGC,843 which one might expect if the Board was 
elected to be representative of the stakeholders of UK Biobank and run in the 
interests of the public.  
However, to be registered as a charity in the first place, UK Biobank is legally 
obliged under charity law to act in accordance with its charitable purpose and for the 
benefit of the public. One of the main consequences of UK Biobank’s incorporation 
as a charity is that it is subject to oversight by the Charity Commission, the Attorney 
General, and ‘person[s] interested’ in UK Biobank. Duties of the Board of Directors 
owed under charity law are more likely to be subject to state intervention. Breach of 
company law duties will be regarded as a breach of trust, since the relationship 
between Directors (exercising all the rights of the Company) and the resource is one 
of fiduciaries over a jointly held resource managed for the public beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, a breach of Directors’ duties under company law may constitute 
evidence of ‘misconduct or mismanagement’ of UK Biobank for the purposes of 
charity law. If there is sufficient evidence of this, then so long as it can be proven 
that the reason for the action is to hold UK Biobank to application of its resources to 
its charitable objects, which are stated in its Memorandum and Articles of 
Association and are binding under charity law by virtue of its status as a charity 
company, the actions of UK Biobank could be challenged via charity proceedings by 
the Charity Commission, the A-G, the EGC and perhaps even participants.  
On this basis, this chapter has investigated the possibility of using charity law 
mechanisms of oversight of UK Biobank Ltd’s activities, for the furtherance of the 
biobank’s public good mission. However, this line of accountability is by no means 
straightforward and is limited in scope. A donor or a member of the EGC (or any 
individual) would not need to prove legal standing to report an issue to the Charity 
Commission, but a prerequisite of charity proceedings would require the 
Commission to be satisfied that they are not able to resolve the claim, before the 
claimant got to the question of if they had standing to bring proceedings. Even then, 
claims would need to relate to the proper running of the charity in accordance with 
its charitable purpose and would not enable donors to challenge UK Biobank Ltd for 
personal harm, for example. This deduction raises further legal questions as to what 
                                                          
843 Although, it has been noted earlier in this chapter that it is common procedure for the Chair of the 
EGC to attend Board Meetings.  
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remedies may be available to redress such personal harm, which will be the topic of 
the next Chapter.  
Another key observation is that UK Biobank Ltd is subject to the same dysfunctions 
and uncertainties that were the very reason for the introduction of new legal forms 
for charities in the UK.844  In particular, this chapter has illustrated the overlapping 
and complicated nexus of duties owed by the Board of Directors, to both the 
Company UK Biobank Ltd under UK company law, and to the public as 
beneficiaries of the charity under UK charity law, by virtue of UK Biobank Ltd’s 
structure as a charity and a company. In fact, legal challenges such as dual 
regulation, administrative burdens and uncertain accountability pathways cut across 
the socio-legal debate to date, and have justified the statutory creation of new legal 
forms such as the CIO.845 Today, the Charity Commission alone regulates CIO’s; 
resolving issues associated with the applicability of dual regimes to charitable 
companies, including uncertainty of trustee and director duties.846 Only charity law 
regulates duties of Directors, and there will be an explicit duty on Members and 
trustees to exercise their powers and discharge their duties in relation to the CIO, 
solely in the interests of the CIO.847 Under the new legal form for charities, Members 
of a CIO are under a duty to exercise their powers ‘in the way he decides, in good 
faith, would be most likely to further the purposes of the CIO.’848  
                                                          
844 Cross SR, ‘New legal forms for charities in the United Kingdom’ [2008] Journal of Business Law 
662, 667: ‘The assumption that there is a need for a new and dedicated incorporated form for charities 
has been widely accepted and there has been no substantive disagreement or indeed even comment on 
the validity or otherwise of the policy arguments supporting the introduction of a new form.’ In their 
Report (Department of Trade and Industry, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework (URN 00/656, 2000) the Company Law Review Group followed the 
approach taken by the Charity Commission’s Advisory Group and did not recommend that transfer to 
CIO status should be made compulsory, ‘or that other routes for the incorporation of charities should 
be closed off. This approach takes into consideration the difficulty and costliness of compelling 
charities to change legal form and the burden this would place on the Charity Commission. It may, 
however, represent a lost opportunity to streamline incorporated charities: Cross SR, ‘New legal 
forms for charities in the United Kingdom’ [2008] Journal of Business Law 662. 
845 And lay at the heart of the earliest calls for the introduction of a new legal form: See Warburton J, 
‘Charity corporations: the framework for the future’ [1990] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 
(March-April) 95; Warburton J, ‘Charity members: duties and responsibilities’ (2006) 70 CPL 330. 
846 However, the new legal form also creates a complicated web of options for existing and new 
charities, raising issues of comparability and choice. The Home Office will review this position five 
years after the introduction of the CIO, but-for now the new forms will be available alongside existing 
corporate forms: Cross SR, ‘New legal forms for charities in the United Kingdom’ [2008] Journal of 
Business Law 662. 
847Ibid. 
848 Charities Act 2011 s. 220.  
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As the CIO is an additional and not compulsory structure for charities, this raises the 
question of whether members of charities under existing structures are subject to a 
similar duty.849 So far, the Charity Commission have produced two model 
constitutions for CIOs: the ‘foundation’ model is for charities whose only voting 
members will be the charity trustees; and the ‘association model’, for charities that 
will have a wider membership, including voting members other than the charity 
trustees.850 On the whole, it is submitted that but-for the timing of UK Biobank Ltd’s 
incorporation in 2003, the CIO would have been a more suitable model. Indeed, if it 
adopted the association model, this could facilitate direct representation of the EGC 
and the donors, thereby enabling socio-legal suggestions to improve the current 
model (Chapter 5). It is therefore arguable that UK Biobank’s model is out-dated and 
could be converted to a CIO to ensure future sustainability of the resource. Further 
research is needed to understand the practical implications of such conversion and 
how burdensome this would be.851 However, while such conversion may arguably 
enhance the public accountability of UK Biobank via the Charity Commission for 
reasons that have been outlined in this chapter, there are limits as to what charity law 
will remedy, and most notably this is unlikely to include personal harm. 
Overall, this chapter has illustrated that UK Biobank Ltd’s existing complicated legal 
framework opens UK Biobank to criticism because there are limited accountability 
mechanisms arising from the structure to carry forward public and private interests in 
the running of the charitable company. This criticism would not stand if UK Biobank 
Ltd had been created as a statutory body, or if UK Biobank Ltd funders were wholly 
public, because this would have enhanced UK Biobank’s regulatory and political 
accountability to the public. It is therefore recommended that evidence of the 
decision to structure UK Biobank Ltd as a charity company is made freely available, 
as is not currently the case. 
                                                          
849 Ibid.  
850 Ibid.   
851 It is submitted that such research is particularly worthwhile in light of the pertinence of new 
corporate forms to other large-scale organisations in the future, e.g. Genomics England, which, is 
currently established as a company wholly owned by the Department of Health:  
<http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/about-genomics-england/> accessed 26 January 2016 
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Moving forward, analysis of the lines of accountability available within the legal 
structure of UK Biobank Ltd in this chapter has prompted investigation as to the 
additional avenues of accountability outside this structure. Therefore, the extent to 
which UK Biobank owes ‘private’ duties to individuals in negligence will be the 
topic of Chapter 7 and the potential for UK Biobank to owe ‘public’ duties is the 
subject of Chapter 8. However, building on discussion in the Introduction and 
Chapter 1, these chapters will demonstrate that such a public/private dichotomy may 
not be appropriate or desirable in the context of UK Biobank Ltd. 
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Part 3: Common law avenues for UK Biobank Ltd 
accountability 
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Chapter 7: Liability of UK Biobank Ltd in Negligence 
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7.1 Introduction 
Summary of issues  
As part of this thesis’ investigation into the extent to which participants may use 
‘private’ and ‘public’ law mechanisms to hold UK Biobank Ltd to account, this 
chapter considers whether UK Biobank Ltd might owe a duty of care to protect the 
‘private’ interests of UK Biobank participants from personal harm from the 
perspective of the law of negligence. It is recalled from the Introduction to this thesis 
that ‘private’ law traditionally sets out the nature of the legal obligations owed by 
individuals to each other (either as natural or legal persons), in contrast to ‘public’ 
law which is concerned with the relationship between individuals and the State 
(Chapter 8). It is also remembered from Chapter 1 that biobanking may give rise to a 
number of risks of personal harm including, for example, misuse of information, 
harm arising from negligent collection of samples, or non-feedback of research 
results, which may therefore be remedied by ‘private’ law.  
Chapter 1 has identified that some of the private interests that are at stake in the 
process of participating in biobanking include physical privacy, informational 
privacy, decisional privacy and proprietary privacy.852 Tort law, within which 
                                                          
852 Results from the ‘Privileged’ project: <http://www.privileged.group.shef.ac.uk/> cited in Laurie G 
and others, ‘Managing Access to Biobanks: How Can We Reconcile Privacy and Public Interests in 
Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10 Medical Law International 315, 2; Taylor MJ and Townend D, ‘Issues 
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negligence is only one avenue of redress, operates to protect an individual’s physical 
privacy. Hence, the tort of battery forbids the intentional and direct application of 
force to another person853 without their consent.854 The tort of negligence has 
traditionally operated to protect individuals from physical personal ‘harm’, as well as 
economic loss and damage to property.855 In the context of medical treatment, 
negligence is increasingly relied upon to protect and redress physical harm, including 
that which stems from interference with informational and decisional privacy 
interests.856 On this basis, informed consent has developed as a doctrine of both 
medical and tort law to protect these interests in research and medical treatment 
(Chapter 1).857  
Although informed consent has been broadly defined in research circumstances 
(Chapters 1 and 4), it is arguable that the way in which tort law is evolving to protect 
informational and decisional privacy may have implications for biobanking research 
and the future of UK Biobank. In particular, the issue of how best to protect an 
individual’s interests in biobanking has been the topic of a growing debate regarding 
the feedback of individual research results during the course of biobank participation 
and subsequent biobank research. Rights-based arguments are being made (in the 
literature, but not yet in the courts) that individuals ought to receive feedback in 
certain circumstances on the grounds that individuals have a right to know, or not 
know, results derived from their participation in research. In the realm of negligence, 
this debate questions the extent to which there is (or there ought to be) a duty to 
feedback such results and in what circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in protecting privacy in medical research using genetic information and biobanking: the 
PRIVILEGED project’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 253. 
853 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; [1984] 3 All ER 374 
854 While an individual cannot consent to harm (R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75) English medical law 
recognizes an absolute right to consent or refuse to medical treatment, even where this might result in 
harm or ultimately, death: Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819; Re B (Adult, 
refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S, R v Collins 
and others, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673 [1998] 2 Fam CR 685 
855 Horsley K and Rackley E, Tort Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011). 
856 In the context of information provided prior to medical treatment, a high standard of information 
disclosure is now required: in line with Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 4, [2005] 1 AC 134, 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] 2 WLR 768 recently upheld the 
patient’s expectations of information, and set a duty of care to meet a ‘reasonable patient standard’ 
that requires disclosure of small yet significant risks prior to intervention, whereas previous precedent 
had held the standard of care to be the reasonable professional.  
857 Kaye J, Bell J, Briceno LM and Mitchell C, ‘Biobank Report: United Kingdom’ (forthcoming) 
JLME  
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As a key issue for biobanking, this chapter will focus on the potential for a legal duty 
to return results to participants to prevent personal harm. By volunteering to donate 
to UK Biobank, there is potential for individual results pertaining to the participant’s 
health to be discovered during each of the following three stages: upon assessment; 
during DNA analysis; and during the course of subsequent research using the 
resource.858 The challenge for UK Biobank has been to develop a policy to manage 
these results, in line with participant’s expectations and interests. In fact, UK 
Biobank adopts a broad no-feedback policy towards individual results urging that 
enrolment in UK Biobank does not provide a ‘health check’, and explaining the 
difficulties that are associated with the value of feedback communicated outside a 
clinical setting and outside the context of an individual’s full medical record.859  
Summary of arguments 
Crucially, to date, the law has not yet recognised a duty to feedback research results 
obtained in the research context. Therefore, the priority for the purpose of this thesis 
will be to test a legal argument for a novel duty of care on the part of UK Biobank 
Ltd to prevent the materialisation of a risk of physical harm. First, this chapter will 
make an argument for the imposition of a direct duty relationship between UK 
Biobank Ltd and UK Biobank participants. By virtue of UK Biobank Ltd’s separate 
legal personality, this chapter will proceed on the basis that a claim in negligence 
would most likely be brought against the Company UK Biobank Ltd, rather than the 
individual Members or Directors responsible for the management of UK Biobank 
(Chapters 4 and 6).860 From the outset, this is a difficult premise because of the 
nature of the relationship between UK Biobank Ltd and the researchers using the 
resource.  
                                                          
858 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 1 August 2013 
859 Ibid. 7. The UK Biobank EGF states: 
‘As a consequence, the significance of the observations might not be clear and UK Biobank staff 
would not be in position to interpret their implications fully. Further, it is not likely to be constructive, 
and might even be harmful (including causing undue alarm and having potentially adverse effects on 
insurance and employment status), to provide information without prior counselling or support (which 
UK Biobank will not be able to provide: as explained below). For these reasons, UK Biobank will 
generally not provide health information to participants, and a clear explanation of this policy (and the 
few exceptions) will be provided in the participant information material.’ 
860 From the outset, this is a difficult premise because of the relationship between UK Biobank Ltd 
and the researchers using the resource, as will be explained in due course.  
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Second, ‘harm’ in the context of this chapter will broadly refer to the manifestation 
of individual research results that are so serious they are ‘likely to threaten life span, 
quality of life or major body functions.’861 Focusing analysis in this way is necessary 
to test whether a duty to feedback results might be owed in this novel context, since 
physical harm is widely recognised to be actionable damage in negligence law.862 It 
is noted that a range of harms could be argued to stem from non-disclosure of results, 
including interference with participant autonomy and human dignity,863 or loss of a 
chance to act on results.864 However, these harms are yet to be clearly recognised in 
English tort law and will not be considered in this chapter.  
Third, the argument made in this chapter is that UK Biobank Ltd may cause harm by 
virtue of a failure to act to return individual research results to participants, and this 
failure or ‘omission’ could constitute a breach of their duty of care. Therefore, 
jurisprudence founded on omissions to act will be used as primary precedent. Fourth, 
analysis in this chapter will apply a line of negligence jurisprudence related to 
establishing a duty of care owed by a public body, and the difficulties this gives rise 
to. This avenue is pursued on the basis of UK Biobank’s potentially ‘public’ 
character for the purposes of public law, which will be the topic of Chapter 8 of this 
thesis. 
Ultimately, to be successful in this claim, a UK Biobank participant (claimant) 
would have to establish all four of the following requirements; that:  
                                                          
861 Since this is the approach taken by UK Biobank in relation to the imaging study: UK Biobank 
‘Biobank Imaging Assessment Participant Information Leaflet’ October 2014  (UK Biobank) 
<http://imaging.ukbiobank.ac.uk/> accessed 2 January 2015. 
862 Stapleton J, ‘The Gist of Negligence: Part I: Minimum Actionable Damage’ (1988) 104 LQR 213. 
863 As opposed to other approaches in the literature which have sought to establish new categories of 
recognised harm. In particular, Chico makes an argument for the non-disclosure of genetic 
information to be characterised as an interference with an individual’s autonomy, which, on the basis 
of recent court ruling such as Chester v Afshar, ought to be protected by tort law. On the other hand, 
Brownsword argues for the recognition of a ‘new blockbuster tort based on human dignity as a way of 
responding to novel genomic claims’. Brownsword, R. ‘An Interest in Human Dignity as the Basis for 
Genomic Torts’ Washington Law Journal 2003, 42, 3, 413-487, cited in Chico, V. Genomic 
Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for Novel Negligence Claims Generated by Genetic 
Technology. Routledge: London and New York, 2011   
864 The courts have not reacted favourably to reformulating damage in the lost chance of avoiding 
personal injury, and complex calculations of causation have prevented the success of a number of 
cases: Hotson v East Berkshire HA [1987] AC 750, [1987] 3 WLR 232; Gregg v Scott [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1471, [2002] All ER 418 
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1) UK Biobank Ltd (the defendant) owed the claimant a duty of care to avoid 
causing the particular type of injury (actionable damage) of which the 
claimant complains; 
2) UK Biobank Ltd has breached the duty of care by falling below the standard 
of reasonable care which the law demands of a Body that professes to 
exercise that particular skill or profession; 
3) The breach by UK Biobank Ltd (either a positive act, or an omission) caused 
the particular damage complained of by the participant; and 
4) The damage suffered by the claimant is not too remote (unforeseeable) at law 
to be recoverable.865 
Even if it was established that UK Biobank Ltd owes its participants a duty of care to 
return serious results, claimants would still need to prove breach of the standard of 
care and causation of the actionable harm. However, to answer research questions 
posed by this thesis; namely how public and private law pertains to the UK Biobank 
model, the purpose of this chapter need not be so ambitious as to try and satisfy all 
the requirements for a successful claim in negligence. It is hoped that investigation 
into minimum actionable damage and duty of care will highlight the potential 
vulnerability of UK Biobank Ltd to liability in negligence for non-feedback of 
individual research results, and therefore the enforceability of obligations to 
participants beyond the scope of UK Biobank’s self-regulatory EGF.  
7.2 Incidental findings in UK Biobank 
Individuals donating to UK Biobank have all consented to the collection, storage and 
use of their biological samples, lifestyle and environmental information, which will 
be available to researchers conducting a wide variety of investigations. As part of 
their participation, donors answer questionnaires on health, lifestyle and diet, 
memory, work and family history, and ‘non-invasive’ measurements are taken 
including blood pressure, pulse rate, height, weight, body fat, vision, fitness, grip 
strength, bone density and lung function. Donors give samples of blood, saliva and 
urine for long-term storage and analysis, including genetic data analysis. Donors 
consent to receive information about the key results of their baseline assessment 
measurements in the form of a printed report, which they may act upon as necessary. 
                                                          
865 Mulheron R, Medical Negligence: Non-Patient and Third Party Claims (Ashgate 2010), 28. 
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Their measurements are compared to population standard ranges so participants have 
some indication of whether their results fall outside the ‘normal’ range, although the 
visit ‘is not intended to be a ‘health check’’ and individual results are not released ‘to 
your doctor or anyone else’.866  
At the time of consent, donors have been made aware that UK Biobank has the 
facilities in place for re-contact, and so consent on the grounds that they may be re-
contacted for repeat assessments or further questionnaires in the future.867 It is 
recalled from Chapter 1 that 20,000 participants have returned for a second 
assessment at UK Biobank’s Co-ordinating Centre868 and 7,184 participants have 
taken part in UK Biobank’s enhanced imaging study.869 Genotyping has also been 
performed on 50,000 participants in conjunction with Affymetrix, and the remaining 
450,000 are currently being genotyped. While participants have provided separate 
consent to the imaging study, genotyping has been considered within the scope of 
the original consent provided by participants in their initial assessment.  
During the course of these various studies there is a risk that ‘findings’ (in various 
guises) with clinical, reproductive or personal significance for the person from whom 
the sample or data is derived will be ‘discovered’, whether intentionally or 
incidentally, and either related to the aims of the research being conducted or not. 
These findings are broadly understood to be ‘incidental findings’, but consensus in 
                                                          
866 UK Biobank ‘Participant Information Leaflet’ April 2010 (UK Biobank)  
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Participant_information_leaflet.pdf?phpMyAdmin=trmKQlYdjjnQIgJ%2Cf
AzikMhEnx6> accessed 2 June 2014 
867 The consent form states: ‘I understand that I may be re-contacted by UK Biobank (e.g. to answer 
some more questions and/or attend another assessment visit), but this is optional.’ UK Biobank 
‘Consent form: UK Biobank’ Version: 20061124: <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Consent_form.pdf?phpMyAdmin=trmKQlYdjjnQIgJ%2CfAzikMhEnx6> 
accessed 2 June 2014 
868 Re-contact will become available to more UK Biobank participants in other parts of the country in 
due course: UK Biobank ‘Have you been invited to a repeat assessment?’ (UK Biobank)  
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2012/06/repeat-assessments-adding-value-to-this-exciting-resource/> 
accessed 1 August 2014 
869  UK Biobank ‘Imaging Study’ <http://imaging.ukbiobank.ac.uk/> accessed 1 August 2014   
In September 2013 UK Biobank announced funding granted totalling £37.M (including £9.6.M from 
the Medical Research Council) to conduct imaging assessments including magnetic resonance 
imaging of the brain, heart and abdomen.  A pilot study of 6,000 participants was undertaken between 
2013-2015, to be followed by a second phase assessment of 100, 000 participants over a 5-6 year 
period.  So far, UK Biobank has released imaging data on 5,000 scanned participants: UK Biobank 
‘Imaging data’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/imaging-data/> accessed 5 February 
2016   
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this definition has by no means been reached870 and is often misunderstood.871 
Generally, health information valuable for biobank participants can be generated at 
different stages in the biobank process: during the physical measurements of the 
assessment process, during the laboratory tests on fresh blood samples prior to 
storage, during the DNA genotyping by Affymetrix, during the imaging scanning, 
and during the subsequent research itself using stored samples and data. Categories 
of the kinds of findings which may be discovered during these stages have emerged 
from policy makers attempting to guide researchers, technicians, and clinicians in the 
field. In December 2013, the US Bioethics Commission published a definitional 
taxonomy of incidental findings in the clinical, research and DTC contexts. The 
Commission described five categories of findings: 
Primary findings: findings that are the principal purpose for the practitioner 
conducting the test.  
Incidental findings: findings beyond the scope of the primary purpose of the test. 
Divided into anticipatable (possible results of a particular test or procedure, 
including well documented findings) and un-anticipatable incidental findings 
(findings which cannot be expected or anticipated at the time the test is conducted 
but arises nonetheless).  
Secondary findings: findings which are not the primary purpose of the test but that 
the practitioner seeks nonetheless. (The Bioethics Commission has recommended 
that more practitioners develop a list of such findings so that instead of stumbling 
upon incidental findings, practitioners can plan for anticipatable incidental findings 
and perhaps actively seek them as secondary findings). 
Discovery findings: findings that result from a broad test conducted to discover 
anything of interest (E.g. DTC companies).872 
These guidelines helpfully categorise the kinds of findings that are likely to arise in 
different contexts, and the difference between findings discovered ‘accidentally’ 
                                                          
870 Knoppers BM and Dam A, ‘Return of Results: Towards a Lexicon?’ (2011) 39 JLME 577; Zawati 
MH and Rioux A, ‘Biobanks and the Return of Research Results: Out with the Old and In with the 
New?’ (2011) 39 JLME 615. 
871 Cho MK, ‘Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics.’ (2008) 36 
JLME 280. 
872 Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Anticipate and Communicate: Ethical 
Management of Incidental and Secondary Findings in the Clinical, Research, and Direct-to-
Consumer Contexts (Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 2013) 
<http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.pdf> accessed 27 
February 2014 
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compared to those searched for. For the purpose of this chapter, discussion will now 
turn to the specific approach of UK Biobank to results discovered during the course 
of baseline assessment, imaging scans and genetic research (including genotyping).  
7.2.1 Baseline assessment and imaging scans 
According to the terms of the participant consent form, individuals volunteer to take 
part in UK Biobank on the understanding that ‘none of my results will be given to 
me (except for some measurements during this visit) and that I will not benefit 
financially from taking part (e.g. if research leads to commercial development of a 
new treatment)…’873 These measures include blood pressure, lung function, bone 
density, weight, and estimated amount of fat at the assessment stage of 
participation.874  
Feedback during UK Biobank’s enhanced-imaging pilot study, which has been 
underway since 2013,875 is considered to be comparable to baseline assessment 
measures. It is recalled from Chapter 4 that incidental findings in the course of 
imaging research are reported to be common. Following a pilot study of 6,000 
participants,876 the approach of UK Biobank is to provide limited feedback for 
findings considered to be potentially ‘serious’ (defined in this context as ‘likely to 
threaten life span, quality of life or major body functions’) that are observed during 
the data acquisition or quality control stage of the imaging process. Separate consent 
has been obtained from participants choosing to take part in the imaging study on the 
following grounds: 
I give permission for UK Biobank to inform me and my General Practitioner (GP) if 
a potentially serious abnormality is found on a scan (i.e. one that indicates the 
possibility of a condition which, if confirmed, carries a real prospect of significantly 
threatening life span, or of having a substantial impact on major body functions or 
quality of life).  
                                                          
873 UK Biobank ‘Consent form: UK Biobank’ (UK Biobank) Version: 20061124: 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Consent_form.pdf> accessed 2 June 2014 
874 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 18 December 2013 
875 UK Biobank Imaging Study: <http://imaging.ukbiobank.ac.uk/> accessed 2 June 2014 
876 Peterson SE and others, ‘Imaging in population science: cardiovascular magnetic resonance in 100, 
000 participants of UK Biobank- rationale, challenges and approaches’ (2013) 15 Journal of 
Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance doi:10.1186/1532-429X-15-46.  
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I understand that, if UK Biobank does not contact me and my GP about a potentially 
serious abnormality, this does not imply that no abnormality exists, but simply that 
no such abnormality was noticed by the staff taking the scans.  
I understand that none of my imaging scans will be given to me at the end of the 
visit. 
Combined, baseline assessments measures are the only feedback that individual UK 
Biobank participants receive.  
Crucially, the participant information leaflet and consent form that is given to 
participants upon arrival for the imagining scan stress that individuals partaking in 
the imaging study, and the professionals conducting the imaging scans, do so in a 
research capacity. Participants provide their additional consent to the imaging study 
on the understanding that imaging assessment ‘Is not a health check and is not a 
replacement for any clinical appointment. The scans being performed are not 
intended for diagnostic use and are not designed to identify any particular 
abnormalities. Instead, the images will be stored for future research use.’877 Hence, 
‘Staff conducting the scans will look at the images to ensure their technical quality is 
good, rather than to identify particular clinical problems. The scans will not be 
routinely reviewed by specialists or other doctors.’878  
However, participants are made aware of the possibility that the technicians 
conducting the scan may ‘happen to notice something unusual in the scan, that they 
think may be potentially serious’.879 In this event, participants are advised that the 
technician will ‘refer the image to a specialist doctor… In the unlikely event that a 
potentially serious abnormality is confirmed to be present on one of your scans, we 
[UK Biobank] will write to you and your GP within about two weeks of your visit, 
so that your GP can make arrangements for further investigation, if required.’880  
On the matter of what constitutes ‘something serious’, the participant information 
expands:  
                                                          
877 UK Biobank ‘Imaging Assessment Participant Information Leaflet’ October 2014: V5 081014 (UK 
Biobank) <http://imaging.ukbiobank.ac.uk/> accessed 5 February 2016 
878 Ibid.  
879 Ibid. 
880 Ibid. 
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Something would be considered potentially serious if it indicated the possibility of a 
condition, which, if confirmed, would carry a real prospect of seriously threatening 
life span, or of having a substantial impact on major body functions or quality of 
life. For example, you and your GP would be informed if we saw an abnormality on 
one of your scans that looked like a tumour. However, we would not inform you if 
we saw an abnormality that looked like gallstones or a simple cyst, as such findings 
are common in healthy people and not considered serious.881 
As a final waiver, the participant information states: 
However, because the scans are being done for later research, they are not checked 
in the same way as a scan that might be done for medical care. So if UK Biobank 
does not contact you about a potentially serious abnormality, this does not imply 
that no abnormality exists. It simply means that no such abnormality was noticed. 
As an indication of the likelihood of findings during the course of the scans, during 
the pilot stage of the imaging project statistics were released for the period up to 
2014. Of the 200 participants which had been scanned, 30 potentially serious 
incidental findings were discovered (0 Head, 16 Heart, 17 Abdomen), 26 of these 
were referred by the radiographers and 5 were considered potentially serious 
incidental findings by the radiologists.882  The information leaflet declares that UK 
Biobank estimates that ‘about 10 to 15% of participants may have an abnormality 
considered to be potentially serious’. By extension, this could mean that as many as 
15,000 of the 100,000 participants to be scanned may have ‘serious’ incidental 
findings. This percentage is particularly significant when considering the 
‘foreseeability’ of personal harm in relation to a negligence claim (discussed later in 
this chapter).  
Seemingly, UK Biobank Ltd have assumed responsibility for the feedback of 
‘serious’ incidental findings, although at the same time they excuse liability for 
failure to notice such findings. Whether this position gives rise to a novel duty of 
care in negligence will be explored in due course. For now, it is important to note 
that the experience of UK Biobank so far indicates that serious findings will be 
                                                          
881 Ibid. 
882 Sellors J, ‘Feedback of Incidental Findings during the Imaging Pilot Study’ (UK Biobank) 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1630-Jonathan-Sellors-4.30pm-incidental-
findings.pdf> accessed 5 February 2016   
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discovered during the imaging scans, and that statistically this will happen relatively 
frequently.   
7.2.2 Findings in the course of subsequent genetic research  
In conjunction with genomics technology company Affymetrix, samples from all 
500,000 participants of UK Biobank are currently being genotyped and linked to 
data held by UK Biobank. Genotyping is taking place in the interim between 
assessment upon enrolment and downstream research conducted by researchers. The 
genotyping project is distinct from the baseline assessment scenario in that the blood 
samples have been stored since their collection from the individual, and personal 
identifiers may have since been removed from these samples, before they are 
accessed by Affymetrix.  This interim stage is also distinct from the scenario of a 
subsequent researcher who is granted access to samples in UK Biobank for their own 
research project.883  
Significant progress in genetic technology has enabled researchers to sequence 
whole genomes instead of targeted genetic analysis.884 This shift to whole genome 
sequencing (WGS) in medical research has infiltrated UK Biobank and in 2013 
Biobank received its first application for access for WGS of a few hundred 
participants.885 While such technological advances offer considerable advantages, 
WGS generates unprecedented amounts of raw genomic data and with the entire 
genome in play, the research community has started to grapple with questions about 
how best to manage and interrogate this rich resource.886  
                                                          
883 The EGF deals with findings ‘prior to storage of samples’ but this cannot include the DNA 
analysis process since DNA will be extracted from blood already stored in Biobank:  
‘Prior to storage of samples, UK Biobank is planning to conduct routinely only those few 
investigations that cannot be done subsequently on stored samples (i.e. haematology). As is the case 
with other measurements that may be conducted on stored samples (see below), these baseline 
measurements are being conducted outside of a clinical setting without prior counselling and support. 
Moreover, all such analyses will be conducted on anonymised samples without other relevant medical 
information about the individual. Consequently, these individual results with personal identifying 
details will not be provided to a participant or to anyone else. A clear explanation of this policy will 
be included in the participant information material.’ 
UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007), 7, 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 5 February 2015 
884 Discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
885 Although it is observed that the success of this application is not yet publically available on the UK 
Biobank website at the time of writing (26 January 2016).  
886 Cho MK, ‘Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics.’ (2008) 36 
JLME 280.  
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By extension, this has raised deeper questions and concerns about whether, when 
researchers generate and interrogate this vast amount of data, they have any 
obligation to look within the data for potential variants associated with severe or life-
threatening diseases.887 This issue has arisen in light of the reality of genomics 
research and the process of incidental findings discovery, and is only very recently 
attracting the attention of academics and policy makers, but is widely appreciated by 
the geneticists and researchers conducting the studies: 
Most of the existing literature about genomic incidental findings assumes that 
incidental findings will be relatively uncommon and that they will rarely be 
‘stumbled upon’ during the course of research. This assumption, however, is at odds 
with the realities of genomic research: If one looks carefully enough, any individual 
genome is likely to reveal important medical information.888  
The reality of progress in genetics research means that today researchers using UK 
Biobank have unprecedented access to information that might be relevant for a 
participant.889 Researchers have it within their means to purposely isolate and 
identify such information, rather than ‘happening’ upon it, and whether this reality 
matches the expectations of UK Biobank participants at the time of their original 
consent is a moot point.  
                                                          
887 The standard view is that ‘researchers generally have no obligation to act as clinicians and 
affirmatively look for IF’s.’ Wolf SM, Paradise J and Caga-anan C ‘The Law of Incidental Findings 
in Human Subjects Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties’ (2008) 36 JLME 361.  
This is challenged in Gliwa C and Berkman M, ‘Do Researchers Have an Obligation to Actively Look 
for Genetic Incidental Findings?’ (2013) 13 American Journal of Bioethics 41, 44: ‘Our goal in this 
article is to challenge the notion that a ‘stumble strategy’ is universally acceptable, arguing that 
researchers who generate and analyse genomic sequences could also generate certain positive 
obligations for themselves vis-à-vis the data. It is conceivable that in specific circumstances 
researchers might have an obligation to actively examine their data for clinically significant findings 
beyond those required for their research.’ 
888 Cho MK, ‘Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics.’ (2008) 36 
JLME 280.  
889 Defining ‘relevance’ is not straightforward. For example in the context of genetic testing, clinical 
utility is partly used to determine the ‘usefulness’ of the test but, even this has a number of meanings: 
Clinical utility in its narrowest sense refers to the ‘ability of a screening or diagnostic test to prevent 
or ameliorate adverse health outcomes such as morality, morbidity, or disability through the adoption 
of efficacious treatments conditioned on test results.’ A screening or diagnostic test alone does not 
have inherent utility; because it is the adoption of therapeutic or preventative interventions that 
influence health outcomes. Therefore the clinical utility of a test depends on effective access to 
appropriate interventions. Clinical utility can more broadly refer to any use of test results to inform 
clinical decision-making. In its broadest sense, clinical utility can refer to any outcomes considered 
important to individuals and families (e.g. reproductive decisions and psychosocial support): Grosse 
SD and Khoury MJ, ‘What is the clinical utility of genetic testing?’ (2006) 8 Genetic Med 448. 
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UK Biobank has not detailed the approach taken to findings that may arise during the 
course of the genotyping project, nor the relationship with Affymetrix.890 The UK 
Biobank website simply states that the genetic data will be returned to UK Biobank 
so that researchers can study the relevance of the genetic differences together with 
other factors, but participant anonymity will be maintained.891 Unlike the imaging 
scans, genotyping has been deemed to be within the terms of a participant’s original 
consent (previously described) and participants have consented on the grounds that 
they will not receive any results of such genetic analysis.892 
So far, data on 150,000 UK Biobank participants has been released, and it is 
anticipated that the genotype data for the next 350,000 will be released in 
2016.893  The breadth of information that will be available after the genotyping phase 
is complete will have significant implications for the kinds of findings that may be 
encountered by researchers using the resource. When applying for access to the 
resource, researchers must sign a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) that binds UK 
Biobank and the researcher in a contractual relationship. Currently, this MTA does 
not obligate researchers to feedback findings encountered during the course of 
research. The Agreement only stipulates that a researcher is obliged to contact UK 
Biobank should the researcher ‘inadvertently identify the participant’894 with no 
provision for individual findings. If it is found that UK Biobank owes a duty of care 
to participants to prevent avoidable harm, it could be argued that UK Biobank should 
                                                          
890 It is acknowledged that since the time of writing some of this information has been made available: 
UK Biobank ‘Genotyping and quality control of UK Biobank, a large-scale, extensively phenotyped 
prospective resource: Information for researchers.’ (Interim Data Release, 2015): 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/UKBiobank_genotyping_QC_documentation-web.pdf>; accessed 5 January 
2016; UK Biobank ‘DNA Extraction at UK Biobank’ (UK Biobank October 2014): 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DNA-Extraction-at-UK-Biobank-
October-2014.pdf> accessed 5 January 2016 
891 UK Biobank ‘Key genetics study underway: video’ (UK Biobank) 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2013/09/genetics-study-targets-serious-disease-video/> accessed 27 
February 2014 
892 UK Biobank ‘Consent form: UK Biobank’ Version: 20061124: <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Consent_form.pdf?phpMyAdmin=trmKQlYdjjnQIgJ%2CfAzikMhEnx6> 
accessed 2 June 2014 
893 UK Biobank ‘Genetic data’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/scientists-3/genetic-
data/> accessed 2 June 2014 
894 UK Biobank, ‘Material Transfer Agreement’ <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Material-Transfer-Agreement.pdf> accessed 27 July 2014.  
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require researchers to notify them of serious and actionable results that could be fed 
back to participants. 895  
A brief overview of the technicalities of genetics research will now be provided to 
inform understanding of the kinds of genetic findings that, arguably, a UK Biobank 
participant would benefit from knowledge of. By extension, these will be argued to 
be the kinds of findings which, for the purpose of a novel negligence claim, would 
most likely to cause actionable physical damage if they are not disclosed, and which 
it would be reasonably foreseeable to expect that if they are not disclosed, the risk 
will materialise causing personal injury to the claimant. 
A brief overview of genetics research to inform legal analysis  
It is recalled from Chapter 1 of this thesis that developments in genetics research 
have led to an improved understanding of single gene diseases like Huntington’s 
disease, and genetically complex diseases like diabetes. The likelihood of developing 
a single gene disorder or a genetically complex disease can be expressed in terms of 
‘absolute risk’ or ‘relative risk’. An absolute risk is the chance an individual has of 
developing a disease over a time period. In single-gene disorders, absolute risk for 
family members can be accurately predicted. For example, in the dominantly 
inherited Huntington’s disease, the siblings and offspring of an affected individual 
have a 50 per cent absolute risk of developing the disease themselves.896  
Previous scientific and medical attention to genetic disorders mainly focused on 
understanding rare, single gene disorders like Huntington’s disease. However in 
                                                          
895 Issues associated with this are noted in: Wolf SM and others, ‘Managing incidental findings and 
research results in genomic research involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 
361. The authors recommend that biobank should consider writing into their contractual agreements 
with collection sites on the one end of the process and secondary researchers on the other end (i.e. into 
collection agreements, MTAs, and DAA’s or DUAs) provisions for how IFS will be addressed. 
896 Chico V,  Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for Novel Negligence Claims 
Generated by Genetic Technology (Routledge, 2011), 11:  
‘…the relative predictive power of genetic testing depends on the condition being considered. 
Directly obtained genetic information for high penetrance monogenetic disorders such as 
Huntington’s disease will be highly predictive of the onset of that particular disease. Furthermore, 
once a person has tested positive for a particular genetic disorder the likelihood that her siblings or 
offspring will carry that disorder can be predicted with some accuracy. Dominant single-gene 
disorders, in particular, have a tendency not to manifest themselves until later in life. Where a person 
tests positive for a monogenic, dominant genetic disorder there is a 50 per cent chance that her 
siblings will possess the gene if one of her parents possesses the gene, and a 75 per cent chance that 
they will possess the gene if both parents do. Furthermore, there is a 50 per cent chance that each of 
her children also possesses the gene, rising to a 75 per cent chance if her reproductive partner is also 
affected.’  
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recent years, attention has shifted toward understanding the basis of common 
complex disorders. It is much more difficult to determine a person’s risk of 
manifesting a multifactorial disorder. In such genetically complex diseases the effect 
of inheriting a particular susceptibility gene is often expressed as a relative risk, 
which is used to compare the risk in two different groups of people.897 Although 
multifactorial disorders often run in the family, they do not have clear-cut patterns of 
inheritance and a person’s genetic make-up merely makes them more susceptible to 
the particular disorder in question. The interactive nature of multifactorial genetic 
conditions means it might be possible to reduce or eliminate a person’s risk of 
manifesting a particular genetic disorder by informing them of the 
environmental/lifestyle factors which, combined with their particular genetic make-
up, increases their susceptibility to the particular condition.  
‘Penetrance’ is also an important predictive factor. This is the proportion of 
individuals who carry a particular disease variant who will go on to develop the 
disease. The breast cancer genes BRCA1/2 are examples of genes with ‘high 
penetrance’ because over 80 per cent of individuals who carry the mutation in one of 
these genes will develop breast or ovarian cancer in their lifetime. Genetic variants 
associated with common diseases are mostly of ‘low penetrance’, because the 
increased risk of developing the disease that is conferred by carrying the gene is 
relatively low.898 Unfortunately, while progress in the identification of genetic 
disease has been impressive, progress in the treatment of such disorders has been 
much slower. The challenge for scientists still lies in discovering ways to alter those 
genes that are defective.899  
This scientific overview is important for consideration of the types of ‘risks’ that 
participants might hypothetically want to know about. Once concrete links are made 
between genes and the environment it may be easy in the future, from a theoretical 
                                                          
897 For example, the absolute lifetime risk of developing a disease may be five in 100 in the general 
population, and the relative risk of the disease may be increased by 20 per cent in people who carry a 
particular genetic variant. The ‘relative’ risk ascribed to this genetic variant is defined as 1.2, because 
the risk has arisen from 1.0 (‘normal’ population risk) to 1.20 (increased risk for people carrying the 
genetic variant). In this population, this 20 per cent increase in relative risk represents an increase in 
absolute risk from five in 100 to six in 100. While a (relative) risk increase of 20 per cent sounds high, 
the absolute risk increase of one in 100 extra cases provides a more practical indication of risk to a 
member of that population: House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, Genomic Medicine 
(HL 2008-09, 107-I), 14  
898 Ibid.   
899 Ibid. For example via gene therapy, preventative surgery etc.  
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perspective, to avoid certain risks.900 So, would participants want to be informed of 
absolute risks for untreatable genetic predispositions? What about high penetrance 
genes such as BRCA1/2? Or single gene disorders for which there is no cure? Or 
susceptibility genes that currently carry a low risk that will significantly increase 
with time, diet and lifestyle? 
These concerns have led to the formulation of ‘lists’ of gene mutations that are 
considered so important and clinically relevant to individuals that they ought to not 
only be disclosed but also actively searched for. In 2013901 the American College of 
Medical Genetics and Genomics released recommendations for a list of ‘incidental 
findings’ that should be searched for and disclosed to individuals, during the course 
of clinical exome and genome sequencing in the laboratory.902 Although not intended 
for application to the biobank setting, this list acts as an interesting benchmark of 
genetic variants that have been deemed to be so significant to an individual’s health 
that they justify added obligations on the laboratories performing the sequencing. 
While all of the disorders on the list are rare, most of the gene and variant categories 
were selected because they are associated with the more common of the single gene 
disorders. The Recommendations specify a set of disorders and the relevant 
associated genes, and certain categories of variants that should be reported, based on 
consensus driven assessment of clinical validity and utility. Disorders for which 
preventative measures and/or treatments are available are prioritised, along with 
disorders in which individuals with pathogenic mutations903 might be asymptomatic 
for long periods of time. The list includes the hereditary breast and ovarian cancer 
genes BRCA1 and BRCA2. Significantly, the ACMG adopt an opt-out approach, 
such that if individuals do not want to know such the results of such research, they 
should not consent to take part in the studies.  
It will be argued later in this chapter that lists such as these may be used as examples 
of the kinds of findings which, if not disclosed, will foreseeably manifest and cause 
                                                          
900 Common non-genetic factors that influence the manifestation/progression of genetic diseases 
include diet, stress, alcohol, drugs and exposure to toxic chemicals or radiation: Ibid. 
901 Green RC and others, ‘ACMG recommendations for reporting of incidental findings in clinical 
exome and genome sequencing’ (2013) 15 Genetics in Medicine 565. 
902 The Working Group’s definition of these as ‘incidental’ is misleading and paradoxical in light of 
their acknowledgment of the distinction between stumbling upon, as opposed to actually searching 
for, particular findings. 
903 An error in the gene that causes impairment of the production of a protein and hence certain 
clinical symptoms: House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, Genomic Medicine (HL 
2008-09, 107-I) 
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physical harm. While some findings will not necessarily be meaningful for the 
participant, for example a genetic predisposition to brown hair, at least for some of 
the subsequent studies researchers may find (and could indeed search for) clinically 
relevant findings. The categories and lists of incidental findings are helpful in as 
much as they delineate the foreseeable range of findings which if not disclosed will 
result in serious individual (and potentially familial) harm. On this basis, for the 
purpose of building a novel duty of care to disclose such findings, ‘findings’ will be 
broadly conceived as any findings during the course of research that relate to the 
individual participant which that person ought to be informed of in order to prevent 
the manifestation of a ‘serious’ risk of harm. Using UK Biobank’s own definition, 
‘serious’ means ‘likely to threaten life span, quality of life or major body functions.’ 
From the perspective of negligence, these are the findings most likely to be deemed 
‘actionable’ in a novel claim in negligence. Although this is a narrow interpretation 
of actionable harm, it is necessary to facilitate further legal analysis of the potential 
duties that are owed and it is enough that there is scope for argument that 
manifestation of a risk discovered in the course of research could cause physical 
injury, which is reasonably foreseeable.904 Therefore, the question that remains is 
whether UK Biobank should be directly, or vicariously, responsible for failure to 
communicate such findings. The conclusion to be drawn from analysis so far is that 
technicians conducting imaging scans or researchers using UK Biobank will discover 
information pertaining to participants during the course of their research, whether 
intentionally or accidentally. It is debatable whether at the time of consent individual 
donors were in a position to appreciate the kinds of findings that researchers might 
subsequently uncover, given the broad terms of their consent and subsequent 
decisions for genotyping of all participant samples. However, UK Biobank have 
seemingly waived responsibility to feedback and how tenable this position is in 
negligence will now be explored. Arguably, there may be a gap between how UK 
Biobank has been set up and the delivery of its existing legal standards for 
participants, which could leave Biobank vulnerable to being sued.905   
                                                          
904 Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155, [1995] 2 WLR 644 [190]: In order to establish foreseeability it 
must be determined whether the defendant can reasonably foresee that his conduct will expose the 
claimant to the risk of personal injury. If so, then the person comes under a duty of care to that 
plaintiff.  
905 It is noted that UK Biobank’s no feedback policy is currently under discussion. 
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7.3 Building a novel duty of care to return ‘serious’ findings in UK 
Biobank 
On the assumption that non-disclosure of serious risks may result in actionable 
physical harm, the next step in a negligence claim is to argue that UK Biobank Ltd 
owes a duty of care to participants to prevent such harm by feeding back such risks. 
There have been no cases in English tort law that have addressed the specific issues 
raised by feedback of findings in the course of research. Since this is a novel duty 
scenario, three tests have been used by the courts in determining a duty of care:906 
a. Whether any duty owed would be ‘incremental’ to previously decided 
cases;907 
b. Whether there has been an assumption of responsibility by the defendant 
towards the claimant (and consequential reliance by the claimant upon the 
defendant conducting himself with due care and skill); 
c. Whether the three-fold Caparo908 test of foreseeability, proximity and that 
a duty would be ‘fair, just and reasonable’, has been met. 
The Caparo test has been preferred as the primary test for a novel duty of care.909 In 
practice, the courts will often consider all or some of these requirements as part of 
the same duty analysis.910 The next section of this chapter will begin by considering 
whether it is possible to establish an analogous duty scenario, followed by analysis 
of whether it is foreseeable, proximate, and just, fair and reasonable to impose such a 
duty on UK Biobank Ltd in the circumstances. In the courts, whether there has been 
an ‘assumption of responsibility’ is often indicative of ‘proximity’ within the Caparo 
test, and this is the approach followed in this chapter.  
                                                          
906 For discussion of these three tests see, e.g. Her Majesty's Commissioners of Customs and Excise v 
Barclays Bank Plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 [4] per Lord Bingham, [82] per Lord Mance.  
907 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] SC (HL) 31, [1932] AC 562 
908 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 2 WLR 358 
909 Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2008] UKHL 50 [2009] 1 AC 225 [42] 
per Lord Bingham and endorsed in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11; [2009] 1 AC 
874, [21] per Lord Hope.  
910 The interdependence of novel duty criteria such as foreseeability, proximity, assumption of 
responsibility and just, fair and reasonableness has recently been illustrated in ABC v St Georges 
Healthcare NHS Trust and Others [2015] EWCA 1394 (QB). 
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7.3.1 Reason by analogy  
There are no directly analogous cases in UK negligence law. It is well established 
that doctors owe their patients a duty of care in English tort law.911 The extent to 
which doctors owe a duty outside the clinical setting is uncertain and case law 
suggests that the further removed the circumstances are from the clinical setting, the 
more difficult it will be to establish a duty. For example, while the ruling in Baker v 
Kaye912 had suggested that a duty of care towards the claimant existed in English law 
(beyond not injuring the person), the Court of Appeal in Kapfunde v Abbey National 
and Daniel913 found against a duty in circumstances where a doctor had been 
employed by a company to carry out medical assessments on potential employees; 
since the doctor had not met the patient, and had based assessment on a 
questionnaire, there was found to be no proximity or ‘special relationship’ between 
the doctor and the patient.  
Beyond the doctor-patient relationship, the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Litigation914 
held that researchers owed a duty of care to research participants ‘akin to that of 
doctor patient, one of close proximity’. To date, this is the only English negligence 
case that has considered the position of researchers. It remains to be seen whether 
and how this ruling could be applied in the future, given that the facts of the case 
were such that the ‘research’ in question was a clinical trial that became a large 
therapeutic program adopted by the Department of Health and the National Health 
Service. On this basis, it has been argued that the close relationship between research 
and therapy could be persuasive in finding a duty of care,915 which may be 
significant in the context of imaging scans (as will be discussed). International 
authority has also imposed a duty of care on researchers in the context of clinical 
                                                          
911 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, [121]; Bolitho v City and 
Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, [1997] 3 WLR 1151 
912 Baker v Kaye [1996] 39 BMLR 12 (QB) held that a doctor owed a duty of care for pre-
employment health assessment (outside the clinical context) but the claim was dismissed on the 
ground that there was no breach of that duty. 
913 Kapfunde v Abbey National plc and Dr D Daniel  [1998] 46 BMLR 176 (CA), [1999] Lloyd's Rep 
Med 48 Kapfunde and Baker are discussed in: Kennedy I and Grubb A, Medical Law (3rd edn, 
Butterworths 2000). 
914 Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Litigation QB 41 BMLR 157, [164]   
915 Kaye J, Boddington P, de Vries J, Gowans H, Hawkins N, Heeney C and Melham K, Ethical, 
Legal and Social Issues Arising from the Use of GWAS in Medical Research (Wellcome Trust 2009).   
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trials,916 but again it is likely that this scenario is too factually different to be deemed 
analogous by a UK court.917  
Established precedent states that professionals owe a duty of care to exercise their 
professional skills to a standard that is expected of a reasonable professional 
possessing that particular skill. Thus, the radiographers (‘technicians’) conducting 
imaging scans owe a duty of care to do so to the standard of a reasonably skilled 
radiographer.918 In the clinical context, a radiographer would likely owe a duty of 
care to the patient to conduct the imaging to a clinical professional standard, look for 
findings in relation to the diagnostic reason for the scan, and act on such findings 
accordingly. However, in the research context the scope of this duty is likely to be 
considerably narrower and therefore distinguishable.  
In the case of UK Biobank, there are multiple 'actors' involved in the participation 
and research process who are acting in a research, rather than clinical, capacity. 
According to the terms of their contracts, these professionals are more likely to owe 
contractual duties to UK Biobank as their employer to do their job properly. In light 
of distinctions made regarding doctor/patient relationships outside the clinical 
setting, it is unlikely that professionals in a research setting would be held to this 
higher standard.  
                                                          
916 Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc. 366 Md 29, 782 A2d 807 (2001) 
This case discussed the issue of researcher duties extensively and held that ‘the very nature of 
nontherapeutic research on human subjects can create special relationships out of which duties arise’: 
‘A special relationship giving rise to duties, the breach of which might constitute negligence, might… 
arise because, generally, the investigators are in a better position to anticipate, discover and 
understand the potential risks to the health of their subjects. Practical inequalities exist between 
researchers, who have superior knowledge, and participants, ‘who are often poorly placed to protect 
themselves from risk.’ [3]  
‘Given the gap in knowledge between investigators and participants and the inherent conflict of 
interest face by investigators, participants cannot and should not be solely responsible for their own 
protection.’ [78] 
The duty required the protection of the research subjects from unreasonable harm and required the 
researcher to completely and promptly inform the subjects of the potential hazards which existed, 
because of the profound trust that participants place in investigators, institutions and the research 
enterprise as a whole to protect them from harm. The case concluded: 
‘… Informed consent agreements in nontherapeutic research projects, under certain circumstances can 
constitute contracts… under certain circumstances, such research agreements can, as a matter of law, 
constitute ‘special relationships’ giving rise to duties, out of the breach of which negligence actions 
may arise.’ [90] 
917 This case is distinguishable on its facts, because on the facts the research project arguably put its 
participants in a more dangerous position by virtue of taking part. The same cannot be said in the 
legal argument at hand; UK Biobank donors are not endangered by taking part, they are just more 
likely to suffer harm if significant findings are encountered and not fed back, preventing action to 
minimise such harm.  
918 Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 566; Wells v Cooper [1958] 2 QB 265; Wilsher v 
Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074 
 
 
204 
7.3.2 The ‘Caparo’ test 
To establish a novel duty of care in negligence, Caparo919 requires the following: the 
risk of harm is foreseeable; there is sufficient proximity between the parties; and it is 
just, fair and reasonable to impose a duty of care. Although Caparo articulates these 
individual criteria, negligence jurisprudence has demonstrated that there is 
considerable overlap between the elements, which have been described as ‘merely 
facets of the same thing.’920 For this reason, while some issues will be discussed in 
proximity, these may also be considered to be issues of just, fair and reasonableness. 
Such overlap is arguably unavoidable: 
[p]roximity is convenient shorthand for a relationship between two parties which makes 
it fair and reasonable one should owe the other a duty of care.921 
Foreseeability  
According to the well-known ‘neighbour principle’ introduced in the landmark 
ruling of Donoghue v Stevenson,922 ‘reasonable foreseeability’ means a duty will be 
owed where the defendant ought reasonably to foresee that his failure to take 
care/omission to act may cause injury to another: 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes, in law, you must not injure 
your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question ‘who is my neighbour’ receives a 
restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you 
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then, in law, 
is my neighbour? The answer seems to be- persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being 
directly affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are 
called into question.923 
The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove that a reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant would have foreseen that injury of some type would, or 
would be likely to be suffered by the claimant if the defendant did not exercise due 
care and skill.924 There is no strict definition of what constitutes reasonable 
                                                          
919 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 2 WLR 358 
920 Ibid. [634] 
921 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; [1996] 3 WLR 388 [932] 
922 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] SC (HL) 31, [1932] AC 562 
923 Ibid. [31] 
924 Mulheron R, Medical Negligence: Non-Patient and Third Party Claims (Ashgate 2010).  29 
 
 
205 
foreseeability of harm, and in Islington LBC v University College London Hospital 
NHS Trust, Buxton LJ remarked that it was a matter of ‘fluidity or flexibility’ and ‘to 
a large extent a matter of impression.’925 The test of reasonable foreseeability must 
be applied to the particular defendant; in this case UK Biobank Ltd.  
It follows then that the question is whether UK Biobank should have reasonably 
foreseen that the act or omission would, or would be likely to give rise to injury to 
the claimant.926 Analysis in Chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis has revealed the 
composition of experts who make up UK Biobank Ltd, including scientific, legal, 
technical and ethical experts. Moreover, analysis of scientific developments in 
research earlier in this chapter has shown how improved knowledge and 
understanding of genetic diseases has led to the identification of certain gene 
mutations with high penetrance,927 and scientific research is moving towards an 
understanding of the clinical utility of information relating to genetic disorders 
(single or multifactorial) and health in general. Arguably, it would be reasonable to 
assume that UK Biobank Ltd would be aware of such developments, as well as the 
potential for researchers to be in a privileged position to identify (look for) and 
understand clinically significant findings.  
What is important for the purpose of this chapter is that certain genetic variations 
have been deemed to be so significant and actionable that the individual must be 
informed of them in order to prevent harm. It is submitted that these lists of 
disclosable variants are influential to the identification of the kinds of risks that 
could constitute actionable harm for the purpose of a claim in negligence. In other 
words, these are the findings that will cause personal injury, which is reasonably 
foreseeable to UK Biobank Ltd if they are not disclosed, and therefore could warrant 
the imposition of a duty of care. 
But to establish a novel duty, precedent has long recognised that foreseeability alone 
will not be sufficient928 and in addition ‘some further ingredient’ is needed to 
establish the requisite proximate relationship. On this matter, precedent suggests that 
a failure to warn falls into the category of omissions, for which proximity will be 
                                                          
925 Islington LBC v University College London Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 596, [14] 
926 Ibid.  
927 Green RC and others, ‘ACMG recommendations for reporting of incidental findings in clinical 
exome and genome sequencing’ (2013) 15 Genetics in Medicine 565. 
928 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 WLR 1049 
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difficult to prove. In relation to feedback of results, the challenge will be to establish 
a close or direct enough relationship between the participant and UK Biobank Ltd, 
which is by no means straightforward, and will depend on the context in which the 
results are discovered as well as the type of result itself. Establishing proximity will 
be difficult because of the chain of relationships between UK Biobank Ltd, 
radiographers, researchers and participants. Currently this only requires limited 
communication in certain circumstances and so in the main enhanced 
communication between the parties, set out in contractual (or consent) documents, 
would be required. Even more problematic is that our argument for a duty to 
feedback is based on a failure to warn, which potentially constitutes an omission.929  
Liability for omissions 
Generally, the common law of negligence does not impose liability for ‘mere 
omissions’, as they are referred to in Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd.930 This 
rule has been expanded in omission cases such as Mitchell v Glasgow CC,931 in 
which the House of Lords essentially categorised a failure to warn as a ‘mere 
omission’ and explained that, exceptionally, an omission could give rise to a duty of 
care. In this instance, some ‘additional feature’ will be necessary, examples of which 
include: 
The requisite additional feature that transforms what would otherwise be a mere 
omission, a breach at most of a moral obligation, into a breach of a legal duty to take 
reasonable steps to safeguard, or to try to safeguard, the person in question from 
harm or injury may take a wide variety of forms. Sometimes the additional feature 
                                                          
929 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, [1996] 3 WLR 388  
930 Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] 1 AC 241, [1987] 2 WLR 480 
The various reasons for this were explained in political, moral and economic terms in Stovin v 
Wise [1996] AC 923, [1996] 3 WLR 388: 
‘It is one thing for the law to say that a person who undertakes some activity shall take reasonable 
care not to cause damage to others. It is another thing for the law to require that a person who is doing 
nothing in particular shall take steps to prevent another from suffering harm….One can put the matter 
in political, moral or economic terms. In political terms it is less of an invasion of an individual’s 
freedom for the law to require him to consider the safety of others in his actions than to impose upon 
him a duty to rescue or protect. A moral version of this point may be called the ‘why pick on me?’ 
argument. A duty to prevent harm to others or to render assistance to a person in danger or distress 
may apply to a large and indeterminate class of people who happen to be able to do something. Why 
should one be held liable rather than another? In economic terms, the efficient allocation of resources 
usually requires an activity should bear its own costs….So liability to pay compensation for loss 
caused by negligent conduct acts as a deterrent….But there is no similar justification for requiring a 
person who is not doing anything to spend money on behalf of someone else….So there must be some 
special reason why he should have to put his hand in his pocket.’ [943-44] 
931 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, [2009] 1 AC 874  
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may be found in the manner in which the victim came to be at risk of harm or injury. 
If a defendant has played some causative part in the train of events that have led to 
the risk of injury, a duty to take reasonable steps to avert or lessen the risk may 
arise. Sometimes the additional feature may be found in the relationship between the 
victim and the defendant (e.g. employee/employer or child/parent) or in the 
relationship between the defendant and the place where the risk arises… sometimes 
the additional feature may be found in the assumption by the defendant of 
responsibility for the person at risk of injury… in each case where particular 
circumstances are relied on as constituting the requisite additional feature alleged to 
be sufficient to cast upon the defendant the duty to take steps that, if take, would or 
might otherwise have avoided or lessened the injury to the victim, the question for 
the court will be whether the circumstances were indeed sufficient for that purpose 
or whether the case remains one of a mere omission.932 
Applied to the case at hand, if the failure to warn participants is going to be deemed 
to be more than a mere omission, an additional factor will need to be proven to 
warrant a duty of care. Such factors will be discussed within proximity and just, fair 
and reasonableness (below), but is it also worth briefly noting that proving breach 
and causation (also necessary for a successful negligence claim) would also be 
considered by the courts.  
Claimants may find it difficult to prove that non-feedback of research results is a 
failure to meet the standard of care expected in the circumstances.933 Proving 
causation is also likely to be problematic due to the multifactorial nature of many 
diseases (briefly explained in this chapter) and the burdensome all or nothing 
approach to the balance of probabilities in tort law, which would require the claimant 
to prove that there was a greater than 50 per cent chance that she could have avoided 
the harm had she known of the risk.934 In relation to genetic disease, for example, 
while scientific research has paved the way for medicine to predict genetic 
conditions, it remains difficult to prevent the fate that those genes predispose,935 and 
                                                          
932 Ibid. [40] 
933 Which since Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] 2 WLR 768 
would arguably be the ‘reasonable patient standard’, although this case related to the well established 
doctor/patient relationship.  
934 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428, [1968] 2 
WLR 422 
935 Chico V, Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for Novel Negligence Claims 
Generated by Genetic Technology (Routledge, 2011), 142 
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it is well noted in the literature that this would be problematic for a claimant seeking 
to establish both factual and legal causation.936   
Proximity   
The concepts of proximity and fairness have been described by the House of Lords 
in Caparo as ‘little more than convenient labels to attach the features of different 
specific situations which, on a detailed examination of all the circumstances, the law 
recognises pragmatically as giving rise to a duty of care of given scope.’937 Thus, 
there is no single formula that will determine whether or not a proximate relationship 
exists between the claimant and the defendant, and the task for the claimant is to 
identify an additional feature beyond mere foreseeability that proves there was 
sufficient proximity between the parties. The closer or more direct the relationship; 
the more likely it will be that a duty will be owed.938 The well-established 
doctor/patient relationship has already been highlighted in this chapter, which 
arguably does not extend beyond the clinical context. In the research context, no 
such duty exists beyond that to take reasonable care as a skilled professional in the 
circumstances.  
In some cases, the existence of a ‘special relationship’ has been sufficient to warrant 
a novel duty of care in omission cases. In Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd939 the 
House of Lords imposed a duty of care on prison officers who failed to prevent 
young boys escaping from a borstal camp, resulting in damage to the claimant’s 
yacht. This was by virtue of the fact that the prison officers had a special relationship 
with the boys and the yacht owners were clearly exposed to a particular risk of 
damage if the boys escaped. Because of this proximate relationship, a duty was 
found.940 Later, Barrett v Ministry of Defence941 held that ‘the characteristic which 
distinguishes those [special] relationships is reliance expressed or implied in the 
                                                          
936 Ibid. See also Johnston C and Kaye J, ‘Does the UK Biobank have a Legal Obligation to Feedback 
Individual Findings to Participants?’ (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 239 
937 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 2 WLR 358 [618] per Lord Bridge 
[633] per Lord Oliver. 
938 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31, [1932] AC 562 
939 Home Office v Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, [1970] 2 WLR 1140  
940 Ibid. [1032].  
941 [1995] 3 All ER 87, [95] 
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relationship which the party to whom the duty is owed is entitled to place on the 
other party to make provision for his safety.’942  
Applied to our case, it is perhaps arguable that the existence of an established 
procedure for reporting serious findings for verification builds the requisite 
relationship (whether ‘special’ or ‘assumed’) between the participant, radiographer, 
and UK Biobank, such that proximity will be satisfied. On this basis, proximity may 
be easier to establish in relation to results of imaging scans than genetics results. 
Potentially, a direct and proximate relationship between the radiographer and the 
participant under examination is more likely because it is foreseeable that if a 
‘serious’ finding is present but not disclosed, the participant physically in front of the 
radiographer will suffer personal harm should the finding manifest.  Subsequently, it 
will be down to the court to decide whether UK Biobank’s waiver of responsibility 
for serious findings not noticed at this stage is reasonable in the circumstances, or 
whether it would be just, fair and reasonable to impose a duty on UK Biobank who 
would be vicariously liable for the radiographer’s failure to warn of such findings.943  
On the other hand, proximity may be more problematic in relation to feedback of 
genetic results, not least because all samples and data are de-identified (Chapter 1) 
before they are released for research use. UK Biobank is open for international 
access, which means theoretically, a researcher on the other side of the world could 
discover a research result pertaining to a de-identified participant. It is difficult to 
imagine how this would qualify as a close and direct relationship, but, it is noted that 
this de-identification is reversible in order to allow further re-contact in future and to 
enable linkage of different sources of information to an individual participant’s 
research file.944  
In the absence of a pre-existing or analogous tortious relationship to bind UK 
Biobank to the hypothetical claimant, the UK courts have, in novel circumstances 
where proximity has been an issue, looked beyond contractual relationships or denial 
                                                          
942 Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] 1 AC 241 [1987] 2 WLR 480, [271] previously held 
that people may owe a duty not to harm others by omission if there is a prior relationship between the 
parties. 
943 UK Biobank would be vicariously liable for data collector who is ‘employed’ to collect the 
samples: Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343, [1951] 1 All ER 574 (CA); Roe v Ministry of 
Health [1954] 2 QB 66 [1954] 2 WLR 915; Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd. [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 AC 
215 
944 UK Biobank, Ethics and Governance Framework (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
‘Anonymisation’ <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/resources/> accessed 26 January 2016. 
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of responsibility and by virtue of the harm and the circumstances imparted a new 
duty of care on the grounds of a ‘special relationship’ or an ‘assumption of 
responsibility.’945 The principle of assumption of responsibility applies to situations 
in which: 
Someone possessed of a special skill, undertakes, irrespective of contract, to apply 
that skill for the assistance of another person, who relies on that skill; a duty of care 
will arise.946 
However, assumption of responsibility as the basis of extra-contractual liability 
emerged in the context of claims for the compensation of types of non-intentional 
harm other than physical personal injury, including psychological and psychiatric 
harm, nervous shock and pure economic loss,947 and this will have implications for 
the weight such precedent could be given to the scenario at hand.  
Hedley Byrne v Heller948 was a landmark case of pure economic loss resulting from a 
negligent misstatement. The question was whether a banker owed a duty of care to 
the party seeking information in respect of a reference gratuitously supplied. 
Previously, the notion that a party may owe another a duty of care for negligent 
misstatements had been rejected, with the only remedy being in contract law. In 
contrast, the claim was allowed and the principle on which the new duty of care not 
to make careless statements was founded was an assumption of responsibility by the 
maker of the statement, coupled with a detrimental reliance by the party seeking the 
information or advice:  
                                                          
945 Lord Reid in Home Office v Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, [1970] 2 WLR 1140 [1027]: 
‘In years later, there has been a steady trend towards regarding the law of negligence as depending on 
principle so that, when a new point emerges, one should ask not whether it is covered by authority but 
whether recognised principles apply to it. Donoghue v Stevenson may be regarded as a milestone, and 
the well-known passage in Lord Atkin’s speech should, I think, be regarded as a statement of 
principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new 
circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we can and should say that it ought to apply 
unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion.’  
946 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, [1963] 3 WLR 101[503] 
947 Leach v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [1999] All ER 215 (CA). In this case the Court of 
Appeal accepted that voluntary assumption of responsibility could create a duty of care to protect 
from psychiatric harm. The case concerned a claimant who had been asked by the police to assist in 
the interrogation of a serial killer by being present as ‘appropriate adult’ during police interviews and 
also in the police cell where he was kept, as required by the practice code of the police. The claimant 
suffered severe psychological trauma following no help or counselling. The Court refused to strike 
out her claim, pointing out that there should be no difference between physical and psychiatric harm 
when assumption of responsibility is concerned. The assumption of responsibility leading to the 
creation of a duty of care was to advise the claimant to seek proper counselling while assisting the 
police, which was to be objectively recognized.  
948 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, [1963] 3 WLR 101 
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Relationships which may give rise to a duty of care in word as well in deed… 
include: relationships ‘equivalent to contract’, that is, where there is an assumption 
of responsibility in the circumstances in which, but-for the absence of consideration, 
there would be a contract… I do not understand any of your Lordships to hold that it 
is a responsibility imposed by law upon certain types of persons… It is a 
responsibility that is voluntarily accepted or undertaken either generally where there 
is a general relationship, such as that of a solicitor and client or banker and 
customer, is created, or specifically in relation to a particular transaction.949 
[Emphasis added]. 
Henderson v. Merett Syndicates950 extended the scope of Hedley to include 
negligence performance of services and held that when the relationship is equivalent 
to contract, the test of assumption of responsibility is objective and based on 
reasonableness. Williams v. Natural Life Ltd951 articulated this as such:  
The touchstone of liability is not the state of mind of the defendant, an objective test 
means that the primary focus must be on the things said or done by the defendant or 
on his behalf in dealings with the plaintiff.952 
So, it matters not whether UK Biobank intended to assume responsibility for their 
participants in this way. The question for the courts would be whether or not such 
responsibility would be reasonable in the circumstances. Although cases such as 
Hedley Byrne and Henderson were cases of economic loss, it is arguable that they 
facilitate an interesting analysis of the relationship between participants, 
professionals (conducting the imaging scanning), researchers and participants. For 
example, this chapter has already discussed the apparent assumption of responsibility 
for feedback of serious findings during in imaging scanning which are referred to 
professionals, on the one hand, and their express waiver of responsibility for results 
that are not noticed by professionals conducting the scans, on the other. From a legal 
perspective, because imaging is being conducted in a research setting, strictly 
speaking there is no legal precedent which dictates that UK Biobank were obliged to 
take this approach, and debatably, by doing so UK Biobank have gone over and 
above the research duty to take reasonable care. However, by assuming 
responsibility for some findings and waiving responsibility for others, it is arguable 
                                                          
949 Ibid [530]  
950 Henderson v Merritt Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, [1994] 3 WLR 761 
951 Williams & Anor v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd & Anor [1998] UKHL 17, [1998] WLR [830]  
952 Ibid. [836] 
 
 
212 
that a relationship is established between participants and UK Biobank, such that the 
waiver is not justifiable. 
Applying principles in Hedley and Henderson, perhaps the necessary ‘quasi-
contractual’ relationship between UK Biobank Ltd and participants could be argued 
to stem from their signing a consent form.953 On this basis, an argument could be 
made to the effect that such a waiver of responsibility is not effective954 and a double 
standard, and that UK Biobank have assumed responsibility for reporting all 
‘serious’ findings during the imaging scans. This argument would be contingent on 
reliance by participants,955 which must be reasonable956 in the circumstances. 
It would be more difficult to argue that UK Biobank Ltd has assumed responsibility 
for feedback of genetic research results, given the blanket restriction on such results 
outlined in the participant consent form. Although, perhaps an argument could be 
made in the future that the EGF document has been created as a ‘living document’ so 
that it can be reflexive and revised in light of public attitudes and societal change.957 
Could this contribute to an ‘undue expectation’ that UK Biobank’s no feedback 
policy could be revised; given the momentum of progress in scientific and genetics 
research, and the apparent move towards identification and feedback of certain 
genetic findings (outlined above)? Taking this one step further, was the informed 
consent document clear enough so as to prevent a ‘diagnostic misconception;’958 in 
other words ‘the expectation of personal health-related information as a reward for 
                                                          
953 Although, it is recalled that feedback would be contingent on communication between the 
radiographer and UK Biobank, which at present will not always strictly be the case.  
954 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] UKHL 1, [1989] 2 WLR 790 
This was an economic loss case, in which it was held that a mortgage valuer owes a duty of care to the 
purchaser of the valued property to exercise reasonable skill and care, which cannot be avoided by the 
use of a disclaimer. A duty of care was held to be owed, and the question was whether or not the 
disclaimer was effective, in light of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) 1977. It was held that the 
disclaimers were not effective to avoid liability, because it was not fair and reasonable for them to 
apply the circumstances of the case.  
955 Her Majesty's Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc [2006] UKHL 28, 
[2007] 1 AC 181 
956 Also stated in Williams & Anor v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd & Anor [1998] UKHL 17, [1998] 
WLR 830, [838]:  
‘The test [of reliance] is not simply reliance in fact. The test is whether the plaintiff could reasonably 
rely on an assumption of personal responsibility by the individual who performed the services on 
behalf of the company.’ 
957 Laurie G, ‘Reflexive Governance in Biobanking: On the Value of Policy Led Approaches and the 
Need to Recognise the Limits of Law' (2011) 130 Human Genetics 347. 
958 Nobile H and Borry P, ‘Why do participants enroll in population biobank studies? A systematic 
literature review’ (2013) 13 Expert Rev Mol Diagn 35, 44 
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the donation of biological material for research?’959 In this instance, reliance could 
be based on participants’ expectations at the time of consent; who may not have 
comprehended the range of research uses that the UK Biobank resource is being used 
for and the potential for findings pertinent to their health.  
Overall, while potentially arguable in relation to the imaging study, establishing a 
duty of care to feedback genetic results based on assumption of responsibility is 
tenuous at best. Even so, a duty of care may still feasibly be imposed by reason of 
the ‘Caparo’ test. Indeed, even if an express assumption of responsibility and 
reliance cannot be proved, evidence of an assumption may well be considered 
evidence of ‘proximity’ for the purpose of this test.  
Just, fair and reasonable  
Even if foreseeability and proximity are proven, establishing a novel duty of care 
may fail if the courts decide that such a duty would not be just, fair and reasonable in 
the circumstances. The just, fair and reasonableness of importing a novel duty of 
care is usually determined by the ‘public policy considerations’960 of the claim. Of 
particular relevance here is the potential argument that UK Biobank is a ‘public 
body’, which is a thorny issue in negligence, and relatedly, the purpose for which 
UK Biobank was founded and the fair and just allocation of its resources. These will 
be dealt with in turn below.  
It is noted that the next chapter of this thesis will discuss the potential for argument 
that UK Biobank Ltd is a quasi-public body for the purpose of judicial review; 
engaging public law mechanisms to protect participants from the risk under 
discussion. Often, allegations made against a public body are on the grounds that 
they have been negligent in failing to exercise a discretionary function. If reference 
can be made to a statute as evidence that the authority had either a public law power 
or duty to act, this will strengthen the claimant’s argument that the authority also had 
a duty of care to act at common law for the purposes of a negligence action.961 That 
being said, UK Biobank is not a statutorily created ‘public body’ (if the existence of 
                                                          
959 On this question, Chapter 8 will explore whether an argument could be made for a ‘legitimate 
expectation’ of feedback of results in public law.  
960  Mulheron R, Medical Negligence: Non-Patient and Third Party Claims: Non-Patient and Third 
Party Claims (Ashgate Publishing 2010) , 30 
961 McIvor CM, Liability in Tort for the acts of third parties; in search for coherence (PhD Thesis, 
Durham University 2003), 94 
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a Parliamentary statute envisaging its operation is the understanding of a public 
body962) so there is not the same Parliamentary concern as has been problematic in 
other cases.963  
However, analysis in this thesis so far has investigated the extent of UK Biobank 
Ltd’s discretion as a private charity company limited, and this does not include a 
broad obligation to feedback. Thus, a central tension emerges which is instrumental 
to this thesis as a whole; the problematic boundary between public and private law to 
protect public and private interests. The issue of public body liability in negligence 
embodies the issue of how to deal with public law in a private law context. The 
reverse of this situation, namely how public law obligations could be related to 
private institutions should UK Biobank fail to meet the traditional public body test, 
will be dealt with in the next chapter. The current chapter proceeds on the basis that 
UK Biobank Ltd could be categorised as a public body, with important implications 
for the likelihood of a successful claim in negligence.  
Public body liability 
Public authorities are regarded as having special status in negligence, warranting the 
application of exceptional rules designed to restrict their duty of care and thus, 
liability. These are usually justified on the basis that imposing liability would operate 
to the detriment of society and the common good. Unlike private persons, the sole 
purpose of these bodies is to serve the community; they have been specifically 
created to carry out functions designed to benefit the community and to this end are 
paid for by the taxpayer. The main objection, then, is that holding public bodies 
liable means compensation comes out of their allocated funds so the amount of 
money that is available to perform their relevant functions is reduced. By extension, 
the whole community suffers for the benefit of one aggrieved individual. There is 
also the floodgates concern that the ‘deep-pocketed’ public authorities will be 
targeted for scheming claims. The other main argument against public body liability 
is the defensive practice concern; the threat of liability may cause public servants to 
adopt excessively cautious approaches to their work. This then leads to inefficient 
use of time and resources, as well as the sacrifice of the purpose for which the 
                                                          
962 Which will be debated in the next chapter.  
963 X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 663, [1995] 3 WLR 152; Hill v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 WLR 1049 
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authority was created. The creation of UK Biobank using public funds to build a 
resource to facilitate research for the public good seems to fit this requirement. 
The hesitance of tort law to impose a duty on public bodies such as the police was 
demonstrated in Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire. In this case, the mother of 
the Yorkshire Ripper’s last victim brought a claim against the police, arguing that 
they omitted to realise that Peter Sutcliffe was the killer. It was argued that had they 
conducted their investigations with due care and attention, Sutcliffe would have been 
apprehended before killing her daughter. The House of Lords effectively granted the 
police blanket immunity from such an action. Such immunity was deemed to be 
necessary since the imposition of a duty might encourage the police to perform their 
duties in a defensive manner,964 which could divert resources away from the police 
force’s ‘most important function; the suppression of crime.’965  
This reasoning was followed in Palmer v. Tees HA966 where the trial judge relied on 
Hill and held that as a matter of public policy it would not be just, fair and 
reasonable to impose such a duty of care in the circumstances; health professionals 
might be encouraged to engage in ‘defensive practice’ in an effort to avoid liability, 
thereby neglecting their primary responsibilities of diagnosing and treating illness.967 
However, the effects of these decisions have since been mitigated, in light of their 
incongruence with the Human Rights Act and the duty on public bodies to act in 
accordance with the ECHR (Chapter 8). Thus Osman v UK968 held that blanket 
immunity for the police was not compatible with the ECHR. Subsequently, D v East 
Berkshire Community NHS Trust969 formally overruled X (Minors) v Bedfordshire 
County Council970 and found a duty of care was owed.971  
                                                          
964 Ibid. Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [64]. 
965 Ibid.  
966 Palmer v Tees Health Authority [1999] EWCA Civ 1533, [2000] PIQR P1  
967 Ibid. [14].  
968 Osman v United Kingdom (23452/94) [1999] 1 FLR 193, [2000] 29 EHRR 245 
969 D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust and others [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373 
970 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 663, [1995] 3 WLR 152 
971 It is not within the scope of this chapter to analyse whether a rights-based argument based on the 
implications of the Convention may be made for a duty to feedback information. This line of 
argument has already been well made in relation to the potential engagement of an Article 2 Right to 
life (Johnston C and Kaye J, ‘Does the UK Biobank have a Legal Obligation to Feedback Individual 
Findings to Participants?’ (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 239) and Article 8 Right to Private and 
Family Life (Laurie G, 'Obligations Arising from Genetic Information: Negligence and the Protection 
of Familial Interests' (1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 109; Laurie G, 'In Defence of 
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Thus, it is no longer the case that public bodies such as the police force are 
automatically immune from liability by virtue of their standing. However, the courts 
may well be hesitant to impose such a duty on UK Biobank given its public good 
mission to facilitate research that is in the public interest for the benefit of future 
generations, not the participants themselves (Chapters 1, 3 and 4). Indeed, this is 
relied upon by UK Biobank as one of the justifications behind its no feedback 
policy; to impose a duty otherwise may well be to misconstrue the reasons behind 
UK Biobank’s creation in the first place, and the interests it was created to benefit 
(Chapter 4): ‘Biobank may well argue that it is in the business of research and that 
the reasonableness of any obligation to feedback clinical information should be 
judged relative to this fundamental mission.’972  
This approach was evident in Caparo, which involved the duties owed by a public 
body to private individuals. It was held that the company in question owed a duty 
only to its shareholders and not private individuals, since the purpose of the 
company’s accounts was not to benefit unknown private individuals relying on audit 
to make a profit, it was to help shareholders at general meeting: 
In seeking to ascertain whether there should be imposed on the adviser a duty to 
avoid the occurrence of the kind of damage which the advisee claims to have 
suffered it is not, I think, sufficient to ask simply whether there existed a ‘closeness’ 
between them in the sense that the advisee had a legal entitlement to receive the 
information upon the basis of which he has acted or in the sense that the information 
was intended to serve his interest or to protect him. One must, I think, go further and 
ask, in what capacity was his interest to be served and from what was he intended to 
be protected? …Before it can be concluded that the duty is imposed to protect the 
recipient against harm which he suffers by reason of the particular use that he 
chooses to make of the information he receives, one must, I think, first ascertain the 
purpose for which the information is required to be given. [Emphasis added]973  
Such authority may well go against the imposition of a duty of care on UK Biobank 
Ltd. On the other hand, there are a number of policy arguments that could be 
asserted in favour of a duty of care, although to date, these have been made out of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Ignorance: Genetic Information and the Right Not to Know' (1999) 6 European Journal of Health Law 
119)  
972 Brownsword R, ‘The Ancillary Care Responsibilities of Researchers: Reasonable but not Great 
Expectations’ (2007) 35 JLME 679. 
973 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 2 WLR 358 [652] per Lord Roskill 
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court and are evident in academic debate and professional guidelines. Significantly, 
policy considerations are also likely to be shaped by societal and cultural change. 
Science and technology has rapidly developed and there has been a wealth of 
professional and academic literature and guidance dedicated to the implications of 
such progress for participants in terms of feedback of research results.  
Policy concerns in context  
There is mounting evidence that professionals (biobanks, researchers, technicians) 
are routinely returning certain ‘disclosable variants’ (as discussed earlier in this 
Chapter). Academics have argued that if these practices become commonplace, 
alongside the lists of findings routinely returned (outlined above), this may create an 
obligation to look at least for such variants in other contexts such as research.974 In 
the future, researchers conducting sequencing may assume responsibility for such 
findings given the momentum of policies moving towards such an approach and 
ultimately this could contribute towards a participant’s expectation to receive 
feedback.975 Notably, empirical literature has highlighted that many individuals wish 
to receive their incidental findings and individual research results, especially if 
researchers find something serious.976 A recent report commissioned by the WT and 
the MRC found that ‘participants showed overwhelming support for the return of 
health related findings to research participants, particularly where a condition is 
                                                          
974 Gliwa C and Berkman M, ‘Do Researchers Have an Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic 
Incidental Findings?’ (2013) 13 American Journal of Bioethics 41 
975 And whether or not this expectation is ‘legitimate’ will be the focus of the next chapter in this 
thesis. This issue was raised by Borry et al in 2013 in their literature review, which aimed at 
reviewing studies addressing the reasons to participate in biobank studies in order to provide data on 
the therapeutic misconception/diagnostic misconception in population biobank studies. The review 
noted that 8 studies found expectation of personal benefit through health-related research, indicating a 
misunderstanding amongst participants of magnitude. Their review was inspired by the literature on 
‘therapeutic misconception’ which was coined in the 1980’s by Appelbaum and Lidz; describing the 
results of a study on research participants’ understanding of the information provided during the 
recruitment of a psychiatric trial. After receiving information about randomisation and use of placebo 
as planned in the trial, some participants still were convinced they would receive a treatment 
appropriate to their condition. Through their misunderstanding of the trial’s main features, these 
participants actually failed to identify the specific aims of the research practice and confused them 
with the clinical practice: Appelbaum PS, Roth LH, Lidz CW, Benson P and Winslade W, ‘False 
hopes and best data: consent to research and the therapeutic misconception’ (1987) 17 Hastings Cent 
Rep 20. Cited in Nobile H and Borry P, ‘Why do participants enroll in population biobank studies? A 
systematic literature review’ (2013) 13 Expert Rev Mol Diagn 35. 
976 Murphy J, Scott J, Kaufman D, Geller, G LeRoy L and Hudson K , ‘Public expectations for return 
of results from large-cohort genetic research’ (2008) 8 American Journal of Bioethics 36. 
See also: Cited in Wolf et al. ‘Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic research 
involving biobanks and archived data sets.’ Genetics in Medicine Special Article (2012) 7.  
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serious and treatable.’977 Generally, participants in the report felt that the benefits of 
feedback outweighed the harms, but the participants wanted to receive the results 
from someone with medical knowledge and expertise, who could ensure that the 
finding was followed up effectively (usually a GP or a specialist healthcare 
professional).978  
There are also examples of international biobanks (albeit a minority) that provide 
individual research results to participants. For example, Chapter 2 has highlighted 
that the Estonian Genome Project979 allows participants to access their ‘genetic data, 
hereditary characteristics and genetic risks obtained as a results (sic) of genetic 
research.’980 The Human Genes Research Act 2000 (which created the Project) also 
explicitly recognises a participant’s right not to know about their genetic data.981 
In the literature, discussion has now progressed to consideration of how such results 
should be fed back and by whom.982 Some authors have argued for the responsibility 
of researchers,983 while others argue for the responsibility of the biobank itself.984 It 
has been suggested that there may be an ‘intermediate’985 researcher duty of care, 
distinct from that of physicians: 
[G]rounded on the ‘subject’s vulnerability and entrustment of her well-being to the 
researcher… The challenge is to reformulate the duties of researchers themselves 
toward research participants in light of important clinical information that 
researchers may discover…986 
                                                          
977 Opinion Leader, ‘Accessing Public Attitudes to Health Related Findings in Research’ (Wellcome 
Trust, April 2012) 
<www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/wtvm0
55196.pdf> accessed 19 November 2013.  
978 Ibid. ‘Executive Summary’ 5 
979 Estonian Genome Project ‘Gene Donor Consent Form’ <http://www.geenivaramu.ee/en/> accessed 
4 September 2013 
980 Zawati MH and Rioux A, ‘Biobanks and the Return of Research Results: Out with the Old and In 
with the New?’ (2011) 39 JLME 615.  
981 Human Genes Research Act 2000, s 11(1). 
982 Wolf SM and others, ‘Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic research 
involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 361. 
983 Wolf SM, Paradise J and Caga-anan C ‘The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects 
Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties’ (2008) 36 JLME 361, 364  
984 Wallace S and Kent A, ‘Population Biobanks and Returning Individual Research Results - Mission 
Impossible or New Directions?’ (2011) 140 Human Genetics Journal 395.  
985 Richardson HS and Belsky L, ‘The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers: An 
Ethical Framework for Thinking about the Clinical Care that Researchers Owe to their Subjects’ 
(2004) 34 Hastings Centre Report 25. 
986 Ibid 
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Richardson and Belsky argue that participant vulnerability and researcher ‘fiduciary 
duties’ mean researchers owe a limited duty of ‘ancillary care’ (care beyond that 
required to carry out the research safely). The authors argue that when research 
participants entrust otherwise private information to a researcher, or provide 
researchers access to some aspect of the participants body, this ‘partial entrustment’ 
carries with it certain researcher duties including the duty to offer back information 
discovered of clinical importance.987 In the same way, Miller et al988 argue that the 
researcher’s ethical obligation to return incidental findings is based on the 
researcher’s professional relationship with the participant, privileged access to 
private information about the participant, and discovery of an incidental finding 
bearing on the participant’s health.989 
On the other hand, Illes et al990 maintain that researcher duties to manage and offer 
the return of incidental findings flow from ethical duties to respect participant 
autonomy and interests. They suggest that researchers, whose work depends on the 
generosity of research participants and their willingness to be part of research, bear a 
duty of reciprocity. Accordingly, Kohane et al991 argue that offering discoveries back 
to individual research participants allows them to be ‘partners in research rather than 
passive, disenfranchised purveyors of biomaterials and data.’992 Commentators have 
also argued that the depth of the relationship between the researcher and the 
participant should determine whether or not results are fed back:993  
Researchers have a stronger moral responsibility to engage with a fuller range of 
participants’ needs when the relationship is deeper.994 
                                                          
987 Ibid.  
988 Miller FG, Mello MM and Joffe S, ’Incidental findings in genomic research: what do investigators 
owe research participants?’ (2008) 36 JLME  271. Cited in Wolf SM and others, ‘Managing 
incidental findings and research results in genomic research involving biobanks and archived data 
sets’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 361, 7 
989 Ibid.  
990 Illes J, Kirschen MP, Edwards E and others, ‘Ethics: Incidental findings in brain imaging research’ 
(2006) 311 Science 783. Cited in Wolf SM and others, ‘Managing incidental findings and research 
results in genomic research involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 361. 
991 Kohane IS, Mandl KD, Taylor PL, Holm IA, Nigrin DJ and Kunkel LM, ‘Medicine; Re-
establishing the researcher-patient compact’ (2007) 316 Science 836. 
992 Ibid. Cited in Wolf SM and others, ‘Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic 
research involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 361. 
993 Ravitsky V and Wilfond BS, ‘Disclosing individual genetic results to research participants’ (2006) 
6 Am J Bioethics 8. Cited in Wallace S and Kent A, ‘Population Biobanks and Returning Individual 
Research Results - Mission Impossible or New Directions?’ (2011) 140 Human Genetics Journal 395. 
994 Beskow LM and Burke W, ‘Offering individual genetic research results: Context matters’ (2010) 2 
Sci Trans Med 38cm20. 
 
 
220 
Conversely, when the relationship is more distant this can mitigate the obligation to 
return results, and Wallace and Kent995 refer to ‘the case of a healthy volunteer’s 
data in a population biobank being used by a ‘secondary researcher.’’ The latter are 
defined as those researchers who are not involved in the original project but are 
‘…accessing the data through managed data access mechanisms’996 (much like 
researchers granted access to UK Biobank). The authors argue that the relationship 
between a secondary researcher and a participant is often too physically distant from 
the research that is taking place in another constitution or country, and furthermore, 
the secondary research project may take place long in the future, ‘creating a gap 
between the time of joining the biobank and the time of discovery.’ 997 
On the other hand, Knoppers et al have argued for the imposition of a duty on 
researchers accessing large-scale population biobanks like UK Biobank, rather than 
the biobank institution itself: 
It is for this very purpose that large population biobanks were funded: to provide 
reliable, baseline data for more specific research in the future. Imposing the return of 
results that is applicable in disease research or clinical trials into the broader 
resource mission of population biobanks will undermine their longitudinal goals (to 
say nothing of the creation of untoward legal liability.) Most importantly, it would 
create unrealistic expectations and harm the credibility and transparency of 
population biobanks.  
There is also a growing body of literature arguing for direct responsibility for the 
management of incidental findings on the part of biobank institutions. Most notably, 
a project funded by the National Institute of Health recently recommended that 
where re-identification of individual contributors is possible, biobanks should work 
to enable the biobank to discharge four core responsibilities:  
1) Clarify the criteria for evaluating findings and the roster of returnable findings; 
2) Analyse a particular finding in relation to this; 
3) Re-identify the individual contributor; and 
                                                          
995 Wallace S and Kent A, ‘Population Biobanks and Returning Individual Research Results - Mission 
Impossible or New Directions?’ (2011) 140 Human Genetics Journal 395.  
996 UK10K Project (2010) cited in ibid.  
997 Wallace S and Kent A, ‘Population Biobanks and Returning Individual Research Results - Mission 
Impossible or New Directions?’ (2011) 140 Human Genetics Journal 395.  
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4) Re-contact the contributor to offer the finding.998 
The special article recommended: 
Findings that are analytically valid, reveal an established and substantial risk of a 
serious health condition, and are clinically actionable should generally be offered to 
consenting contributors.999 
In addition, moral arguments have been made for imposing a duty on UK Biobank to 
feedback incidental findings to those participants with a ‘reasonable expectation’ of 
such information.1000 Brownsword starts from the hypothetical that a participant in a 
research trial claims to have a reasonable expectation of ancillary-care advice or 
assistance1001 from the research team; ‘a novel claim’ for ‘ethicists and lawyers 
alike:’  
In the absence of express undertaking or bespoke legal support, (of the kind that 
simply does not currently exist), how might such a claim be made out… If there is 
no… immediate anchoring point in practice, what then? The claimant might, in good 
faith, have the relevant expectation, but this is little more than a de facto 
expectation. On what basis is the claimant’s expectation to be presented as 
reasonable?1002  
Brownsword articulates the following four-stage test, which is helpful to the analysis 
of the balance of benefits and burdens that the courts would be engaged in: 
i) Is A in a position to assist B? 
ii) Does A have the capacity to assist B in any material respect? 
                                                          
998 Wolf SM and others, ‘Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic research 
involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genet Med 361. 
999 Ibid. 
1000 Brownsword R, ‘The Ancillary Care Responsibilities of Researchers: Reasonable but not Great 
Expectations’ (2007) 35 JLME 679. 
1001 Which include the ‘responsibility to advise or assist participants who have medical condition X in 
circumstances where the research concerns medical condition Y, and the research did not contribute 
to the presence of condition X in participants, nor did the having of condition X contribute to the 
research.’ Ibid. 679 
1002 Ibid. 680: Brownsword notes that the case is ‘easily made out’ (1) if the relevant undertaking 
(assuring advice, assistance, or treatment) has been given prior to enrolment; (2) if it is an explicit 
term of the contract to participate; or (3) if the responsibility to offer such ancillary care is generally 
acted upon as a matter of common custom and practice.  
Regarding the latter, Brownsword was writing in 2007 and it is submitted that potentially the claim is 
more easily made out today, in light of recent trend towards disclosure of incidental findings.  
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iii) Even though A is in a position to assist B and has the relevant capacity, 
would the burden of responsibility on A be unreasonable relative to A’s own 
essential interests?  
iv) Even though A is in a position to assist B, has the relevant capability, and 
the imposition of responsibility on A would not be unreasonable (relative to 
A’s essential interests), would B be taking unfair advantage of A if A were 
required to assist B?1003  
Brownsword maintains that UK Biobank is ‘plainly’ in a position to assist volunteer 
participants and has information that is material to the health and well-being of a 
participant. Indeed, the submission in earlier sections of this chapter has been that 
UK Biobank is in a privileged position with regard to the types of research projects 
granted access to the resource and by extension the kinds of findings that may arise. 
Furthermore, UK Biobank has the capability to disclose the information, as 
acknowledged in its EGF and proven by the recent re-contact of individuals for the 
second phase of assessment.1004 Finally, there is no implication of ‘free-riding or the 
like’ because ‘Biobank participants receive no significant material or financial 
inducement) and their participation is essentially public spirited.’ This leads 
Brownsword to the conclusion that ‘seemingly, then, the Biobank has a prima facie 
background obligation to feedback to participants important personal medical 
information where it happens to have it.’1005  
To summarise, an apparent shift in attitudes towards feedback of findings in the 
research context could pervade the courts in the future. It is arguable that given the 
intentional reflexivity of the EGF, UK Biobank’s policy towards feedback of 
incidental findings could be reviewed to reflect this developing landscape. Despite 
international policies supporting an ethical and legal duty to return,1006 the latest 
                                                          
1003 Brownsword questions: ‘What are the responsibilities of researchers in relation to such findings 
should they inform participants? If they didn’t, could they be liable in breach of contract or tort? 
Would any guidance to researchers be susceptible to judicial review?’ Ibid.  
1004 For Brownsword, while the burden is ‘more than trivial,’ it ‘falls a long way short of being 
unreasonable’ because ‘this is just the kind of special pleading that the community [of rights] has 
neutralised by tying the notion of essential interests to those basic interests shared by all agents.’ Ibid. 
1005 Ibid.  
1006 Knoppers BM and Kharaboyan L, ‘“Deconstructing” Biobank Communication of Results’ (2009) 
6 SCRIPTed 677, 684.  
For example: UNESCO International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 2000, Article 10 indicates 
that there is a right to be informed of results during research:  
‘When human genetic data, human proteomic data or biological samples are collected for medical and 
scientific research purposes, the information provided at the time of consent should indicate that the 
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guidelines published in 2014 by the WT and the MRC (two of UK Biobank’s main 
funders and drivers of the project – Chapters 3 and 4) suggest that the fact that UK 
Biobank has a policy on feedback of findings is enough.1007   
The issue of feedback has not escaped the attention of the UK Government and in a 
seminar given in Oxford in 2014 the Minister for Life Sciences indicated that this 
was an impending matter for Parliament and legislation is envisaged for the 
future.1008 It was suggested that Government intends to move towards a ‘participant 
empowerment’ model; whereby participants are contractually empowered to consent 
to participation in research and therefore entitled to feedback. Indeed, this would be 
in line with progress in the medical context, which has moved towards a patient 
centric rather than professional standard of care for informed consent.1009 
7.4 Conclusion 
Since its establishment, UK Biobank has developed policies designed to facilitate the 
return of ‘serious’ findings discovered during the course of imaging scanning. 
However, UK Biobank’s broad no-feedback policy is yet to be amended in the 
context of genetic research, despite the likelihood of such findings during the course 
of research and an increasing trend to return certain genetic information in light of 
‘lists’ that are being developed on the ground. The extent to which this approach is 
sustainable in the future is therefore questionable.  
The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate whether the private law of 
negligence could pertain to UK Biobank Ltd as an avenue of accountability for the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
person concerned has the right to decide whether or not to be informed of the results. This does not 
apply to research on data irretrievably unlinked to identifiable persons or to data that do not lead to 
individual findings concerning the persons who have participated in such a research. Where 
appropriate, the right not to be informed should be extended to identified relatives who may be 
affected by the results.’ 
In addition, the Oviedo Convention states: 
‘Everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health. 
This is a right to know all information that is collected about an individual’s personal health: Whether 
it be a diagnosis, prognosis or any other relevant fact.’ 
The Convention also acknowledges that ‘the wishes of individuals not to be so informed will also be 
observed,’ but interestingly this may be overridden as it ‘may be of vital importance for patients to 
know certain facts about their health, even though they have expressed the wish not to know them.’ 
However, the UK is yet to sign and ratify this Convention, so the legal effect of the Convention on the 
UK (and UK Biobank) questionable. 
1007 Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust, Framework on the feedback of health-related 
findings in research (MRC, March 2014) <www.mrc.ac.uk/documents/pdf/mrc-wellcome-trust-
framework-on-the-feedback-of-health-related-findings-in-researchpdf/> accessed 09 July 2015. 
1008 George Freeman MP speaking at Oxford Seminar Series on Genetic Privacy (2014) 
1009 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) UKSC 11 [2015] 2 WLR 768. 
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protection of participant interests in knowing about serious findings relevant to their 
health. In sum, a participant would have to overcome significant hurdles to prove 
that UK Biobank Ltd ought to be liable for its failure to feedback. First, the harm in 
question would have to be characterised as the physical injury suffered as a result of 
the manifestation of a risk, which was not disclosed by UK Biobank, but was 
foreseeable so as to be actionable.  
Second, omissions are generally more difficult to recover damages for in negligence. 
To augment a failure to warn of such risks from a ‘mere omission’ an additional 
feature is required. In the context of imaging scans this may be provided by the 
proximity of the radiographer, and the pathways in place for validation of serious 
findings, as well as the procedures put in place by UK Biobank for return of such 
results, which may or may not constitute an assumption of responsibility. On the 
other hand, such proximity is difficult to establish in the context of genetic research, 
where, theoretically, researchers who discover ‘serious’ findings could be based on 
the other side of the world and have no obligation to return such information 
according to the terms of their MTA with UK Biobank Ltd. Finally, there are 
significant policy issues associated with the imposition of liability on an institution 
like UK Biobank; set up with a public good mission and (partly) funded by public 
money such that UK Biobank Ltd may arguably be characterised as a ‘public body’. 
However, international and professional guidelines suggest that the landscape for the 
return of results is changing, and a position of no return of research results is 
arguably becoming increasingly untenable.  
Indeed, there is currently limited protection for UK Biobank participants who may 
be at risk of serious, treatable diseases. UK Biobank’s negative feedback policy, 
combined with the absence of a legislative backdrop (Chapter 4) and significant 
hurdles to legal mechanisms for liability at common law, leave participants poorly 
protected from this kind of risk. In the absence of statutory guidelines or a 
contractual agreement, a participant of UK Biobank may use the tort of negligence to 
try and further their interests in feedback of serious research results. However, on the 
basis of analysis of precedent for novel duty of care scenarios, this claim would be 
fraught with hurdles and difficulties.  
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Alternatively, the next chapter will discuss the potential of a remedy in public law 
for the protection of a participant’s interests in the running of UK Biobank, including 
the prevention of harm as a result of failure to feedback research results. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Summary of issues 
A number of conclusions have been drawn in the preceding chapters of this thesis 
that are instrumental to the present chapter’s analysis of public law. Analysis so far 
has concluded that UK Biobank Ltd has the power to make decisions that could 
adversely affect participants, individuals and the general public interest and that the 
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private legal structure of UK Biobank as a charity company calls into question the 
public accountability of UK Biobank Ltd. Chapters 6 and 7 have also shown that it is 
unlikely that UK Biobank donors’ interests in protection from personal harm would 
be upheld in private company, charity and negligence law. With these conclusions in 
mind, this chapter analyses the applicability of public law to UK Biobank Ltd’s 
discretionary power, to explore whether public law could provide a remedy for 
individual donors to hold UK Biobank accountable to its public mission and protect 
their interests. In other words, the chapter investigates whether the power that UK 
Biobank exercises is ‘public’ so as to give rise to remedies in public law.1010  
The public law remedy is worth exploring because it offers a range of alternative 
potential methods for ‘controlling’ the exercise of power by a body, such as UK 
Biobank, that purports to operate in the public interest. Although it should be noted 
that, as alluded to in Chapter 1, public law proceedings may also be used to defend 
private interests, as in human rights proceedings for instance.  
Of the most notable powers of the Administrative Court, it can quash decisions, issue 
injunctions, and impose duties and standards of good administration on decision 
makers.1011 If UK Biobank is deemed to be a public body, this would place all of its 
formal policy decisions and day-to-day activity in the public realm.1012 As a result, 
an interested party could bring judicial review proceedings against one of its 
decisions or managerial acts. Indeed, at the heart of administrative law is the concept 
of accountability; which includes the notion that individuals affected by decisions 
should have the ability to call to account those responsible for those decisions to the 
rule of law.1013 However, to be susceptible to public law proceedings and the 
enhanced legal obligations required under administrative law, various procedural 
                                                          
1010 Theoretical questions around public power will be raised in the last section of this chapter; i.e. 
even if not found to be a public body exercising public functions, UK Biobank’s power is public and 
therefore ought to be subject to heightened duties of administration, as was the approach pre- O’Reilly 
case law: O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (1982)  
1011 Borrie G , ‘The Regulation of Public and Private Power’ [1989] Public Law 552. 
1012 Capps B, Campbell V and Meulen R, ‘Access to the UK Biobank Resource: Concepts of the 
Public Interest and the Public Good’ (Commissioned Report, UK Biobank 2008) < 
http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports> accessed 26 January 2016.  
Importantly, by bringing questions of human rights to the fore, arbitration by independent Judges in 
regard to both UKB’s policies and the Government’s demands will be initiated. This would mean that 
criticisms of UKB will be aired in public courts; exposing unjustified policies (on the part of UKB) 
and challenges (on the part of government authorities) at the highest level. 
1013 Gamble A and Thomas R, ‘The Changing Context of Governance: Implications for 
Administration and Justice’ In Alder M, Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 19 
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hurdles have to be overcome. Above all, UK Biobank must first be deemed a 
‘public’ body or a body that ‘functions’ as a public body. As a charitable company 
limited, it is not certain whether or not this is the case given the ‘private’ nature of 
this legal structure. Of necessity, therefore, this chapter analyses the detail of public 
law. 
Summary of arguments explored 
The first section of this chapter will analyse the arguments for and against UK 
Biobank’s characterisation as a public body. In both judicial review and human 
rights jurisprudence examples have arisen of ‘non-public’ bodies that challenge our 
understanding of the legal question; ‘what constitutes a public body’? Three 
analytical approaches to this question have underpinned judicial review and human 
rights jurisprudence. First, the landmark case R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 
ex p. Datafin Plc (Datafin hereafter)1014 prioritised the importance of the nature of a 
public function, over the source of a body’s power. The regulatory function of the 
body in question was determinative of its ‘publicness’. Later, this was modified by 
the ‘but-for’ test: ‘power will be public if exercised pursuant to the carrying out of a 
function in circumstances where, in the absence of a non-governmental body to 
perform the function, the government itself would almost invariably carry out the 
function.’1015  
In the context of human rights, two further approaches have emerged. The majority 
in the leading case of YL v Birmingham City Council adopted the ‘severability 
thesis’.1016 This distinguishes and separately considers public bodies’ ‘functions’ 
(s.6(3)(b) HRA) and ‘acts’ (s.6(5) HRA). In YL, the private company charged with 
providing the public service of housing provision was deemed not to function as a 
public body because the nature of the act in question (termination of a tenancy) was 
a private one. Alternatively, the ‘continuum thesis’ recognises the interrelatedness of 
functions and acts and this was the prevailing approach in the more recent case of 
                                                          
1014 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc. [1987] QB 815, [1987] WLR 699, 
[1987] 1 All ER 564 
1015 Campbell C, ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’ (2009) 68 Cambridge 
Law Journal, 92 
1016 YL v Birmingham City Council (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening) [2007] 
UKHL 27 [2008] 1 AC 95 [23] Lord Scott; [129] Lord Neuberger 
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Weaver v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2008].1017 Significantly, all three 
approaches can be found in the YL case; the continuum thesis underpins Lord 
Bingham’s leading dissenting judgment, and the prioritisation of a body’s public 
function was a moot point for Elias LJ.  
Thus, the question ‘what constitutes a public body’ is unresolved.1018 While there 
exists three differing jurisprudential models for how to understand this legal 
question, in this chapter the analysis and application of each will demonstrate that 
UK Biobank Ltd also does not fit neatly within this framework. Nevertheless, it is 
arguable that UK Biobank Ltd is a timely example of a quasi-public body that 
challenges the definitional boundaries of ‘public’ and ‘private’. If the reasoning of 
leading decisions in Datafin, YL and Weaver are applied, it is submitted that there are 
strong legal arguments to conclude that UK Biobank Ltd has a sufficiently public 
nature to be deemed a public body for the purpose of judicial review and the HRA. 
This conclusion is based on evidence from UK Biobank’s Ltd’s constitution, 
together with the significant public investment and Government involvement in UK 
Biobank, and crucially, UK Biobank’s public good mission.  
Therefore, once it has been established that UK Biobank could be a public body, Part 
2 of this chapter will proceed to analyse the potential grounds for challenge of UK 
Biobank Ltd’s discretion; first under judicial review and next, human rights.  
First, in English law, the role of the courts in judicial review is to test the legality, 
not the merits, of a public body’s decision. Under Part 54 of the Civil Procedure 
Rules, judicial review is a claim regarding a decision, action or failure to act in 
relation to the exercise of a public function.1019 Classically, judicial review is a 
remedy of last resort to be used when all other mechanisms for challenging an 
administrative decision have been exhausted.1020 As a residual remedy, judicial 
                                                          
1017 Weaver v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2008] EWHC 1377 (Admin), [2009] 1 All ER 17 
1018 Allison contends that ‘due to the lateness and limited extent of administrative centralisation in 
England, there does not exist in English law a ‘prevailing and well-developed theory of the state’ 
appreciative of the distinctness of the administration and its role.’ Allison JWFA, Continental 
Distinction in the Common Law  (revised edn, Oxford 2000), 72  
1019 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B 223, [1947] 2 All 
ER 680.  
1020 However, time limits for a judicial review claim are shorter (2-3 months) than for private law 
actions. This practical pressure may require a claimant to bring a judicial review claim first, and it 
may be unreasonable for the courts to deny this: Law Commission, Administrative Redress: Public 
Bodies and the Citizen (Law Com No 322, 2010), 2.19 
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review applicants have to overcome a number of arduous obstacles. In particular: 
claimants must seek the court’s permission for a hearing;1021 show the case is of a 
public law nature;1022 and demonstrate that they have an arguable case and 
standing.1023 Currently, the standing rules for judicial review are wide,1024 and the 
‘sufficient interest’ test1025 has been interpreted by the courts as including cases 
where it is in the public interest for an issue to be examined.1026  
The decisions and day-to-day running of UK Biobank may impact a number of 
different stakeholders, for example: donors, researchers, wider interest groups such 
as NGO’s, and the Ethics and Governance Committee. So, could an aggrieved 
researcher bring judicial review proceedings against a decision to refuse them access 
to the resource? Or, could an interested party challenge a decision to grant access to 
a private company with dubious commercial intentions? What if the biobank was 
forced to close, or was sold, perhaps for reasons of bankruptcy? Could a sale to a 
private company be reviewable? 
More recently, the Human Rights Act 1998 has imposed an additional ground of 
action in public law; making it unlawful for public bodies to act incompatibly with 
Convention rights.1027 While judicial review cases are concerned with the question of 
whether bodies are under duties of legality, fairness and rationality in their decision 
making, the HRA adds direct ‘vertical’1028 duties to act compatibly with Convention 
rights. Following analysis of the traditional administrative law grounds for review, 
this chapter will subsequently consider how far UK Biobank’s no feedback policy 
                                                          
1021 Civil Procedure Rules Part 54.4  
1022 Senior Courts Act 1981 s. 31; O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (1982) 
1023 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed & Small 
Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617, [1981] 2 WLR 722; R v Inspectorate of Pollution, Ex parte 
Greenpeace Ltd (No. 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329, [1994] Env LR 76 
1024 However, it is notable that the current Government is seeking ways to reduce the breadth of these 
rules: Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review: Proposals for further reform (White Paper, Cm 8703, 
2013). 
1025 The Senior Courts Act 1981 s. 31(1) requires that the court should not grant leave for an 
application for judicial review to be made unless the court ‘considers that the claimant has a sufficient 
interest in the matter to which the application relates’. This was interpreted widely in Greenpeace v 
Commission (Case T-585/93) [1995] ECR II-02205, which reinforced that an individual bringing an 
action does not need to be directly affected by the decision. 
1026 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Lord Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 
552  
1027 The Human Rights Act 1998 s. 6(1) states ‘It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right.’ 
1028 Oliver D, ‘The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the Human 
Rights Act’ [2000] PL 476, 8 
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could be challenged as incompatible with Convention rights such as Article 2 and the 
right to life, or Article 8 and the right to private and family life. For example, a 
challenge might be made by a donor who, after being diagnosed with a life 
threatening illness which could have been disclosed during the participation process, 
claims such non-disclosure is a breach of their human rights. Taken one step further, 
could Biobank’s no-feedback policy be reviewable in its entirety? This discussion 
will be informed by the growing body of literature which argues for disclosure of 
‘incidental’ findings on the grounds of human rights.1029 
Finally, this chapter will raise wider theoretical questions regarding the 
appropriateness of the ‘public’/‘private’ divide for the purpose of judicial review.  
Dawn Oliver’s scholarship on the potential ‘horizontal effect’ of administrative 
justice is applied to consider the reasons why, even if UK Biobank is not recognised 
as a public body, administrative law principles ought to be applicable to the 
management of the resource. As a closing remark, this section invites critical 
reflection on the relevance of the public/private distinction in the case of UK 
Biobank at all, given the reality of its incorporation as company and rhetoric of its 
public good mission. 
8.2 Is UK Biobank Ltd a Public Body? 
Bearing in mind the traditional definitional boundaries between public and private 
law that have been outlined in this thesis (Introduction), in order to fall subject to 
public law, UK Biobank must be proven to be sufficiently ‘public’ and acting in a 
public rather than private law capacity. However, as will be shown in this chapter, 
these boundaries are increasingly blurred and there are a number of arguments in the 
literature that consider how public values may be upheld in private law. Potentially, 
such arguments may suggest that this dichotomy may not be appropriate in the 
context of UK Biobank as a corporation with a public mission.  
In the abstract, there are a number of factors that may suggest that this is the case. 
Despite its lack of statutory footing, it can be argued that UK Biobank sets itself up 
as delivering a public good, only conducting research that is in the ‘public 
                                                          
1029 As discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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interest’.1030 It is recalled from Chapters 3 and 4 that the funders of the project were 
conscious of the importance of organising UK Biobank as a resource belonging 
primarily to the public domain; to inspire public confidence and maintain public 
trust. This was no doubt informed by the experience of the Icelandic database and 
controversies surrounding commercialisation in privately owned biobanks, and the 
impossibility of specific consent in long-term, large-scale population databases that 
are created without specific research purposes in mind.1031  
On the other hand, analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 has illustrated that the decision to 
incorporate UK Biobank Ltd as a private charitable company was also made to 
safeguard and justify the significant public and private financial investment in the 
project, as well as to emphasise Biobank’s independence from its funders (public and 
private) via its separate legal personality.  
However, UK Biobank collects samples and data from the public, stores both, and 
allows access by public and private bodies on the grounds of the public good.1032 
Whether and to what extent these factors prove UK Biobank to be ‘public’ will now 
be considered for the purpose of 1) public law and judicial review; and 2) human 
rights.  
8.2.1 The changing face of a ‘public body’  
Judicial review is only actionable against public bodies or, more broadly, bodies 
exercising public functions. Part 54.1(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules defines a 
claim for judicial review as a claim to review the lawfulness of: (i) an enactment or 
(ii) a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of a public function. 
Additionally, section 6(1) of the HRA states that it is unlawful for a public authority 
to act incompatibly with the Convention rights and section 6 (3)(b) includes within 
                                                          
1030 ‘UK Biobank will ensure that only those who are bona fide researchers working on health related 
research in the public interest get access to the valuable information and data.’ UK Biobank ‘UK 
Biobank in the news’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2012/04/uk-biobank-in-the-news-
2/> accessed 1 January 2015 
1031 As described in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
1032 Capps B, Campbell V and Meulen R, ‘Access to the UK Biobank Resource: Concepts of the 
Public Interest and the Public Good’ (Commissioned Report, UK Biobank 2008) < 
http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports> accessed 26 January 2016, 24: For the authors this is 
proof that UK Biobank certainly isn’t acting for private interests: ‘it is fairly certain that UK Biobank 
is not performing a private function.’ 
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its scope ‘any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.’1033 
In practice, these provisions have created ‘hybrid’ categories of partly private, partly 
public organisations, for reasons that will be explored herein. Beyond this, however, 
there is not yet a definitive legal test as to what constitutes a public body or public 
functions, and an incremental and contextual approach has pervaded. This drift of 
public law into the private arena has occurred because the focus of administrative 
law has shifted from controlling the institutions of government, to controlling the 
exercise of functions of governance, and now ‘[t]he boundaries of administrative law 
are set by a messy combination of functional and institutional markers.’1034 
Traditionally, administrative law was understood institutionally;1035 in terms of the 
organs and agencies of central and local government. So, administrative law was 
seen as being concerned with judicial control of government decision-making.1036 
Through the 1970’s and early 1980’s administrative law developed and formalised a 
‘new’ remedy in judicial review.1037 A clear divide was drawn between public and 
private law via Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1977. In effect, this 
meant that from this point, a public law claim had to be brought via judicial review. 
This was confirmed in s. 31 of the Senior Courts Act and emphasised in O’Reilly v 
Mackman,1038 in which Lord Denning M.R stated that an Order 53 application 
‘should be the normal recourse in all cases of public law where a private person is 
challenging the conduct of a public authority or a public body, or of anyone acting in 
the exercise of a public duty.’1039 Applicants could not originate their action under 
the general civil law procedure because that would allow them to avoid the 
procedural safeguards that are afforded to public authorities by the judicial review 
procedure (i.e. sufficient interest, time and permission).  
                                                          
1033 Although s. 6(5) states; ‘in relation to a particular act: a person is not a public authority by virtue 
only of s.6 (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private.’  
1034 Cane P, Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2004), 26 
1035  Ibid. 
1036 Ibid. 4-5 
1037 It is arguable whether judicial review existed before Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 
1977:  Williams D, ‘Administrative Law in England: The Emergence of a New Remedy’ (1986) 27 
Wm & Mary L Rev 715. 
1038 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (1982)  
1039 Ibid [256]  
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Shortly after this time of procedural change, a notably functional1040 approach was 
taken to the question of whose decisions ought to be reviewable in the GCHQ 
case.1041 This case ruled that the reviewability of decisions should depend not on the 
source of the power to make the decision, but instead on the substance or nature of 
that decision.1042 Therefore, decisions of central government were reviewable by the 
courts according to the principles of administrative law, regardless of whether the 
power to make the decision was given by statue or Royal Prerogative. R v. Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex p. Datafin Plc1043 followed this approach. The Panel was 
a body established by the Stock Exchange but the court held that decisions of the 
Panel were subject to judicial review, on the basis that the Panel was performing 
regulatory functions of public importance that significantly affected the interests of 
individuals, and because its activities were embedded in a framework of statutory 
regulation of the financial services industry. If the Panel had not existed it was likely 
that the government would have established a statutory body to do its work instead. 
Therefore, the Panel was a public body for the purpose of judicial review. 
8.2.2 Regulatory functions for judicial review  
Focussing on the regulatory functions of the Panel, the Court of Appeal held that this 
‘governmental’ private body’s decisions should be reviewable because it was 
engaged in ‘self-regulation’ of financial activities and the court was concerned with 
the ‘monopolistic regulation of an industry’.1044 In so doing, the court rejected the 
suggestion that judicial review was only available in respect of statutory or 
prerogative powers and extended protection to self-regulatory bodies exercising 
public discretion: 
Self-regulation is an emotive term. It is also ambiguous. An individual who 
voluntarily regulates his life… [is] practising self-regulation. But it can… [also] 
connote a system whereby a group of people… use their collective power to force 
                                                          
1040 Cane P, Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2004), 26 
1041 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ case) [1985] AC 374, 
[1984] 3 WLR 1174  
The case reached the House of Lords and then later was appealed to the Court of Appeal whose 
functions were changed by the ‘Bowman Review’: Jacob JM, ‘The Bowman Review of the Court of 
Appeal’ (1998) 61  MLR 390. 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc. [1987] QB 815, [1987] WLR 699, 
[1987] 1 All ER 564 
1044 Garton J, ‘The judicial review of the decisions of charity trustees’ (2006) 20 Trust Law 
International 160. 
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themselves and others to comply with a code of conduct of their own devising. This 
is not necessarily morally wrong or contrary to the public interest, unlawful or even 
undesirable. But it is very different.1045  
The Court noted the ‘abundance’ of ‘invisible’ legal support the Panel received and 
deemed the Panel to be performing a ‘public function’ that was therefore reviewable 
under Part 54.4 of the CPR: 
The panel is… performing its function without visible means of legal support. But 
the operative word is ‘visible’… invisible or indirect support there is in 
abundance… As an act of government it was decided that… there should be a 
central self-regulatory body which would be supported and sustained by a periphery 
of statutory powers.1046  
Potentially, UK Biobank’s Ethics and Governance Framework is evidence that UK 
Biobank is exercising the kind of self-regulation that the courts had in mind in 
Datafin. Although the Framework operates within UK Biobank’s multi-faceted 
regulatory environment, this thesis has illustrated that UK Biobank Ltd still has 
wide-ranging discretionary powers to manage the resource. The Framework was 
established by the funders of UK Biobank1047 (including the WT, the MRC and the 
DH) who were aware that the project raised a number of ethical concerns as a 
‘living’, self-regulatory governance tool; to ensure that safeguards are in place for 
scientifically and ethically approved research and to assist in the day-to-day 
management of UK Biobank by outlining Biobank’s relationship with i) participants; 
ii) researchers; and iii) society. The Framework was also a means of inspiring public 
trust in the governance of UK Biobank, by instilling confidence in Biobank 
participants that the resource made up of their samples would not be used in a 
manner contrary to their interests and consent.  
A common concern of the court in Datafin was preventing abuse of the wide 
discretionary powers that the Panel possessed:  
Is… this remarkable body… above the law… I do not doubt… that it is intended to 
and does operate in the public interest and the enormously wide discretion which it 
                                                          
1045 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc. [1987] QB 815, [1987] WLR 699, 
[1987] 1 All ER 564, [824] per Sir John Donaldson MR  
1046 Ibid. 
1047 UK Biobank ‘Ethics’ (UK Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ethics/> accessed 27 February 
2015 
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arrogates to itself is necessary if it is to function efficiently and effectively… in the 
public interest. But that said, what is to happen if the panel goes off the rails? 
Suppose, perish the thought that it were to use its powers in a way which was 
manifestly unfair. What then?1048 
In Datafin, the Counsel for the Panel submitted in response that the Panel would lose 
public support in the financial markets and would be unable to operate. Perhaps the 
same would be true of UK Biobank. Each participant possesses the right to withdraw 
at any time1049 and in the unfortunate event of controversy participants may act on 
this right to the detriment of the project. No doubt, the EGC could act upon its power 
to make such a breach public, causing reputational damage to the project.1050 
Furthermore, in Datafin, decisions of the Panel were subject to judicial review on the 
basis that their regulatory functions were of public importance and significantly 
affected the interests of individuals. ‘Publicness’ was further proven by its 
production of the Code on Takeovers and Mergers. The matters covered by the Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers were wide-ranging, and the public consequences of non-
compliance with the Code were serious for members of the Stock Exchange, a vital 
national resource, albeit one privately owned. The Panel was therefore deemed to be 
performing a public duty; acting in the public interest and not their own or their 
members’ interests when administering the Code.1051  
The same form of argument can be made for UK Biobank, whose EGF explains its 
commitment as ‘the steward of the resource, maintaining and building it for the 
public good in accordance with its purpose.’1052 Crucially, in order to be 
incorporated as a charitable company, the purpose of UK Biobank Ltd had to benefit 
the public. UK Biobank Ltd’s Memorandum of Association outlines its charitable 
purpose: to ‘advance the health and welfare of human beings, and promote 
                                                          
1048 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc. [1987] QB 815, [1987] WLR 699, 
[1987] 1 All ER 564, [824] per Sir John Donaldson MR 
1049 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
I.B.6 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016  
1050 Ibid. 
1051 Oliver D, ‘The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the Human 
Rights Act’ [2000] PL 476, 8. Generally, public bodies are regarded as being under duties to act only 
in the public interest, as they perceive it to be; ‘Above all, they are not regarded as having self-serving 
interests.’ 
1052 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
II. <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016 
‘Relationship with Research Users; A Stewardship of Data and Samples’.  
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knowledge and education,’1053 which falls under s.3(d) of the Charities Act 2011: 
‘the advancement of health or the saving of lives’. This limits the powers of the 
Board of Directors, who are ‘company directors under company law and charity 
trustees under UK charity law’1054 to ensure their discretion is exercised in 
accordance with UK Biobank’s public good mission.1055  
A separate but related question to the regulatory functions of a public body has 
subsequently emerged: ‘but – for’ the existence of the body in question, the functions 
would have to be performed by a governmental body. Thus, ‘but – for’ the existence 
of UK Biobank Ltd, would the government step in and fulfil the role of governing 
the UK Biobank resource? This was one of the arguments made in the subsequent 
case of R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan.1056 The 
appellant argued that if the Jockey Club or other private body did not perform its 
functions, then the government would be obliged to create a body to perform those 
functions.1057 The problems with this question are well documented, not least due to 
the lack of consensus on the normative question of what functions the government 
should perform.1058 Therefore, judge’s conclusions are often ‘ad hoc and 
unprincipled’; requiring judges to ‘rely on their own conceptions of the appropriate 
role of the government.’1059 Nonetheless, Beloff and Kerr argue ‘the but-for test, 
                                                          
1053 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk> accessed 22 February 2015 
1054 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
III.A <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016 
‘Management and Accountability Board of Directors’. Furthermore, UK Biobank Ltd’s 2011 Report 
and Financial Statements recognised that ‘...the Directors of the Charity are its Trustees for the 
purpose of charity law and throughout this report are collectively referred to as the Directors...’ UK 
Biobank Ltd, ‘Report and consolidated financial statements’ (UK Biobank, 30th Sept 2011), 4 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/UK-Biobank-Limited-Signed-2011-Report-and-
Financial-Statements.pdf> accessed 06 Jan 2016. 
1055 However, ‘Factors such as delegation from, or supervision by, a State body, public funding, the 
public interest in the relevant function or service being provided and the pursuit of the public interest 
as opposed to a pure commercial interest in profit are not in themselves likely to establish public 
authority status’; Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority under the 
Human Rights Act (ninth report) (2006–07, HL 77, HC 410), 16. Cited in Capps B, Campbell V and 
Meulen R, ‘Access to the UK Biobank Resource: Concepts of the Public Interest and the Public 
Good’ (Commissioned Report, UK Biobank 2008), 24 
<http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports> accessed 26 January 2016  
1056 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909 
1057 The appellant was successful in persuading the Court on this particular point, although ultimately 
the Appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the Jockey Club was not ‘in its origin, its history, its 
constitution or (least of all) its membership a public body’ per the Master of the Rolls; and ‘the 
remedies in private law available to the Aga Khan seem to me entirely adequate’ per Lord Hoffman 
1058 Campbell C, ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’ (2009) 68 Cambridge 
Law Journal, 93 
1059 Ibid. 
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properly understood, presupposes that no private body would be prepared to 
undertake the function in question.’1060 For Campbell: 
It is only by having regard to how the government would act in those circumstances 
that it can be ascertained whether a function – and power exercised pursuant to the 
function – is genuinely public.1061 
Applied to UK Biobank, across Europe many different regulatory approaches have 
been taken to the governance of large-scale population biobanks. This was the topic 
of discussion in Part 1 of this thesis. There is debate as to which approach is more or 
less effective, with many academics concluding that it is not possible to adopt a ‘one 
size fits all’ system.1062 In some instances, countries have found it necessary to 
establish publically owned biobanks via statutory legislation, such as Estonia and the 
Human Genes Research Act.1063 Arguably, a court could be influenced by the 
statutory alternative and conclude that government intervention is necessary in the 
absence of UK Biobank Ltd. This is especially conceivable because UK Biobank 
receives joint funding from a number of institutions that are classified as public 
bodies, including the Department of Health and the Medical Research Council. 
Accordingly, it has been argued that UK Biobank is carrying out a duty that the 
Department of Health or some other government institution would normally do.1064 
Given the public interest mission of the Biobank, it is arguably more difficult to 
consider the alternative model for UK Biobank; handing over to a commercial 
company. This is particularly so given the Icelandic database controversy and the 
                                                          
1060 Beloff M and Kerr T, ‘Why Aga Khan is Wrong’ (1996) 1 Judicial Review 30, 30-31 
1061 Campbell C, ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’ (2009) 68 Cambridge 
Law Journal, 95:  
‘Accordingly, it would be a mistake to hold, purportedly pursuant to the but-for test, that a function 
was not public, on the basis that the government would not invariably undertake the function, because 
of the preparedness of a private body other than the respondent to undertake the function. It can 
hardly be thought that the ‘adventitious availability’ of a non-governmental body willing to exercise a 
function would preclude that function being public, especially given that the whole point of the but-
for-test is to ascertain whether functions which are exercised by non-governmental bodies may be 
public.’  
Citing Beloff M and Kerr T, ‘Why Aga Khan is Wrong’ (1996) 1 Judicial Review 30, 31 
1062 As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis 
1063 Human Genes Research Act 2000 
1064 Furthermore, UK Biobank is situated within, and works closely with, UK Universities and the 
Research Ethics Committees that vet the individual projects prior to application to UK Biobank are 
also firmly within the public realm. Capps B, Campbell V and Meulen R, ‘Access to the UK Biobank 
Resource: Concepts of the Public Interest and the Public Good’ (Commissioned Report, UK Biobank 
2008) < http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports> accessed 26 January 2016. 
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concerns that deCODE’s private structure raised about the agenda of the functioning 
of the company.1065  
This international precedent could be evidence that UK Biobank is performing a 
regulatory function that is in the public interest, and that ‘but-for’ its existence the 
resource may have been managed governmentally. However, there are also important 
factors that might lead to the conclusion that UK Biobank Ltd is not judicially 
reviewable. In particular, it could be decided that there are adequate remedies 
available in private law and therefore, as a residual remedy, public law redress is not 
necessary. This was the conclusion that was reached in the Aga Khan case via breach 
of contract: 
The Club has an implied obligation under contract to conduct its disciplinary 
proceedings fairly. If it has not done so, Aga Khan can obtain a declaration that the 
decision was ineffective… and, if necessary, an injunction to restrain the Club from 
doing anything to implement it. No injustice is therefore likely to be caused in the 
present case by the denial of a public law remedy.1066  
As previously mentioned, UK Biobank Ltd’s discretionary powers are significantly 
limited by UK company and charity law, because the Board of Directors act as 
charity trustees and company directors. Charity law duties owed to the public are 
enforceable by the State via the Charity Commission, A-G and others as persons 
interested in charity proceedings.1067 The Board of Directors owe statutory and 
fiduciary duties to the company and the charity under charity and company law, and 
breach of these duties is regarded as a breach of trust, since the relationship between 
Directors (exercising all the rights of the Company) and the resource is one of 
fiduciaries over a jointly held resource managed for the public beneficiaries. Charity 
proceedings may be brought in relation to the administration of a trust for charitable 
purposes,1068 but litigants may not rely on charity proceedings to enforce a personal 
right1069 such as an action in tort1070 or for breach of contract or another other right at 
                                                          
1065 Winickoff DE, ‘Genome and Nation: Iceland’s Health Sector Database and its Legacy’ (2006) 1 
Innovations 80. 
1066 Lord Hoffman in Aga Khan 
1067 Ibid.  
1068 Charities Act 2011 s.115(8) 
1069 In Rooke v Dawson [1895] 1 CH 480: Here the trust deed provided for the award of a scholarship 
to the pupil achieving the best performance in an examination. The trustees declined to award the 
scholarship to the plaintiff, who had obtained the highest mark and who sought a declaration that he 
was entitled and an order directing the trustees to make him the award. Chitty J decided that, there 
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common law or equity.1071 Therefore, an action brought against a Board member 
(trustee) for breach of their fiduciary duty (perhaps a conflict of interest) during 
decision-making is likely to fall within the definition of charity proceedings.1072 
Additionally, the preceding chapter has demonstrated the potential for a negligence 
claim for failure to disclose incidental findings to a Biobank participant. If an 
individual has been aggrieved by a decision not to feedback and consequently 
suffered personal harm, it may be the case that the tort of negligence is a more 
appropriate means of compensating the individual with damages. In this situation, 
judicial review would only be a means of inviting the decision maker to retake their 
decision which, once the harm has been done to the claimant, may not be satisfactory 
or appropriate. On the other hand, if the claim was to review the policy in its 
entirety, then it is submitted that public law would be an excellent means of inviting 
UK Biobank to justify or review its policy; to be dealt with in more detail in the next 
section of this chapter.   
Therefore, depending on the nature of the claim in question, judicial review may not 
be the appropriate avenue for challenge. Charity and company law supervise the 
decisions made by the Board regarding access requests etc. and the tort law of 
negligence could be a means of challenging UK Biobank’s feedback policy if 
causation of harm could be proven. However, in other instances judicial review may 
offer the only realistic means of challenging the issue in question. In sum, it would 
be down to the court to decide whether a private law remedy is available and 
adequate for the purpose of the challenge.  
8.2.3 Summary 
Politically, Datafin was heard at a time of constitutional and institutional reform. 
The aim was to reduce direct government participation in social and economic life, 
and encourage ‘new public management.’ Accordingly, functions that had once been 
                                                                                                                                                                    
being no contract between the plaintiff and the trustees, the formers action was not to enforce a 
personal right, but rather to enforce the administration of the trusts of the charitable deed. As the 
Charity Commissioners certificate had not been obtained under the Charitable Trusts Act 1853, s.17, 
his Lordship held that the action could not proceed, as discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
1070 British Diabetic Association v Diabetic Society of Great Britain [1995] 4 All ER 812, [1996] FSR 
1. 
1071 In Rendall v Blair [1890] 45 ChD 139 [160], Fry LJ expressed the view that an action to enforce 
‘an individual equitable right, not relating to the administration of the trusts of the charity’ would be 
outside the Charitable Trusts Act 1853, s.17 
1072 Construction Industry Training Board v A-G [1973] Ch 173, [1972] 3 WLR 187. 
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the province of central and local government were now being performed by private, 
non-governmental entities;1073 changing ‘the shape of the state.’1074 This trend has 
continued to this day and has problematized the definitional boundaries of ‘public’ 
and ‘private’. Although the basic position is that the judicial process is confined to 
disputes in public law,1075 over time, the application of administrative law rules and 
principles1076 has expanded due to changes in ‘the way the state does its 
business.’1077  
Today, reforms on local government,1078 education,1079 healthcare1080 and public 
services1081 have continued under the Coalition government1082 and important 
questions of the scope of the courts’ powers to control the performance of functions 
by such entities persist.1083 This is especially reflected in the drafting of section 6 
(3)(b) of the HRA, which identifies and brings within the scope of the Act ‘hybrid’ 
                                                          
1073 Reform included privatisation of state-owned enterprise such as the gas and electricity industries, 
and assets such as council houses, promotion and increased regulation of industry self-regulation, for 
example in the financial services sector, and contracting out of the provision of public services such 
as waste collection etc.  
1074 Bamforth N, ‘Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution’ (2003) 8 Judicial Review 157: 
 ‘Since 1979, the United Kingdom has witnessed privatisation, regulation, deregulation, new public 
management, the creation of next steps agencies, contracting in the public sector, compulsory 
competition tendering in local government, public private partnerships, the citizen’s charter, and 
health service reorganisation (to name but a few of the most prevalent initiatives). The tangled 
interactions between public and private bodies involved in these mechanisms have been further 
complicated by the operation of divergent patterns of contracting-out and regulation at different 
constitutional layers. There are increasingly dense networks of accountability within which power is 
exercised, with state institutions being tied into relationships with the business sector and voluntary 
and consumer groups in many different ways.’  
1075 Forsyth C, ‘The Scope of Judicial Review: 'Public Duty' not 'Source of Power'’ [1987] PL 356 
1076 Public law values can be seen in the ‘Seven Principles of Public Life’ identified by Lord Nolan’s 
Committee on Standards in Public Life: Selflessness; integrity; objectivity; accountability; openness; 
honesty; leadership: Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘The 7 principles of public life’ (the 
‘Nolan principles’, Cabinet Office 1995) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-
public-life/the-7-principles-of-public-life—2> accessed 17 September 2014.   
1077 Feldman D, ‘Changes in Human Rights’ in Adler M (ed), Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 
2010), 109 
1078 Cabinet Office, ‘Building the Big Society’ (Cabinet Office 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78979/building-big-
society_0.pdf> accessed 26 January 2016.  
1079 The ‘Free Schools’ policy; cited in Carolan E, ‘The legitimacy of public service reform: 
democracy; accountability and experimentalism in the Big Society’ [2013] Public Law 240. 
1080 Health and Social Care Act 2012 
1081 Cabinet Office, Open Public Services (White Paper, Cm 8145, 2011).  
1082 Carolan E, ‘The legitimacy of public service reform: democracy; accountability and 
experimentalism in the Big Society’ [2013] Public Law 240, 1 
1083 For more detailed discussion see Gamble A and Thomas R, ‘The Changing Context of 
Governance: Implications for Administration and Justice’ In Alder M, Administrative Justice in 
Context (Hart 2010), 3-23 
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authorities i.e. authorities which exercise both public and private functions;1084 
thereby adopting a similarly functional approach.1085  
Consequently, a series of cases brought under the HRA on the implications of this 
provision have challenged the basic understanding that the judicial review process is 
confined to disputes in public law. As will be demonstrated, the definition of ‘public 
body’ is subtly different under the HRA than the judicial review definition outlined 
above. However, in the case of Weaver1086 Lord Justice Richards implied that in 
many cases the answer will be the same whether the case is brought under judicial 
review or the HRA: 
In so far as a function of [the body in this case] is a public function which makes it a 
public authority for the purpose of the Human Rights Act 1998, then it seems to me 
that it should equally be amenable to judicial review on conventional public law 
grounds in respect of its performance of that function. It would be strange if a 
function had a public character to engage the application of the 1998 Act yet 
insufficient to engage the court’s normal public law jurisdiction.1087 
8.3 Section 6 HRA: Public functions; Private acts 
Under HRA jurisprudence there are two types of public body; ‘core’ and hybrid 
‘functional’1088 public bodies. These were distinguished in Aston Cantlow PCC v. 
Wallbank1089 in which Lord Nicholls identified examples of specific authorities 
‘known’ to be public, including: the police, the army, government departments and 
local authorities.1090 Core public bodies are public for all purposes and would be 
                                                          
1084 Although there is academic debate that we have ‘witnessed an apparent reiteration of the divisions 
between public and private institutions at UK level due to the obligations imposed specifically on 
public authorities by the HRA 1998.’ Bamforth N, ‘Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution’ 
(2003) 8 Judicial Review 157. For discussion of the potential inconsistency between domestic law and 
the Convention, see: Bamforth N, ‘The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public 
Authorities and Private Bodies’ (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 159. 
1085 The then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, stated that in drafting s.6 of the HRA the Government 
decided that ‘the best approach would be by reference to the concept of a public function.’ HC Deb 17 
June 1998, vol 314, col 409; cited in Palmer E, ‘The Liability of ‘Functional Public Authorities’ for 
Breach of ECHR Rights: The House of Lords Endorses a Palpable Gap in Human Rights Protection’ 
(2008) 16 Med LR 141. 
1086 Weaver v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2008] EWHC 1377 (Admin) [2009] 1 All ER 17 
1087 Ibid. [64]  
1088 Mead D, ‘The Continuing Mystery of “Publicness” within Section 6 of the HRA’ (UK Const Law 
Assoc Blog, 17th October 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org > accessed 31 Jan 2016.  
1089 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 
37, [2004] 1 AC 546 (HL) Hereafter Aston Cantlow  
1090 Mead D, ‘The Continuing Mystery of “Publicness” within Section 6 of the HRA’ (UK Const Law 
Assoc Blog, 17th October 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org > accessed 31 Jan 2016. 
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considered public bodies in judicial review as well. Core public bodies must comply 
with Convention rights at all times, and do not have any Convention rights of their 
own.1091 This is because to be a rights-holder one must be a ‘victim’ under s. 7(1) 
HRA, which in turn requires one to be a ‘person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals’ under Article 34 ECHR (s. 7(7) HRA).  
Core public bodies contrast with hybrid authorities, which have both public and 
private sides and are defined in section 6 (3)(b) as:  
 b) Any person certain of whose functions are of a public nature. 
In Aston Cantlow, the wider reach of the Convention intended in section 6(3)(b) was 
integral to the decision that the Church was not a core but a hybrid public body. The 
consequential issue was whether this hybrid possessed, as well as fell subject to, 
Convention rights.1092 Lord Nicholls and Lord Hope emphasised that when 
considering whether bodies fall within the terms of section 6(3)(b), the approach 
should be more generous than when identifying ‘core’ public bodies: 
Giving a generously wide scope to the expression ‘public function’ in s 6(3)(b) will 
further the statutory aim of promoting the observance of human rights values 
without depriving the bodies in question of the ability themselves to rely on 
Convention rights when necessary.1093 
Certainly, earlier analysis in this chapter points to the conclusion that UK Biobank 
Ltd does not qualify as a ‘core’ public body. It is funded by public and private 
money, it is not created or controlled solely by government, and it is not definitive 
                                                          
1091 Recently, the question of whether hybrid public authorities can possess Convention rights was 
raised in Olympic Delivery Authority v Persons Unknown [2012] EWHC 1012 (Ch), [2012] EWCA 
1012 in which Arnold J ruled in the affirmative.  
1092This has been a matter of intense debate in academia as well as in the Court: Mead D, ‘The 
Continuing Mystery of “Publicness” within Section 6 of the HRA’ (UK Const Law Assoc Blog, 17th 
October 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org > accessed 31 Jan 2016; Williams D, ‘Administrative 
Law in England: The Emergence of a New Remedy’ (1986) 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 715.   
1093 At [11]. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has since argued that this wide 
interpretation is necessary to prevent the United Kingdom breaching its own obligations under the 
Convention: Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human 
Rights Act 2006–07, HL 77, HC 410). The extent to which the entrenchment of human rights into UK 
law diminishes the value in a public/private distinction will be commented on in the last section of 
this chapter. Four of the Law Lords in Aston Cantlow seemed to equate the notion of ‘public’ with 
‘governmental’ (at least in relation to core public authorities) on the basis that the United Kingdom is 
responsible in Strasbourg for acts of governmental organisations. See [7], [10] (per Lord Nicholls), 
[46–47], [59] (per Lord Hope), [87–90] (per Lord Hobhouse), [156], [166], [170] (per Lord Roger).  
See also discussion in Palmer E, Public functions and private services: A gap in human rights 
protection (2008) 6 Int J Constitutional Law 585. 
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that UK Biobank does not possess its own Convention Rights. In fact, according to 
the EGF UK Biobank Ltd as the legal owner of the database and sample collection 
has certain rights, including ‘the right to take legal action against unauthorised use or 
abuse of the database or samples’.1094 So, the more relevant legal question is whether 
UK Biobank Ltd is a ‘hybrid’ public body with both public and private facets.  
The problem that has emerged, however, is that the test for hybridity under section 
6(3)(b) ‘leaves[s] a great deal of open ground.’1095 For example, there is uncertainty 
regarding the relationship between section 6(3)(b) and section 6(5); questions of 
whether either provision carries more weight than the other;1096 and problems 
distinguishing between functions and acts.1097 Policy considerations have been used 
to justify contrasting approaches between judges, evidenced in bare majority 
decisions with powerful dissenting arguments and rendering it difficult to know how 
the courts will decide in the future.1098 Conceptually, two jurisprudential approaches 
have emerged and both are demonstrated in the judgments of the leading case of YL 
v. Birmingham City Council.1099 These are the professed ‘severability thesis’ and the 
‘continuum thesis’. These will now be critiqued and applied to evaluate how UK 
Biobank would be treated in court. Analysis will conclude that if either approach is 
followed, UK Biobank may fall subject to the heightened administrative and human 
rights obligations of a public body. 
                                                          
1094 UK Biobank, Ethics and Governance Framework (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) II.A 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/resources/> accessed 26 January 2016. Arguably, a parallel can be 
drawn with the recent case of Olympic Delivery Authority v Persons Unknown [2012] EWHC 1012 
(Ch), [2012] EWCA 1012  
1095 [36] per Lord Hope.  
1096 Mead D, ‘The Continuing Mystery of “Publicness” within Section 6 of the HRA’ (UK Const Law 
Assoc Blog, 17th October 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org > accessed 31 Jan 2016; Williams A, 
‘The Scope of Section 6 HRA Revisited’ UK Const. L. Blog (UK Const Law Assoc Blog, 28th 
October 2013) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/10/28/alexander-williams-the-scope-of-section-
6-hra-revisited/> accessed 06 Feb 2016; Mac Amhlaigh C, ‘Once More Unto the (Public/Private) 
Breach …:  s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Severability Thesis’ (UK Const Law Assoc 
Blog, 13th December 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/12/13/cormac-mac-amhlaigh-once-
more-unto-the-publicprivate-breach-s-6-of-the-human-rights-act-1998-and-the-severability-thesis/> 
accessed 31 Jan 2016. 
1097 See YL v Birmingham City Council (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening) 
[2007] UKHL 27 [2008] 1 AC 95 and R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission intervening) [2009] EWCA Civ 587 (CA), [2010] 1 WLR 363 for 
contrasting approaches 
1098 Ibid.  
1099 See YL v Birmingham City Council (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening) 
[2007] UKHL 27 [2008] 1 AC 95 
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8.3.1 The ‘severability thesis’: Public functions and private acts 
In YL the issue was whether a private company operating a care home for profit, 
Southern Cross Healthcare Ltd, was a hybrid public authority1100 and whether a 
decision to evict a tenant from the care home was a public or private act. Southern 
Cross provided accommodation and care to Mrs YL under arrangements made with 
Birmingham City Council; the Council had a statutory duty to provide these services. 
When threatened with eviction, Mrs YL brought proceedings on the basis of her right 
to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. She argued that 
Southern Cross would owe a duty directly to her if the company was exercising a 
public function, which required clarification of what the relevant ‘function’ was. 
With two Lords strongly dissenting,1101 their Lordships decided in a bare 3:2 
majority that Southern Cross was not performing ‘functions of a public nature’ for 
the purpose of section 6(3)(b) so that it was not a ‘public authority’ obliged to act 
compatibly with Convention rights. They held that providing care and 
accommodation was not inherently a public function and that in housing Mrs YL, 
Southern Cross was acting as a profit-making company governed by private not 
public law, rather than carrying out functions of a public nature.1102 Evicting the 
tenant was a private act and so Mrs YL could not assert her Convention rights 
against Southern Cross.1103  
To reach this conclusion, the majority followed the reasoning of earlier cases Poplar 
Housing1104 and Leonard Cheshire; also concerned with the question of whether a 
private act performed by a private body (the private care home’s enforcement of its 
                                                          
1100 It being accepted that it was not a core public authority. 
1101 Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale 
1102 See YL v Birmingham City Council (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening) 
[2007] UKHL 27 [2008] 1 AC 95 Lord Scott [31]; Lord Manse [116]; Lord Neuberger [130] 
1103 The Court considered itself bound by the earlier decision in R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire 
Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366, [2002] 2 All ER 936 (hereafter Leonard Cheshire) in which the 
Court of Appeal held that state-funded patients in a privately-operated care home could not sue the 
private care home under the HRA, because the provision of care was not a 'public function' under 
s.6(3)(b) HRA. The Court of Appeal concluded that a private body carrying out a public function on 
behalf of a public body would only be a 'public authority' under the HRA if it could be shown that the 
function itself has a 'public flavour'. Because accommodation in a care home was something that 
could be done by a private provider, it could not be said that the provision of care was necessarily a 
'public function' under s.6(3)(b) HRA, even though the local authority in Leonard Cheshire was under 
a statutory duty to provide care to its patients. 
1104 Teresa Donoghue v Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd (Respondent) 
& Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and The Regions (Interested Party) [2001] 
EWCA Civ 595, [2002] QB 48 hereafter ‘Poplar Housing’. 
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own contract with its residents) became a function of a public nature because the 
private body was assisting a public body in the discharge of the latter’s public 
functions.1105 The Court of Appeal in YL considered itself bound by Leonard 
Cheshire1106 and not Aston Cantlow because the latter, it justified, concerned a 
different matter of law; namely whether the Church Council had relinquished their 
ability to enforce their own Convention rights, as would be the case if it was 
considered a core public body. Appealing, the Secretary of State argued that in 
deciding that Southern Cross was not a public body the Divisional Court had 
wrongly decided on the basis of Leonard Cheshire; ignoring the generous reasoning 
of Aston Cantlow, which it felt had ‘superseded’ the restrictive Leonard Cheshire 
                                                          
1105 In Poplar Housing, the defendant had been housed by a local authority, Tower Hamlets, which 
sought to evict the defendant from her flat following a decision that she was ‘intentionally homeless’. 
It was then discovered that her home belonged to Poplar, a housing association that the local authority 
had set up and to which it had transferred much of its housing stock. Poplar sought an order to evict 
the defendant, and her defence was that Poplar was a functional public authority, and that it was a 
breach of her Article 8 rights under the Convention for Poplar to evict her. The Court of Appeal held 
that Poplar was a functional public authority because of its close relation with Tower Hamlets, which 
meant that its relation with the tenant was ‘enmeshed’ in the local authority’s discharge of its own 
public function. There was however no breach of Article 8 because the interests of other homeless 
people justified the system for obtaining possession of a flat rented to a particular person (Article 8(2) 
ECHR). Focus on the historic ties between the institutions was later criticised and undermined by the 
subsequent ‘functional’ approach adopted in R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] 
EWCA Civ 366, [2002] 2 All ER 936 
1106 In Leonard Cheshire the court found against the foundation performing a public function, but 
failed to provide detailed analysis of when a function would be public. Instead, it was suggested that 
if, in performing a function, a non-public body is ‘standing in the shoes’ of a public body, then the 
function may be public. However, guidance was not provided as to how this should be decided except 
that according to the Court of Appeal, there was no special characteristic of the relationship between 
the local authority and the charity that would suggest that it should be considered a hybrid public 
authority. Lord Woolf CJ emphasised that the Foundation’s functions were private, even though the 
local authority would have been regarded performing a public function had it delivered the services 
itself: [15]. 
For Williams ‘The resulting incongruity and arbitrariness is concerning. Vulnerable service users can 
plead their Convention rights against the service provider if the local authority decides to deliver the 
services in-house, but not if it decides- which is completely beyond the service user’s control – to 
contract them out’  
Williams D, ‘Administrative Law in England: The Emergence of a New Remedy’ (1986) 27 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 715, 765 
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approach.1107 The appeal was rejected on the grounds that the facts of Leonard 
Cheshire bound the Court in YL, not the distinguishable facts of Aston Cantlow.1108 
In so ruling, the Court of Appeal clearly focussed on the distinction between 
‘functions’ for the purpose of section 6(3)(b) and ‘acts’ for the purpose of section 
6(5).1109 This brought ‘the perplexing conceptual question of how ‘functions’ and 
‘acts’ differ to the fore.’1110 On this point Lord Neuberger reasoned: 
In my view, both as a matter of ordinary language and on a fair reading of [s. 6], 
there is a difference between ‘functions’, the word used in s. 6(3)(b) and ‘act[s]’, the 
word used in section 6(2) and (5) […].  The former has a more conceptual, and 
perhaps less specific, meaning than the latter.  A number of different acts can be 
involved in the performance of a single function.  So, if this appeal succeeds, a 
proprietor … would be performing a ‘function’, which, while ‘of a public nature’, 
would involve a multitude of acts, many of which would be private … a hybrid 
public authority is only bound by section 6(1) in relation to an act which is (a) is not 
private in nature and (b) is pursuant to or in connection with a function which is 
public in nature.1111 
The majority took a two-step approach leading to the conclusion that the act of 
terminating the tenancy and evicting the tenant was private because it was 
contractual in nature. In particular, Lord Scott argued that: 
The effect of [s.6 HRA] is that an act (or an omission) of a private person or 
company that is incompatible with a Convention right is not unlawful under the 
1998 Act… unless the person or company has at least some ‘functions of a public 
                                                          
1107 R (Johnson) v London Borough of Havering; R (YL) v Birmingham City Council (2007) EWCA 
Civ 26, [2007] 2 WLR 1097: ‘But it was strongly submitted to us, as it had been to the judges in the 
courts below, that a series of general observations in the Aston Cantlow case as to the proper approach 
to section 6(3)(b) of the 1998 Act, to which observations respectful attention must of course be given, 
showed that this court had not properly applied the law in the Leonard Cheshire Foundation case. 
Indeed, to quote Mr Sales's skeleton, that the approach of the House in the Aston Cantlow case was 
‘in stark contrast’ to the approach of this court in the Donoghue case [2002] QB 48 and the Leonard 
Cheshire Foundation case.’ (Buxton LJ, [41]).   
1108 Arguably, the continuum thesis underpinned the reasoning of the Aston Cantlow case; discussed 
in this Chapter.  
1109 See Lord Hobhouse in Aston Cantlow and Lords Scott and Neuberger in YL v Birmingham City 
Council (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening) [2007] UKHL 27 [2008] 1 AC 95. 
Williams argues that these later cases ‘saw something of a judicial awakening in this respect’ as 
compared with earlier institutional approaches demonstrated in Poplar: Williams D, ‘Administrative 
Law in England: The Emergence of a New Remedy’ (1986) 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 715. 
1110 Ibid.  
1111 At [129] 
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nature’; but even if that condition is satisfied the private person or company will not 
have any liability under the 1998 Act if the nature of the act complained of was 
private.1112 
Arguably, in so doing the Court of Appeal placed emphasis on section 6(5) as the 
‘centre’ of the hybridity test because even if functions of a public nature were found, 
an authority would be precluded from being subject to Convention rights if the 
nature of the particular act in question was private. This has, therefore, been argued 
to be an example in the judiciary of the ‘severability thesis’ described by academics 
such as Mac Amhlaigh: 
The two-stage test to determine the liabilities of ‘hybrid bodies’ is clear from this 
latter judicial endorsement of the severability thesis; firstly it must be ascertained 
whether the function being discharged was a ‘public’ one within the meaning of s. 
6(3)(b), and secondly, it must be determined that the impugned act which gave rise 
to the alleged human rights violation was not private.1113   
Following this two-step approach, even if UK Biobank was characterised as a hybrid 
public body, the act in question would still need to be proven to be public to be 
reviewable under s.6 HRA. Many of the challengeable acts might be ‘regulatory’ 
decisions and policies that may fall into the public bracket, for example the decision 
to have a no feedback policy (Chapter 7). Alternatively, other decisions might be 
argued to be of a contractual nature, for example between a researcher and UK 
Biobank regarding access to samples, and therefore ‘private’.  
8.3.2 The ‘continuum thesis’ 
The narrow approach of the severability thesis was ‘vigorously’ contested by the 
minority in YL who took a broader, functional approach focusing on section 6(3)(b) 
and the fundamental purposes of the HRA; to give effective protection to ECHR 
rights in the UK courts.1114 Lord Bingham argued that there could be no ‘single test 
                                                          
1112 At [23] 
1113 Mac Amhlaigh C, ‘Once More Unto the (Public/Private) Breach …:  s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 
1998 and the Severability Thesis’ (UK Const Law Assoc Blog, 13th December 2013) 
<http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/12/13/cormac-mac-amhlaigh-once-more-unto-the-publicprivate-
breach-s-6-of-the-human-rights-act-1998-and-the-severability-thesis/> accessed 31 Jan 2016. 
1114 As section 6 is a provision in a domestic statute whose meaning ‘is not to be found in the 
Convention but rather is ‘a measure intended to give effective domestic protection of Convention 
rights’ and so a generously wide approach ought to be given to the expression public function in 
section 6(3)(b).  Lord Bingham at [4]; Baroness Hale at [60] cited in Palmer E, ‘The Liability of 
 
 
249 
of uniform application to determine whether a function is of a public nature.’1115 He 
therefore concluded that ‘tempting though it may be’ to try and formulate a general 
test, ‘the draftsmen had been wise, to leave it to the courts to decide on the facts of 
particular cases where the dividing line should be drawn.’1116 Therefore, the courts 
should consider a range of factors, including whether or not the state has assumed 
responsibility for the performance of the task in question, and ‘the nature and extent 
of the public interest in the function in question’.1117 Accordingly, a function remains 
public where the state makes arrangements for the function to be performed by a 
private body, and this is the underpinning of the continuum thesis:1118 
[i]t is artificial and legalistic to draw a distinction between meeting those needs and 
the task of addressing and arranging them, when the state has assumed responsibility 
for seeing that both are done.1119 
Citing the factor-based approach of Lord Nicholls in Aston Cantlow, Lord Bingham 
and Baroness Hale also agreed that, ‘although not itself determinative’, the extent of 
the state’s involvement in the funding of a service is an important indicator that a 
private body is performing a public function.1120 The minority were evidently 
influenced by Lord Nicholls’ conclusion that while there could be ‘no single test of 
application’ in relation to the definition of a public function, the relevant factors for 
the claimants, at least, included the extent to which the body: was exercising 
statutory powers; was taking the place of central government or local authority in 
providing the function; or was providing a public service.1121  
It is perhaps surprising that the severability approach of the majority in YL was not 
directly followed in the subsequent and recent case of R (Weaver) v London & 
Quadrant Housing Trust (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening).1122 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Functional Public Authorities’ for Breach of ECHR Rights: The House of Lords Endorses a Palpable 
Gap in Human Rights Protection’ (2008) 16 Med LR 141.  
1115 YL v Birmingham City Council (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening) [2007] 
UKHL 27 [2008] 1 AC 95 [5].  
1116 Ibid.  
1117 Ibid. [7] So, the minority are using the nature of the act question as one question that must be 
answered alongside many others, with the others drawn in through the nature of the function clause. 
As a result, we come to much the same position as under JR.  
1118 Ibid. [65] 
1119 Ibid.[66] 
1120 Aston Cantlow Lord Bingham [11], Baroness Hale [69]. 
1121 Ibid. [12] 
1122 R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust (Equality and Human Rights Commission 
intervening) [2009] EWCA Civ 587 (CA), [2010] 1 WLR 363 
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In fact, there is evidence of both the severability thesis and the factor based 
‘continuum thesis’ that had underpinned the judgments of Lord Bingham and 
Baroness Hale.1123 This is further evidence of the difficulties that surround the legal 
question of what constitutes a public body. 
Weaver questioned the status of the London Quadrant Housing Trust (LQHT) under 
s. 6, who, in contrast to Poplar had not been created by government, but rather as a 
non-profit charity. Mrs Weaver had defaulted on a number of rent payments and 
after a number of failed payment programmes, LQHT enforced a mandatory ground 
for possession and eviction under the Housing Act 1988.1124 Mrs Weaver had no 
defence to LQHT’s possession claim but sought to challenge LQHT’s decision to 
take possession proceedings; arguing that LQHT was in breach of a legitimate 
expectation by failing to pursue ‘all reasonable alternatives’ before resorting to 
possession. She also contended that possession was a breach of her rights under 
Article 8 of the Convention. To be able to pursue this line of argument, Mrs Weaver 
had to first establish that LQHT was amenable to judicial review and that it was a 
‘public authority’ within the meaning of s. 6(3)(b) of the HRA.  
On judicial review amenability, the Divisional Court held that LQHT was a public 
authority: 
Insofar as a function of LQHT is a public function which makes it a public authority 
for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, then … it should equally be 
amenable to judicial review on conventional public law grounds in respect of its 
performance of that function.1125 
Therefore, LQHT was a public body for the purpose of judicial review, and a hybrid 
for the purpose of the HRA. When LQHT challenged this,1126 the Court of Appeal 
                                                          
1123 Williams A, ‘A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities under the Human Rights Act: 
Private Contractors, Rights-Stripping and “Chameleonic” Horizontal Effect’ (2011) 139 Public Law 
51 
1124 Schedule 2; Ground 8. In contrast to Ground 10 and 11 which are discretionary; meaning that the 
ground must not just be proven but the Court must also be satisfied that it is reasonable to make a 
possession order, the enforcement of which the Court can suspend or postpone. 
1125 R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust (Equality and Human Rights Commission 
intervening) [2009] EWCA Civ 587 (CA), [2010] 1 WLR 363 [64] (Richards LJ) 
1126 The Divisional Court rejected Mrs Weaver’s substantive grounds of challenge. It held that there 
had been no legitimate expectation and, even if there had been one, it had not been breached and that 
there was no infringement of her Convention rights. Mrs Weaver was subsequently evicted and from 
that point on was no longer involved in the case. However, LQHT decided to appeal the finding that it 
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decided 2-1 (Lord Justice Elias and Lord Justice Lawrence Collins in the majority 
with Lord Justice Rix dissenting) to dismiss the appeal, upholding the decision that 
the LQHT was a hybrid authority exercising functions of a public nature. Elias LJ 
delivering the leading judgment took a notably wide approach to the question of the 
relationship between HRA and JR and commented that although they were not the 
same, ‘in this case’ they were most likely to be determined in the same way, as the 
Divisional Court had done.1127 This contrasted the approach in YL and Aston 
Cantlow and the uncertain implications of the relationship between judicial review 
and human rights in the future have been noted.1128  
To decide whether LQHT was exercising a public function for the purpose of the 
Act, Elias LJ1129 in a conflicted judgment began by severing the assessment of public 
function and act, following YL. For Elias LJ, the focus of the Divisional Court on the 
nature of the function of housing management, rather than the nature of the act of 
terminating a tenancy, did not: ‘satisfactorily encapsulate the real issue in this case 
which is whether the termination of this tenancy was a private act within section 
6(5).’1130 
… [O]nce it is determined that the body concerned is a hybrid authority – in other 
words that it exercises functions at least some of which are of a public nature – the 
only relevant question is whether the act in question is a private act. Even if the 
particular act under consideration is connected in some way with the exercise of a 
public function, it may nonetheless be a private one. Not all acts concerned with 
carrying out a public function will be public acts. Conversely, it is also logically 
possible for an act not to be a private act notwithstanding that the function with 
                                                                                                                                                                    
was a public authority for the purposes of the termination of Mrs Weaver’s tenancy and the Divisional 
Court gave permission to appeal. 
1127 R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust (Equality and Human Rights Commission 
intervening) [2009] EWCA Civ 587 (CA), [2010] 1 WLR 363, [83] 
1128 Alderson I, ‘R (Weaver) v. London and Quadrant Housing Trust’ (2013) 16 The Charity Law & 
Practice Review 129.  
1129 Mead D, ‘The Continuing Mystery of “Publicness” within Section 6 of the HRA’ (UK Const Law 
Assoc Blog, 17th October 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org > accessed 31 Jan 2016; Williams A, 
‘The Scope of Section 6 HRA Revisited’  UK Const. L. Blog (UK Const Law Assoc Blog, 28th 
October 2013) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/10/28/alexander-williams-the-scope-of-section-
6-hra-revisited/> accessed 06th Feb 2016; Mac Amhlaigh C, ‘Once More Unto the (Public/Private) 
Breach …:  s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Severability Thesis’ (UK Const Law Assoc 
Blog, 13th December 2013) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/12/13/cormac-mac-amhlaigh-once-
more-unto-the-publicprivate-breach-s-6-of-the-human-rights-act-1998-and-the-severability-thesis/> 
accessed 31 Jan 2016. 
1130 At [6] 
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which it is most closely connected is a private function, although it is difficult to 
envisage such a case. Such situations are likely to be extremely rare.1131  
Following the severability thesis, the subsequent consideration would be whether the 
relevant act in question under s. 6 (5) was a ‘private’ act so as to negate the finding 
that LQHT’s functions were public for the purpose of s. 6(3)(b). However, at this 
point, Elias LJ retreated from the severable approach and, like Lord Justice Rix 
(dissenting), took a broader, ‘relational’1132 approach to the relationship between s. 
6(3)(b) and section 6(5): 
When considering how to characterise the nature of the act, it is in my view 
important to focus on the context in which the act occurs; the act cannot be 
considered in isolation simply asking whether it involves the exercise of a private 
law power or not.1133 
In my judgment, the act of termination is so bound up with the provision of social 
housing that once the latter is seen, in the context of this particular body, as the 
exercise of a public function, then acts which are necessarily involved in the 
regulation of the function must also be public acts. The grant of a tenancy and its 
subsequent termination are part and parcel of determining who should be allowed to 
take advantage of this public benefit. This is not an act which is purely incidental or 
supplementary to the principle function.1134 (Emphasis added) 
The majority therefore concluded that between YL and Aston Cantlow a ‘broad or 
generous’ ‘factor-based approach’1135 had emerged. Accordingly there was ‘no 
single test of universal application.’1136 Instead, ‘a number of factors may be 
relevant, but none is likely to be determinative on its own and the weight of different 
factors will vary from case to case.’1137 The factors derived from Aston Cantlow and 
YL that influenced the majority included: 
                                                          
1131 At [28]  
1132 Mac Amhlaigh C, ‘Once More Unto the (Public/Private) Breach …:  s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 
1998 and the Severability Thesis’ (UK Const Law Assoc Blog, 13th December 2013) 
<http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/12/13/cormac-mac-amhlaigh-once-more-unto-the-publicprivate-
breach-s-6-of-the-human-rights-act-1998-and-the-severability-thesis/> accessed 31 Jan 2016. 
1133 Weaver [66] Elias LJ 
1134 Ibid. [76] Elias LJ 
1135 Elias LJ in Weaver at [35] 
1136 per Lord Nicholls in Aston Cantlow at [12] 
1137 per Lord Bingham in YL at [5] 
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 where the body performs a governmental function, which would otherwise 
have been exercised by a central or local governmental body, or is acting on 
behalf of such a body for that purpose;1138  
 where the body is funded or subsidised by a governmental body out of public 
funds;1139 where the body provides a service to the public, or one which it is 
in the public interest to have provided;1140 
  if the decision is amenable to judicial review; and where a failure to exercise 
the function properly would give rise to a significant risk to Convention 
rights.1141  
Furthermore, the exercise of statutory powers ‘may be a factor supporting the 
conclusion that the body is exercising public functions’ and can ‘often be 
determinative’.1142 Providing a public service should not be confused with 
performing functions that are in the public interest or for the public benefit.1143 On 
the other hand, some factors will have little weight, and the fact that a function is one 
which is carried out by a public body does not mean that it is a public function when 
carried out by a potentially hybrid body.1144 Hence, ‘…it will often be of no real 
relevance that the functions are subject to detailed statutory regulation.’1145  
Applying these principles, Lord Justice Elias held that LQHT was a public authority 
because: LQHT had a ‘significant reliance on public finance’ through subsidy rather 
than a contractual arrangement in which it was paid for providing services of public 
benefit; when allocating housing, LQHT ‘operated in very close harmony’ with local 
authorities to assist them in meeting their statutory duties; providing subsidised 
housing (as opposed to proving housing generally) is a governmental function; 
                                                          
1138 per Lord Nicholls in Aston Cantlow at [10]  
1139 Ibid. [12]  
1140 Ibid.  
1141 per Lord Bingham in YL at [8]  
1142 per Elias LJ in Weaver [35], derived from the speeches of Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger in YL. 
This may be why LQHT conceded that it was a hybrid authority. 
1143 Elias LJ referred to Lord Mance’s observations in YL at [105]: ‘the self-interested endeavours of 
individuals usually works to the general benefit of society.’ 
1144 Elias LJ in Weaver at [36] 
1145 Ibid. Lord Neuberger observed in YL [134] that otherwise companies providing financial services 
and running restaurants, both of which are subject to detailed regulatory control, could be said to be 
public authorities. 
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LQHT is a charity and as such acts in the public interest rather than for profit; and 
LQHT is subject to detailed regulation. 1146 
In so ruling, despite endorsing principles from YL, Weaver went some way beyond 
the restrictive conclusions of this case and towards the broader analysis that had been 
prominent in Aston Cantlow. There has not been a subsequent case discussing 
Weaver’s impact and the Supreme Court has since re-refused leave to appeal 
Weaver. However, the Supreme Court have recently expressed in their revised Order 
on Appeal that this issue is clearly one for the Supreme Court to consider, and that 
they would fast track a more suitable case, indicating that the question is still 
contentious and unsettled.1147 
8.3.3 UK Biobank Ltd: Public functions for the purpose of s.6 HRA 
A number of factors have therefore emerged from YL and Weaver that help 
determine whether or not UK Biobank Ltd would be deemed public for the purpose 
of s.6. Most significantly, UK Biobank has received substantial public support: from 
government for its creation in the first instance, who saw UK Biobank as an 
opportunity for the UK Government to put the UK at the forefront of genomics 
research;1148 from public and private bodies which are part of UK Biobank’s 
constitution, namely the MRC and the WT as Members of UK Biobank Ltd as a 
charitable company; from the taxpayer who, in conjunction with the WT continues to 
fund the endeavour;1149 and finally from the public who participated in the project in 
good faith. 
In terms of funding, YL highlighted that public funding takes various forms1150 and 
Lord Neuberger argued: 
It seems to me much easier to invoke public funding to support the notion that a 
service is a function of ‘a public nature’ where the funding effectively subsidises, in 
                                                          
1146 Ibid. [68]-[71] 
1147 Arden Chambers, ‘eflash No.366 R (on the application of Weaver) v London and Quadrant’ 
(Arden Chambers, November 2009) <www.ardenchambers.com/uploads/File/pdf/eflash%20366.pdf> 
accessed 31 Jan 2016 
1148 As highlighted in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
1149 It has also had funding from the Welsh Assembly Government, the British Heart Foundation and 
Diabetes UK: <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/> accessed 1 September 2014  
1150 ‘The injection of capital or subsidy into an organisation in return for undertaking a non-
commercial role or activity of general public interest may be one thing; payment for services under a 
contractual arrangement with a company aiming to profit commercially thereby is potentially quite 
another.’ [Emphasis added] Lord Mance at [105]. 
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whole or in part, the cost of the service as a whole, rather than consisting of paying 
for the provision of that service  to a specific person. [Emphasis added] 1151 
To date, UK Biobank Ltd funding totals £93 million, with £25 million granted in 
2011 for the following 5 years.1152 The resource has not reached the stage where it is 
self-sufficient from money generated by access fees, although the intention is that 
this revenue will be put back into the resource to guarantee its longevity.1153 UK 
Biobank’s annual returns are available through the Charity Commission website and 
the most recent financial report (to 30th September 2014) shows that the WT and the 
MRC are providing equal levels of funding for the resource. There is also an 
agreement from January 2014 whereby UK Biobank has entered into a contract with 
both the MRC and the WT for funding of up to £58M over 8 years.1154  
In terms of power, in YL it was held that the reason for which powers have been 
conferred will go some way towards proving that an authority functions in a public 
manner: 
[The] existence of wide ranging and intrusive set of statutory powers …is a very 
powerful factor in favour of the function falling within section 6(3)(b).’1155  
UK Biobank Ltd has permission to grant access to the NHS medical records of all 
participants. Participants consent to donating their material to UK Biobank, who 
declares itself the ‘legal owner of the samples’.1156 Participants ‘relinquish all rights 
to these samples which I am donating to UK Biobank’1157 on the understanding that 
UK Biobank Ltd will only make access grants to bona fide researchers acting in the 
                                                          
1151 [165] 
1152 <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/> accessed 1 September 2014 
1153 UK Biobank ‘Can commercial research organisations use the Resource?’ (UK Biobank) 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/all-faqs/> accessed 1 September 2014. 
According to the Charities Commission webpage, UK Biobanks Annual Return for 2013 shows an 
income of £1,320 in ‘Trading to raise funds’:  
<http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/CharityWithPartB.aspx?Reg
isteredCharityNumber=1101332&SubsidiaryNumber=0> accessed 30 January 2016 
1154  UK Biobank Ltd, ‘Report and consolidated financial statements’ (UK Biobank, 30th Sept 2014) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/2014-UK-Biobank-Limited-Signed-2014-
Report-and-Financial-Statements.pdf> accessed 6 Jan 2016.  
1155 Lord Neuberger at [167]. 
1156 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
Section II A. ‘Stewardship of Data and Samples’ <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016.  
1157 UK Biobank, ‘Consent form: UK Biobank’ Version: 20061124: 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Consent_form.pdf?phpMyAdmin=trmKQlYdjjnQIgJ%2CfAzikMhEnx6> 
accessed 2 June 2014  
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public interest.1158 This power is also derived from UK Biobank Ltd’s incorporation 
as a charitable company, in pursuit of its charitable objects, as identified in Chapter 4 
and analysed in depth in Chapter 6. As we have seen, UK Biobank has also created 
its own self-governing instrument (the EGF). Arguably this significant power, 
although not statute-based, indicates that UK Biobank is exercising public functions 
for our purposes.  
If we accept that UK Biobank is exercising public functions under section 6(3)(b), 
the final hurdle is to prove that the nature of the act in question was public. The 
extent to which this is problematic depends, as we have seen, on whether the 
approach of the majority in YL or the minority in YL and the Weaver approach is 
followed. For example, UK Biobank policies could be considered by the court as 
inextricably bound with its purpose of providing a research resource for the benefit 
of society. This is not least in light of UK Biobank’s power to devise its own self-
governing instrument on the issue of incidental findings which is, as yet, unregulated 
in the UK. 
On the other hand this may not be true, for example, of a breach in the contractual 
MTA between a researcher and UK Biobank if the YL severability thesis is followed. 
As in YL, this would be the kind of private law scenario that concerns the exercise of 
private rights between a researcher and UK Biobank Ltd in its capacity as an 
incorporated charity company. The latter would therefore be more likely to be 
deemed a breach of contract and hence perhaps more readily characterised as a 
‘private act’ for the purpose of s.6(5).  
8.3.4 Summary  
Overall, the disagreement between the majority and the minority of the Court in YL 
demonstrates just how subjective the test for hybridity is. Indeed, it might be argued 
                                                          
1158 Not stated on the consent form, but the UK Biobank participant information leaflet states: ‘The 
purpose of UK Biobank is to set up a resource that can support a diverse range of research intended to 
improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness, and the promotion of health throughout 
society… UK Biobank is a not-for-profit charitable company set up to act as the legal owner and 
guardian of the database and sample collection. In signing the consent form, participants transfer all 
property and intellectual property rights in their samples and data to UK Biobank. The charity’s role 
is to protect this valuable resource so that scientists can do a wide range of health related research in 
the future.’ UK Biobank, ‘Participant Information Leaflet’ (UK Biobank April 2010), 10  
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Participant_information_leaflet.pdf?phpMyAdmin=trmKQlYdjjnQIgJ%2Cf
AzikMhEnx6> accessed 2 June 2014 
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that had a different judiciary been in bench, an entirely different outcome could have 
been reached. In particular, there is confusion as to whether the s.6(3)(b) test arrives 
at a different result under the HRA as to ordinary judicial review outlined above,1159 
and the severability or continuity of s.6(3)(b) and s.6(5) is yet to be resolved.   
But what does this mean for UK Biobank? Evidently, the vulnerability of UK 
Biobank to an HRA action depends not only on whether the charitable company is 
proven to be public, but also the nature of the challenge brought against UK Biobank 
and whether it relates to an act which encourages the court to separate the act from 
UK Biobank’s function, as was the case in YL, or whether the continuum thesis is 
followed such that Biobank’s functions and acts are relational. On this basis, this 
chapter will now briefly analyse a few hypothetical examples of public law challenge 
to which UK Biobank may be subject.  
8.4 Grounds for Judicial Review  
8.4.1 Procedural Impropriety, Legitimate Expectations and UK Biobank 
Ltd’s Access Decisions 
From the above analysis, it may be submitted that there is a plausible argument that 
UK Biobank is a hybrid public body for legal purposes. In this section, the analysis 
turns to the grounds on which a challenge could be brought against it.   
In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions V Minister for the Civil Service1160 
(GCHQ case) Lord Diplock set out a framework for understanding the grounds for 
judicial review, summarising them under the headings illegality, irrationality and 
procedural impropriety. This analysis section will consider the potential for 
challenge on the grounds of procedural impropriety (fairness), as it is submitted that 
this is a plausible ground for review of UK Biobank Ltd’s decisions. 
Within administrative law it is understood that good administration requires 
decisions to be made according to processes that appropriately require the decision-
maker to take into account all the relevant considerations before acting. Such 
processes are captured within the umbrella term procedural impropriety. Procedural 
impropriety is closely linked to other heads of review. For example, judicial review 
                                                          
1159 Aston Cantlow and YL cf. Weaver.  
1160 [1985] AC 374 
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can also be used for instances where a public body has disregarded a relevant 
consideration, or taken into account an irrelevant consideration when reaching its 
decision, but only it can be proven that if the relevant matter had been considered or 
the irrelevant one ignored, a different decision might have been made.1161 
As a ground for review, procedural impropriety includes a number of different 
procedural expectations. For instance: parties to a dispute must be given an 
opportunity to be heard;1162 there are rules against bias;1163 consultations must be 
conducted ‘properly;’1164 and adequate reasons for decisions must be provided1165 
which are proper, adequate and intelligible and enable the person affected to know 
why they have won or lost.1166 This branch of administrative law has expanded over 
the years. One result is that it is now possible to argue that when a body by its 
conduct creates a legitimate expectation that it will act in a particular way, it has an 
obligation to take that expectation into account in deciding what to do.1167 There is 
also scope for argument that a public functionary has a duty to give reasons once a 
decision has been made. For example, there could be a duty to give reasons where a 
body has, by words or conduct, generated a legitimate expectation that reasons will 
be given.1168 The principle of unfairness inherent in public law ‘implies not only that 
decisions must be reasoned but also that any reason given for a decision must be 
properly related to the purposes for which the power was given.’1169 In the absence 
                                                          
1161 Elliot M and Thomas R, Public Law OUP: 2011 
1162 R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex p Moore [1965] 1 QB 456  
1163 Magill v Porter [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357, per Lord Hope at [103]: ‘The question is 
whether the fair minded observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real 
possibility that the tribunal was biased.’ 
1164 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213 held that to be 
‘proper’, consultation must be undertaken at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage; it 
must include sufficient reasons for particular proposals to allow those consulted to give intelligent 
consideration and an intelligent response; adequate time must be given for this purpose; and the 
product of consultation must be consciously taken into account when the ultimate decision is taken.  
1165 A ‘duty’ to give reasons was considered in the case of R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Murray 
[1998] COD 134 which held against an express duty, but recognised that there was a trend in the 
courts towards an insistence on greater openness in the making of administrative decisions.  
1166 R v Brent London Borough Council ex p Baruwa [1997] HLR 915 
1167 Cane P, Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2004), 221 
1168 R v Civil Service Board ex p Cunningham [1991] 4 All ER 310  
1169 Cane P, Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2004), 205: British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of 
Technology [1971] AC 610, [1970] 3 All ER 165. 
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of such expectation, reasons may be required if the claimant’s interest in the decision 
is sufficiently ‘weighty.’1170  
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is perhaps the most significant development in 
this area of law. The doctrine addresses circumstances in which a decision maker 
may have operated a practice or made a promise that raised expectations that it 
would be unfair or unreasonable to dishonour. The question of whether a legitimate 
expectation has arisen depends on the interaction of a number of factors which may 
or may not be individually relevant depending on the context, including: whether the 
words or conduct which gave rise to the expectation were clear and unequivocal;1171 
whether the person who promised the benefit had the legal power to grant it (or 
whether he was acting ultra vires); and whether the recipient of the promise took 
action in reliance upon it to their detriment.1172 There are also related cases in which 
public authorities have been held to have acted unfairly in not following relevant 
past practices adopted by the authority.1173 In these cases it may be said that by 
consistently following a particular practice, the authority impliedly represents that 
the practice will be followed in the future.1174 However, the principle creates the risk 
of unduly constraining the freedom of public authorities either to change their 
policies or to tailor them to take account of the facts of individual cases.1175 For this 
reason courts are wary of reading promises or representations to individuals into 
general statements of policy.1176 
Considering such grounds with regard to UK Biobank, there may be a number of 
possible scenarios that could give rise to a legal action. For instance, it may be the 
case that in the future, once a higher volume of access requests have been granted, 
unsuccessful research applicants wish to challenge the decision of the Board and 
Committee on the grounds that they had a legitimate expectation that their request 
                                                          
1170 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Doody [1994] 1 AC 531; R v Corporation 
of the City of London, ex p Matson [1997] 1 WLR 765; R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Murray [1998] 
COD 134.  
1171 Association of British Civilian Internees – Far Eastern Region v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2003] EWCA Civ 473, [2003] QB 1397. 
1172 R v Department of Education and Employment, ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115. 
1173 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p Unilever Plc [1996] 68 TC 205; HTV v Price 
Commission [1976] ICR 170; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ 
case) [1985] AC 374 [1984] 3 WLR 1174. 
1174 Cane P, Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2004), 211. 
1175 Ibid.  
1176 E.g. Ministry of Defence, ex p. Walker [2000] 1 WLR 806, [2000] 5 LRC 49. 
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would be approved. To date, there have been 57 successful access grants.1177 UK 
Biobank’s Ethics and Governance Framework commits UK Biobank to explaining to 
participants and the public the policies and procedures for research access1178 as laid 
down in Biobank’s Access Procedures.1179 According to the UK Biobank Access 
Procedures,1180 access to the resource is subject to recommendation by the Principal 
Investigator and Co-ordinating Centre and ultimate approval by the UK Biobank 
Board of Directors and Access Sub-Committee. If an access request is denied it will 
be for the court to analyse whether similar projects had previously been successful, 
whether inadequate reasons were given as explanation for the decision, and whether 
the Committee and Board considered all relevant factors before making its decision. 
Could there have been a bias in the decision making process in light of the 
membership of the Board?  
What if UK Biobank grants a contentious access approval to a company with 
possible commercial intentions that are not necessarily in the public benefit, for 
example, a company with links to the tobacco industry?1181 It has been argued that 
participants who freely give their data to a biobank to further public interests do not 
truly consent if it turns out that the institution in question are essentially serving 
private or third party interests.1182 This is because their willingness to participate 
often entails a large degree of trust that the future of the biobank’s resources will 
remain as stated from the outset. Ethically, biobanks should respect the participants’ 
                                                          
1177 Listed on the UK Biobank website: UK Biobank, ‘Approved research’ (UK Biobank) 
<http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/approved-research-2/> accessed 2 September 2014 
1178 UK Biobank, Ltd. ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 
2007) II.B.2 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 
2016. 
1179 UK Biobank Ltd., Access Procedures: Application and review procedures for Access to the UK 
Biobank Resource Version 1.0 (UK Biobank 2011) <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Access-Procedures-2011.pdf> 14 January 2013 
1180 Ibid.   
1181 Although on the website UK Biobank reassures the public that this would be unlikely to be the 
case: ‘Previous research into the effects of smoking saves many millions of lives around the world 
every year. The UK Biobank Resource is well placed to provide more health information to tackle 
smoking-related diseases. Researchers using the Resource will have to show that they are bona fide 
health research scientists and that their work is for the public good. It is virtually impossible to see 
that an application by the tobacco industry to use the Resource would fulfil these requirements and be 
approved. Likewise applications by researchers funded by the tobacco industry (directly or indirectly) 
would be similarly unlikely to be approved. (In addition to the tobacco industry, there may be other 
sources of research applications not considered acceptable because their activities are not in the public 
interest.)’ UK Biobank ‘Will tobacco industry researchers be able to use the Resource?’ (UK 
Biobank) <http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/all-faqs/> accessed 4 September 2014 
1182 Capps B, Campbell V and Meulen R, ‘Access to the UK Biobank Resource: Concepts of the 
Public Interest and the Public Good’ (Commissioned Report, UK Biobank 2008) < 
http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports> accessed 26 January 2016. 
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consents to maintain trust in the project (Chapter 1). Legally, however, they should 
respect the terms of consent because a number of stakeholders have a legitimate 
expectation that such consent will be honoured.  
In UK Biobank’s case, participants, researchers, NGO’s, and the EGC may all have 
standing to initiate a challenge if they can prove ‘sufficient interest’. Participants 
broadly consented to future uses of their samples and information in confidence, on 
the understanding that access to their material would only be granted ‘to all bona fide 
researchers for all types of health related research that is in the public interest.’1183 
This is not to say that all ties with industry should be resisted to further the public 
interest. In fact, it is important to bear in mind that the social value of research (or 
public interest) may also include work with or by private actors.1184 Indeed, research 
has indicated a degree of tolerance for commercial involvement so long as there is 
also a commitment to benefit sharing and that the prospect of profit is not one of 
excessive or obscene profit.1185 However, it may be the case that access requests 
from private industry require a transparent and heightened justification as to why the 
research is in the public interest, which may not be so high for a not-for-profit 
publically funded researcher.  
Overall, it remains to be seen whether the Administrative Court would respond 
favourably to an accusation that a decision was not in the public interest, especially 
given the estimation of UK Biobank worldwide. Indeed, UK Biobank has strived to 
inspire confidence and trust in the project via consultations, transparency (via its 
website) and governance arrangements including the independent Ethics and 
Governance Council (EGC) and EGF.1186 For now, what is important is that if UK 
Biobank is proven to be a public body there may exist another layer of accountability 
of decision making and protecting participant interests which strengthens UK 
                                                          
1183 UK Biobank, Access Procedures: Application and review procedures for Access to the UK 
Biobank Resource Version 1.0 (UK Biobank 2011) <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Access-Procedures-2011.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2014.  
1184 Laurie G and others, ‘Managing Access to Biobanks: How Can We Reconcile Privacy and Public 
Interests in Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10 Medical Law International 315; Taylor MJ and Townend D, 
‘Issues in protecting Privacy in Medical Research Using Genetic Information and Biobanking: The 
Privileged Project’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 253. 
1185 Davidson S, McLean C, Treanor S and others, ‘Public Acceptability of Data Sharing Between the 
Public, Private and Third Sectors for Research Purposes’ (Scottish Government, DPPAS 14736, 
2013). 
1186 Capps B, Campbell V and Meulen R, ‘Access to the UK Biobank Resource: Concepts of the 
Public Interest and the Public Good’ (Commissioned Report, UK Biobank 2008) < 
http://egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports> accessed 26 January 2016 
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Biobank’s legitimacy, and goes some way to meeting its promise of being run for the 
public good.  
8.4.2 Human Rights and UK Biobank Ltd’s No-Feedback Policy  
Alternatively, could a participant contest a decision not to feedback a research 
finding which had serious implications for their health on the grounds that it 
breaches the Article 8 right to private and family life, or even the Article 2 right to 
life? Furthermore, could they (or a person with ‘sufficient interest’) challenge 
Biobank’s no feedback policy in its entirety, on the same grounds? Even if UK 
Biobank was characterised as a hybrid public body, and the act in question accepted 
as a public function and not a private act, this would still leave the fundamental 
question of whether or not failure to feedback results is a breach of human rights.  
The issue of incidental findings in the context of biobanking research is a matter of 
intense academic debate which, as yet, has not reached a legislative conclusion. 
There has also not been any jurisprudence directly on the matter (Chapter 7). It is 
therefore not within the scope of this chapter to contribute originally to this ongoing 
debate. However, an argument has been made1187 that there could be a positive 
obligation on UK Biobank to safeguard the lives of its participants (Article 2) and 
warn of potential health risks that are discovered in the course of research.1188 
Otherwise, a participant may claim that not knowing valuable information about 
their health and genetics is an infringement of their Article 8 right to private and 
family life.1189  
                                                          
1187 This argument is raised by Johnston and Kaye in Johnston C and Kaye J, ‘Does the UK Biobank 
have a Legal Obligation to Feedback Individual Findings to Participants?’ (2004) 12 Medical Law 
Review 239, 262. Article 2 ECHR states; ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected at law. No one 
shall be deprived of his life intentionally...’  
1188 The authors argue on the basis of Osman v UK (23452/94) [1999] 1 FLR 193, [2000] 29 EHRR 
245. In this case the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) considered the failure of the State to 
protect the lives of individuals from a threat. It was argued that the police had failed to act on 
information that could have averted the risk to an individual who was murdered. The ECtHR held that 
the State must take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. However, 
no breach of Article 2 was found because to establish this positive obligation it is necessary to show 
that the authority knew or ought to have known at the time of existence of a real or immediate risk to 
the life of an individual or individuals from the criminal acts of third parties and that they failed to 
take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected 
to avoid that risk. 
1189  Capps B ‘The Third Party Interest, Public Goods, and Third-Party Access to UK Biobank’ (2012) 
Public Health Ethics 2; Chico V, Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for 
Novel Negligence Claims Generated by Genetic Technology (Routledge, 2011).  
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In Venables v News Group Newspapers1190 a challenge under s. 6 HRA allowed the 
court to develop the common law to provide private sphere protection for Article 8 
privacy rights.1191 The conclusion reached in this case means that even if the Court 
did not characterise UK Biobank as a public body for the purpose of review, there 
may still be scope to challenge its decisions. Arguably, cases such as this have 
extended the scope of human rights protection beyond the public/private dichotomy 
potential ‘horizontal effect’1192 of public law in due course. This will inform opinion 
on whether, and on what grounds, UK Biobank ought to be held higher standard of 
accountability, regardless of its characterisation as public or private for legal 
purposes. As a concluding remark, it is posited that UK Biobank may be a timely 
example of a more modern concept of governance which potentially transcends the 
traditional public/private divide because of the nature of the interests it was created 
to further and protect.1193 
8.4.3 Summary  
Analysis so far has concluded that there is a strong argument that UK Biobank Ltd 
could be treated as a public body for the purpose of public and human rights law. If 
this were the case, UK Biobank participants could directly challenge UK Biobank 
Ltd decision making if they were granted the necessary legal standing. By extension, 
this legal analysis raises an additional theoretical question as to whether or not UK 
Biobank Ltd should be a public body for legal purposes. This question goes to the 
heart of an extensive body of literature debating the appropriateness of the 
public/private law divide in law, which will now be briefly discussed in the biobank 
context. It is submitted that this is as yet an unexplored research question and as such 
is a topic worthy of further future research.  
Discussion will now briefly consider this debate, which theorises the purposes of 
public law. Discussion will raise the possibility of following old common law 
standards to impose principles of good administration on UK Biobank even if it is a 
                                                          
1190 [2001] 1 All ER 908 
1191 See also Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457; Douglas 
and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No. 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 (CA). As will be 
discussed next in this Chapter, Oliver argues this is evidence of ‘indirect horizontal effect’ of 
administrative justice principles: Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice 
Principles’ in Alder M, Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 234. 
1192 Ibid. 229 
1193 As will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
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private body, exercising private functions, as a matter of public policy. This 
‘horizontal’ approach has pervaded human rights cases concerning the right to 
privacy (but not in cases of contracting out). There is also a line of precedent that 
suggests principles of good administration ought to be extended to private decision-
making. I will critically consider the arguments for and against the expansion of 
administrative law to cover public-private biobanks, and how far such legal 
development might be regarded to be for the public benefit.  
8.5 Biobanking beyond boundaries: Extending judicial review 
towards administrative justice  
A growing body of literature has raised a number of arguments as to the relationship 
between private law and public values and the extent to which division between 
public and private law in this way is desirable or appropriate. First, it has been 
argued that the leading case of O’Reilly introduced a procedural distinction between 
public and private cases that has since wrongly been interpreted substantively.1194 
Second, and relatedly, a line of case law pre O’Reilly shows the court imposing 
administrative duties on bodies exercising power and discretion despite their legal 
status.1195 Third, the Human Rights Act was specifically designed to ‘bring rights 
home’ and accordingly, a broad interpretation was intended by the drafters to catch 
hybrid bodies that exercise public functions.1196 Evidence such as this leads Oliver to 
the conclusion that there is no such thing as a public/private dichotomy,1197 and is the 
basis of Campbell’s argument that monopoly power ought to be accountable 
regardless of legal status.1198  
If these assertions are defensible, then it might be submitted that UK Biobank Ltd 
ought to be subject to public administrative duties because of the wide-reaching 
discretion it exercises, and the nature of the range of interests it serves to protect. 
                                                          
1194 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M, 
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010). 
1195 Ibid 
1196 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Bringing rights home for everyone: The problem (1998, HC 
Deb 314) 409-410; Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority Under the 
Human Rights Act (2003-4, HL 39, HC 382). 
1197 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 243 
1198 A body is exercising public power if it is the only body providing that ‘service’ so is the only way 
for a decision to be made: Campbell C, ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’ 
(2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal. 
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Consequently, private individuals (i.e. participants) would be able to challenge UK 
Biobank Ltd, thereby adding a further layer of accountability to UK Biobank’s legal 
model as a charitable company. This is a welcome conclusion: if UK Biobank is not 
in a private legal relationship with its participants, which is true if the nature of their 
consent is not contractual,1199 there is no pre-existing tortious relationship (Chapter 
7), and participants and the EGC are not empowered within the legal structure of UK 
Biobank Ltd (Chapter 6); arguably the governance model of UK Biobank is such that 
protecting participants is not, by itself, a quid pro quo of the public interest that UK 
Biobank Ltd was created to serve. Therefore, if public law could create a legal 
relationship between the participant and UK Biobank, this would strengthen the 
accountability of the public-private mixed model and facilitate forms of individual 
redress that would be available if UK Biobank Ltd was a statutory body. This 
relationship would also empower wider stakeholders of UK Biobank, such as the 
donors, members of the public and the EGC, thereby demonstrating the kind of 
‘good governance’ that is debated in the socio-legal biobanking literature (Chapters 
1, 4 and 5).   
8.5.1 Procedural and substantive distinctions between public and private 
and good administration 
These [bodies] control the destinies of thousands; they have quite as much 
power as the statutory bodies… They can make or mar a man by their 
decisions…1200 
Jurisprudential problems with the question ‘what constitutes a public body’ are 
demonstrative of the uncertainty that exists between the definitional boundaries of 
public and private in law. This question is embroiled in a much broader, theoretical 
and normative debate as to the role of the State in the exercise of public power.1201  
This thesis has critiqued the extent to which UK Biobank Ltd could be considered 
both a private and a public body in law, in light of the ‘publicness’ of its decision-
                                                          
1199 In fact samples are donated as a gift of which UK Biobank Ltd is the legal owner: as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 6.  
1200 Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175, [1971] 1 All ER 1148 [1154] 
1201 Although it is not within the scope of this thesis to analyse constitutional relationships with the 
State and the role of law in the regulation of this relationship, nor the theoretical relationship of UK 
Biobank with the State, but there is scope for significant novel research on this question and 
contribution to a developed body of literature including: Black J, ‘Constitutionalising Self-
Regulation’ (1996) 59 MLR 24.  
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making, and despite its incorporation as a charitable company. However, separating 
analysis in this way begs the question of whether a public/private divide should exist 
in law at all. This is the topic of a much wider academic debate which questions ‘… 
whether, when and how good administration standards of the kinds applied in 
judicial review can or should be applied to purely private-horizontal decision 
making.’1202 So, when a private body like UK Biobank Ltd has the power to make 
decisions that can adversely affect individuals and their interests, to what extent 
should this discretion be limited in law? Academic debate has highlighted three 
arguments that point to the conclusion that this should be the case, based on either: 
an extension of public duties to private bodies and vice versa;1203 abolishing the 
public/private divide in law altogether;1204 and the evolving role of the Human 
Rights Act in protecting public and private interests.1205  
Some commentators have argued for the extension of the scope of judicial review to 
include anybody performing a public function in providing public services. This 
‘public function test’ would be satisfied where bodies are set up to ‘achieve some 
collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the 
public or that section of the public as having the authority to do so.’1206 Justifications 
for judicial control would include the impact of decisions on the interests of 
individual citizen, and their significance for the interests of the public at large.1207 
Accordingly, such bodies would be under duties to observe standards of legality, 
reasonableness and procedural fairness in decision-making.1208  
                                                          
1202 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 237 
1203 For example see Craig P, ‘Contracting Out, The Human Rights Act And the Scope of Judicial 
Review (2002) 118 LQT 351; Palmer E, ‘Should Public Health be a Private Concern? Developing a 
Public Service Paradigm in English Law’ (2002) 22 OJLS 663; Woolf H, ‘Public Law- Private Law: 
Why the Divide?’ [1986] Public Law 57; Vincent-Jones P, ‘Citizen Redress in Public Contracting for 
Human Services’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 887, 901. 
1204 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 237; Oliver D, ‘Lord Denning and the Public/Private 
Divide’ (1999) 14 Denning Law Journal 79; Oliver D, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide 
(Butterworths 1999), 227 
1205 Oliver D, ‘Functions of a Public Nature under the Human Rights Act’ [2004] PL 329; cited in 
Vincent-Jones P, ‘Citizen Redress in Public Contracting for Human Services’ (2005) 68 Modern Law 
Review 887, 905. 
1206 DeSmith SA, Lord Woolf and Jowell J, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 1995),167 
1207 Palmer E, Public functions and private services: A gap in human rights protection (2008) 6 Int J 
Constitutional Law 585, Vincent-Jones P, ‘Citizen Redress in Public Contracting for Human 
Services’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 887, 902. 
1208 Ibid.  
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More broadly, arguments have been made to transcend the public/private divide as 
the basis for defining the application of judicial review and instead focus on of the 
power that such bodies can wield:  
… the role of judicial review is to regulate all forms of power; any exercise of  
power, public or private, by state or companies should be subject to principles of 
‘liberty, fair dealing and good administration’.1209 
This argument for ‘publicness’ based on power can be further subdivided into those 
focussing on the amount of power exercised by a body, compared to those that focus 
on the exercise of monopoly power and the extent of the bodies association with the 
state.1210 For example, Oliver (who advocates that there is no substantive 
public/private divide in administrative law) argues that instead of consideration as a 
branch of public law, administrative law should be perceived as a ‘technique for 
controlling exercises of power on both sides of the public/private divide:’1211  
My view, as I guess many may know, is that there is no public-private divide… I am 
saying that public and private law cannot be divided from one another in any 
categorical, significant or meaningful way and thus that an integrated approach to 
the substantive law of decision making is wise.1212 
As evidence, Oliver describes the ‘ample case law’ that exists ‘to lay the foundations 
for common law and equitable development … in certain situations and 
relationships’ on the principle of power. Oliver argues that there is a line of cases 
pre-dating O’Reilly v Mackman1213 in which the courts elaborated principles under 
which duties of good administration could be imposed on decision making in the 
private sphere. Indeed, before O’Reilly, Administrative law was not understood to be 
a sub-species of public law.1214 Subsequently, Oliver argues that ‘quite illogically’, 
                                                          
1209 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M, 
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 237. Citing: Borrie G, ‘The Regulation of Public and 
Private Power’ [1989] Public Law 552, 559. See also: Woolf H, ‘Public Law- Private Law: Why the 
Divide?’ [1986] Public Law 57; Oliver D, ‘Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?’ 
[1987] Public Law 543 
1210 Pannick D, ‘Who is Subject to Judicial Review and in Respect of What?’ [1992] PL 1; Cane P, 
‘Self-Regulation and Judicial Review (1987) 6 CJQ 324. Cited in Black J, ‘Constitutionalising Self-
Regulation’ (1996) 59 MLR 24 
1211 Oliver D, ‘Lord Denning and the Public/Private Divide’ (1999) 14 Denning Law Journal, 79 
1212 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 243  
1213 [1983] 2 AC 237 
1214 Oliver cites Lord Denning in Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175, [1971] 
1 All ER 1148 [1153]: ‘it may truly be said that we have developed a system of administrative law. 
 
 
268 
while the O’Reilly decision introduced the doctrine of procedural exclusivity,1215 this 
has since been understood to change ‘substantive public law’. This ruling has led to 
the differentiation of public and private on the basis of the procedures by which they 
might be protected rather than their substance.1216 It has followed that administrative 
law is part of public law, and so in principle only cases involving duties of fairness 
and rationality outside of contract should be brought by way of judicial review.1217 
This precedent has, in Oliver’s view: 
…[s]tifled healthy incremental common law development of substantive decision-
making principle, which was not limited to public law and did not entail a 
substantive as opposed to procedural and remedial public/private divide.1218  
Examples of pre-O’Reilly cases include Breen v Amalgamated Engineering 
Union,1219 where Lord Denning held that duties of fairness and rationality might 
apply to decisions of private tribunals, categorising them as administrative law 
duties. The reason for imposing such duties was that private exercises of power (in 
the context of Unions) needed to be controlled:1220  
Does all this apply to a domestic body? I think it does… All these delegate power to 
committees. These committees control the destinies of thousands; they have quite as 
much power as the statutory bodies of which I have been speaking. They can make 
or mar a man by their decisions… Often their rules are framed to give them 
discretion. They then claim that it is an unfettered discretion with which the courts 
have no right to interfere… They claim too much… their rules are said to be a 
contract between the members and the union. So be it. If they are a contract, there is 
an implied term that the discretion should be exercised fairly. But the rules are in 
reality more than a contract. They are a legislative code laid down by the council of 
the union to be obeyed by the members. This code should be subject to control by 
the courts just as much as the code laid down by Parliament itself. If the rules set up 
                                                                                                                                                                    
These developments have been most marked in the review of decisions of statutory bodies: but they 
apply also to domestic bodies.’ 
1215 Requiring public law cases to be brought under the Civil Procedure Rules, Part 54 
1216 Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v Maclaine Watson and Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyds Rep 570 [625]. 
1217 Oliver D, ‘Lord Denning and the Public/Private Divide’ (1999) 14 Denning Law Journal, 79 
1218 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 239 
1219 [1971] 1 All ER 1148 
1220 Oliver D, ‘Lord Denning and the Public/Private Divide’ (1999) 14 Denning Law Journal, 72 
Therefore, Oliver is one of the academics who frames the public/private divide according to the power 
that an authority exercises- not the amount of power, but the relationship or association between the 
state and the authority (in particular, whether or not the body exercises monopoly power) 
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a domestic body and give it discretion, it is to be implied that body must exercise its 
discretion fairly.1221  
Therefore, in this case, and in others around this time,1222 duties of good 
administration were imposed on the basis of wider grounds of public policy. This 
was because private legislators are under a duty, as exercisers of power, to exercise 
their discretion with due regard for the impact of their decisions on those affected by 
them.1223 Arguably, this approach has founded the more recent common law 
developments in relation to sporting bodies. In particular, the Jockey Club cases1224 
can be used to support the argument that the jurisdiction of the court to grant 
declaratory relief does not depend on the existence of a contract, but rather on the 
impact of the decision on those affected.1225 
For example, Richards J in Bradley stated:  
[37] That brings me to the nature of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over such a 
decision. The most important point, it seems to me, is that it is supervisory. The 
function of the court is not to take the primary decision but to ensure that the 
primary decision-maker has operated within lawful limits. It is a review function, 
very similar to that of the court on judicial review.  Indeed, given the difficulties that 
sometimes arise in drawing the precise boundary between the two, I would consider 
it surprising and unsatisfactory if a private law claim in relation to the decision of a 
domestic body required the court to adopt a materially different approach from a 
judicial review claim in relation to the decision of a public body. In each case the 
essential concern should be with the lawfulness of the decision taken: whether the 
procedure was fair, whether there was any error of law, whether any exercise of 
judgment or discretion fell within the limits open to the decision maker and so 
forth…  
                                                          
1221 Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175, [1971] 1 All ER 1148 [1154] 
1222 Nagel v Feilden [1966] 1 All ER 689. In this case, the plaintiff’s case was pleased on the basis 
that the practice of the defendants was ‘in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy.’ Lord 
Denning did not use the phrase ‘restraint of trade’ and instead dealt with the case on public policy 
grounds stating: ‘a man’s right to work at his trade or profession is just as important to him as, 
perhaps more important than, his right to property. Just as the courts will intervene to protect his 
rights of property, so they will also intervene to protect his right to work.’ [694]  
1223 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 239; Oliver D, ‘Lord Denning and the Public/Private 
Divide’ (1999) 14 Denning Law Journal, 77 
1224 Bradley v Jockey Club [2005] EWCA Civ 1056, [2006] ISLR SLR-1; R (Mullins) v Jockey Club 
[2006] EWHC 986 (QB), [2006] ACD 2 
1225 Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 239 
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On this basis, it has been argued that duties of fairness and rationality may be non-
contractual and imposed, for instance, in equity or as a matter of public policy.1226  
Furthermore, Campbell uses the case of Datafin1227 as evidence that the exercise of 
monopoly power ought to constitute proof of ‘publicness’ to warrant judicial review, 
in spite of the public/private status of the body in question. In Datafin, the Panel on 
Take-overs and Mergers was the sole body responsible for the regulation of mergers 
and acquisitions in the City: 
…One possibility would be to regard as public, power that is exercised by a person 
or body in the carrying out of a particular function, where only that person or body 
performs that function. In these circumstances, someone who might be adversely 
affected by the exercise of power in the carrying out of the function in question 
would be unable to choose to deal with an alternative decision – maker.1228  
Rather than justifying review on the grounds of the source of the power, Campbell 
contends that the monopoly power such bodies are given to ‘grant permission to a 
person to engage in an activity… in the absence of such permission would be illegal’ 
could be just reason for review. For Campbell, this test is consistent with results of 
the courts ‘in the bulk of past judicial review cases,’ where applicants for review 
submitted ‘that the power sought to be impugned is public because of its nature.’1229 
Therefore, it is argued that the adoption of the monopoly test would not significantly 
disrupt existing precedent.  
Conversely, arguments have been made against the extension of judicial review, 
including, briefly: the pragmatic ‘flood-gates argument’;1230 the technical 
jurisdictional argument concerned with ensuring that only appropriate cases are 
brought under Part 54 CPR;1231 and the conceptual argument of the strain on the 
coherence of the principles of judicial review if they are extended and the desire to 
                                                          
1226 Ibid. 243 
1227 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc. [1987] QB 815, [1987] WLR 699, 
[1987] 1 All ER 564 
1228 Campbell C, ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’ (2009) 68 Cambridge 
Law Journal, 116. 
1229 Ibid. 
1230 Which is the pressure of an increased case load: Black J, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ 
(1996) 59 MLR 24, 31 
1231 Ibid. 
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protect the body’s autonomy from court or state interference.1232 Other weaknesses 
have been raised by Vincent-Jones such as the need for legislation if such reform is 
considered to be beyond judicial interpretation and development.1233  
8.5.2 Human Rights 
In addition to the debate for the extension of public law to private bodies and the 
abolition of this distinction in law, there have also been arguments to the effect that 
human rights are now so entrenched in UK law that this has rendered the 
public/private divide meaningless. This argument is based on the substantive values 
promoted by the Human Rights Act, rather than procedural norms: ‘with the content 
and effect of decisions as well as the process of decision making, and ultimately with 
justifiability and proportionality rather than reasonableness.’1234 For example, the 
Human Rights Act specifically provides for hybrids via section 6 (3)(b), to capture 
‘private’ bodies exercising ‘public functions’ (Chapter 8.3). Indeed, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights has suggested that the intention was for this provision 
to be widely construed, so as to ‘bring rights home’.1235 This is in contrast to the 
narrow interpretation of the judiciary, which has been highlighted in this chapter.  
That said, in some cases such as Venables and Campbell1236 the courts have 
considered themselves able to extend the scope of the Act to develop private rights to 
privacy.1237 So, while Convention rights do not have direct horizontal effect, the 
courts may develop the common law in such a way that individual’s rights will be 
                                                          
1232 Arthurs H, ‘Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business’ (1970) 17 OHLJ 1. Cited 
in Ibid. 
1233 Vincent-Jones P, ‘Citizen Redress in Public Contracting for Human Services’ (2005) 68 Modern 
Law Review 887, 901. Vincent- Jones notes that there is disagreement amongst public lawyers as to 
how far the governance issue raised by contractualisation amount to a crisis in administrative law:  
‘One argument is that the ‘court-centered focus’ of the common law has vested too much importance 
in the position of the judiciary within the structure of governance. The increasingly ineffectual role of 
the courts is regarded here as a reflection of the failure of the legal order to respond to new challenges 
of social complexity, resulting in the displacing of law as an active regulatory mechanism over great 
areas of public life.’ Citing Loughlin M, ‘Courts and Governance’ in Birks P (ed) The Frontiers of 
Liability (OUP 1994).  
1234 Elliott MC, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart 2001). Cited in Vincent-
Jones P, ‘Citizen Redress in Public Contracting for Human Services’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 
887, 904. 
1235 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority Under the Human Rights 
Act (2003-4, HL 39, HC 382). 
1236 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 
1237 For Oliver, this was because broader ‘polycentric’ issues of contracting out were not raised: 
Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M, 
Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 244 
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protected.1238 In these cases, the principle of proportionality1239 meant that the rights 
and interests of the parties were weighed and a decision for the individual was 
reached.1240 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the Human Rights Act in fact reinforces 
the public/private divide. This is in light of the severability of section 6(3)(b) and 
section 6(5) between public functions and private acts,1241 as evidenced in the 
approach of the majority in the leading case of YL (which has been analysed in depth 
in this chapter). 
8.5.3 UK Biobank Ltd 
So, what does this mean for UK Biobank Ltd? In practice, perhaps very little; the 
implications would depend on a judicial review claim being brought against UK 
Biobank and the courts once again wrestling with a decision on the ‘publicness’ of 
this body corporate.  
As Chapter 6 of this thesis has demonstrated, it cannot certainly be said that the 
current Board of Directors and Members of the company are accountable to the 
public when performing all of their constitutional and legal duties under ‘private’ 
charity and company law,1242 which casts doubt on the robustness of the chosen 
model for its public good purpose. If the ‘public’ nature of UK Biobank Ltd’s power 
was called into question, the proposed ‘public function test’ may well justify judicial 
control in light of the impact of UK Biobank Ltd decision making on the interests of 
participants, as well as the promised significance of UK Biobank for the benefit of 
the public. Alternatively, the common law approach illustrated above and advocated 
by Oliver might be used as evidence that this question ought to be decided on the 
basis of the court’s substantive duty to control the abuse of power. If this was the 
                                                          
1238 Ibid. 
1239 Previously, in the case of Daly v Sec of State for the Home Office [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 
532 the courts articulated a series of questions to ascertain proportionate and lawful infringements 
including: ‘is the measure adopted sensibly directed at the aim? Could aims be achieved in a less 
restrictive way?’  
1240 However, Oliver cautions that extending Human Rights protection in this way is not as 
straightforward as extending principles of good administration, since it allows the courts to ‘substitute 
their own views for those of private decision makers.’  Oliver D, ‘Towards Horizontal Effect of 
Administrative Justice Principles’ in Alder M,  Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 2010), 246 
1241 Hunt M, ‘The “horizontal effect” of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] PL 423. 
1242 Although it is noted that this is not the case for all duties which are accountable to the Charity 
Commission, for example the alteration of UK Biobank Ltd’s constitutional documents: see Chapter 
4.  
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case, then UK Biobank Ltd’s considerable discretion over the sensitive personal 
information stored in the resource, combined with the far-reaching implications of its 
misuse, may be convincing evidence for scrutiny. On the other hand, endorsing 
Campbell’s argument would require UK Biobank Ltd to be the sole controller of UK 
Biobank’s activities which, given the role of the Charity Commission and the 
potential for EGC legal standing to oversee certain activities, as discussed in Chapter 
6, might be difficult to sustain.  
Or, if the claim referred to a breach of a Convention right, for example privacy, then 
the courts might not necessarily be restricted by considerations of public function 
under section 6. Instead, in light of Campbell and Venables, perhaps the more 
pressing challenge for the court would be balancing the rights of the individual 
against the benefits of biobank research for society. Given the popularity of UK 
Biobank and success to date, in this instance the scales may well tip in UK 
Biobank’s favour. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered, on the basis of public law and human rights 
jurisprudence, the extent to which UK Biobank might be considered a public body 
for the purpose of protecting donors and holding UK Biobank to account. An 
important conclusion of this chapter is that there are strong legal arguments to be 
made, backed by good precedent, that UK Biobank Ltd could be characterised as a 
public body and therefore is vulnerable to judicial review challenge. Analysis has 
highlighted precedent that could be used as evidence that UK Biobank Ltd is a 
‘hybrid’ public body performing functions of a public nature for the purpose of Part 
54.4 CPR and s.6 HRA 1998. Such a challenge could either be on made on the 
grounds of traditional administrative principles or breach of Convention rights. It is 
conceivable that an aggrieved researcher with a legitimate expectation of access to 
the resource might challenge an unsuccessful application. In light of current 
academic debate and the uncertain, unregulated environment surrounding feedback 
of incidental findings, an interested individual may claim that UK Biobank’s no 
feedback policy is inconsistent with their Article 8 right to private and family life, or 
indeed, their Article 2 right to life.  
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Public law analysis potentially adds another dimension of accountability to UK 
Biobank’s multi-faceted legal framework, which may go some way to legitimising 
UK Biobank’s significant discretion and non-statutory footing. In the absence of a 
pre-existing private relationship between UK Biobank and its participants, judicial 
review is therefore a potential means by which a private individual may seek to 
challenge exercises of UK Biobank Ltd’s power that may have adversely affected 
them. However, the limits of the judicial review remedy are notable. The scope of 
judicial review raises questions as to who could prove legal standing to bring an 
action against UK Biobank, and on what grounds. Furthermore, as a reactive process, 
the judicial review remedy would be reliant on a case actually being brought against 
UK Biobank in the future, and this remains to be seen.  
Furthermore this conclusion has, somewhat inevitably, begged the question of 
whether Biobank should be a public body and consequently opened the door to the 
wider theoretical debate of the appropriateness of the traditional public/private divide 
today. In conjunction with Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis (regarding the theoretical 
and legal basis of UK Biobank as a corporation), this chapter shows how UK 
Biobank could be seen to be a ‘private’ corporation protecting ‘public’ values which 
may well require the application of stricter public responsibilities to UK Biobank’s 
discretion. This chapter highlights the potential for UK Biobank to be analysed as a 
timely example of such a corporation, which would contribute to an existing debate 
regarding the role of corporations as ‘social institutions.’1243 Furthermore, emerging 
tensions between ‘private’ law and ‘public’ values (as defined herein) have inspired 
a growing debate as to the relationship between public and private law, and whether 
a divide between the two is necessary and/or desirable. As such, UK Biobank could 
be used as a lens to normatively re-examine the relationship between public and 
private, to illuminate the deficiencies of such a distinction.1244   
                                                          
1243 Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise’ (2006) 33 International Journal of 
Social Economics 376. 
1244 Barker K, ‘Private law: Key encounters with public law’ in Barker K and Jensen D, Private Law: 
Key Encounters with Public Law (CUP 2013), 3 
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Thesis summary and key findings 
UK Biobank Ltd has been established as a charitable company limited by guarantee 
to manage the operation of UK Biobank; one of the world’s most comprehensive 
population biobanks. The establishment of UK Biobank was driven by the UK 
government and the Wellcome Trust following heavy involvement in the success of 
the Human Genome Project in the late 1990’s, and in response to pressure from the 
scientific community for a large-scale epidemiological resource to combine patient 
medical information with human tissue samples and investigate the linkages between 
lifestyle, genes and environment. Around the same time (late 1990’s) the NHS was 
undergoing considerable reform and early forecasts suggested the development of 
the electronic health record, as well as governmental investment in new genetics 
research partnerships between the NHS and industry. This infrastructure and 
investment meant that the UK was in a unique position to be able to fund and 
facilitate a world-leading resource comprised of 500,000 participants’ human tissue 
and medical records.  
The host of associated ethical challenges that are raised by population biobanks have 
attracted worldwide academic attention and have been intensely debated in socio-
legal scholarship. Early lessons for population biobanking were learnt from the 
Icelandic National Health Database; whose controversial opt-out approach to 
participant consent and exclusive licensing to the private company deCODE 
Genetics, put consent and commercialisation at the top of the list of ethical 
challenges. In so doing, a central concern of population biobanking was exemplified: 
how to uphold the interests of individual donors in the use of their biological 
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materials and health records while at the same time furthering the public’s interest in 
maximising research use of the biobank resource. The crucial challenge is therefore 
to manage these diverse interests in a way that is consistent with donor expectations 
and the purpose of the biobank to inspire and maintain trust to ensure long-term 
biobank sustainability. As we have seen, there is no one way of doing this and a 
range of approaches to biobank governance have therefore emerged, which vary 
according to the type of biobank concerned (Chapters 1 and 2).  
At the time of UK Biobank’s development, between 1999 and 2004, Estonia and 
Iceland were two suitably comparative examples of models to regulate and govern a 
population biobank. In an attempt to balance these interests, which are not 
necessarily incompatible,1245 both Iceland and Estonia’s biobanks were created by 
the legislature and were made publically accountable via specific biobanking 
legislation that regulated access to, and use of the biobanks. In Iceland, an exclusive 
licence to for-profit company deCODE for access to the database ultimately led to 
the demise of the national health sector database, which was never built. Similarly, in 
Estonia, an exclusive licence also threatened the success of the biobank, before it 
was bought-out by the Estonian State in 2007. Combined, the Estonian and Icelandic 
experiences highlight the difference in priorities between public and private investors 
in genomics research, and between research and development in the drugs industry 
compared with research for the public benefit. Ultimately, the combination of 
regulation and biobank business models did not strike the right balance and this lack 
of equilibrium either threatened or thwarted the successful development of these 
population biobanks. 
In the UK, in the absence of specific biobanking legislation but within a general 
nexus of regulation applicable to human specimen research, the decision was made 
to establish UK Biobank as an independent legal entity in its own right; a charitable 
                                                          
1245 In fact, it has come to be accepted that there are public interests in protecting both the privacy of 
individuals and promoting scientifically sound and ethically robust health research: Another relevant 
case-study for the use of the public interest as a guiding principle to the governance of research is 
within the Scottish Health Informatics Programme’s (SHIP) Good Governance Framework which also 
served as the basis of the Scottish Government’s strategy in its Guiding Principles for Data Linkage: 
Information Governance Working Group, SHIP Guiding Principles and Best Practices (SHIP 2010) 
<www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Guiding_Principles_and_Best_Practices_221010.pdf> accessed 
24 Jan 2014.See also: Laurie G and Sethi N, ‘Towards Principles-Based Approaches to Governance 
of Health-related Research using Personal Data’ (2013) 4 The European Journal of Risk Regulation 
43. 
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company limited by guarantee. According to traditional definitions of private law, 
this is a ‘private’ legal structure.1246 Although the initial proposal was to build the 
biobank on a statutory footing (Chapter 3), the UK government ultimately opted for 
this structure at the behest of funders, notably the WT (Chapters 3 and 4).  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have examined the legal basis of this dual model in private1247 
charity and company law and the theoretical underpinnings of the model to 
understand clearly the legal scope and limits of the discretion vested in the Directors 
and Members of UK Biobank. By virtue of this private legal model, UK Biobank Ltd 
is not directly accountable to the public, which would be the case had UK Biobank 
been created as a public authority (like the HFEA) accountable to Parliament, as 
originally envisaged (Chapter 3). This observation raises the question of the extent to 
which UK Biobank’s charity-corporate model is fit for its public purpose and 
whether the structure adequately protects the private interests of the donors. On the 
basis of UK Biobank’s traditionally ‘private’ structure, but in light of UK Biobank’s 
potentially ‘public’ nature and the public values which it promotes (Introduction), 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 explored the implications for individual redress and lines of 
accountability of UK Biobank Ltd in both private and public law. The conclusions of 
these chapters will now be outlined, highlighting the limitations and scope of each 
remedy in relation to the research questions of this thesis.    
Private Law avenues for holding UK Biobank Ltd to account 
Critical examination of company and charity law and UK Biobank Ltd’s 
constitutional documents has revealed a series of inherent tensions in the charitable 
company legal structure (Chapter 6). These conflicts point to weaknesses in UK 
Biobank because it falls to the management of UK Biobank, i.e. the Board of 
Directors and the Members of the company (WT and MRC) to make decisions1248 
that strike the right balance between the public good mission of UK Biobank and the 
protection of private interests. Contrary to what one might reasonably expect, and 
indeed to what donors and the public might expect, there are no representatives of 
                                                          
1246 Barker K, ‘Private law: Key encounters with public law’ in Barker K and Jensen D, Private Law: 
Key Encounters with Public Law (CUP 2013), 3 
1247 As defined in the Introduction of this thesis. 
1248 Or delegate responsibility to committees to make such decisions, i.e. the Access Sub Committee: 
UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007), 
II.B.2 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016 
‘Decisions on access and use’ 
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the EGC or the donors on the Board. Perhaps even more surprisingly, there appears 
to be no legal requirement for Members to appoint Board Directors in pursuit of UK 
Biobank’s public mission,1249 possibly explaining why the composition of the Board 
does not currently include direct representation of the EGC or the donors.1250 This is 
particularly problematic in the light of the strictly advisory role of the EGC.1251 
Structuring UK Biobank Ltd in this way gives rise to the risk that donors and 
members of the EGC have limited legal means to hold decision makers to UK 
Biobank’s public mission. Instead, by virtue of the dual legal basis of UK Biobank 
Ltd in charity and company law the Board of Directors owe a confusing and 
overlapping web of statutory and fiduciary duties; to both the Company and its 
Members, and the public as beneficiaries of the charity. This complicates the lines of 
accountability within the private corporate legal structure, making it unclear who 
may enforce the duties of the Directors and via what means. Yet, under UK company 
law, UK Biobank Members operate with significant discretion and have the right to 
enforce the duties of Directors and vitiate breaches. There is uncertainty as to what 
extent the Members must exercise these rights in the public interest and there are 
limited legal qualifications on the exercise of Members’ administrative and voting 
rights.  
On the other hand, one of the key consequences of incorporating UK Biobank as a 
charity is that UK Biobank Ltd is legally subject to oversight via the Charity 
                                                          
1249 However, according to UK Biobank Ltd’s most recent ‘Report and consolidated financial 
statements’ the Directors’ Report states:  
‘Under UK Biobank Limited’s Articles, Directors may be appointed either by the Members or by the 
Board. Under the terms of a contract entered into by the Charity the Members are entitled to appoint 
one Director each and they are jointly entitled to appoint additional Directors. The Secretary of State 
for Health, the Scottish Ministers and the University of Manchester are entitled to appoint one 
Director each.’  
UK Biobank Ltd, ‘Report and consolidated financial statements’ (UK Biobank, 30th Sept 2014) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/2014-UK-Biobank-Limited-Signed-2014-
Report-and-Financial-Statements.pdf> accessed 06th Jan 2016.  
It is not certain which contract this Report is referring to, but the exact statement can also be found in 
the 2013 Report. If it is referring to the joint venture agreement that has been signed by the WT/MRC, 
access to this agreement could provide valuable evidence as to the basis of this provision, and 
potentially, the justification for not granting the EGC a similar entitlement. UK Biobank Ltd., ‘Report 
and consolidated financial statements’ (UK Biobank, 30th Sept 2013) <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/2013-UK-Biobank-Limited-Signed-2013-Report-and-Financial-
Statements.pdf> accessed 06th Jan 2016. 
1250 Which one might expect if the Board was elected to be representative of the stakeholders of UK 
Biobank and run in the interests of the public.  
1251 As identified in Chapters 1 and 3,which is contrary to the original suggestions in the DH White 
Paper: Department of Health, Our Inheritance, Our Future: Realising the Potential of Genetics in the 
NHS (White Paper, CM 5791-II, 2003).  
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Commission and potentially via charity proceedings. Duties owed by the Board of 
Directors under charity law, for example the application of resources towards UK 
Biobank’s charitable purpose, may be scrutinised by the Charity Commission. 
Importantly, Chapter 6 has shown that legally standing does not need to be proven to 
report issues to the Charity Commission, which means that the Chair of the EGC, 
members of the public, donors or even an investigative journalist could potentially 
raise a concern. If the Charity Commission were to find that UK Biobank is in 
breach of its charitable mission, this may constitute evidence of misconduct or 
mismanagement for the purpose of charity proceedings involving court action. As a 
prerequisite, the Charity Commission must be satisfied they cannot resolve the 
matter outside such proceedings. Even then, charity proceedings are only open to 
those who can prove legal standing, namely either the Charity Commission, the A-G 
or ‘persons interested.’  
The case law suggests that there is uncertainty as to who would satisfy the 
requirements for legal standing, and ‘persons interested’ are typically private 
individuals. Whether the EGC would qualify as ‘persons interested’ is a moot point.  
Precisely in whose name would the action be filed? Would it be matter for the EGC 
Chair? Would the whole Committee or the majority of the Committee have to agree?  
Could individual members of the EGC file an action? What pressures within UK 
Biobank might be deployed to prevent or dissuade a member of the EGC from this 
course of action? What is the likelihood of such an action? These are difficult legal 
questions that do not readily admit a clear answer and illustrate the legal 
complexities of holding UK Biobank to account in its existing legal form.  
Overall, the charity-corporate legal structure of UK Biobank only opens limited and 
uncertain avenues of accountability for the furtherance of the biobank’s public good 
mission, which do not extend to protecting the private interests of the donors from, 
for example, misuse of their donated biological samples and/or personal injury.  
As a potential means of redressing personal harm, Chapter 7 has explored additional 
avenues of redress in the English common law of negligence using the specific 
example of failure to feedback individual results. The chapter highlights the absence 
of clear precedent and the multiple burdensome hurdles that donors would need to 
overcome to prove that UK Biobank owes a duty of care to them and are in breach of 
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this duty in the adoption of a negative policy on feedback. This would be a novel 
duty scenario; case law suggests that the likely classification of this duty as a failure 
to warn (an omission), coupled with the potentially public nature of UK Biobank as 
the defendant, may mean that the courts could find that it is not ‘fair just and 
reasonable’ to impose such a duty on UK Biobank. Paradoxically, the ‘public good’ 
dimension of UK Biobank’s mission may make it more difficult for individual 
donors to establish a duty of care owed to them in the law of negligence. However, 
the fast evolving environment of genetics research and the increasing availability of 
resources to feedback such results raises questions as to how far UK Biobank’s no 
feedback policy will be sustainable in the future.  
Public Law avenues for holding UK Biobank Ltd to account  
Considering the identification of UK Biobank’s potentially public character in 
Chapter 7, and to explore how legal avenues within public law may be available to 
assert the aforementioned interests and hold UK Biobank to account, Chapter 8 
considered the extent to which UK Biobank discretion is ‘public’ for the purpose of 
judicial review. 
Chapter 8 has shown that there is a strong case to be made that UK Biobank Ltd may 
be deemed to be a public body for the purpose of public law, such that all UK 
Biobank Ltd decisions (i.e. on feedback of individual research results in the future) 
would lie in the public realm. If UK Biobank can be proven to be a public body for 
the purposes of public law, Chapter 8 has highlighted a range of public law duties 
that UK Biobank Ltd potentially owes when exercising their discretion, which 
conceivably includes policies for feedback of individual results. In depth 
jurisprudential analysis concludes that it is at least arguable that UK Biobank Ltd 
indeed functions as a public body for the purpose of judicial review and 
administrative law, and for the purpose of the Human Rights Act. There is 
convincing precedent that could be used as evidence that UK Biobank Ltd is a 
‘hybrid’ public body performing functions of a public nature for the purpose of Part 
54.4 CPR and s.6 HRA 1998.   
Potentially, this layer of accountability goes some way to legitimising UK Biobank’s 
significant discretion and non-statutory legal basis. In the absence of a pre-existing 
private relationship between UK Biobank and its participants (Chapter 7), and 
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governance processes through which participants can have a say in the running of the 
resource (Chapters 4 and 5), judicial review is a potential means by which a private 
individual may seek to challenge exercises of UK Biobank Ltd’s power that may 
have adversely affected them. The limits of this remedy have been noted in this 
thesis; judicial review would only require UK Biobank Ltd to review procedural 
decisions not to provide a remedy or compensation to individuals whose samples 
have been (mis)used.  So far a restrictive approach has been taken to substantive 
review of public acts under the Human Rights Act (against the intention of the Joint 
Human Rights Committee) to provide a remedy.1252 Another limitation of judicial 
review is of course its reactive nature. It remains to be seen whether a case will be 
brought against UK Biobank, and by whom (perhaps a researcher denied access to 
the recourse, or an opaque decision to grant access on the part of UK Biobank 
challenged by a member of the EGC?) Even if judicial review is a powerful remedy, 
it cannot be relied upon unless a case is brought against UK Biobank. That said, in 
the face of future uncertainty and rapid developments in the biobanking arena this is 
an important conclusion, and a significant contribution of this thesis to the scholarly 
literature on UK Biobank. 
Together Chapters 6, 7 and 8 show how UK Biobank’s legal structure straddles the 
public/private divide in law and the multiple layers of law that UK Biobank is 
subject to by virtue of its charity-corporate legal structure. As such, this thesis raises 
novel questions as to the adequacy of the charity-company legal structure for 
biobanking, and the implications of the public/private law divide in this context.  
Before concluding with final remarks and future directions of this research, there are 
a number of observable limitations of this research, which will now be briefly 
discussed.  
Limitations of research 
This thesis has explored some of the avenues of accountability that may arise by 
virtue of UK Biobank Ltd’s legal structure to protect donors’ interests and pursue 
UK Biobank’s public mission, mainly in respect of the biobank’s use of donor 
biological materials and tissue samples. However, space has precluded an exhaustive 
                                                          
1252 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act 
(ninth report) (2006–07, HL 77, HC 410). 
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review of all the legal avenues and a number of additional routes may have been 
analysed. For example, this thesis notes the applicability of data protection law to the 
running of UK Biobank, by virtue of the materials and data contained therein. But 
this thesis has not aimed to critically analyse the ways in which the Data Protection 
Act,1253 overseen by the Information Commission, operates to protect health data and 
the privacy interests of individuals who have taken part in research. This important 
area of research is already being rigorously considered.1254 
It is noted that the new EU Data Protection Regulation includes provisions for 
research access to genetic data, which is now explicitly considered ‘personal 
data’.1255 It is also currently uncertain whether there will be an exception to the ‘right 
to be forgotten’ that is enshrined in the Regulation in the case of scientific research. 
If so, this principle would uphold the privacy interests of UK Biobank donors with 
implications for UK Biobank practices in terms of the destruction of data in the event 
of donor withdrawal. However, it seems that Member States will be able to decide 
whether or not this applies in research1256 and ‘broad consent’ to research purposes 
has survived the Regulation, such that further processing of personal data for 
‘scientific research’ purposes is considered to be a compatible lawful basis for 
sharing.1257  
Furthermore, this thesis has not extensively considered the potential contractual 
obligations of UK Biobank with regard to granting access to researchers, as well as 
the potentially quasi-contractual nature of the relationship with UK Biobank donors 
by virtue of their signing the consent form. For example, it is at least worth 
considering whether UK Biobank is acting within its statutory obligations in 
excluding liability for feedback individual research results? Is it arguable that the no-
feedback policy could be an unfair contract term?1258 On the other hand, construing 
                                                          
1253 Which implements EU data protection law in the UK 
1254 Taylor MJ, ‘Legal bases for disclosing confidential patient information for public health: 
Distinguishing between health protection and health improvement’ (2015) 23 Med Law Rev 348; 
Taylor MJ, ‘Health Research, Data Protection and the Public Interest in Notification’ (2011) 19 Med 
Law Rev 267; Taylor MJ and Grace J, ‘Disclosure of Confidential Patient Information and the Duty 
to Consult: The Role of the Health and Social Care Information Centre’ (2013) 21 Med Law Rev 415. 
1255 Art 4(10) final (unofficial) draft of General Data Protection Regulation: draft available: 
<http://www.haerting.de/sites/default/files/pdfs/proposal-eudatap-regulation-final-compromise-
151216.pdf> accessed 20 January 2016 
1256 Ibid. Art 83(2)  
1257 Ibid.  Art 5(1)(b) 
1258 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
were recently consolidated within the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
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the relationship between donors, researchers and biobanks in contract carries 
negative implications for the ‘trust’ model that is often presented as ideal in the 
literature on biobanking.1259 This might be an important area of further research in 
the context of UK Biobank in the future.  
Finally, as a general observation, the difficulties expressed by Langan in obtaining 
archival evidence from the WT that may have enabled a more detailed and balanced 
understanding of the origins of UK Biobank, also points to the limitations in the 
levels of public scrutiny relating to a private company by contrast to a public body. 
Were the WT (or UK Biobank) listed in Schedule 1 of the FOI Act1260 this would 
enable any member of the public to obtain information as to the operation of the 
organisation. This avenue is particularly desirable when bearing in mind the recent 
changes to the remit of the EGC in reviewing applications for access, as if UK 
Biobank were listed as a Scheduled public body this might enable access to 
information in the extreme circumstance that UK Biobank refuse to provide evidence 
of the reasons behind their decision. 
Concluding remarks and future directions 
Throughout this thesis there have been a series of overlapping themes that have been 
returned to regularly. One such issue is the ongoing debate as to the adequacy of UK 
Biobank’s legal structure and the theoretical model that should ideally underpin it. 
Regarding the theoretical conceptualisation of UK Biobank as a shareholder or 
stakeholder model of governance, in depth analysis of the legal framework and the 
composition of UK Biobank Ltd in this thesis suggest that UK Biobank Ltd is not so 
obviously conformant to either the stakeholder or shareholder models, for a number 
of reasons. First, part of the Board’s functional responsibility is to negotiate access to 
the resource to maximise use of the resource and optimum public benefit outputs. In 
pursuit of this objective it is arguable that expertise, rather than democratic 
representation, fuelled the election of the UK Biobank Board of Directors, 
corresponding with a traditional shareholder approach to corporate governance. 
However, because of the lack of share capital and the membership structure of UK 
                                                          
1259 Winickoff DE and Winickoff RN, ‘The Charitable Trust as a Model for Genomic Biobanks’ 
(2003) 349 N Engl J Med 1180; Winickoff DE and Neumann L, ‘Towards a Social Contract for 
Genomics: Property and the Public in the ‘Biotrust’ Model’ (2005) 1 Genomics Society and Policy 8.  
1260 Sch. 1 Freedom of Information Act 2000: ‘Public Authorities’ 
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Biobank, and the wider–reaching range of interests that are affected by UK 
Biobank’s objectives beyond the charities ‘shareholders’, it is arguable that 
Winickoff’s shareholder model is not appropriate for UK Biobank Ltd’s charity 
mission either. In fact, the Board of Directors is under a statutory duty to consider 
wider stakeholders by virtue of the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ provision of the 
Companies Act 2006, and in this regard it may be more fitting to view UK Biobank 
governance as being underpinned by a stakeholder perspective of governance. 
However, this is not necessarily fully realised because the Board of Directors are not 
democratically elected to represent this full range of stakeholders. Donors and 
members of the public are absent from the governance model; as are members of the 
EGC who are supposedly responsible for safeguarding the interests of the public in 
the running of UK Biobank.1261  
Indeed, based on conclusions in this thesis, it may be more accurate to conceptualise 
UK Biobank as a social institution because of UK Biobank Ltd’s charitable 
incorporation, potentially public character and mission to benefit the health of future 
generations on the one hand, and the self-professed role of the Board of Directors as 
‘stewards’ of the UK Biobank resource on the other.1262 Further research into the 
public and private law implications of social institutions generally, and in relation to 
UK Biobank in particular, is an opportunity for novel contribution to an emerging 
debate regarding the role of social institutions in society.1263 
Looking ahead, proposals have been made in the socio-legal literature for 
governance solutions that would go some way to giving a voice to underrepresented 
interests in biobanking. However, these proposals arguably do not go far enough in 
terms of accountability to the public mission of endeavours such as UK Biobank Ltd, 
and are based on a limited understanding of the existing legal structure. Within the 
existing legal structure, while representation or involvement of members of the 
donor, public and EGC might enable these constituencies to have a voice in the 
                                                          
1261 UK Biobank, ‘UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework’ (Version 3.0, UK Biobank 2007) 
<www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/EGF20082.pdf> accessed 24 Jan 2016. 
1262 Mason C, Kirkbride J and Bryde DJ, ‘From stakeholders to institutions: the changing face of 
social enterprise governance theory’ (2007) 45 Management Decision 284, 290: there must be a 
‘culture of trust between the principal (or primary stakeholder) and managers to support this 
approach. To achieve this, it is typical for managers to be members of the defined community that the 
enterprise serves to ensure that managerial decision making closely aligns with the required needs of 
that community. In so doing, the organisation ‘aligns with the ethos of the social enterprise’.  
1263 Low C, ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise’ (2006) 33 International Journal of 
Social Economics 376. 
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governance of UK Biobank, this does not ensure that all the legitimate voices are 
heard and accounted for. Based on the doctrinal, socio-legal and comparative legal 
analysis in this thesis, it is debatable how far the private and the public interest are 
served by the legal structure of UK Biobank Ltd, which may not have been the case 
if UK Biobank had been established on a statutory basis as a public body 
accountable to Parliament. Public law accountability has been reduced following 
corporatisation. Thus, there is prima facie a case for redressing this loss, whether by 
administrative law or other means.1264  
A key finding of this thesis is that one avenue for reform of the UK Biobank legal 
structure that deserves further consideration following the Charities Act 2011 is to 
convert UK Biobank Ltd from a charity company into a Charitable Incorporated 
Organisation (CIO). Potentially, the benefits of such reform would be to empower a 
wider UK Biobank constituency to have a say in organisational decision making and 
the running of the resource (Chapter 6). Conversion could facilitate involvement of 
members of the EGC, as well as donors and participants, by virtue of the wider 
membership and voting rights, which are facilitated by both the ‘foundation’ and the 
‘association’ model made available by the Charity Commission so far.1265 This new 
legal structure would also make UK Biobank Ltd wholly accountable to the Charity 
Commission and by extension, increase public oversight. However, further research 
is needed to understand the practical implications of such conversion and how 
feasible this is as a short or long-term solution for UK Biobank. Moreover, even if 
UK Biobank was converted to this new legal form, it is observable that this structure 
would arguably do little more than the charity corporation structure to protect donors 
                                                          
1264 Vincent-Jones P, ‘Citizen Redress in Public Contracting for Human Services’ (2005) 68 Modern 
Law Review 887, 901.  
1265 Charity Commission, ‘How to write your charity's governing document’ (CC22b, Charity 
Commission, 2nd June 2014) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-to-write-your-charitys-governing-
document> accessed 07th Feb 2016: 
‘We have produced two model constitutions for CIOs:  
• The ‘foundation’ model is for charities whose only voting Members will be the charity trustees 
• The ‘association’ model (this model) is for charities that will have a wider membership, including 
voting Members other than the charity trustees.  
In practice a CIO using the ‘foundation’ model will be like an incorporated charitable trust, run by a 
small group of people (the charity trustees) who make all key decisions. Charity trustees may be 
appointed for an unlimited time and they will probably appoint new charity trustees. A CIO using the 
‘association’ model will have a wider voting membership who must make certain decisions (such as 
amending the constitution), will usually appoint some or all of the charity trustees (who will serve for 
fixed terms), and may be involved in the work of the CIO. There are not two different forms of CIO. 
A CIO with the ‘foundation’ model could change to the ‘association’ model if it wanted a wider 
voting membership. (This could also happen the other way around, but Members who were not 
trustees would be giving up their membership.) Some of the changes would need our approval.’  
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from personal harm. Therefore, wider common law avenues of redress or legislative 
solutions would still be required to ensure that appropriate redress is available to 
individual donors for misuse of their biological samples (or data).   
Moving forward, analysis of the multi-dimensional structure of UK Biobank Ltd to 
run UK Biobank has raised a number of questions for future research. Theoretical 
questions have arisen regarding the legal underpinnings and level of scrutiny of 
public and private discretion in large-scale organisations that are created (partly) 
with public funds and established for the public good, but are privately structured by 
virtue of operating as a body corporate. This thesis suggests that there is scope to 
review the legal structure of biobanks in the context of population health services 
and research, such that organisations responsible for delivering a public good, using 
public funds, are subject to appropriate levels of public scrutiny and administrative 
responsibility as well as clear obligations in private law to provide compensation and 
redress to donors. In light of an apparently continuing trend for public health 
endeavours to be organised outside the traditional public law confines,1266 and in 
view of the private interests at stake and the public interest in accountability and 
transparency of ethically sensitive activities, the legal implications for donors and the 
public of the shift to private corporate models of governance requires further 
research. 
Overall, there is significant scope for novel research into how best to link 
corporations, including biobanks like UK Biobank Ltd, with the general public and 
society. There is a risk that the increasing privatisation of public mission 
organisations and the resultant reduction in public law accountability will not protect 
the full range of interests that are concerned and instead will grant management 
significant, and in some instances unlimited, discretion with no adequate public 
oversight. Such research would add to emerging debates as to the evolving role of 
the corporation in the 21st Century and the potentially ‘public’ aspects of ‘private’ 
corporations, which may invite application of stricter public standards in the future. 
This research would have important implications not only for future public health 
initiatives established at arms-length from the government, but also public 
                                                          
1266 For example, Genomics England, which is a wholly owned Department of Health Company: 
Genomics England ‘About Genomics England’ (Genomics England) 
<http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/about-genomics-england/> accessed 5 February 2016 
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mission/private structured organisations in wider contexts, and would contribute to a 
long held debate as to the role and division of public and private law in society.  
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